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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the days before Christmas, as I hurry through the shopping mall area that 
connects the train station to the center of the city of Utrecht, I sometimes catch a 
glimpse of a man dressed in an impeccable uniform, standing beside a crimson 
kettle that hangs from a tripod, and singing Christmas carols while holding a 
bundle of brochures. The first image that this man invokes is rather common, for 
who does not recognize this man as a member of the Salvation Army? Almost 
simultaneously however, a myriad of other associations come to mind, for the 
Salvationist also calls forth images of military readiness and religious zeal to-
gether with the picture of a friendly face and a helping hand. This last associa-
tion in particular, emphasizes the contrast that this Salvationist forms with the 
contemporary urban context of a crowded Utrecht shopping mall with individu-
als like myself heedlessly rushing by.  
The military connotations that this Salvationist arouses with his uniform, also 
invokes feelings of discord with the Utrecht urban scene, for it heralds memories 
of bygone days when a uniform commanded admiration and awe, and even con-
demnation when combined with World War II or the anti-authoritarian 1960s. 
However, soon after all the associative dots are connected, there is one overall 
dominating feeling that floats up to the surface of this stream of consciousness: 
the Salvation Army as an important religious charity. For does the Salvation 
Army not hand out blankets and hot chocolate to those that try to live through 
another freezing city night? And does the Army not provide for Christmas ban-
quets for the hungry and deprived? In that light, this Salvationist in the shopping 
mall seems to call our attention not only to his somewhat archaic appearance, 
but also to the reason for which he is prepared to spend his hours alongside the 
Christmas kettle: the social misery that is also very much an urban (and non-
urban, for that matter) reality.  
At the same time however, and especially during Christmas, his presence 
provides for us a way to be relieved from the feeling of guilt that may very well 
follow on laying eyes on him. Relief from a guilty conscience by putting some 
stray change into the red kettle. And thus, we yield to the combination of the 
urging confrontation with social misery that is strengthened by the Christmas 
spirit of ‘doing a good deed’, and the possibility of immediate relief from this 
moral claim as offered by the Salvationist. This combination urges us to gladly 
support the noble cause of this charitable organization that has a structural focus 
on helping society’s poor and weak – maybe much in contrast with the occa-
sional character of our own actions at the moment. 
The fairly inadequate psychological interpretation of this ‘Dickensian’ image 
of the Salvationist is not meant to be of any professional quality, nor to be com-
plete, but it aims to stress the fact that most people that pass this uniformed indi-
vidual, recognize to a certain extent what he stands for and why. A premise that 
 
 
14 
 
needs some historical reading because the Salvation Army has been proactively 
present in the Dutch society for 125 years now. In 2012, the Dutch Salvation 
Army has been widely celebrating this honorable event.1 In 1887, the Salvation 
Army opened its doors to the Dutch society, locating itself in the capital Am-
sterdam as a satellite of the London-based organization. After having overcome 
the initial mistrust of the Dutch people with regard to the Army, it grew to be 
one of the most widely acknowledged religious social charity organizations with 
an enduring positive image.2 So, without much dispute, it can be stated that the 
Salvation Army has become a sympathetic icon of the Dutch urban scene.3 
There is however much more to the Salvation Army than is reflected by the 
dedicated Salvationist with his Christmas kettle. To begin with, behind this uni-
formed individual we find a sizable international organization that is active in 
121 countries, and offers services like residential programs for the elderly, chil-
dren, women, the homeless and young mothers; day care programs, addiction 
programs, services to armed forces, emergency disaster response, community 
services to missing persons, prisoners, youngsters, the unemployed, indebted, 
hungry and even to students. Additionally, the Salvation Army provides for 
many medical and health services and educational programs around the world. 
In order to do this work, the organization relies on almost 30,000 officers and 
other staff worldwide, next to more than 1.1 million dedicated members, called 
soldiers. These are complemented by around 104,000 professional employees 
who are non-members.4 Within the Dutch ‘Territory’, as a national branch of the 
Salvation Army is called, this ratio between the Salvation Army’s own people 
(soldiers, officers) and ‘outside’ professional employees is rather different. Cur-
rently, the 59 Dutch corps (as the religious communities of the Salvation Army 
are called) are manned by 5800 soldiers and adherent-members, and are man-
aged by about 140 officers. The Welfare and Health Care Department however, 
employs more than 5300 professionals that are aided by about 900 volunteers.5 
In 2010 it offered services to about 51,000 people and in a variety of activities 
                                                        
 
1The official name of the Dutch Salvation Army is Het Leger des Heils in Nederland (The Salvation 
Army in the Netherlands. See: http://www.legerdesheils.nl/). On September 1, 1921, a small group of 
Salvationists seceded from the Salvation Army and established the Nederlands Leger des Heils (Dutch 
Salvation Army) See for further details Chapter 5, Paragraph 7. In 2003 the Nederlands Leger des Heils 
stopped its religious activities while some of its members continued to gather under the newly established 
Noordelijk Heilsleger (Northern Salvation Army. See: http://www.noordelijkheilsleger.nl/). The social 
activities of the Dutch Salvation Army were accommodated in a separate foundation called: Landelijke 
Instelling voor Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning en Rehabilitatie (National Institute for Social Support 
and Rehabilitation. See: http://www.limor.nl/). For the sake of convenience and readability, I take the 
liberty to refer to the Leger des Heils in Nederland with different terms, like the Salvation Army, the 
Army, the Dutch Army and the Army in the Netherlands. 
2 According to the annual survey ‘Chari-barometer’ on public familiarity with charitable organizations, 
provided for by the Dutch research organization Mediad, in 2009 the Salvation Army ranked 10 on the 
list of about 30 organizations and in 2011 ‘between 10 and 12’. 
3 This image is borrowed from Diane Winston who described the Salvation Army in the USA as an icon 
of urban religion (Winston 1999). 
4 The Salvation Army Year Book 2011:29-30 
5 Jaarverslag Leger Des Heils 2010:65 
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that covered a range of areas of the social work field like homelessness, elderly 
care, mental and physical care, youth care, substance abuse, probation services 
and prevention. Nevertheless, to any person that does not call upon the Army for 
help in any form, this array of professional social services might well remain 
unknown, making the association to charity a central feature of the Army’s iden-
tity. 
This feature is however, quite at odds with another characteristic element that 
defines the Salvation Army in the Netherlands, for it is not just our individual 
charitable contributions that provide for the necessary financial means for the 
Army to do its work. The annual amount that the Army needed in 2010 accumu-
lated to a mere €290 million, and only a relatively small part of this amount was 
raised by Salvationists that were standing by their Christmas kettles. Even 
though all fundraising efforts of the Salvation Army in the Netherlands mounted 
up to a handsome €22,000,000, this only made up for about 8% of the total 
costs. Most of the other costs (90%) were paid for with public money in the 
form of subsidies, grants, government contracts, contributions from collective 
health insurances and Social Support Act stipends.6 This is quite a remarkable 
characteristic, especially when compared to the Army in other territories. In 
Germany for example, private donations to the Heilsarmee amounted to 18% of 
the annual total in 2009 and the government contracts on social work only gen-
erated 40% of the total annual income.7 In the United Kingdom, government 
support made up only about 17% of the budget in 2009, and in the United States 
of America it did not even exceed 10% in 2008.8 It is thus an interesting obser-
vation that even though the Salvation Army is equally recognized as a charitable 
social service organization in many countries, only the Dutch Salvation Army 
seems to be so largely dependent on government support. 
The third important element of the Dutch Salvation Army is the fact that it 
consists of five legally separated organizational entities: four foundations and a 
church. At odds with many other territories in which it operates, the Salvation 
Army in the Netherlands has legally and organizationally separated its ecclesias-
tical and its professional social activities. This partition within the Salvation 
Army is of a relatively recent nature, as it was introduced in 1990 as the result of 
a fundamental reorganization. With this reorganization the Salvation tried to 
modernize the organization according to the current standards, but it also tried to 
settle a long-standing debate that revolved around the fundamental matter of 
identity: How was the Army to balance the two basic foundations of its mission: 
social aid and spiritual conversion? 
With this quick glance behind the scenes of the Salvation Army in the Neth-
erlands, it becomes clear that the Salvationist in the Utrecht shopping mall rep-
                                                        
 
6 Idem:135 
7 Die Heilsarmee in Deutschland, Litauen und Polen Jahresbericht 2009:25  
8 The Salvation Army's Annual Review 2009. UK Territory with the Republic of Ireland, 2009:18-19; The 
Salvation Army of The United States of America National Annual Report 2008:14-15 
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resents much more than just a benevolent group of Christians trying to do good 
deeds. These short descriptions also imply that the Salvation Army does not 
operate in a social or political void. An observation that brings us to the main 
underlying presupposition of this study: as a faith-based social service provider, 
the Salvation Army is inherently related to other actors like the state and civil 
society. On the one hand, this relation can be characterized as dynamical be-
cause it has developed throughout the course of history, but on the other hand, it 
reveals a measure of continuity. By studying these characteristics I hope to offer 
valuable insights into the manner in which the Dutch Salvation Army shaped its 
identity in relation to its context. In order to explore these characteristics of the 
liaison between the Salvation Army and the Dutch state, the central focus in this 
study will be on the common theme that bound these actors together: social 
welfare. 
The welfare state in the Netherlands 
When we put the struggle between the state and civil society for primacy of 
social policy issues central to our view on the development course of the Dutch 
welfare state, roughly three phases can be discerned. These distinct phases are: 
1) National government aloof, and a strong civil society until World War II; 2) a 
dominant (welfare) state between 1950 and 1980, increasingly interconnected 
with civil society; and 3) the ongoing struggle to transform the welfare state to a 
more activating form, the so-called participation state, with an altering role of 
civil society. Even though both the civil society and the state are prevalent in all 
three phases, it can be argued that their levels of dominance and influence dif-
fered throughout the twentieth century. 
The emergence of the Dutch welfare state is closely connected to interna-
tional developments. Germany, and to a lesser degree also the United Kingdom, 
had already during the nineteenth century been working on elements of what 
would later become the welfare state. An increasing interest of the state in mat-
ters that traditionally concerned charitable social relief organizations resulted in 
rudimentary financial arrangements that benefitted certain groups in society. For 
a large part this growing state interest can be interpreted as a reaction to the 
growing proverty problem as well as the lack of education.9 
A strong civil society 
In the Netherlands however, the industrialization process gained momentum 
relatively late compared to these countries. Just as in Germany and the United 
Kingdom, in the Netherlands too social work was provided for by numerous 
                                                        
 
9 Anderson 1972:181; Joll 1973; Peper 1978; Van Doorn en Schuyt 1978; Daalen 1999; Wilterdink en 
Van Heerikhuizen 1999; De Swaan 1996:194-204; Heerma van Voss 2000:388; Arts 2004; WRR 
2006:46. 
 
 
17 
 
individuals, churches and charity organizations in the nineteenth century.10 Until 
the 1870s this ‘private initiative’ or civil society, had all the freedom it needed 
in order to bring relief to the people who were in need, and the government re-
mained aloof with regard to social issues unless these civil society organizations 
were not able to cope with them.11 Nevertheless, during the second half of the 
nineteenth century, the Dutch government also started to show a sense of re-
sponsibility towards social issues like poverty, and in terms of legislation this 
interest was codified into the Constitution of 1848 (Art. 195) and the Armenwet 
(1854, Poor Act). However the responsibility of poor relief still vastly belonged 
to civil society.12 
The effects of industrial and economic development during the second half 
of the nineteenth century showed that this position of civil society was rather 
delicate. Urbanization and early industrialization called for increasing state in-
tervention on infrastructure and economics, and even though the primary re-
sponsibility for poor relief remained with civil society, around the year 1900 this 
came under pressure. Instigated by a more Christian-liberal point of view, the 
Dutch government began to show an increasing commitment to social issues.13 
New legislation was created, that partly was based on the social-democrat and 
Christian ideas that the state had to support and protect the most vulnerable in 
society. This new legislative activity however, threatened to tip the balance in 
favor of the state assuming more responsibility for social issues, but at the same 
time, civil society organizations had begun to unite themselves within the con-
tours of rising ideological social pillars. The vigor that accompanied this process 
of ‘pillarization’ consisted of a uniting force that not only brought together al-
ready existing groups and organizations in a sphere of kindred spirits, but the 
process of pillarization also contained an emancipatory drive that mutually de-
fined the ideological groups. One of the consequences of the pillarization pro-
cess was that it started to change the attitude of civil society towards the state 
from rather cooperative into an attitude of opposition.14 With this new attitude, 
the former implicit understanding of non-interference between both actors start-
ed to changed course. 
In the wake of World War I (1914-1918) most European countries had intro-
duced social legislation that covered areas like poverty, health, old age and un-
employment. Even though the rapid expansion of state initiative that accompa-
nied this change might imply otherwise, in order to be successful at combating 
these social problems, national governments still needed the civil society organ-
izations to do the actual work.15 In the case of the Netherlands, the fact that the 
state remained auxiliary to the primary responsibility of private organizations 
                                                        
 
10 Van der Linde 2007; Van Doorn en Schuyt 1978:22 
11 Van der Linde 2007:149-150 
12 Van der Valk 1986:9 
13 Van der Linde 2007:162-163 
14 Blom en Talsma 2000; Van der Woude 2009 
15 Anderson 1972:181 
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like churches, was in 1912 confirmed by a new Armenwet (Poor Act). This Act 
emphasized that the balance between the two actors remained unaltered, and it 
also meant that in disregard of the growing governmental activities, the actual 
responsibility of the care for the poor remained primarily in the hands of civil 
society.16 The tendency of increasing government intervention on social issues 
would however continue, alongside the persistence of civil society to combine 
forces by the creation of intermediate umbrella organizations in order to 
strengthen themselves against this influence.  
State dominance on welfare 
After World War II (1939-1945), the Dutch welfare state came to blossom. 
Based on new political vigor and inspiration from the developments in the UK 
on social policy, the Dutch state aimed to improve the care provision for its 
citizens. A postwar political consensus and a growing economy provided a 
breeding ground for new social legislation between 1948 and 1963. This crea-
tion of social welfare legislation indicated that the state interest in social issues 
had now taken a structural character. This was embodied in the existence of a 
Ministerie voor Maatschappelijk Werk (MaWe, Ministry of Social Work) which 
would prove to be a generator of much social policy to follow and also provided 
for accompanying funds.17  
The introduction of the Algemene Bijstandswet (ABW, Social Assistance 
Act) in 1963 was seen as the primary tailpiece in the completion of Dutch social 
security because by then all citizens were guaranteed a minimum income, apart 
from being employed or not.18 For the first time in Dutch history every individ-
ual was guaranteed a basic level of social security, and poor relief was no longer 
an individual favor that was granted through charity or philanthropy, but had 
structurally changed into a fundamental right. 
The introduction of the ABW also emphasized that the function of the Dutch 
civil society altered. Until then it was the private initiative that had provided for 
much of this material and non-material poor relief together with local govern-
ment and local ‘poor councils’. And now that the ABW officially replaced the 
Poor Acts of 1854 and 1912, it no longer acknowledged this vital position of 
civil society in the domain of poor relief. In fact, it put the primary responsibility 
for the material provision of poor relief in the hands of the Dutch national gov-
ernment, leaving only the non-material care to civil society.19 Viewed from this 
perspective the ABW can be appreciated as the symbol of a major shift in the 
position of civil society with regard to the state. But still, civil society would not 
and could not be sidetracked. These organizations were still regarded by the 
Dutch government as being responsible for the implementation of social policy, 
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and therefore civil society was broadly subsidized. Moreover, by 1970 welfare 
had gradually become synonymous with ‘well-being’, a development that sug-
gested a state-issued guarantee for everyone to enjoy life to the fullest through 
individual development, prosperity and good health. This ambition labeled the 
Dutch welfare state as a ‘caring state’. An expression that implicitly heralded the 
continuing and definitive dominance of the state over civil society. 
Towards a participation state 
During the 1960s and 1970s, the joint approach of social issues by the state and 
civil society was accompanied by a renewed emphasis on professionalization. 
New academic insights, new working methods and also a new era of self-
realization, democratization and political awakening had taken professionaliza-
tion to a new level. Accompanied by a decreasing religiosity within the Dutch 
society, a process of ideological erosion set in. Civil society organizations expe-
rienced an influx of new personnel with a professional outlook towards their 
work and gradually the traditional grassroots workforce was outnumbered; a 
workforce that often was ideologically motivated. This process is generally re-
garded to have induced a slow but sure drainage of the ideological foundations 
of many civil society organizations.20  
The two subsequent international oil crises of the 1970s slowed down the 
economic motor driving the Dutch welfare state. Because of elevated unem-
ployment rates and a growing lack of finances to accommodate this problem, 
certain ‘cracks’ in the welfare state were revealed, unleashing a fundamental 
political and academic debate. Main themes in this debate were the welfare 
state’s financial and moral tenability, the definition of the welfare state and thus 
its origins, its expansion, purpose and function; its alleged ideological founda-
tions; its would-be internal logic and of course its social effects.  
With regard to civil society, it was argued that the larger and all-
encompassing the welfare state had become, the more were its destructive ef-
fects on the Dutch civil society. Now that the ideologically weakened civil soci-
ety had increasingly become a part of the Dutch administrative structure by 
placing itself in the service of the welfare system, many of these organizations 
ended up being reduced to mere administrative organs of the Dutch government 
- a process that has been called verstatelijking.21 This position of increasing 
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dependency of civil society in relation to the state confronted it with three op-
tions: 1) to stop, 2) to modernize into transparent and democratic professional 
organizations, or 3) to merge into larger ideologically neutral (also called ‘gen-
eral’) cooperative bodies and de facto lose its individual ideological and organi-
zational identity.22 A trilemma that now painfully confirmed the state’s domi-
nance over civil society in welfare matters.23 
As a result civil society seemed to have lost much of its political legitimiza-
tion. The government itself, however, did not have any means to implement 
social policy, and with the increasing lack of funds and ideological legitimiza-
tion for social policy, the door was set ajar to the market. Economic liberalism 
and a retrenching state would have to incite citizens to take responsibility for 
their own well-being and that of their fellow citizens. The direction was clear: 
the Dutch people had to be motivated to come into action and in policy terms the 
word ‘participation’ was complemented with ‘responsibility’. In order to make 
this new idea effective in practice, the government had to retrench from public 
policy in accordance with the idea: more market, less government. This ap-
proach would continue until current times. Since the 1980s the Dutch welfare 
state has been ‘under construction’ and, in many different ways, efforts were 
made to combine less expenditure together with activating the Dutch citizens. 
However, it was still the government that retained primacy on welfare issues. 
A courtship between the Dutch state and the Salvation Army 
This description of the struggle between the government and civil society for 
primacy in the field of social welfare shows that the Dutch state and civil society 
have been attracted towards each other for a long time. The government lacked 
the actual striking power to reach its social policy goals and thus battle social 
wrongs, and civil society made abundant use of governmental support in its 
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effort to do exactly that, be it from its own perspective, and often supplemented 
with its own good deeds. On the other hand, as this study will show, both actors 
also demonstrated reluctance with regard to this cooperation. Even though they 
were bound together by mutual dependency, this relation seems to have been 
interspersed with an alternating pattern of attraction and rejection in which both 
actors presumably have their own, also changeable, preconditions. A pattern that 
resembles a courtship. This study aims to shed light on the dynamics that are 
perceptible in this relationship and therefor we will put our focus on an organi-
zation that has had such an relationship with the Dutch government for a long 
time: the Salvation Army. 
Within a time span of a mere 120 years the public approach towards poor re-
lief changed from a voluntary manifestation of care, often based on charity, into 
a structural public service, mainly organized and subsidized by the government. 
During this entire period, the Salvation Army has not only been a witness to this 
development, but it has also actively taken part in the process as an actor. This 
means that studying the development of the Salvation Army can shed new light 
on how the above described changing welfare system impacted the religiously 
motivated civil society in the Netherlands, for whereas many of these organiza-
tions lost their identity during the 1970s and 1980s, the Salvation Army has been 
able to avoid this fate as it is still a major player in the field of social work, and 
with an explicit religious identity. This implies that next to the dynamics be-
tween the two actors, we can also speak of internal dynamics within the actors, 
for next to a mutual attraction, both parties also showed a certain amount of 
hesitation towards each other. Therefor it is important to recover to what extent 
these external dynamics interrelated with the Army’s internal process of identi-
ty. A process that proved to have a dynamic of its own. The fact that the Army 
has been able to maintain its faith-based character while being a publically fund-
ed social service provider, hopefully sheds a new light on the process of ver-
statelijking. 
The central research question of this study is therefore: What are the percep-
tible dynamics in the relation between the state and the Salvation Army in the 
Netherlands with regard to social policy between 1890 and 1990 and what do 
these dynamics reveal about the changing Dutch welfare state, the faith-based 
civil society in the Netherlands, and how they affected the identity of the Salva-
tion Army itself? This complex question can be unraveled into more concrete 
derivative questions like: What were the social policy goals and their underlying 
principles from the perspective of the government? How did these goals func-
tion in the cooperation with regard to the balance of power and the measure of 
dependency between both actors? What were the main issues in the relation with 
the government that pressured the Salvation Army and what mechanisms sprung 
into action within the Salvation Army in order to control these external influ-
ences and to maintain its autonomy and identity? In order to be able to answer 
these questions, I will first have to be more specific about how I approach the 
concepts that are referred to in this study. Subsequently, I will elaborate on the 
methodological approach of these questions. 
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Conceptual approach 
The welfare state as a historical process 
The above used term ‘welfare state’ has to be regarded as a hybrid concept with 
dissimilar images that are all connected with local and thus specific historical 
developments. However there are also manifest international parallels such as 
the shared idea of the state acting as a re-distributor of resources in order to aid 
the most vulnerable within society. Within this image, the most important varia-
bles that mark the difference between the types of welfare states can be pin-
pointed as the role that the different actors play within the policy force field that 
the welfare state incites, for who redistributes what? Is it a nation’s central gov-
ernment that reallocates levied taxes to those groups it regards as the most eligi-
ble? Or are the civil society organizations the redistributors that use offered 
(volunteered) time and finances to provide for (non-)material aid-programs to 
the helpless? And what is the role of the individuals themselves, whether or not 
organized in larger groups; to what extent is an able-bodied person expected to 
contribute to the well-being of others by offering a part of his income based 
upon solidarity? These and more variables have made the definition of the wel-
fare state concept a subject of ongoing debate. A debate that especially fanned 
up during those times when the welfare state came under pressure because of 
economic decline or a lack of public support, as was the case during the 1970s 
and 1980s. 
Viewed from the matter of how the welfare state was to function, social sci-
entists debated the differences and similarities between different types of wel-
fare states from World War II on. Already during these early years of the wel-
fare state, the British sociologist Thomas H. Marshall considered the ascendency 
of the welfare state against the background of the development of citizenship. 
After the subsequent obtainment of civil rights during the 18th century and polit-
ical rights in the nineteenth century, the twentieth century witnessed the ac-
quirement of social rights in the emergence of the welfare state.24 Richard Tit-
muss, also a British sociologist, viewed the welfare state not so much from the 
standpoint of non-material political emancipation however, but considered the 
function of providing for basic material needs central. By doing so, he was able 
to discern two types of welfare states. The ‘residual’ type provided for minimal 
welfare arrangements and served as a safety net for those who were not able to 
provide for themselves. The contrasting type according to Titmuss, was the in-
stitutional type that guaranteed a basic level of welfare to every member of soci-
ety and not to just a small group of the most vulnerable.25 Decades later, the 
Danish sociologist Gøsta Esping-Andersen placed the welfare state concept in 
the context of capitalism by focusing on decommodification, or the measure in 
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which individuals could withdraw from employment. He concluded that the 
Bismarckian class-based welfare state model showed a great amount of corpo-
ratism, but had at the same time only an average effect on work participation. 
According to Esping-Andersen, the ‘Beveridge type’ of welfare was the most 
decommodifying type, for it offered equal state support for all. The least de-
commodifying welfare state model according to Esping-Andersen, was the An-
glo-Saxon model because, especially in the United States, the government pro-
vided for universal support only in a very modest way and instead allowed the 
market to react to the demand for social welfare.26 These different examples of 
how to assess the welfare state shows that the phenomenon is not quite as univo-
cal as the term implies, an observation that will be substantiated when we turn 
our attention to the Netherlands. 
Related to the perspective of Titmuss, the development of the Dutch welfare 
state can be divided into three phases, for it has changed from being residual 
before World War II into rather institutional especially in the 1970s, and then 
again returned to a more residual functioning safety-net system from the 1980s 
onwards. When compared to the model of Esping-Andersen, two phases become 
visible, for the Dutch welfare state seems to have evolved from a classic corpo-
ratist model in which a religious worldview and the central role of the nuclear 
family slowly gave way to a more liberal form in which a free-market logic was 
to fill the gap that was left open by a government presumed to be retrenching.27 
Yet another view on the Dutch welfare state has come from the classification 
proposed by the French economist Michel Albert. In his theory, the Dutch wel-
fare state can be classified as an example of the Rhineland model of capitalism, 
placing the Netherlands in the same category as Germany, Switzerland, Den-
mark and Sweden.28 In contrast with capitalist market economies as Reagan and 
Thatcher promoted during the 1980s, the Rhineland model was based on market 
regulation and a relatively high degree of social partnership between employers, 
employees (labor unions) and the state. This collective bargaining and consensus 
policy would become one of the distinctive features of the Dutch welfare sys-
tem, internationally acclaimed as the polder model.29  
Next to being aware of the fact that the notion of welfare state has different 
classifications, it is also relevant to reflect on the way in which it is thought to 
have originated and developed. Many different scenarios are conceivable, for 
though the beginning of the Dutch welfare state can be retraced to the approval 
of the first social law in 1901 with the Industrial Injuries Act, Dutch liberal poli-
ticians will probably argue that the Kinderwet (Children’s Act) of 1874 formed 
the starting point.30 Others however, will remark that the modern Dutch welfare 
state was formed after 1945 as a result of the growing government influence on 
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the redistribution of labor, income and well-being that was facilitated by the 
crisis of the 1930s and subsequent war.31 So, instead of focusing on the exact 
origins of the welfare state, the question of its development might prove more 
constructive, especially in light of the matter of identity that is central to this 
study. For then other questions arise: Is the welfare state the product of a pre-
conceived idea, a grand scheme that formed the blueprint for its emergence and 
development? Or is it rather the result of a coincidental order of discursive man-
ifestations and their actions by actors that coagulated successively into a coher-
ent pattern?  
In order to arrive at possible answers, drawing a parallel with organizational 
theory can help. In his work on strategy change within an organization, Henry 
Mintzberg, expert in (public) management studies, specified in 1996 how deli-
cate the process of fundamental strategy alteration can be, because of the inter-
connectedness with other organizational elements like structure, people and 
processes. Therefore, most organizations take fundamental change very slowly – 
consciously searching for a balance between all related elements. Arguing in 
line with Charles Lindblom though, according to Mintzberg this organizational 
evolution or incrementalism is the usual modus operandi for an organization, in 
contrast to revolution which he regarded as a thorough intervention that is forced 
upon an organization by usually external factors like e.g. economic decline. But, 
Mintzberg argues while referring to Lindblom, incrementalism is not just mud-
dling through – it has a logic of its own: it is “conscious, purposeful, active, 
good management”.32 
Incrementalism defies the idea of a preconceived design. Organizations are 
shaped over time, and elaborating on this idea Mintzberg argued that the coming 
of age of welfare states was also more of an incremental nature than the result of 
a preconceived design. It was the result of a continuing bureaucratic process of 
debate, consensus and compromise. This idea of gradualism was also to be rec-
ognized in the realm of economic theory by means of the concept of ‘path de-
pendence’, and was also adopted by social and political sciences since the 
1990s.33 This concept of historical causation implies that the character of an 
organization does not change very abruptly, and is probably not inclined to fol-
low alternative roads to the ones taken before. Continuity and conservatism 
seem to be strong forces within an organization.34 When compared to the devel-
opment of the Dutch welfare state, these organizational features imply that this 
development is also more of an evolutionary kind than revolutionary, character-
izing the Dutch welfare state as a ‘historical product’ with a long and slow de-
velopment process, and not so much as the result of a ‘grand design’.35 In this 
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study about the developing Dutch welfare state both evolution and revolution 
will be attended to. 
The mystery of civil society 
During its modern history, Dutch society produced a myriad of small and larger 
voluntary organizations and groups that pursued goals varying from political 
representation, child education and health care, to providing for night shelter for 
the homeless and also mere proselytizing. The Salvation Army regarded itself as 
an active member of this amalgam of organizations that is now often called ‘civ-
il society’. As will be explored in this study, the Salvation Army was intercon-
nected with many other civil society organizations, often by means of a shared 
network or when taking up an active role in a collective of kindred organiza-
tions, a so-called umbrella organization.36 This however raises the question, not 
just of relevance to this study but also in general: How can this concept of civil 
society be understood? 
The modern term civil society was applied during the end of the 1980s when 
the diminishing state power of the USSR called forth a debate on how to 
strengthen any democratic potential within already existing social structures. 
Since then many different views have been proposed on the definition of the 
concept of civil society: private initiative (without capital letters, referring to the 
social bonds between people); Private Initiative (with capital letters, referring to 
the institutionalized form of these social bonds); charitable organizations; third 
sector; social midfield; the 5th power; non-governmental organizations (NGO) 
with their religious (RiNGO) and quasi-NGO (QuaNGO) varieties; non-profit 
organizations (NPOs) and not-for-profit organizations.37 For the Dutch case, 
historian Van der Woude aptly paraphrased the discursive phenomenon of civil 
society as “the mystery of the social midfield”, referring to those organizations 
that occupied the space (midfield) between or even overlapping government, the 
public and the market.38 The direction of the debate depends largely on the pa-
rameters that are applied, and just as with the concept of the welfare state, these 
can be manifold. For example, the different definitions that are used can be ex-
plained from a historical point of view and can be classified by the manner in 
which the civil society positioned itself towards the state: 1) in contrast to the 
state; 2) as intermediary between the state and other parties or 3) as alternative 
to the state.39 On another level, the homogeneity that the term civil society im-
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plies does not mean that this is actually the case. The perceived amount of co-
herence between these organizations is in essence formed by the eye of the be-
holder, as Werkman and Van der Woude suggest in their study of the Dutch 
Christian-Social movement as a part of civil society. They argue that it is exactly 
the measure of organizational diversity within this movement that justifies a 
focus on variety, rather than approaching the movement as a homogenous uni-
ty.40 Even stronger, as is suggested by Kennedy, in such a sense, civil society 
can also be regarded to be a transnational phenomenon.41 
Next to all its possible nuances, a commonly accepted theoretical point of 
departure is that the civil society is formed of voluntarily organized groups of 
people that are positioned in the space between the spheres of the state, the mar-
ket and the private domain.42 But from that point on, the discursive paths differ. 
The traditional civil society – private initiative – consisted of many different 
church-related or private charity organizations that were active on social issues 
like education, health, labor and income, often combined with religious revival, 
and they were usually not perceived as a unity.43 However, when looking at their 
principles, many of them were strongly inspired by shared religious values and 
somewhat later by doctrines like ‘subsidiarity’ and ‘sphere sovereignty’.44 Since 
the last decades of the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth century, the 
increase in the number of civil society organizations and their degree of organi-
zation made it possible for organizations of a kindred ideology to unite into 
platforms that started to function as intermediaries between the government and 
the grassroots level. This contributed to the emergence and consolidation of the 
above-mentioned ideological pillars. This form of institutionalization is referred 
to as Private Initiative, with capital letters, as opposed to the private initiative 
(without capital letters) that was less institutionalized and referred to actual ini-
tiatives that were commenced and run by private persons or groups.45 With the 
incorporation of the Private Initiative in the development of the Dutch welfare 
state as a result of the amalgam of subsidization and professionalization, the 
broader term ‘social midfield’ came into use. As the term implies, the dominant 
characteristics of this concept were that it had an intermediary position between 
the government and individual citizens rather than being positioned in contrast 
to the government. This intermediary position seems to have facilitated its grow-
ing interlacement with public administrative structures. 
As mentioned before, during the 1980s this group of organizations was 
termed civil society referring to a social sphere of voluntary associations as a 
counterforce to the state and market by the formation of NGOs and NPOs.46 In 
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addition, it is argued that the concept of civil society is basically a different con-
cept from the idea of social midfield in its emphasis on voluntarism. Taking part 
in political or social associations sprung from personal conviction or involve-
ment and revealed itself in, for example, voluntary work.47 For example: an 
organization can be characterized as a quasi-NGO (QuaNGO) because its de-
pendence on market mechanisms makes it semi-public.48 Reversely, a church 
can be excluded from the concept of civil society because of its private charac-
ter, unless it publically advocates the social and economical well-being of its 
(potential) members.49  
In this study, the Salvation Army is regarded to be a part of that segment 
within civil society that consists of organizations that are explicitly motivated by 
their religious (Christian) or political convictions. In the Dutch tradition, these 
organizations are often called levensbeschouwelijk – a term that I apply in this 
study as equal to the internationally accepted term ‘faith-based’, although the 
Dutch term has a somewhat broader meaning. Also, even though the Salvation 
Army has its limits as a pars pro toto for the whole of faith-based civil society, 
in this study I hope to make clear that an investigation of its history actually 
brings to the forefront the presumed field of tension regarding the governmental 
attitude towards this group of organizations. 
Dynamics of relations 
From the above exposé on the concepts of welfare state and civil society, it be-
comes clear that both ‘actors’ operate on a common ground: both aim to coun-
teract poverty and its distressing social effects. However, this common interest 
also seems to have brought about a demarcation dispute on the primacy of social 
care, underlining the idea that both actors are separate entities with separate 
characteristics, and when taken to the extreme, with separate identities. In this 
sense both can be considered as ‘others’. However, in a more constructivist 
sense, another image rises, for it can also be argued that the above narrative of 
the welfare state development exists only by the grace of the inescapable pres-
ence of civil society – an observation that some have characterized as “a com-
plicated process of increasing entanglement of state and society”.50 From this it 
follows that both actors, the state and civil society, define each other as well as 
themselves and they do so within the framework narrative of the welfare state. 
In this study I will therefore approach the relation between the Dutch state and 
civil society as an intertwined political collaboration on matters of welfare and 
in this relation I will subsequently search for coherent patterns that characterize 
the dynamics between these actors. For this I will turn my focus to their ability 
or willingness to act on aligning or diverging goals. 
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A basic presupposition in this approach is that the alignment of goals be-
tween the state and civil society enforced a growing interdependency on each 
other’s resources like labor and capital. In contrast it can be argued that when 
other, less compatible goals would come into play, this interdependence would 
provide a recipe for conflict. The American political scientist Donald Kettl re-
fers to this dynamics in his theory of “government by proxy”.51 In the United 
States, the term ‘proxy-organization’ is used to indicate that an organization has 
become a default public service organization to the United States government. 
These ‘proxies’ enjoy a preferential status when it comes to appropriating gov-
ernment contracts, grants, tax cuts or loans on public services concerning social 
work, education and other social issues. Typical examples of American proxy-
organizations are: Lutheran Social Services, Catholic Charities, Jewish Federa-
tions and the Salvation Army.52 In his elaboration of the subject, Kettl refers 
indirectly to the influence that this proxy-position might have on the identity of 
the proxy organization itself. The cooperation between the government and, for 
example, civil society organizations is situated in a field of tension that, accord-
ing to Kettl, seems to inherently lead to conflicting policy goals, because even 
though the primary aim of both actors is to synchronize their public goals in 
order to work together, at the same time there are always other, more private 
goals that seem to be impossible to match. Elaborating on what system-theorist 
James D. Thompson calls “the paradox of administration”, Kettl describes this 
field of tension in terms of “certainty and flexibility”.53 First of all, both the state 
and proxy-organization want a degree of certainty. The government is aiming 
for results in the work area on which their policy efforts are focused and the 
proxy-organization wants a predictable flow of money to at least support their 
efforts to implement these policies. But in return, both actors also want a certain 
degree of flexibility from the other: the government is hoping for an easy con-
currence by the proxy-organization with new policy shifts that result from social 
or political developments. The proxy-organization in its turn preferably wants a 
carte blanche on how to reach those shared aims, and maybe even room to try to 
reach its more private goals.  
Even though Kettl does not refer to explicitly faith-based organizations or 
churches, a possible field of tension seems to present itself here. For example, a 
church that provides for social services might be supported by the government 
because these programs are in line with government policy objectives. From the 
perspective of the church however, providing for social aid is an intrinsic part of 
its biblically derived mission, and in that light it is not unthinkable that the vi-
sion of the church is that the best social aid people could get is by conversion to 
Christianity. In such a case, the church might hope for flexibility from the side 
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of the government to organize social care accordingly. This example shows that 
even though both actors have a shared goal, the need for flexibility by the one 
will not always be met by the other, for when the government upholds the idea 
of separation of church and state it will not actively support evangelization. 
Therefore the state will most probably not support the church financially and at 
the same time allow it to exert its discretionary powers to mould its help-
program to its own liking.  
Kettl’s theory of proxy-organizations shows that governments are in need of 
organizations in order to put their public policy into daily practice, and in the 
process of building these proxy-relations, governments become dependent on 
their proxies. On the other hand, the proxies are bound to act by government 
rules and regulations, and may additionally also become increasingly dependent 
on government funding. This works well when alignment of (shared) goals oc-
curs. But, when the divergence of (private) goals forces both actors to find a 
balance in their efforts to cooperate on their shared public goals, in order to 
avoid obstructing conflicts, it is not unthinkable that an actor decides to take 
drastic measures like e.g. reorganization, in order to be able to meet the re-
quirements. This thought brings us to an interesting element of Kettl’s theory, 
for he implies that it is often the proxy-organization that gives in when diverging 
goals threaten to escalate into conflicts of policy, because they lack the means to 
influence the balance of power to their advantage.54 And even though Kettl him-
self refrained from further empirical study of this presumed effect, this assump-
tion provides for an interesting basis for the study of the effects of the relation-
ship of the Dutch government with its proxy-organization, the Salvation Army. 
But in order to study these dynamics properly, another issue must first be ad-
dressed: How can we understand a concept like organizational identity? 
Dynamics of organizational identity 
When we speak of an organization like the Salvation Army all kinds of different 
images pop up in our minds depending on our personal experience with the or-
ganization. Is it a church, a probation organization or is it a charity for the home-
less? How can we identify ‘the Salvation Army’? In order to come to grips with 
this matter, we will have to explore the notion of organizational identity. 
The illusive character of the idea of organizational identity is rather evoca-
tively demonstrated by organizational theorist Weick: “The word organization is 
a noun and it is also a myth. If you look for an organization you won’t find it”.55 
According to Weick, an organization is intangible except for the walls that sur-
round it. This notion is deep-rooted in the present-day academic debate on the 
issue, as Weick’s concept of organization shows: “the organization consists of 
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plans, recipes, rules, instructions, and programs for generating, interpreting, and 
governing behavior that are jointly managed by two or more people”.56 
A more social-constructionist view in this line is offered by Morgan who 
states that when you look at an organization, you automatically search for com-
parison with images already known to you. Morgan argues that even though the 
existence of organizations seems to be self-evident, when wanting to observe 
them we see what we want to see: “Think ‘structure’, and you will see structure. 
Think ‘culture’ and you will see all kinds of cultural dimensions”.57 Like Weick, 
Morgan states that organizations might be a fact in the day-to-day experience of 
people, but when you want to touch an organization for example, it becomes 
fictional because then you will have much trouble finding one. This Fata Mor-
gana-like character of organizations suggests that they merely exist in the minds 
of people. Elaborating on this thought, he argues that the use of metaphor helps 
us to ‘see’ certain aspects of the organization. For instance, when viewed 
through the looking-glass of ‘organization as a machine’, we begin to see an 
organization as created by and constructed around mechanistic thinking, as be-
ing a “rational enterprise, designed and structured to achieve predetermined 
ends”.58 But when we encounter the same organization with the metaphor of 
‘organization as brains’, we will most probably be focused on its capacity to 
learn and therefore develop. This application of metaphors adds meaning to the 
concept of organization, but Morgan is quick to admit that however useful this 
view can be to managers in search of diagnostic tools or inspiration, it also has 
its limitations. According to Morgan the use of metaphor “invites us to see the 
similarities, but ignore the differences”, for its power lies in the confirmation of 
overlapping qualities.59 Another limitation of this approach is that it invokes a 
perspective that focuses on the organization as a given constant. This way cer-
tain developments within organizations that occur over time possibly remain 
unappreciated, so, in order to take into account organizational changes, an his-
torical approach is needed. 
These views on the organization make clear that the idea ‘organization’ is ra-
ther discursive. However, in this constructivist view Weick and Morgan seem to 
ignore certain important elements that make an organization more factual than 
they argue. For instance, an organization can be a legal person and thus is rather 
‘real’ in terms of legal consequences for the people that are bear responsibility 
for such an organization. Additionally, the structure of an organization might not 
be tangible, but that does not make it less existing. The organizational structure 
can play a dominant role in the everyday experience of the people that have to 
deal with these structures. Also organizational structure can be a force in its 
own, creating certainty, predictability, and continuity. It can even be a part of 
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the organizational identity for when for example the workforce might change, 
the structure of an organization might very well stay the same. So, even though 
the organization in itself is hard to pin-point, the organizational structure is actu-
ally an important feature that relates to the identity of the organization. 
When we regard organizational identity to be not just a fixed and coherent 
constant, we are at liberty to think of an organization as fragmented, multiple, 
ambiguous, dynamic and adaptable. All characteristics that are opposite to the 
idea of a more constant process “which involves societal factors, psychological 
factors, interaction, reflection, practice and performance”.60 According to organ-
ization theorists Pullen and Linstead, identity has to be regarded as a process 
that takes place on a timeline and therefore inherently incorporates the past and 
the future. It is constantly on the go, but not without its past and potential. This 
process is characterized by ontological uncertainty that is often the result of its 
response to the ‘other’, for Pullen and Linstead discuss this process of identity in 
terms of “a demarcating self”. The presence of the other, whether it is a rival; a 
colleague; or in the case of this study even a government, is one of the elements 
of what Pullen and Linstead call “identity capital” and it contains “material, 
socio-economic, symbolic or discursive resources” from the past, present and 
even future. All these contextual features are resources that are drawn from the 
process of shaping an organizational identity – a ‘self’.61  
This process of identity-forming can also be considered as the result of a nar-
rative rather than something tangible or even factual. From this perspective, 
HRM-expert Peter Hamilton describes the identity of an organization as primari-
ly a rhetorical process, a discourse.62 In his view, organizational symbols like 
logos and flags play an important part in this rhetoric of identity and have the 
specific aim of generating employee support. Therefore these rhetorical ele-
ments are important ritualistic generators of identity and are useful in “constitut-
ing and promoting community”.63 But next to these more palpable forms, anoth-
er generator of identity is the mission statement of the organization. According 
to Hamilton, mission statements reflect the organization’s inner values, purpose 
and raison d’être, all referring to its identity. Critics often state that mission 
statements are “mere rhetoric” and generate nothing more than employee skepti-
cism towards the organization.64 But Hamilton argues that mission statements 
are inherently rhetorical and therefore important in “trying to generate audience 
identification with the organization through promoting a sense of community by 
evoking various values which are often implied to be in the interests of that 
community, which therefore should be lived up to and followed.”65 Thus in 
Hamilton’s view, when the process of identity is viewed as a narrative that is 
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constructed to (re)generate a process of identification, rhetorical elements like 
mission statements are not to be overlooked. So how does this above described 
approach reflect on the case of the Salvation Army? 
Soon after the Salvation Army started out in the Netherlands it developed in-
to a rather sizable social work organization that based its actions on a Christian 
philosophy that is often characterized as a “practical religion” or, even stronger, 
a “theology of service”.66 As will be elaborated further on in this study, this 
philosophy is based on a two-pronged mission of providing for social and spir-
itual care. The Salvation Army itself often refers to this dual mission as ‘two 
sides of the same coin’ and as a well-known Army motto goes, these sides may 
be discernible, but they are also inseparable. This dual mission is not a unique 
feature of the Salvation Army. In his work on the Dutch diaconate, Erik Sengers 
acknowledged that such a double objective was present in many charitable or-
ganizations in both the Catholic and the Protestant segments of Dutch society. 
Furthermore, Sengers made a plea to reintroduce the original Latin term caritas 
(charity) instead of diaconate, for caritas emphasizes the connecting force be-
tween the biblical expressions ‘love’ and ‘doing good deeds’, whereas the word 
diaconate had come to focus merely on the latter. Charity means both ‘word and 
deed’ and, according to Sengers, thus is the most appropriate term for the com-
bining force between the two parts of the dual mission of many charitable organ-
izations.67  
This dual mission has also been the subject of a long-standing and multifac-
eted debate within Army ranks. The profoundness and longitude of this debate, 
that also will be a subject of study, implies that the identity process of the Salva-
tion Army is also of a highly narrative character and this observation underlines 
the idea that organizational identity is hardly a fixed constant, but is always in 
flux. Additionally, this creation of a ‘self’ by the Salvation Army implies that an 
‘other’ is also present. The context of the developing welfare state presents the 
Dutch government as one of the most prominent ‘others’ and therefore the rela-
tion between the government and the Salvation Army is central to this study. In 
this study I will search for “patterns of shared meaning that guide organizational 
life” and that occur within the Salvation Army.68 Because it presented itself as a 
value-driven organization, it is exactly these internal patterns of shared meaning 
that may reveal how the relation between the Army and the government is inter-
connected to the Army’s identity process. This brings us now to the question of 
how I approach the concept of ‘government’ in this study. 
Government and public policy 
Relevant to the relationship between the Dutch government and civil society is 
the manner in which the government tried to encourage these organizations in 
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order to implement public policy. Within the narrative framework of the welfare 
state, this means that I will search for possible coherence within social policy 
ideas that are designed to contribute to this change in organizational behavior. 
Because the issues that will be addressed in this study are basically initiated and 
formed on a national level, I will focus on national manifestations of public 
policy on the matter of social work and welfare.  
In the Netherlands, from the early 1950s onwards, the governmental view on 
social work and welfare was translated into policy by the Ministry of MaWe.69 
According to some, the ministry was even positioned “in the heart of the welfare 
state”.70 While widening its reach on social welfare problems, the ministry en-
countered the mores and practices that had been persistent in this area of the 
work field for decades, and that had been co-created by civil society. Together 
with ongoing social change, the view on welfare also altered and subsequently 
led to new efforts in order to entice, press or curb civil society organizations to 
act according to the view of the government. In order to influence civil society 
organizations, the government had certain means at its disposal: policy, grants 
and regulations, all often used adherently. Because these means are deployed in 
order to achieve political aims it can be assumed that their application is based 
on political choices. Consequently, the underlying concepts of the social policy 
of the ministry can be a point of departure in the search for coherent elements on 
this subject, especially when taken into account that these concepts were the 
driving force of this ministry in its effort to influence civil society organizations 
that were active in this area of the work field. So from the perspective of the 
government, the central question will be: What dominant policy concepts can be 
retraced in the history of the Dutch welfare system and what underlying values 
did these concepts represent?  
This question however, needs further thought on two important concepts 
with regard to the matter of policy: policy implementation and policy instru-
ments. In order to come to grips with the dynamic process of policy implementa-
tion, many scholars have sought to classify the process based on the assumption 
that to a certain extent any implementation of policy creates winners and losers. 
In 1972, T.A. Lowi specified four kinds of policy: distributive, redistributive, 
regulatory and constituent policy. The first aimed at distributing of new re-
sources; the second aimed at shifting the distribution of existing resources; the 
third focused on regulative efforts; and the last type aimed at establishing or 
reorganizing organizations.71 Even though such a classification provided for an 
interesting view on the different aims of policy, according to public policy 
                                                        
 
69 This ministry started out under the name Ministerie van Maatschappelijk Werk (MaWe, Social Work, 
1952-1965) but changed over time into the Ministerie van Cultuur, Recreatie en Maatschappelijk Werk 
(CRM, Culture, Recreation and Social Work, 1965-1982), Ministerie van Welzijn, Volksgezondheid en 
Cultuur (WVC, Social Welfare, Public Health and Culture, 1982-1994) and Ministerie van Volksgezond-
heid, Welzijn en Sport (VWS, Public Health, Social Welfare and Sports, 1994-current date). 
70 De Haan en Duyvendak 2002:102-104 
71 Lowi 1972 
 
 
34 
 
scholar Michael Hill, this subdivision was not tenable because it did not comply 
with policy efforts on education being (re)distribution of knowledge, or warfare, 
for example. Also the distinction between a distributive policy and a regulatory 
policy for example, seemed hard to make, for often these were combined in 
practice. Instead, Hill presented an overview of typification efforts of public 
policy implementation by including the measure of resistance of relevant ac-
tors.72 Others observed that the difference between distributive and redistribu-
tive policy was hardly distinguishing. Ripley and Franklin tried to solve this by 
adding that the redistributive policy did not so much make use of existing re-
sources, but aimed primarily at shifting “resources from the advantaged to dis-
advantaged groups”.73 They also added that contrary to other policy types, redis-
tributive policy revealed a very high degree of ideology in the debate between 
the actors on its implementation.74  
Any form of typological classification tends to oversimplify, but that does 
not mean that such a magnification of specific characteristics can not be useful 
in helping us understand how various aspects of a complex process like policy 
creation and implementation interrelate. Therefore, I place the Dutch social poli-
cy efforts in the context of this typology. In their classification, Ripley and 
Franklin indicate that when this policy process is approached as being “redis-
tributive”, one might gain insight on how ideology has played a part in the pro-
cess. Since I will make an attempt to determine the government policy lines and 
their underlying themes and how this affected the redistribution of income to-
wards the society’s disadvantaged, this systemic approach seems to provide for a 
useful lens.  
This elaboration brings forth the question of means and instruments, for how 
were these policy implementation efforts put into practice? Just as with the poli-
cy implementation process, many scholarly efforts have been made to define and 
list the tools or instruments that the government has at its disposal in order to 
implement policy.75 These classifications vary from very fine-meshed to rather 
large indicative units.76 This study however, is not about testing any of these 
classifications, but instead aims to describe the dynamics in the relationship 
between the government and the faith-based civil society organization the Salva-
tion Army. And in that case this approach can be rather useful, for the studied 
relation between government and civil society does revolve around policy 
themes. Especially with regard to the figurative idea of courtship, or more con-
cretely, in relation to the balance of power between two actors in the public 
domain, the provided spectrum of Howlett and Ramesh offers an interesting 
starting point in further analysis. Howlett and Ramesh specify three forms that 
may have the potential of a policy instrument: 1) voluntary structures like fami-
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ly, community, voluntary organizations and private markets; 2) mixed instru-
ments like information, subsidies, auction/property rights and tax/user charges 
and 3) compulsory instruments like regulation, public enterprise and direct pro-
vision.77 Eventhough it is rather debatable whether ‘family’ or ‘community’ can 
be regarded to be policy instruments, the other two varieties offer rather interest-
ing catagories, because Howlett and Ramesh base their classification on the 
measure of resistance that might be expected between the government as policy 
maker and other actors that undergo such policies. In this study I will especially 
pay attention to the latter two forms of policy: inviting or compulsory policy.  
In the case of the developing Dutch welfare state, De Haan and Duyvendak 
studied the instruments that the Dutch government applied in its policy-making 
process in order to get civil society organizations to cooperate. Already during 
the early years of the Ministry of MaWe, it became clear that subsidies would be 
an important tool – a tool that has been of great influence on the relation be-
tween both actors.78 According to the Catholic Minister of Social Work, Klompé 
(KVP, 1965-1963 and 1966-1971), this strategy aimed “to further and support 
private initiative to such an extent, that it can be responsible for fulfilling its 
tasks with due regard for its own character and responsibilities.”79 According to 
De Haan and Duyvendak, the government applied a mixture of instruments with 
regard to the welfare sector: legislation (be it scantily), coordination, research 
and, most of all, direct and indirect subsidies.80 
A study in three parts 
The main research question of this study is: What are the perceptible dynamics 
in the relation between the state and the Salvation Army in the Netherlands with 
regard to social policy between 1890 and 1990? What do these dynamics reveal 
about the developing Dutch welfare state and faith-based civil society and how 
did they affect the identity of the Salvation Army itself? What I shall specify 
next is how I will approach these questions here. To begin with, because this 
study rests on a historical approach, I will elaborate briefly on the view that I 
take on the historical métier. In my opinion, a historian attempts to describe 
historical events in their context. Therefor the core of the historical profession is 
formed by interpretation and decription, a process that is also called the herme-
neutical process. This approach is also quite common to other classical research 
traditions like the study of religion, of law and more recently of the social sci-
ences.81  
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The etymology of the word ‘hermeneutic’ points to the Greek equivalent for 
‘to translate’ and was derived from the mythical character Hermes who had the 
burdening task of translating the riddled messages that were sent from the gods 
on Olympus to the Greek people. In this sense, hermeneutical understanding 
stands for translation of meaning from one world to another.82 In historical prac-
tice this amounts to interpretation of various representations of historical events, 
as presented to us through primary sources like documents, artifacts and oral 
tradition. Consequently, as interpreter of these manifestations, the historian will 
create ‘facts’ that seem relevant for constructing a valid bearing surface for his 
particular interpretation which helps to shape his narrative – his version of the 
historical events. I deliberately put the word ‘fact’ between inverted commas in 
order to stress the notion that the presented ‘facts’ are merely the creation of an 
individual as an observer and de facto interpreter. This makes these ‘facts’ high-
ly personal and therefore subjective and debatable. The notion of facts (without 
inverted commas) refers to the presumed existence of an objective reality, but 
because of the multitude of individual observers and interpreters, in my opinion, 
we will never be able to find out whether or not there is one reality. At least 
there are as many realities as there are observers. Therefore facts (without in-
verted commas) are unavailable to us.83 Following from this argument is that in 
historical research the focus is on selected but apparently coherent moments, 
events or more longitudinal presumed developments in history, and by doing so 
the historian creates a conceptual lens through which he views history. In her 
ethnographic approach of organizations, social scientist Berendsen calls this 
process the (re)production of coagulated (repetitive) patterns that form the con-
text of social interaction.84 This approach inherently excludes the possibility of 
being complete because the result – a historical narrative – will be one of many 
possible narratives, but on the other hand, the division between inclusion and 
exclusion has to be accounted for by the historian in order to sustain any claim 
on validity of any historical narrative. So, a historian will have to give an ac-
count of his conceptual lens – the looking glass through which he assesses the 
value of particular historical manifestations. He will also have to account for his 
research methods. 
This study consists of three parts that offer different perspectives on the rela-
tion between the government and the Salvation Army. One of the main pillars of 
the relation between the government, faith-based civil society and the Salvation 
Army was formed by their common interest in social welfare issues. These is-
sues were addressed in an increasingly structural and comprehensive way during 
the twentieth century as the result of a cooperative effort between civil society 
and the government.  
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In Part I, the following questions will put the focus on the relationship be-
tween these two actors: What were the social policy themes that played an im-
portant role for the government? How did these themes develop over time? On 
what underlying values were these themes based? And how did these develop-
ments affect the Dutch faith-based civil society? The results of this effort will 
constitute a contextual narrative for the Salvation Army’s operational environ-
ment. The reconstruction of these developing goals and values is based on anal-
ysis of various primary and secondary sources. The reconstruction of the long-
term developments on policy goals is based on the rather uniform and informa-
tive source of the explanatory memorandum to the annual social policy budget 
proposals by the Ministry of MaWe and its successors. When studied in a longi-
tudinal manner, these explanatory memoranda give insight into how certain 
governmental policy intentions have been pursued, achieved and also sometimes 
abandoned over time. These findings are subsequently put into their political 
context by the study of relevant parliamentary policy documents and parliamen-
tary records as well as by a thorough analysis of secondary sources like histori-
cal case studies of other (faith-based) civil society organizations in the social 
welfare work field; descriptive accounts of social work field developments like 
the history of the Ministry of MaWe and its successors; the historical develop-
ment of probation work in the Netherlands; and standard textbooks on Dutch 
political and welfare state history.  
In Chapter 1, I will describe the emergence of what I call the ‘social policy 
system’ in which I place the government and civil society in a systemic context 
of interdependency based on a shared effort on certain policy goals. This sys-
temic approach is useful in studying the mutual understanding between the two 
actors for utilizing each other for shared or diverging aims. During this chapter it 
becomes clear that civil society at first gradually became a valued partner of the 
government, but as shown in Chapter 2, during the 1970s this position changed 
when the social policy system started to falter. By then civil society seemed to 
have lost much of its allure for the government; a process that resulted in the 
repositioning of these organizations towards the government. This description of 
the social policy system forms the backdrop of the development of the Salvation 
Army identity process during the twentieth century, because the Army had also 
become part of this system. 
Therefore in Part II, I shift the focus to the Salvation Army. Through the 
thematic lenses of interdependency, legal incorporation, and professionalization, 
I describe how the developments in the social policy system impacted the rela-
tion between the government and the Salvation Army and what that meant for 
the Army’s identity process. With regard to the Army’s sense of history, an 
interesting observation is that even though the Salvation Army thinks of itself as 
a rather practical organization that has no strong focus on the conservation of its 
history or its archives of policy records and other possibly historical relevant 
paperwork, it has a rich tradition of history writing of its own. Next to many 
volumes of different types of internal magazines (e.g. Strijdkreet, De Officier), 
parts of the Army’s history has been well-documented by Ringelberg and Van 
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der Vlugt. As a former Army communication officer, Ringelberg has written a 
dissertation on the history of the Salvation Army in the Netherlands until 1945, 
and Major Van der Vlugt is responsible for the archives of the Salvation Army 
church in the Netherlands. Additionally, other Salvationists have shown a seri-
ous interest in the preservation of the Army history, as the historical accounts of 
Spaan, Maris, Voorham and Van Teijlingen show. Because of these available 
sources, Part II of the study is extensively based on primary records. The availa-
ble records of the Salvation Army in the Netherlands that are kept in the public 
archives contain many annual financial reports, minutes of deliberative organs 
of the Army and relevant correspondence between Army leaders. This paper 
trail is put into perspective by means of the publications of and interviews with 
key-persons that witnessed or even influenced the Army’s process of identity at 
the time. The narrative that rises from these primary sources is contextualized by 
parliamentary records, reports and of course, other secondary literature on rele-
vant subjects that determine the Army’s operational context. 
By means of this modus operandi the above mentioned themes of interde-
pendency, legal incorporation, and professionalization are elaborated in four 
subsequent chapters each having a chronological structure of its own. The start 
of this study is 1887 – the year that the Salvation Army opened its doors in the 
Netherlands. The end of the empirical part of this research will be in 1990 be-
cause by then the Salvation Army had been fundamentally reorganized into new 
legal and organizational enitities. Chapters 3 through 5 however, will end before 
1980 because in the subsequent decade the themes of interdependency, legal 
incorporation, and professionalization have become too intertwined to describe 
on a separate basis. 
In Chapter 3, I describe how the development of the financial relations be-
tween the Salvation Army and the Dutch government affected the balance be-
tween the Army’s two-fold mission of social and religious work. Therefore, a 
thorough analysis of the Army’s mission is followed by an account of the grow-
ing reliance of the Army on government support. That this dependency had its 
consequences for the organization will be illustrated by the case study of the 
Army’s probation department, as it was this department that was the first within 
the Salvation Army that was confronted with growing government regulation 
and consequently experienced a change in internal culture. On the other hand, 
this relation also had its consequences for the government, as this dependency 
also – to a certain degree – seemed to apply to the government. 
The second relevant theme that will be addressed in this study is a field of 
tension issue that was reduced by the Army to a mere question: Are we a church 
or a foundation? A thorough historical account of the internal debate on this 
issue has already been provided by historian Ringelberg.85 However, whereas 
Ringelberg described the debate with a strong focus on the ideas and strategies 
of the individuals that played a part in this debate, in Chapter 4, I will place this 
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internal debate in the context of the relationship between the Army and the gov-
ernment. In this chapter two storylines will be distinguished: 1) the narrative of 
what the Salvation Army wanted to be and 2) that of what it was actually able to 
be, according to Dutch law and customs. Inherent to this matter is a question that 
is once again related to the Army’s twin mission: Should the Army’s social ob-
jective be regarded as auxiliary to the spiritual objective, since the alleviation of 
social problems would only have temporary meaning and spiritual redeeming 
would be of eternal value? Or was it just the other way around? Even though the 
Army itself dismisses this reorganization officially as a solution of a mere legal 
problem, the context of the relationship with the Dutch state seems to shed a 
more differentiating light on the issue. 
In Chapter 5, I will explore how the growing financial dependence and the 
balancing of the dual mission in legal terms were interconnected to the Army’s 
process of modernization, for this touched on an essential contributor to the 
Army’s identity process: its workforce. The increasing emphasis on profession-
alization has given the organization the opportunity to hire more people, but it 
also might have made the Army more vulnerable to government intervention in 
the area of personnel policy, a point that, once again, will be proven with the 
example of the Army’s probation department. The Army increasingly lacked 
internally-trained staff. This situation opened the doors for external employees, 
and also to the training of the Army’s own people which made way for profes-
sional opinions that were new to the Army’s mental legacy. This development of 
the professional also incited a tension between the volunteers who were tradi-
tionally committed to the Army’s work and the new salaried professionals. The 
influx on the professional front seemed to bring with it another element that 
exerted pressure on the Army’s identity: democratization. Due to external pres-
sure, the Army was obliged to allow its workers to have a democratic say by 
means of works councils. This also meant that to a growing extent, non-Army 
people started to exercise influence on Army policy and thus on the Army’s 
identity process. 
During the 1980s the issue of identity became a major point of discussion 
within and outside the Salvation Army. The above sketched thematic narratives 
of interdependency, legal incorporation and professionalization flowed together 
during this decade and called for a fundamental solution – a process that is de-
scribed in Chapter 6. For not only the Dutch government started to question the 
Army’s identity, but also the Army itself appeared to be in dire need of defining 
its own identity; how could the Army distinguish itself within the new force 
field of the market. In this decade the Army started to re-evaluate its identity, 
resulting in a thorough reorganization that aimed to prepare the Army for the 
coming decades and conserve its core values that were dear to its identity. 
This description of how the Army lived through and shaped its identity pro-
cess in the light of the changing Dutch welfare state ends with a cliffhanger as 
its reorganization in 1990 forms a relevant finale to the Army’s identity process 
during the twentieth century. This finishing point however, does not give us a 
chance to evaluate the choices that were made by the Army during this period. It 
 
 
40 
 
leaves us with questions like: To what extent was the new organizational struc-
ture a success, and where did it fail to meet expectations? And how did this 
renewed positioning towards the government within the social policy system 
reflect on the Army’s identity? Therefore, in Part III (Chapter 7) I will start with 
an evaluation of the developments concerning the social policy system and what 
these developments meant for faith-based civil society and its central feature: 
identity. Subsequently, I will make a recapitulating evaluation of how the Salva-
tion Army’s identity process unfolded within this social policy system. These 
assessments will lead to concluding remarks with regard to the central research 
question of this study. But in order to assess the value of these observations, in 
the closing chapter of this book, Chapter 8, I will contextualize these outcomes 
with a sketchy interpretation of the period 1990-2010. In this part, I will put the 
Salvation Army in the context of the current social policy system and describe 
what internal (policy) struggles the Army went through. Because this chapter 
has the character of an epilogue, I will allow myself to be more interpretative 
here than in other parts of the book. Especially with regard to how the Salvation 
Army was able to shape its identity with regard to its twin mission – its ‘coin 
with two sides’. 
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CHAPTER 1. EMERGING SOCIAL POLICY THEMES  
(1854 - 1974) 
1. Overture to the Dutch welfare state 
As is described in the Introduction, the emergence of the welfare state is re-
tractable to the modernization process of the western world, in which industrial-
ization, urbanization and emancipation of the people through education were 
especially important forces.1 Also, the coming of age of the Dutch welfare state 
is inextricably connected to political and cultural unification and growing social 
dismay as result of a comprehensive industrialization process, for it was one of 
its unforeseen and unwanted results – the ‘social question’ – that cranked up the 
motor of the welfare state avant-la-lettre. Diseases, industrial perils, insecurity 
of income and a need for education, urged national governments to act on behalf 
of their citizens.2 Collective and reciprocal care mechanisms were created and 
enforced by the state, showing an increase in government interference in what 
was traditionally regarded to be the domain of ‘private initiative’, now often 
called civil society (see Introduction for further explanation). Large-scale public 
protest however, failed to occur. Due to international rivalry between the young 
nation states during the second half of the nineteenth century, caused by the 
tension between national self-determination and international unity, the mobili-
zation of nationalistic sentiments seemed to have widened the social acceptance 
of this top-down approach to politics.3 
While taking advantage of the spirit of the times, between 1871 and 1889 
German chancellor Bismarck introduced a series of social insurances in order to 
secure an income for workers in case of industrial accidents, deteriorating 
health, pension and disability. When workers had contributed to the economic 
system through their labor, they would be eligible for this type of financial sup-
port by the state. By creating a certain level of income security for the German 
working class, Bismarck hoped to win their loyalty and commitment to the 
emerging German state.4 
A few decades previously, a more general approach was employed in the 
United Kingdom in relation to workers’ welfare. The destructive effects of in-
dustrialization with regard to health, housing and safety were also heavily suf-
fered by the working class throughout the United Kingdom. But in this case, it 
was exactly this correlation between industrial development and the demise of 
the workers that gradually brought about a change in the view on how to cope 
with poverty. In The Poor Law of 1601, two categories of the poor were drawn 
up: one could be a deserving poor or an undeserving poor. The deserving poor 
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were those people who were regarded to be internally motivated to provide for 
themselves, but were not able to because of disability or other external reasons 
for their unemployment. These people deserved to be helped. The undeserving 
poor on the other hand, were to blame for their poverty themselves. They were 
regarded as able but unwilling to change their situation. The new poor that suf-
fered from the effects of industrialization were increasingly regarded as ‘deserv-
ing poor’ and consequently the thought gained ground that their social problems 
had to be diminished. This shift in ideas were codified into the New Poor Law of 
1834. It would however take until the first decade of the twentieth century for 
material social care to become available in the United Kingdom to more groups 
of people than just the working class. Nevertheless, it was the swiftly expanding 
middle class that had to produce the main part of the necessary funds, making 
this form of solidarity a rather peculiar one, because whether or not the middle 
class supported this view, they were still obliged to pay. 
Both in the United Kingdom and in Germany, the state started to show a cer-
tain interest in social issues during the nineteenth century. This new role as-
sumed by the state had its consequences for the groups and organizations that 
were traditionally committed to offering social relief and that regarded this work 
as an inherent part of their mission. At first, this new governmental approach 
resulted in nothing more than a supplementary contribution to the work that had 
already been initiated by these civil society organizations. Only in some minor 
cases, social work activities were actually taken over.5 However, the govern-
mental attitude in the United Kingdom and in Germany towards poverty had 
gradually changed from that of standing aloof to a certain degree of involve-
ment. 
2. Balancing the state and civil society 
In the case of the Netherlands, the dominant approach of the government was 
that of the liberal ‘night watch state’. This meant that the government was only 
to come into action in case of a threat to the public order or health. Otherwise, it 
would abstain from any interference with activities that were developed by often 
local private initiatives in cooperation with the local government. In case of 
poverty, this meant that the national government would only act in those in-
stances when there were no alternatives or no financial means available.6 The 
Dutch central government thus, kept its distance. At least until the wave of mod-
ernization began to sweep across the Netherlands as well.  
Compared to welfare states like Germany and the United Kingdom, the 
Dutch welfare state emerged rather late. Social scientist Abram de Swaan even 
framed this process as “a long hiss with a delayed bang”.7 A first indication of a 
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changing governmental view on the issue of poverty can be found in the new 
Grondwet (Constitution) of 1848. In a single sentence it was announced that 
poor relief would from then on “be an issue of continuing care by the govern-
ment” and had to be “regulated by law”, implying that the Dutch government 
thought itself to be at least partly responsible for poor relief.8 The roots of this 
notion can be retraced to the conviction that the state had increasingly become 
accountable for the material and physical well-being of its citizens, because 
poverty was no longer regarded as merely one’s own fault. Nevertheless, the 
Dutch poor relief constellation of local municipalities and civil society, proved 
to be hard to change. This was reflected by the Armenwet (Poor Act, 1854) for it 
explicitly confirmed that the responsibility for poor relief belonged primarily in 
the hands of civil society. Nevertheless, the first signs of government interest in 
poverty matters were visible. 
While referring to this relation between the government and civil society, 
historian Van der Woude characterized the following decades as a period of 
liberal government rule. The prime responsibility for social care would remain 
with private charity organizations between 1850 and 1880, even though civil 
society was fragmented and therefore relatively weak compared to the expand-
ing Dutch government. The amount of freedom from political interference was 
exchanged for the often implicit understanding that civil society was to waive 
any political activity.9 This implicates that the two parties also agreed on their 
proximity. 
The introduction of the socalled Kinderwet (Child Act, 1874) announced a 
change in the attitude of the government with regard to social issues. The Act 
focused on the protection of the most vulnerable workers: children under the age 
of 15, and women. In 1889, another curtailment of possible exploiting effects of 
industrialization was offered by the Arbeidswet (Labor Act): regulation of the 
working hours and forbidding work on Sundays and during nights. This gov-
ernmental interest was substantiated with the rise of the social-liberals in the 
parliament at the turn of the century. The liberal concept of individual freedom 
and personal responsibility remained a central characteristic of government poli-
tics, but because of the growing awareness of the social question it was 
acknowledged that individual freedom was, more than often, curtailed by sick-
ness, poverty, ignorance and age. Thus, according to the social-liberal view that 
surfaced during these years, the most vulnerable within society had to be sup-
ported in order to be free and the state was responsible for reducing these barri-
ers, or at least compensating for them.10 A first result was the Leerplichtwet 
(Compulsory Education Act) of 1900, but there was subsequently much more 
legislation spanning areas like housing (Woningwet, Housing Act, 1901), health, 
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safety (Ongevallenwet, Accidents Act, 1901) and childcare (Kinderwetten, Child 
Acts, 1901).11 
During World War I (1914-1918), the Netherlands remained politically neu-
tral and as a result, was sidelined during the conflict. Its political landscape 
however, changed profoundly during these first decades of the twentieth centu-
ry. The introduction of universal suffrage for men in 1917 and for women in 
1920 fostered the process of pillarization, because it instigated a broad political 
emancipation of the (mostly religious) masses. A political power bloc of the so-
called confessionelen (confessionals) emerged.12 Political scientist Van Doorn 
described this as the “inescapable presentation of the confessionals”, because 
they were interlaced with the Dutch political history: “Through the fabric of 
Dutch history runs a thread that has never been broken: a Christian thread.”13 
Even though the Catholics and Protestants were sharply divided, from the 1880s 
onwards, these confessionals started to take a structural interest in active poli-
tics. Faith-based political parties were formed, like the Protestant Anti-
Revolutionaire Partij (ARP, Anti-revolutionary Party, 1879), the Christelijk-
Historische Unie (CHU, Christian-Historical Union, 1908) and the Catholic 
Algemeene Bond van RK-Kiesverenigingen (RK, General Society of RC-
electoral associations, 1904). These faith-based parties seized political power 
and dominated the political force field for decades to come.14  
This political emancipation also resulted in an increasing overlap between 
the government and civil society. Civil society did not just position itself in 
contrast to the state, for both sides were increasingly staffed by representatives 
of the same pillar. This provided for a mutual confessional base that gave way to 
possible cooperation and ultimately led to a shift in the political constellation in 
which civil society placed itself as an intermediary between its grassroots and 
the national government.15 The pillarization process was not typically Dutch, for 
this development was perceptible in Germany and Belgium as well. In the Neth-
erlands however, because of the dominant role of the confessionals, the ideolog-
ical segmentation of society into four ideological pillars seemed to have been 
remarkably successful.16 It is even argued that in the Dutch case, it would be 
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more appropriate to speak of a “land of four streams” rather than of a nation.17 
So how does this overture to the Dutch welfare state relate to, often, faith-based 
charities that were commenced by benevolent individuals or groups within 
churches, communities or other social structures, or in other words, to civil soci-
ety? 
3. Seeking rapprochement (1900-1945) 
3.1. Opening moves 
It was not only the state that showed interest in cooperating on social issues, but 
both parties were initiators. In 1911 for example, the Amsterdam based ‘Toyn-
bee’ youth and community center organization Ons Huis (Our Home) concluded 
after internal deliberation that its financial situation was so weak that it had to 
put in a request with the Amsterdam municipality for financial support.18 The 
municipality however, showed much reluctance and denied the request; Ons 
Huis had to solve its own problems. And indeed, Ons Huis looked for a creative 
solution to its financial problems and since one of its most prominent aims was 
to contribute to the moral and social development of young people in Amster-
dam, it decided to start a holiday school for mischievous youth. In order to be 
able to start this project, Ons Huis once again called upon the Amsterdam mu-
nicipality for financial support, and this time with success for in 1914 it received 
a subsidy of fl.1,500.19 
The strategy of Ons Huis was to find compatible goals between its own or-
ganization and the Amsterdam municipality. The nuisance that this group of 
children caused seemed to provide for such a common ground. In addition, Ons 
Huis addressed the financial burden that these ill-behaved children created for 
the city and as a result, the Amsterdam municipality seemed to regard the subsi-
dization of Ons Huis as a kind of investmen. Supporting Ons Huis could prove 
to be cheaper than accepting the social problems.20 Therefore, the city was 
helped. As was Ons Huis, for now it had successfully obtained its desired finan-
cial support.  
In this case, it was a civil society organization that initiated the cooperation 
with the local municipality, but in other cases, the government sought a rap-
prochement. For example, after having started their cooperation, the Amsterdam 
municipality urged Ons Huis to take an active interest in female factory-
employees who worked long hours and afterwards looked for social diversion 
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that was regarded to be of an immoral kind. Sometime later, the municipality 
also persuaded Ons Huis to offer boxing-lessons for the youth – an activity that 
was considered even by Ons Huis to be rather outside its core business of moral 
edification. Nevertheless, Ons Huis complied in both cases.21 And additionally, 
Ons Huis answered the call note of the government on a national level. As a 
result of the economic crisis of the 1930s, the unemployment rates skyrocketed 
to 20% of the labor force. The government issued a grant for those organizations 
that were willing and able to provide care to the unemployed.22 Ons Huis ap-
plied successfully, and so, even though Ons Huis had hardly any experience 
with finding employment, it also became an employment intermediary – a posi-
tion that nobody would probably have imagined a few years earlier. According 
to historian Nijenhuis, this broadening of its work area by Ons Huis was based 
on the fact that the organization did not want to strain its good relations with the 
government, indicating that Ons Huis had started to growingly appreciate this 
form of cooperation, presumably due to the fact that the government provided 
for the bulk of its finances by 1936.23 
3.2. A reciprocal agreement 
In the area of probation work as well, the government started to show increasing 
interest in its relation with civil society. During the term of Cabinet-Kuyper 
(1901-1905), the Catholic Minister of Justice, Loeff (1901-1905) made inci-
dental subsidies available for civil society organizations that were active in the 
rehabilitation work of released prisoners. These subsidies were mainly allocated 
to those probation groups that had united into the Nederlandsch Genootschap tot 
Zedelijke Verbetering der Gevangenen (The Dutch Fellowship for Moral 
Reformation of Prisoners, 1823). Also, a small part was allocated to the Salva-
tion Army, even though it had been closely cooperating with the Genootschap. 
Nelissen (1908-1910), a successor of Loeff, changed this incidental subsidy 
arrangement in 1910 into the Reclasseringsregeling (Probation Order). By doing 
so, he called upon organizations that were already active in the field of probation 
and to commit to a structural form of cooperation with the government. In re-
turn, the Ministry of Justice demanded a so-called “declaration of willingness”, 
stating that the organization was prepared to subject itself to the stipulations of 
the Reclasseringsregeling and thus declare to be in line with government goals. 
In exchange for the financial support, the government wanted to have a certain 
amount of influence over how these subsidies were spent, and after much delib-
eration, many probation organizations, including the Salvation Army, eventually 
complied.24 Therefore, in contrast with the incidental financial support that 
community center organizations received in 1910, on the matter of probation, 
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the government aimed actively at the creation of more continuous and secure 
relations, based on a more structural flow of subsidy. 
With regard to the governmental approach on social matters during the end 
of the nineteenth century, the liberals aimed at increasing the influence by an 
ideologically neutral state. The confessionals however, wanted to curb this pos-
sible neutralization by means of strengthening the position of Dutch civil socie-
ty. Civil society could therefore serve as a buffer between the state and the citi-
zens.25 With the growing political dominance of these confessionals, both gov-
ernment and civil society changed their initial attitudes towards each other from 
being mutually reluctant towards a clear inclination for a more structural coop-
eration.  
In addition, both sides clearly showed a certain amount of flexibility. The 
government seemed to be increasingly willing to provide financial support and 
even invited civil society to make use of the available funds, something that 
would have been rather unthinkable 50 years ago. Flexibility was shown from 
the side of civil society as well. Ons Huis, for example, seemed to be quite pre-
pared to adapt its operational scope to the wishes of both the local and national 
government. To a certain extent, it can even be argued that Ons Huis, and other 
civil society organizations showed willingness to recalibrate their own goals to 
those of the government, and in return, the government valued their services. 
Part of the changes that seemed to occur in the relation between the government 
and civil society was this inclusion of reciprocity based on the exchange of ser-
vices for money.  
3.3. Supplementarity 
This reciprocal agreement however, was not realized overnight, for many organ-
izations that considered grant applications experienced an urgent sense of am-
bivalence. On the one hand, the individual and often altruistic public financial 
support at the grassroots of these organizations was very uncertain and resulted 
in an irregular flow of money. This combined with the increase in social prob-
lems, made the prospect of a more secure structural supplementation from the 
side of the government seem inviting. On the other hand, however, the fear for 
government influence was very much alive within civil society as well as within 
the government itself. This was reflected by the maxim that formed the basis of 
many initial subsidy arrangements: supplementarity. As a result of the combina-
tion of the Catholic political philosophy of ‘subsidiarity’ and the Reformed prin-
ciple of ‘sphere sovereignty’, the Dutch government regarded interference with 
civil society as an undermining of its effectivity and even as endangering its 
existence. So, governmental financial support was supposed to be auxiliary to 
the organization’s finances, and was provided on a temporary basis. In this man-
ner, government support was based on the idea of supplementarity. 
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From the side of civil society as well, the fear for dependency on government 
funding and possible accompanying government interference was duly felt. The 
general idea was that when a subsidy was allocated, the government wanted to 
have a say in how to spend this money. Even though the government seemed to 
respect the principles of sphere sovereignty and subsidiarity, this influence still 
felt like a limitation to the organizational freedom in policymaking. So, “how 
would that affect the autonomy, and even worse, the identity of the organiza-
tion?” the Protestant community-center organizations wondered.26 The Catholic 
home-care and district nursing organization Wit-Gele Kruis (White-Yellow 
Cross, 1916) also struggled with this matter. The organization consisted of vari-
ous small and relatively autonomous branches across the Netherlands, but in 
1923, two important reasons drove them to combine forces in a federation. The 
first reason was that by doing so, the Wit-Gele Kruis could become a full-blown 
intermediary for its grassroots levels. The second reason was that, as an inter-
mediary, it could lobby with the government in order to create relevant policy 
and to appropriate the necessary financial means to implement such policy.27 
Therefore, by unification into one organizational body, the Wit-Gele Kruis or-
ganizations tried to strengthen their position towards the government, while at 
the same time being able to receive government funds. In return, it was prepared 
to accept the loss of the individual character of the organizations.28 This theme 
was also discussed within the new umbrella organization of the probation area of 
the work field, Vereeniging van Reclasseeringsinstellingen (VvRI, Association 
of Probation Organizations, 1912). Once again the government itself concluded 
that even though it wanted to have some say on the material side of the work 
(e.g. how was the allocated money spent?), it abstained from influence on the 
non-material side of the work. This part was regarded to be the realm of the 
organizations themselves, because they represented the ideology of their grass-
roots. For this reason, the after-care for released prisoners was left entirely to the 
probation organizations.29 
3.4. Preliminary professionalization and harmonization 
With regard to the policy content that formed the basis for this preliminary co-
operation, public health issues like tuberculosis or the mortality rate of newly 
born, combined with issues of public moral, such as the example of the rowdy 
Amsterdam youth shows, often formed incentives for the government to search 
for cooperation with civil society organizations. These were problems of a usu-
ally incidental nature that also called for solutions of a temporary kind.  
On another level however, a long-term perspective seemed perceptible. In 
1922, the Amsterdam municipality demanded that the work it subsidized for Ons 
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Huis be done by trained youth leaders.30 This demand for a schooled staff was 
hard to ignore because the organization had been successfully working together 
with the Amsterdam municipality, and in order to preserve this relationship and 
the accompanying regular flow of income that it had been receiving during this 
period, Ons Huis complied. This professionalization was also perceptible on 
another level. During the 1920s the government increasingly demanded verifica-
tion of the correct application of the allocated public funds. In order to induce 
subsidized organizations to comply with this need, stipulations were added to 
the subsidy arrangements that required these organizations to keep their books 
and to file reports on their activities.31 During the 1930s more types of subsidy 
would require this form of accountability and as a result these stipulations also 
contributed to the professionalization of the organization. 
This attention for professionalization was accompanied by another motiva-
tion that seemed to drive the government during this period. One of the results 
of the pillarized Dutch social landscape was that the social work field had ex-
panded. This had led to a fragmented and compartmentalized organizational 
hotchpotch.32 In the area of poor relief alone, there were about 7500 active or-
ganizations in 1900.33 Its increasing interest in social issues confronted the gov-
ernment with this wide variety of organizations, and any coordination effort 
seemed to be quite impossible and expensive. Therefore, the government stimu-
lated the already ongoing process of the clustering of these organizations. This 
so-called “harmonization” could be realized in different ways. For instance, the 
Wit-Gele Kruis federations of Den Bosch and Breda were forced in 1929 to 
merge into a provincial institute, as the national government had adjusted the 
former subsidy stipulations accordingly.34 Especially within the realms of the 
ideological pillars, harmonization was further stimulated. In 1923, for example, 
the Amsterdam municipality made clear that the Catholic community-center 
work that was provided for by Sint Fransiscus Liefdewerk (St. Francis Charity, 
1894) would continue to receive a subsidy only when they would become a 
member of the federation of the Roman Catholic youth groups.35  
Now that the government and civil society had started out on a cooperative 
journey, the emerging policy themes of professionalization and harmonization 
seemed to have added another dimension to this relation. From the side of the 
government, there was an increasing awareness of subsidy being an effective 
instrument to stimulate civil society. Still, the reluctance that civil society dis-
played with regard to cooperation with the government by accepting subsidies 
proved not to have been groundless, for certain consequences of this developing 
relationship were not anticipated. 
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3.5. Unforeseen consequences 
The possibility to tap into governmental financial sources seems to have been an 
incentive to establish new organizations. This process was strongly tied to the 
process of pillarization as is exemplified by the establishment of the Catholic 
Wit-Gele Kruis. According to sociologist Wijnen-Sponselee, the most important 
drive to establish these Catholic Cross-organizations seems to have been the 
probability that the already existing ‘general’ home-nursing service organization 
Groene Kruis (Green Cross, 1901) would snap up the available subsidies.36 
Therefore, even though it was not really anticipated, the increase in home-
nursing organizations from a mere 13 in 1880 to 840 in 1920, is hardly surpris-
ing.37 
Another unforeseen consequence was that even though many subsidies were 
granted on a temporary basis, a part of them would eventually prove to be of a 
more structural nature. This strongly depended on the persistence of the problem 
that the subsidy addressed. For example, the money that was earmarked to coun-
ter tuberculosis amounted in 1903 to approximately fl.10,000 and its allocation 
was based on a temporary arrangement. However, fifteen years later the TBC 
bacteria were still strongly persistent, forcing the government to increase its 
financial support to this cause to an annual amount of fl.220,000.38 
This structural character of some of the arrangements led to a growing sense 
of habituation among the organizations that benefitted from them, as was exem-
plified by the provincial home-nursing organization. After having received sub-
sidies since 1933, the balance sheet of the organization showed a surplus in 
1936. Based on the argument that this was proof of the fact that the organization 
was able to control its costs, the provincial administration revoked the subsidies 
amounting to fl.3,600 on a total balance of fl.7,600. That this would result in an 
immediate and serious deficit for the home-nursing organization came probably 
as a surprise to the province, for in 1939 it reinstated the subsidies.39 However, 
although the provincial home-nursing organization had now experienced the 
possible consequences of its financial dependency on the Dutch government, it 
did not refrain from further grants. On the contrary, by 1939 the grants had 
slowly but surely grown from a supplementary status to the organization’s main 
financial source of income.40 The provincial home-nursing organization seemed 
to have attached enough importance to this financial arrangement to let this 
detail slip by. 
Even though the government showed an increasing interest in social issues 
by means of legislation, accompanied by a possible threat of infringement of the 
domain of civil society, it also showed great willingness to work together with 
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civil society organizations. Civil society in its turn, acted upon both the fear of 
government interference as well as its financial need, and not only increasingly 
agreed on such a cooperative effort, but it also started to acknowledge and some-
times even initiate it. With the legal confirmation that civil society organizations 
maintained their primacy in the domain of poor relief, another period of hard-
ship announced itself in the form of World War II. 
4. A social policy system in the making (1945-1960) 
4.1. Restoration and renewal 
During World War II, the seed of a new development sprouted as an internation-
ally shared course was set off in order to create a basic level of social insurance 
for all people. The idea that underpinned this process was that governments 
were to take structural action to counterbalance the possible destructive effects 
of economic and (international) political developments, because if they failed to 
do so their citizens would remain too vulnerable, as had been demonstrated by 
the turmoil during the first half of the century. In Social Insurance and Allied 
Services, Sir William Beveridge sketched the outline for such an universal social 
security system in the United Kingdom, once again based on the idea of solidari-
ty.41 The ultimate result would be social security ‘from the cradle to the grave’, 
that materialized into, for example, the collective provision of free medical ser-
vices in the UK through the National Health Service.42 In his proposal, Beve-
ridge displayed a combination of the liberal notions of personal responsibility 
and freedom with the more socialist view on government planning and sup-
port.43 The socialist component also became perceptible by the compulsory 
character of the arrangement, for again it would be the national government that 
was urged to initiate and create these social arrangements. 
These innovative policy concepts did not fall on deaf ears and were heard al-
so in the Netherlands. However, their actual implementation would need more 
time because with the rising of the dust cloud of World War II it became clear 
that the Dutch political, social and material infrastructure had suffered severe 
damage. A month after the surrender of the German army in 1945, Prime Minis-
ter Schermerhorn (1945-1946, VDB) announced that it was time for restoration 
and renewal:  
 
“Restoration of everything material that our nation needs, restoration also of 
everything and all institutions that determine our intellectual and spiritual 
atmosphere and that were valued by our people. And also renewal. A word 
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that expresses the perception that in our national life all kinds of needs were 
suffered, raising desires and strengthening the will to improve.”44  
 
In order to realize this, the government found a willing partner in the Dutch civil 
society. Potential policy conflicts were avoided as much as possible because a 
mutual consent on postwar reconstruction seemed to align the goals of both 
parties, and a reconstruction-alliance was formed that lasted throughout the first 
postwar decades. Self-control, frugality and toil were commonly understood 
principles, especially within the realms of the political elite that decided to co-
operate.45 Renewal occurred, for instance, in the area of economics when a 
Keynesian economical demand-management system was supported by the poli-
tics of ‘planned wages’ and a growing web of social security arrangements. On a 
political level, reconstruction was visible in terms of the reinstallation of the 
prewar pillarized political power structure. This however, in its turn spurred 
another drive for renewal, as was embodied in the establishment of a Dutch 
labor party Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA) in 1946. Next to the aim of becoming 
the representative party of the Dutch labor force, the PvdA aimed at the uproot-
ing of these prewar pillars.46 
This consensus on reconstruction and renewal resulted in an intensified co-
operation between government and private organizations like unions, and led to, 
what many have called, a period of corporatism.47 Inspired by the ideas of Beve-
ridge, the Dutch governmental Committee-Van Rhijn sketched the foundations 
for a Dutch version of social security.48 With the corporatist consensus holding 
the doors open for new policy on social matters, Minister of Social Affairs, 
Drees (1945-1948, PvdA) took this train of thought further by creating the legal 
fundaments of what has been called the Dutch welfare state.49 In 1947 Drees 
introduced the Noodwet Ouderdomsvoorziening (Emergency Elderly Act) that 
would later be reformed into a pension guarantee for everyone, called the Alge-
mene Ouderdomswet (AOW, General Elderly Act, 1956), and a basic income for 
involuntary unemployed workers was guaranteed in 1949 by means of the Werk-
loosheidswet (WW, Unemployment Act).  
Between 1958 and 1973 the Dutch political landscape was dominated by the 
confessional parties. The two largest Dutch confessional parties KVP and ARP 
took the political lead, and in alternating coalitions with the liberal-democrats 
(VVD) and the PvdA, important social welfare legislation was created. This 
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‘safety net’ consisted of the Algemene Kinderbijslagwet (AKW, Child Allow-
ance Act, 1962), the Wet op de Arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering (WAO, Em-
ployment Disability Act, 1967) and the Algemene wet bijzondere ziektenkosten 
(AWBZ, Additional Health Assurance Act, 1967). The symbolic crown jewel of 
the Dutch welfare state and the most fundamental universal social security ar-
rangement was formed, however, by the Algemene Bijstandswet (ABW, Social 
Assistance Act, 1963), for with the ABW the fundament of the Dutch social 
security was formed. Now all citizens were guaranteed an income.50 Together 
with the correlation of social security to the minimum wage in 1969, a collective 
basic level of subsistence was created.  
4.2. Institutionalization: Ministry of Social Work 
The relation between civil society and the government also showed its develop-
ing dynamics when during this postwar period, the government seemed to be-
come more and more responsible for the material side of social care by provid-
ing for subsidies and social security. Additionally, civil society was increasingly 
confronted by the reduction of its responsibilitie to the alleviation of non-
material needs only.51 On the other hand, both civil society and the government 
were conscious of the possible weakening effect on civil society and both want-
ed to guard the balance between the two actors. 
This balance was also one of the assignments of the new Ministry of Social 
Work (MaWe) that was established in 1952. During the formation of the third 
Cabinet-Drees (1952-1956), the Catholics – that like the Social Democrats had 
reorganized themselves into new a political party called Katholieke Volks Partij 
(KVP, Catholic People’s Party, 1946) – aimed to counterbalance the political 
influence that the Social Democrats had gained by means of their traditional 
claim on the Ministry of Social Affairs. It was not unthinkable that this social-
democrat influence could result in an increasing state influence in the social 
policy domain. According to the KVP however, the state had to keep its distance 
because it had to enable civil society to provide for care to its grassroots. And 
this could very well be realized by subsidization. Eventually, Prime Minister 
Drees (1948-1958, PvdA) yielded. The Ministry of MaWe was established and 
the KVP provided for its administration and management.52  
By establishing a separate political institution for social welfare matters, the 
importance of the idea of the government providing for the general well-being of 
all its citizens was underlined. This ministry also provided for a means for the 
KVP to increase its influence on national policy issues. Additionally it secured 
the position of civil society with regard to the state, because by means of this 
ministry, the state would be able to make a coordinated effort to create coherent 
policy on social issues and at the same time confirm the role of civil society in 
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this field.53 On the other hand, by means of the Ministry of MaWe the Dutch 
state also disposed of an institutional structure to continue the prewar endeavor 
to do something about the myriad of organizations that were active in social 
services and to encourage these organizations to improve their services by 
means of professionalization.54 The underlying idea was no different from in the 
prewar era: by means of a ministry, cooperative efforts could be channeled and 
coordinated. Harmonization of the work field would help to increase efficiency 
as well as enhance the quality of the organizations and their services.55 
One of the characteristic differences with the prewar era however, was that 
with the establishment of this ministry, the creation of new policy would expand 
enormously, as would the accompanying subsidies. Prior to its establishment, 
Drees had already revealed its reserve towards the existence of the ministry by 
calling it “the spending ministry”.56 
4.3. Identity and representation as principles of organization 
The prewar policy theme of harmonization was embarked on with vigor by the 
Ministry of MaWe. Harmonization however, was not only supported by gov-
ernment, but also by civil society organizations because now both parties could 
benefit from the formation of a more coherent organizational structure.57 In 
order to achieve this, the ministry functioned like a spider in the social work 
web, aiming for further harmonization. At the same time, the ministry provided 
funds for civil society to continue its unification process into umbrella organiza-
tions.58  
This harmonization process revealed that the government specifically valued 
one traditional feature of civil society: its faith-based or ideological identity. The 
social segmentation along the demarcation lines of the common ideological 
denominators, called forth a clustering of this work field. In order to strengthen 
this perceived development, in 1955 the ministry issued a subsidy arrangement 
that was called Samenwerkingsorganen op neutrale of levensbeschouwelijke 
grondslag (Cooperative bodies on a neutral or faith-based ground). One of the 
expected results was the scaling-up and a subsequent improvement of efficiency 
that would strengthen the constellation of the pillars.59 Therefore the arrange-
ment provided for salaried professionals that were to coordinate the cooperation 
of relevant organizations that were active within the same pillar.60 In this view, 
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the main ordering principle was formed by the shared identity of certain groups 
of civil organizations, and according to the first Minister of Social Work Van 
Thiel (KVP, 1952-1956) it was by reinforcement of this binding capacity of 
identity that the influence of the state on civil society would be curbed. This was 
important for Van Thiel, because now that social work had a serious impact on 
the lives of an increasing group of people, the idea that by means of these social 
services the influence of the state could reach into this private realm, was unac-
ceptable by both civil society organizations as well as the Catholic minister 
himself.61 The varied ideological world-views of these organizations were rec-
ognized as essential, because it was the personal and private nature of social 
work that made “social work based on an ideological foundation of the utmost 
importance.”.62 This point of view would however make an equal support of 
organizations of all different pillars unavoidable. For example, in order to do 
justice to this diversity of the Dutch ideological segmented work field, repre-
sentatives of all ideological currents had to be accounted for in the main deliber-
ative bodies that were concerned with policy matters.63 
4.4. Participation through shared responsibility 
The emphasis on the identity of civil society was also detectable in the efforts of 
the ministry to involve civil society organizations in the policymaking process. 
Under the label of “social planning” the ministry wanted to increase the in-
volvement of the Dutch people in the policy process by including their repre-
sentative organizations. Based on joint social research activities, the relevance 
and effectiveness of social policy could be enhanced.64 This approach on poli-
cymaking was inspired by the American concept of ‘community organization’. 
After a work visit to the United States in 1954, a group of ministry officials 
became acquainted with this concept that propagated the idea that in order to 
stimulate the public to take responsibility for improvement of their own social 
situation, local private initiative had to be activated by means of a continuing 
dialogue with the government. This approach was expected to create a sense of 
shared responsibility because when civil society organizations would be actively 
involved in the policy process, this involvement would generate public support 
in itself.65 
The concept of shared responsibility would also be implemented on another 
level than representation. For instance, whenever the Ministry of Social Work 
granted a subsidy, the organization in question would also have to contribute in 
a financial way. According to the ministry, by doing so “the people express their 
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joint responsibility for their fellow men.”.66 In addition, the idea of shared re-
sponsibility was connected to the role of the volunteer in social work activities. 
Professionalization was necessary in order to create a certain measure of quality, 
but on the other hand, as Van Thiel’s successor Minister Klompé (KVP, 1965-
1963 and 1966-1971) stressed, the mobilization of the volunteer would also have 
to become one of the mainstays of the ministry’s policy of social work, for “af-
ter all, the work of the volunteer is the proof of the willingness of the population 
to carry out this work.”67 
Boosted by the establishment of the Ministry of Social Work, the govern-
ment converted its recognition of the value of the identity of civil society into 
new policy initiatives. As representatives of their specific grassroots, civil socie-
ty organizations had expertise on the needs and deficits of their people and thus 
would know best how to allocate the money that the ministry put at their dispos-
al. The idea of representation resonated within many civil society organizations, 
but it did not seem to detract much from the risk of government interference 
with what was perceived as being the affairs of civil society.68 Any government 
intrusion could mean diminishing autonomy for civil society. However, the 
government shared the same reluctance and the ministry explicitly underlined 
that in order to be effective, the autonomy of civil society was indispensible, and 
with the aim of guarding this autonomy the ministry had, by all means, to be 
auxiliary to the well-appreciated social work of these civil society organiza-
tions.69 
4.5. Initial effects 
By the end of the 1950s, the first effects of the expanding policy effort on social 
work became visible. In the relatively underdeveloped work field of elderly care 
for example, the number of organizations that were subsidized had risen from 7 
in 1954 to 79 in 1959 - a trend that the minister described as being sound.70 This 
growth, however, was rather unforeseen, and it started to have its consequences 
for the budget. In 1959 minister Klompé indicated that not all of the subsidy 
applications could be granted.71 On the other hand, the minister explicitly 
stressed that in the social work areas that lacked an effective approach, extra 
subsidy was needed.72 This rationale indicated that the ministry started to realize 
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its controlling power. The use of subsidy was now openly confirmed as a public 
policy instrument. In 1962, for example, the ministry stated that the two pillars 
of its policy were research of social developments and stimulation of civil socie-
ty by means of subsidies in order to respond appropriately to the outcome of 
these studies. 
However, not all policy initiatives had the effects that were aimed for. In 
1960 the ministry indicated that an unwanted development of what was called 
“an ongoing formalization and institutionalization in society” was going on, 
possibly leading towards a gap between the government and civil society organ-
izations on the one side and the Dutch population on the other. An adjustment of 
policy was made, for according to the ministry, civil society had to “communi-
cate” more with its grassroots in order to create a sense of shared responsibility 
and bearing surface for proposal for social policy, and to strengthen their mutual 
bonds.73 Civil society organizations were also called on to improve the measure 
of “self-activation” of their clients.74 This meant that the subsidies were increas-
ingly aimed at efforts on the part of civil society to encourage the initiative and 
independence of the Dutch citizens. Additionally, local governments were en-
ticed to contribute to this aim by means of decentralization of policy responsibil-
ities – a train of thought that would remain recognizable for the coming dec-
ades.75 
With regard to the position of civil society, the Ministry of Social Work con-
tinued to underline the value of civil society as a partner in the realization of 
policy aims. In 1963 in a statement, the ministry affirmed that by a cooperative 
effort the government and civil society had contributed to the prosperity of the 
people as well as their well-being. According to the ministry, many civil society 
organizations had actually shaped government policy, and had done this in a 
structural manner.76 In addition, it was acknowledged that this had also had its 
effects on civil society itself, and that because of the close cooperation between 
government and civil society, some tasks had shifted sides from civil society to 
the government. This required organizations to reorientate towards other new 
tasks and it altered their place in the constellation.77 As stated before, the mutual 
commitment of the government and civil society to policy themes like harmoni-
zation, professionalization, and now participation and quality as well, was large-
ly based on a strategy of supplementarism: the government provided for money 
and preconditions; civil society for knowledge, increasingly skilled profession-
als and public legitimacy for government policy. At the turn of the 1950s this 
swapping of public revenues in return for the commitment of civil society had 
revealed to be of a repetitive, systematic character, and by then the contour of a 
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structural and rather systematic relationship between both actors had become 
perceptible on the matter of policy – a social policy system. 
5. Crystallizing policy themes (1960-1974) 
By 1960 the Netherlands had become an affluent nation. A huge supply of natu-
ral gas was discovered under the northern part of Holland, which boosted its 
position in the international market. Employment rates skyrocketed to about 
98% of the labor force, and additionally, an intricate web of social security ar-
rangements was woven, forming a “safety net” for all that might come to need it. 
Nevertheless, 1960 also seemed to herald the end of the era of political collabo-
ration. Discontent rose within the realm of the labor force because they felt over-
looked in the allotment of the benefits of this new prosperity and in support of 
their demand for higher wages, in 1963 strikes were initiated. Material well-
being seemed to increasingly supersede the previously more important non-
material well-being; a change in the atmosphere in the public realm that would 
also have its political consequences.78 
In 1963 the Social Assistance Act (ABW) was ratified. The originator of this 
Act, minister Klompé, aimed to disconnect the moral bonds between material 
care and non-material care. In neighboring countries, for instance, citizens had a 
fundamental right to a government-guaranteed level of subsistence, but in the 
Netherlands this material care was still connected to the possibility of a condi-
tional sale with non-material care. So, when the government would become 
responsible for the material part, the care for the non-material aid would have to 
remain with civil society, because this way, any undesired state interference 
with private matters was prevented.79 This meant that next to the enormous im-
portance that the ABW had for many Dutch citizens in terms of income security, 
it also had its consequences for the civil society organizations. Civil society 
would have to give up a part of its traditional focus on poverty and some of its 
influence as well. However, a massive protest from the side of civil society or-
ganizations failed to occur. Civil society had been consulted intensely during the 
ratification process, and in the end a broad support for the ABW was obtained 
amongst civil society organizations.80 
Even though the government was very much aware of the fact that the ABW 
would change the position of civil society, the Ministry of Social Work ( re-
named in 1965 as the Ministerie van Cultuur, Recreatie en Maatschappelijk 
Werk, CRM, Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work) stood aloof and 
awaited the outcome of the repositioning process that civil society organizations 
were about to be engaged in.81 This attitude did not however mean that the min-
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istry did not value any further cooperation with civil society. On the contrary, it 
continued its close collaboration with civil society, because the ministry itself 
lacked the resources that were traditionally available to civil society.82 Addition-
ally, close cooperation with civil society also secured public support for gov-
ernments policy ambitions. With regard to civil society however, in this cooper-
ation the element of identity seemed to have been narrowed down to the provi-
sion of non-material aid only. 
5.1. Quality and participation 
As the representative of its grassroots, civil society had proven its value to the 
government on different policy themes. Themes like professionalization, harmo-
nization and shared responsibility provided for enough common ground for both 
actors to work together. On the level of the organization and its employees, the 
development of professionalization of the civil society organizations continued 
in the form of adjustment of the internal administrative process, serving the 
purpose of accountability – a prerequisite that grew more important with the 
further development of the postwar subsidy system. A second important aspect 
of professionalization was the education of employees. The need for education 
had already grown long before World War II, but also during the 1960s further 
training, education and schooling was marked as one of the main goals of the 
government in order to professionalize civil society organizations.83 
The concept of shared responsibility was developed into the provision for a 
structural subsidy flow. By doing so, the government tried to establish a con-
structive and qualitative relationship with civil society, aiming to create a mutual 
view on different problem areas instead of a mere focus on the amount of subsi-
dy an organization was able to receive.84 During the first years of the 1960s, the 
concept of shared responsibility also expanded to other, more local governmen-
tal levels. Stressing the principle of subsidiarity, the ministry aimed to allocate 
social responsibilities as close as possible to the people that experience their 
consequences.85 This decentralization of policy responsibilities would mean that 
subsidies would be granted on a lower governmental level than just on a national 
level, because it was in fact the local governments that were supposed to have 
better oversight over the social problems that were present and therefore would 
know better how to allocate the money than the national government would. 
Analogous to the additional funds that civil society had to raise in order to be-
come eligible for national grants, now the local governments also had to raise a 
part of the subsidy total that was allocated. This governmental policy ambition 
meant that civil society organizations were to increasingly deal with different 
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governmental levels in different locations at the same time, instead of dealing 
with one ministry at the national level. By 1967 the ministry concluded that the 
position of many municipalities was improved because local governments had 
increasingly gained the responsibility to provide for the necessary social care for 
their community and to do so they could call in local civil society organiza-
tions.86 
However, even though this effort for shared responsibility aimed to create 
public support for social policy, the grassroots of civil society seemed to care 
less. Different reports on social change suggested a correlation between growing 
material wealth and decreasing happiness, that subsequently led to a growing 
lack of interest for the public cause. This change in the public perception of the 
welfare state seemed to influence the legitimization of social policy during the 
first years of the 1960s. Therefore, in order to regain this much-needed public 
support, the Ministry of Social Work concluded that the idea of welfare had to 
be redefined. Because the material concept of welfare was increasingly associat-
ed with the spirit of consumerism – a hot topic of debate during the 1960s – it 
was decided that its non-material side of well-being was to be emphasized in the 
policy lines of the ministry; non-material well-being in which personal devel-
opment and social renewal were placed at the center.87 This readjustment of the 
idea and concepts of social policy made individual and cultural development the 
center of the ministry’s focus with the relatively new subculture of the younger 
generation as a hallmark.88  
The development of a youth subculture that reacted against the traditional 
social structures and the culture of their parents, had also resulted in a call for a 
democratic influence within the same structures. This combination of democra-
tization and individual development seemed to result in “a growing desire to 
carry one’s own responsibility”.89 These social trends were observed not just on 
an individual basis, they also seemed to seep through all of society, for it was 
also observed that many civil society organizations were not quite up to date 
with regard to democratization.90 That, however, was not the only peril that 
seemed to approach civil society. Another problem was that the enduring ambi-
tion for professionalization seemed to have put the volunteers in a tight spot. 
Traditionally these volunteers had been invaluable for civil society because they 
formed the core of their grassroots. However, because of the influx of profes-
sionals that also took over the work, the position of these volunteers had gradu-
ally changed from being the regular core of the social work staff to mere assis-
tants to the professionals, a position that curbed the creativity and self-
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motivation of these volunteers. Moreover, this loss of social capital of individual 
and altruistic commitment was contrary to the government goal of individual 
participation and shared responsibility.91  
In order to respond to the developments of democratization and individuali-
zation, government policy had to be adjusted, and the core strategy of social 
planning was joined by a more activist notion of ‘social reform’, being a collec-
tive term for quality of life, social ability, social action, permanent education 
and participation.92 In 1967 the Ministry of CRM took a critical stance towards 
the “empty pleasures of the consumer society” and a counterbalance was found 
in the prominence of individual development by emphasizing that people had to 
participate in matters that played a part in their own lives, for example politics.93 
Increasing focus was placed on the education and moral elevation of the public 
by raising the subsidies for popular education, arts, archaeology, nature conser-
vation and recreation, and people were to take active part in these “essential 
elements of life”.94  
In 1970 the Minister of CRM, Klompé put this idea of participation at the 
center of the social policy by setting the focus on democratization and “self-
activation”. According to the minister, next to the possibility of being actively 
involved in a democratic society, the individual citizen did actually have the 
responsibility to participate in the realization of the well-being of his or her fel-
low citizens. Civil society organizations would have to create the necessary 
conditions to activate their grassroots, which once again confirmed the interme-
diary function of the organization.95 Klompé also suggested that one of these 
conditions might very well be increasing harmonization and even reduction of 
the many civil society organizations, because that might well improve the acces-
sibility of the welfare arrangements for the citizens.96 
5.2. Manageability 
Next to these efforts on quality and participation, the government continued to 
further harmonize social work organizations during these years. The idea of 
combining different organizations into large-scale forms of cooperation was 
particularly relevant for the Dutch rural areas, but for the urbanized areas the 
varied presence of organizations that were based on different ideologies was still 
much valued. Therefore, the government also continued to strengthen the bonds 
between civil society organizations and their grassroots. In 1964, the liberal 
Minister Schouwenaar-Franssen (VVD, 1963-1965) even decided that in order 
to be eligible for certain subsidies, minimum requirements be included with 
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regard to cooperation with other organizations and the government.97 In 1966 
minister Klompé had returned to the supervision of the ministry that by then was 
called CRM. Two years later she suggested a check on the measure in which 
civil society organizations aligned with the government goal of effectivity. This 
check was inspired by the notion that some of the work was done twice or with-
out an actual need for it. So a clarification on the effectivity was supposed to 
lead to a closer cooperation between organizations, even to a point where organ-
izations might consider mergers.98 Therefore, by the end of the 1960s the Minis-
try of CRM showed a more explicit and active attitude towards improvement of 
manageability of the work field by further harmonization. 
In the first part of the 1970s, the ministry’s harmonization effort received 
support in an unexpected way. As a result of the oil crisis, the economic climate 
started to lose its vigor, and in an effort to shield the ministry from inevitable 
cutbacks, Minister Engels (KVP, 1971-1973) hurried to re-emphasize the ra-
tionale of the ministry’s existence by stating that social-cultural policy was at 
least of the same value as social-economic policy:  
 
“He who thinks (…) that social-cultural activities can only cost money when 
the social-economic needs are met, reduces these activities to a mere orna-
ment of a collective or individual welfare situation.”.99  
 
In addition, in order to support this rhetorical image he presented concrete ac-
tions: the economic situation seemed to ask from civil society organizations to 
make larger contributions, and additionally to reorganize into the most effective 
organizational mold available, including an effective deployment of personnel; 
actions that were very much in line with the ministry’s policy on shared respon-
sibility and harmonization.100 
5.3. Unforeseen effects  
These developments have had their impact on the forming of social policy con-
cepts. Professionalization had been regarded as one of the guarantees for im-
proving the quality of social work, and therefore by 1970 professionalization 
had become a standardized stipulation in many subsidy arrangements. This em-
phasis on professionalization however, seemed to form a field of tension with 
another emerging underlying value: participation, represented by the policy 
concept of shared responsibility. 
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Since the emergence of the social policy system an important incentive to in-
duce civil society to take action was public money and subsequently various 
subsidy arrangements were created for different aims. This myriad of subsidies 
however, also had its organizational downside, because they were increasingly 
experienced as inconveniently arranged and impossible to gain an overview of, 
as if they were without system and efficiency.101 Another consequence of this 
growing policy system was that, as observed before, the allocated subsidies 
created a new demand for even more subsidies, because the expansion of civil 
society organizations demanded for additional funds in order to support the or-
ganizational and administrative structures. The policy on professionalism had 
increased the costs for civil society organizations, and combined with the devel-
opments of rising wages and market prices these costs had increased to such 
levels that the organizations themselves were not able to bear them. In reaction 
to this difficult situation, Minister of CRM Vrolijk (PvdA, 1965-1966) notified 
in 1965 to being prepared to step in with additional funds and also to decrease 
the percentage of the organization’s contribution to the costs.102 By doing so, 
however, a central feature of the subsidy system as the confessionals had envi-
sioned was endangered because this approach was directly at odds with the idea 
of shared responsibility. So even if the social policy system had its advantages 
with regard to policy reaction and implementation, it also had its unforeseen 
effects. And some of these would soon become the center of attention.
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CHAPTER 2. FROM INSTITUTIONAL REPRESENTATION 
TOWARDS INDIVIDUAL ACTIVATION (1974-1990) 
1. Pinpointing the problems 
At the beginning of the 1970s it had become clear that the total of subsidy ar-
rangements and the number of civil society organizations that laid a claim on 
them, had created a complex and even problematic whole. This complexity di-
minished the accessibility of the arrangements for those who were in need, and 
thus these subsidies also lost some of their effect as a governing tool. Therefore 
attempts were made to come to a more univocal arrangement of the various 
subsidies, and in 1973 a committee was appointed to see how such a system 
could be forged: Beraadsgroep Harmonisatie Welzijnsbeleid en Welzijnswetgev-
ing (Committee on Harmonization of Social policy and Welfare legislation). In 
May 1974, the committee finished its work and presented its first explorations.1 
In this report, that would soon become known as the Knelpuntennota (bottleneck 
report), the alleged social policy troubles were structurally analyzed.  
The committee had audited the social policy and practice by means of five 
criteria: coherency of welfare provisions; public accessibility of these provi-
sions; measure of democracy within the organizations that provided for these 
activities; measure of flexibility within these organizations; and the legal status 
of the organizations, their employees and their clients. The general outcome was 
that improvement was considered necessary on all levels. In that sense, the re-
port was uncompromising in pinpointing many of the presumed inherent defects, 
tensions, contradictions and problems of the social policy system that had be-
come visible during recent years. Also, the report seemed to be especially harsh 
on civil society. 
The key word in the title was harmonization, which referred to the perceived 
discord between current social policy and its practical implications. The rapidly 
changing legitimization of social welfare during the 1960s had made social poli-
cy a repository for divergent issues, and in combination with a growing habitua-
tion towards the financial support of civil society organizations, the result was, 
according to the committee, an unmanageable combination of policies and or-
ganizations. The report put this “unbridled growth of activities, provisions, or-
ganizations, regulations, institutions, projects and subsidies” in a historical per-
spective and also made suggestions for improvement.2 
On a macro level, certain elements that seemed to have caused this expansion 
were defined: economic and demographic expansion, development of sciences, a 
changing social awareness and fundamental criticism of the modern technologi-
cal-industrial society. A second level of contributing factors had to do with the 
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stimulation of welfare as a result of government policy. Here, the report referred 
to the increasing growth of organizations within the ideological pillars and the 
subsequent variety in and between services. In addition, the emphasis on profes-
sionalism was regarded to be a part of the problems, as the report interpreted 
“professionalism” as “the replacement of the volunteer by the professional”.3 A 
third important element that contributed to this “unbridled growth” was the em-
phasis that government put on the availability of social provisions by means of 
financial support and other managerial instruments. 
1.1. Counterproductive government policy 
The problems that the committee pinpointed were complex in the sense that they 
were not to be attributed to just one single actor in the field of social policy. 
According to the report, they could be ascribed to the collective responsibility of 
different social work stakeholders: the national government, provincial and local 
governments and even the Dutch people, represented by their civil society or-
ganizations. The main problem concerning the government was that the balance 
between the different government levels seemed to invoke tensions. The effort 
by the national government to centralize policymaking in the form of harmo-
nized welfare legislation was contrary to the growing need for decentralization 
and democracy within Dutch society. Another example was the fact that the 
subsidy arrangements were created on a national level, while citizens would 
hold their local municipality accountable for any lack of coherence.4 According 
to the report, a third problem on the level of the government was the assertion 
that the different areas of social policy were divided among different ministries 
and this diminished the managerial clout of the Ministry of CRM. Conclusively, 
some of the policy efforts that the government aimed at seemed to result in 
counterproductive effects. 
This conclusion was also based on the analysis of a concealed development 
within civil society. According to the committee, one of the main forces that 
caused the myriad of organizations and the multitude of financial provisions had 
been strong specialization within the different areas of social work. The report 
interpreted this process of “functional pillarization” to be a substitute to the 
“crumbling ideological pillarization”. The fact that this development had been 
possible at all was, according to the report, due to the lack of deliberate and 
systematical central planning by the government, which had to be based upon a 
mutual consent with civil society.5 Although a clear social-democratic influence 
was visible in this phraseology, the study group stated that it could not be said 
that the government did not plan at all - it did, but in a non-coherent way.6 This 
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would not have been such a problem if the accompanying costs had not in-
creased too much. However, they did. The total of costs for the Ministry of 
CRM as part of the national budget rose from 4.2% in 1966 to 9.4% in 1974 and 
the percentage of the budget of CRM that was earmarked for social work rose 
from 40% in 1966 to 74% in 1974, and thus strongly influenced the focus of the 
ministry.7 These expanding costs however, exposed another problem: inade-
quate control of the quality and coherence of the provided services by the civil 
society organizations. 
1.2. Deficiencies of civil society 
The Knelpuntennota was merciless on civil society. The characteristics of identi-
ty and representation that made civil society organizations valued partners to the 
government, appeared to have become deficient over time. One of the conclu-
sions of the report was that especially in the case of “identity organizations”, the 
citizens, who paid for all these provisions and social welfare arrangements, 
hardly had any democratic influence on these organizations that represented 
them. The current system lacked any structural form of joint decision-making, 
and consequently had, according to the report, a negative effect on the measure 
of participation of the people to whom these arrangements applied. The report 
stated that during its development, civil society had lost much of its original 
core-strength of being in direct contact with its grassroots. It had lost its social 
qui vive and as a result many civil society organizations had become introspec-
tive and lacked any democratic influence on the part of their members on policy 
matters. “So”, the committee posed the rhetorical question, “how ‘private’ is the 
private initiative?”. Within this context of democratization, the committee made 
another interesting remark that directly touched on the more traditionally struc-
tured civil society organizations. It stated that some forms of public management 
were based upon archaic conceptions of hierarchical structure. These concep-
tions often tended to block the process of internal democratization and succes-
sively led to mere lip service being paid towards democratization, without any 
actual internal consequences.8 
It was crystal clear that civil society was in a tight spot. Despite the positive 
intentions behind the creation of social policy by the government, the actual 
effects of that policy, according to the committee, seemed to work out contrari-
ly, especially for civil society. The undetected problem of functional pillariza-
tion was worsened by the availability of new grants to accompany new regula-
tions. On one side, this helped civil society to swiftly act on new kinds of social 
needs, but on the other hand, it seemed to create a lot of new specializations and 
organizations. This expansion paradoxically, diminished accessibility of these 
arrangements for their clientele by creating a chaotic range of services. Addi-
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tionally, the growth in subsidies brought about considerable expenses, and even 
led to legal inequality between the different types of organizations that were 
active in different areas of the social work field and were held accountable in 
different ways. In addition, it was often not certain how much an employee 
would get paid until the government had decided on the amount and stipulations 
of the relevant subsidy. Therefore, next to functional pillarization, the extensive 
subsidy system also seemed to have led to greater insecurity for the organiza-
tions and their employees concerning their legal status. A third effect of the 
almost unlimited system of subsidization was that it had allowed for organiza-
tions to change into closed, undemocratic institutions, estranged from their 
grassroots. This policy effect also reflected in the area of personnel, for the poli-
cy aim of enhancement of quality was largely being accomplished by hiring 
well-educated professionals. The report implied that this emphasis on profes-
sionalization had an important negative side effect: the traditional driving force 
of civil society, the volunteers, faced marginalization, thereby further estranging 
civil society organizations from their members. Next to the influx of more pro-
fessionally dedicated personnel replacing the more ideologically driven workers, 
the ongoing functional specialization and the scaling up of the many fragmented 
organizations into more coherent umbrella organizations contributed to the in-
troversion that the study group detected among many of the civil society organi-
zations. They had become undemocratic and therefore unrepresentative organi-
zations that had drifted away from their original grassroots supporters. 
2. Directions for improvement 
In accordance with their assignment, the committee also made suggestions for 
an improvement of the situation that civil society found itself in. These so-called 
“keystones” were meant to set afloat the process of further harmonization.  
2.1. Further decentralization 
The main policy goal of welfare, being the advancement of cultural, social, 
physical and mental well-being, remained unaffected, and in order to achieve 
this goal, the pillarized social work field had to change into a more horizontally 
oriented structure. This meant a thorough reshuffling of the traditional structure 
of cooperation between different levels of government and also between gov-
ernment and the civil society.9 A main ingredient of this “horizontalization” 
would be further decentralization of policy planning and finances towards lower 
government levels. This rearrangement of responsibilities implied that the na-
tional government would ultimately remain responsible for the implementation 
of policy. The concrete planning however, would be handed over to lower gov-
ernmental levels like provinces and municipalities together with relevant civil 
                                                        
 
9 Idem:20 
 
 
71 
 
society organizations, because they would be the ones to translate these policy 
efforts into concrete services. This inclusion of civil society in deliberations on a 
lower level was especially relevant because the proposed measure of decentrali-
zation meant that these organizations would no longer be funded by central gov-
ernment grants, but on a more local level, by community grants. In order to for-
malize this consultative structure, the suggestion was made to establish a so-
called “point of crystallization”: a commission in which all relevant civil society 
organizations were represented.10 
This new liberty of policymaking on a local level however, had the downside 
of possible legal inequality. Local differences between communities could easily 
be formalized into diverging regulations because the communities were able to 
enforce different standards upon civil society in order to be eligible for their 
grants. To avoid this, the central government would have to remain responsible 
for a balanced accessibility of basic provisions in the areas of care, culture and 
education. 
2.2. Representation and harmonization 
Even though the committee had defined the problem of a democratic deficiency 
within the civil society organizations, it did not suggest a direct solution. The 
committee however, did speak its mind on the issue of representation within the 
social work field in a broader sense. Representation would not only be expressed 
by the structure of the proposed commissions (crystallization point), but much 
more by the way these groups worked together.11 With this, the study group 
envisioned a regular conference of representatives of all relevant actors in the 
policymaking process. The traditional principle of representation, which referred 
to the presence of all the different pillars in such meetings, was deemed “fiction” 
because of the supposed lack of democracy within these private organizations. 
Therefore, by introducing this view on representation of civil society by forcing 
it into a process of collective decision-making and thus furthering harmonization 
without much respect for its ideological diversity, the committee suggested a 
collision course towards the already crumbling pillarized consultation structure 
within the public sector. 
Harmonization was also proposed for the area of policy. Like in its initial as-
signment, the committee underlined that the idea of creating a framework law 
that included all welfare legislation, could quite well help to provide for the 
desired unambiguous legal basis for the broad area of social welfare. Within this 
framework law, called Kaderwet Specifiek Welzijn, diverse elements of social 
welfare could be clustered and reorganized based on criteria like coherency, ac-
cessibility, democracy, flexibility and legal security. Though such an idea was 
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presented previously, it now seemed to have found new support in the Knel-
puntennota. 
In order to realize these ideas, planning, organization, regulation and subsidy 
grants were suggested as the most effective policy instruments, but even though 
many of the suggested improvements were not quite new, they could gain re-
newed momentum in their implementation. This all depended on how the Knel-
puntennota would be received by its political initiators. 
3. The government’s reaction 
The confluence of the economic recession that was felt in its depth by the mid 
1970s and the publication of the Knelpuntennota, seemed to reinforce the gov-
ernment’s intention to revise the modus operandi with regard to civil society. To 
a certain extent, the report did not reveal new things because many of the de-
scribed weaknesses of civil society were already known to both civil society 
itself as well as to the government. The actual impact seemed to come from the 
fact that now, any presumed structural weakness of civil society had actually 
been put into writing. Traditionally, civil society had been the provider of all 
kinds of social services, and because these services were fostered by the grand 
concept of welfare after World War II, civil society had become an extension of 
national social policy. The advantage of this position was that civil society had 
been able to influence the policy process, and additionally, as part of govern-
ment’s palette of tools, it had also been able to profit from the structural gov-
ernment support. The negative side of this position however, was that civil soci-
ety also suffered from the diminishing legitimization of social policy itself, 
which negatively influenced the status of the related civil society organizations. 
With the Knelpuntennota in hand, the government now had a tool to come to a 
constructive policy with regard to civil society. 
In their first official reaction on the report, Prime Minister Den Uyl (PvdA, 
1973-1977) and Minister of CRM, Van Doorn (PPR, 1973-1977) stated that 
even though the conclusions were drawn on behalf of the committee, and alt-
hough the government had yet to reflect on its position towards the outcome, 
they themselves found the description of the specific problems to be an appro-
priate starting point for further policy development.12 The idea of decentraliza-
tion of policy responsibilities and implementation especially, was given much 
attention in their letter to the parliament. In accordance with their social-
democratic view however, Den Uyl and Van Doorn stressed the pivotal role of 
the central government in this process because according to them, the govern-
ment would continue to have the ultimate responsibility for this field. On the 
other hand, the ministers acknowledged that the main idea behind decentraliza-
tion – subsidiarity – was quite significant, because the replacement of responsi-
                                                        
 
12 Handelingen II 1973/74, 12 968, nr. 1  
 
 
73 
 
bilities on a local level would improve visibility and accessibility of any policy 
effort.13 With that in mind, the central government would only intervene, ac-
cording to these social-democratic ministers, when the local government did not 
live up to its responsibility and seriously neglected its tasks. Or, secondly, when 
the national or supra-local interests would prevail over local interests.14  
This continuation of decentralization as a policy theme implied that things 
would also change between the government and civil society. With the transfer 
of policy power and subsidy jurisdiction, cooperation with civil society was also 
assigned to lower administrative levels. The ministers openly acknowledged that 
the proposed continuation of decentralization meant a disruption of the current 
situation. Now that local or regional governments would become the main sub-
sidizers, a renewed orientation of civil society towards the government seemed 
inevitable.15 Instead of doing business with one central institute like a ministry, 
civil society would from now on have to focus on different local situations. 
What remained the same however, was the central role of the national govern-
ment in determining a guiding policy that contained elements like quality, legal 
security, measure of need, diversity and financing. The Knelpuntennota suggest-
ed continuing the use of policy instruments like planning, organizing, subsidiz-
ing and regulation, and even though the responsibility for its results would in-
creasingly be attributed to the local governmental bodies, the scope and direc-
tion of the policy that local governments would complete would still be deter-
mined by the national government.  
Also unaltered was the importance that the government attached to the coop-
eration with civil society. The process of planning for social policy and decen-
tralization required not only national and local governments to carefully work 
together, but also civil society organizations to be involved in order to align and 
coordinate their activities and services. The report stated that the assumed pro-
fessional pillarization had induced a compartmentalization of services within the 
whole of civil society, which had resulted in a great amount of fragmentation, 
insecurity and a lack of transparency in who was doing what. In accordance with 
this observation, the ministers proposed to create a coherent program to come a 
reallotment of subsequent activities and tasks.16 In combination with the pro-
posed decentralization, the different governmental bodies would continue to 
have the ultimate responsibility, but with the explicit stipulation that this would 
not affect the functioning of civil society organizations.  
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3.1. First decisions 
The suggestion that was made in the Knelpuntennota on further decentralization 
was conceptualized by the Ministry of CRM by creating a new subsidy ar-
rangement that also supported the earlier efforts of work field harmonization. 
The national subsidy system in which the national government allocated grants 
to civil society organizations, would in the near future be replaced by a contribu-
tion system in which the national government allocated lump sums to local gov-
ernments. This local approach aimed at improving the effectivity of the allocated 
funds. In addition, harmonization of social policy would be addressed in a more 
constructive manner. The committee that wrote the Knelpuntennota suggested 
the establishing of an ‘umbrella’ Act – a sort of enabling legislation that formed 
the framework within which all relevant social subsidy arrangements and their 
legislation would be gathered.17 Additionally, and in line with the government 
approach to shared responsibility, this umbrella act would help to structurally 
decentralize many of these arrangements to lower administrative levels, and in 
turn, it would strengthen public involvement. From 1976 onwards, the govern-
ment set out to realize such legislation, in close consultation with civil society.18  
On the matter of democratic deficiency within civil society, another commit-
tee was established: Commissie van advies inzake het Democratisch en Doel-
matig Functioneren van Gesubsidieerde Instellingen (Advisory Committee on 
the matter of Democratic and Effective Functioning of Subsidized Institutions). 
This committee, whose name was swiftly abbreviated to ‘DDF’, was burdened 
with the task of studying the possibilities for democratic participation of the 
employees in organizations that received government grants. This was partly a 
matter of legal incorporation, because the government wanted to know which 
legal form (foundation or association) seemed to be most relevant to civil socie-
ty organizations. Maybe even a new legal form would have to be created in or-
der to accommodate these organizations.19 The relevancy of this particular mat-
ter was clear because at that time the second book of the Dutch Civil Code was 
in the making, and herein, rules were laid down with regard to legal incorpora-
tion. In 1977 the DDF-Committee presented its report and it was only in 1984 
that its successor Stuurgroep Democratisch en Doelmatig Functioneren van 
gesubsidieerde instellingen (Steering Committee Democratic and Effective 
Functioning of Subsidized Institutions), also called Interdepartementale Stuur-
groep Dijk (Interdepartmental Steering Committee Dijk), produced a rough draft 
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of legislation. This sketch was however not codified, but was divided between 
two separate Acts in the mid-1990s.20 
4. New policy lines: towards individual activation 
Due to the economic decline, a growing unemployment, and an erupting discon-
tent with the welfare system itself, during the second half of the 1970s a pro-
found debate started on the tenability of the welfare state. In 1978 sociologists 
Van Doorn and Schuyt made a comprehensive analysis of many different as-
pects that were deemed wrong with the Dutch welfare state. In De stagnerende 
verzorgingsstaat (The stagnating welfare state) they argued that the welfare state 
lacked any “wellfounded reasoning”. Any adjustment of the “technocratic redis-
tributive machine” that the welfare state had become, had to create better acces-
sibility of welfare provisions for all that needed it.21 Sociologists Adriaansens 
and Zijderveld added fuel to these flames. While Van Doorn and Schuyt had 
addressed the problem of the immobilizing effect of “welfare consumerism”, 
Adriaansens and Zijderveld reacted more strongly. In their opinion, the welfare 
state robbed the citizens of their individual responsibility for their own welfare, 
invoking an “immoral ethos”.22  
4.1. Participation: civil society as supportive structure 
In 1976 however, the government still openly appreciated cooperation with civil 
society, be it increasingly on a local level, the intention to decentralize only 
seemed to weaken the position of civil society in the social policy system; a shift 
that can even be interpreted as a subtle vote of no confidence from the side of 
the government. In terms of identity and representation, civil society seemed to 
have lost part of its relevance as a government instrument, but not all of it. Min-
ister Van Doorn claimed that civil society was still functional to the implementa-
tion of social policy work, but only when it was prepared to consider taking up 
more than merely being representative of its rank and file.23 In order to pave the 
way, Van Doorn suggested a new role for civil society.  
The traditional form of civil society with “all kinds of institutions that have 
too little connection with their grassroots or in which their grassroots can hardly 
monitor the run of things”, had served its turn.24 The new function that Van 
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Doorn suggested, was one of individual activation: “Private initiative in the 
sense of self-activation and personal responsibility of citizens.” This was the 
new kind of civil society that, according to Van Doorn, was to form the back-
bone of welfare work.25 This idea made a clear distinction between the former 
idea of civil society as institutions that represented homogenous groups in socie-
ty, and a new individualistic approach where the idea of self-activation was 
proclaimed to be the new panacea for the lack of public participation. This idea 
fit the spirit of the 1970s very well. As a result of the emancipatory vigor of the 
preceding decade, an awareness of personal individuality had grown, which for 
the younger generation seemed to have been formalized into several subcultures 
that were often linked to different popular music scenes. On another level, dem-
ocratic influence, anti-statism, and a growing suspicion of a dominant govern-
ment gave rise to a more individualistic society. In combination with the eco-
nomic slowdown that had become perceptible during the mid-1970s and its sub-
sequent unemployment problem, this governmental claim for self-activation was 
quite understandable.  
4.2. Participation: revaluation of the volunteer 
This new approach was made even more explicit by minister Van Doorn. Pro-
fessionalization was to remain one of the continuing policy aims in order to 
improve the quality of service. To this end, the Knelpuntennota suggested that 
certain requirements of competence and suitability be applied for the personnel 
of the organizations that provided social services. Nevertheless, with this consol-
idation of the role of the professional in order to increase the quality of the or-
ganizations and their services, the volunteers had started to become marginal-
ized. This process of marginalization had previously been acknowledged and 
even partly accepted by the government, and until 1973 the Ministry of CRM 
even supported this development by stipulating certain conditions that the volun-
teer had to meet: volunteers were no longer the core of the staff, but had to ful-
fill a complementary role to the professional. They also had to be screened for 
personal aptitude and show some willingness to undergo education and train-
ing.26 After the publication of the Knelpuntennota however, the governmental 
attitude towards volunteers seemed to have changed course. In 1976 the Minis-
try of CRM decided to make money available for the development of the role of 
the volunteer within social services – a first time occasion. In order to legitimize 
this approach, minister Van Doorn argued that the motivating force of the volun-
teer was his or her identity:  
 
                                                        
 
25 “Het particulier initiatief in de zin van zelfwerkzaamheid en eigen verantwoordelijkheid van de burgers 
(…)” Kamerstukken II 1975/76, 13 600, nr. 2:6 (MvT) 
26 Kamerstukken II 1973/74, 12 600, nr. 2 (MvT) 
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“Volunteers often organize themselves in organizations of all sorts (play-
ground-associations, national youth work organizations, action groups, play-
groups, etc.) with a distinct identity. This individual characteristic plays a 
large role in the measure to which volunteers are prepared to commit them-
selves.”.27  
 
This statement can be interpreted to mean that the volunteers were not only the 
bearers of the organizational identity, but that this “identity” also provided for 
an intrinsic motivation for these volunteers to do their jobs. 
Also, the economic hardship had awakened interest for inventive and espe-
cially cheaper ways of work. Throughout the country, innovative local activities 
on social work were initiated and some had caught the eye of the ministry. At 
the same time that the role of the professional became the subject of debate in 
the academic realm, the ministry also acknowledged that the position of the 
volunteer towards the professional was quite vulnerable and more attention 
would have to be given to the professional encouraging the volunteer instead of 
dominating him or her.28 The volunteer was increasingly regarded to be im-
portant to the welfare work, so, “rehabilitation of the volunteer is [sic] necessary 
in order to develop solidarity to the fullest, without which good welfare work 
cannot thrive”.29 As an additional argument however, the minister stated that the 
increasing costs that accompanied the growing number of professionals urged to 
look for alternative and cheaper labor, and volunteers provided a convenient 
solution to this problem.30 Therefore, next to emphasizing the importance of the 
volunteer in forming a part of the organizational identity as an intrinsically mo-
tivated worker, now a more economic perspective of reducing labor costs also 
seemed to gain ground. Even the apparent moral argument of the commitment of 
the volunteer based on his or her identity seemed to be part of an economic rea-
soning: the greater the presence of intrinsic commitment, the more this would 
turn into a drive to work and do better.31 Therefore, the Ministry of CRM stated 
that the strengthening of the role of the volunteer had become one of its priori-
ties.32 
 
                                                        
 
27 “Vrijwilligers organiseren zich vaak in organisaties van allerlei aard (speeltuinverenigingen, landelijke 
jeugdwerkorganisaties, actiegroepen, peuterspeelzalen etc.) met een duidelijke eigen identiteit. Die eigen-
heid speelt een grote rol in de mate waarin vrijwilligers bereid zijn zich in te zetten.” Kamerstukken II 
1976/77, 14 100, nr. 2:65 (MvT) 
28 In Chapter 5 the academic debate on the role of the professional will be elaborated on. 
29 “Een eerherstel van de vrijwilliger is nodig om in het welzijnswerk solidariteit in zijn volle omvang te 
brengen, zonder welke goed welzijnswerk niet kan gedijen.” Kamerstukken II 1977/78, 14 800, nr. 2:5 
(MvT) 
30 Kamerstukken II 1977/78, 14 800, nr. 2 (MvT) 
31 Kamerstukken II 1978/79, 15 300, nr. 2 (MvT)  
32 Kamerstukken II 1979/80, 15 800, nr. 2 (MvT); Kamerstukken II 1980/81, 16 400, nr. 2 (MvT); Kamer-
stukken II 1984/85, 18 600, nr. 2 (MvT) 
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4.3. Individual activation: towards a ‘caring society’ 
The economic climate had hardened during the second part of the 1970s. In 
1978, the Dutch Cabinet - Van Agt I (1977-1981) presented a memorandum 
called Bestek ’81 in which thorough economization was announced and in which 
the cabinet revealed the contours of its view on how the market could play a part 
in this process.33 Nonetheless, by 1982 the unemployment rate had increased to 
13.5% of the labor force and the budget deficit had increased to 8.2% of the 
national income.34 The general assumption was that the preferred Keynesian 
approach of demand management had failed to resist the incidental (in-
ter)national pressures that had added to the crisis. This was not regarded as a 
problem caused by cyclical fluctuations in the market, but as a predicament of a 
more structural nature that was no longer to be resolved by a Keynesian ap-
proach.35 An alternative was found however, in the idea of yet another structural 
counterforce that seemed to be provided for by the “free market”.36 No longer 
would the market be strongly regulated by the government, now government 
policy had to become subservient to market developments.37  
This new approach to economic liberalism seemed to have interpreted the 
liberal concept of freedom quite differently from how it was formed during the 
second half of the eighteenth century. The original idea of liberalism was di-
rected against the feudal system of the French Ancient Regime and aimed to 
create a state apparatus as a neutral buffer between the whimsical power of the 
French monarchs and the French people. This “buffer state” had expanded swift-
ly during the advancement of Dutch welfare in the twentieth century and it was 
exactly this extensive welfare state to which the so-called neoliberals reacted 
against during the 1980s. The neoliberal interpretation of the concept of freedom 
had thus changed from aiming for freedom guaranteed by the state, into freedom 
from state interference.38 One of the consequences of this new approach was the 
emergence of a new political culture of a businesslike and sober nature – “no-
nonsense politics” – that was personified in the subsequent Cabinets-Lubbers 
(Lubbers I: 1982-1986, CDA-VVD; Lubbers II: 1986-1989, CDA-VVD; Lub-
bers III: 1989-1994 CDA-PvdA) and would be recognizable well into the 
1990s.39 
On many of the above policy issues, close consultations with institutional 
civil society was still the motto during the 1980s, even though the governmental 
level on which it occurred was increasingly changing from the national to local 
                                                        
 
33 Bestek ’81, Hoofdlijnen van het financiële en sociaal-economische beleid voor de middellange termijn 
1978 
34 Aerts et al. 1999:318 
35 WRR 2006:34 
36 De Rooy 2002:268 
37 Aerts et al. 1999:319 
38 Reijngoud 2012 
39 Aerts et al. 1999:321 
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or provincial levels. On this front, civil society was not only asked for its opin-
ion, but also for its approval of many new policy lines. This was exemplified by 
the involvement of civil society organizations in the discussions on the effects 
that certain cutbacks would have on the organizations that would be affected by 
them.40 The power of civil society to generate public support for such unpleas-
ant measures was very much welcomed by the state.41 
The previously launched effort to increase both the manageability of the so-
cial work field and the social policy arrangements, was further developed during 
the 1980s. To a growing extent, rhetoric on “public participation” and “effec-
tiveness of civil society” was combined with the policy lines of decentraliza-
tion42 and supporting the volunteer.43 This combination was also perceptible in 
the government effort to create comprehensive enabling legislation, such as the 
afore mentioned Kaderwet. Moreover, in terms of organizational harmonization, 
further unification was desired.44 This however, also meant that if it wanted to 
remain a relevant player in the field of social welfare, the institutionalized civil 
society had to modernize thoroughly in terms of democratization and effectivi-
ty.45 The summarizing term that the government coined to voice these main 
policy aims was “responsible society”:  
 
“Decentralization, democratization, room for private initiative, volunteer 
commitment (…) are all instruments for development of human possibilities. 
(…) Development of individuals is a prerequisite to come to a ‘responsible 
society’.”46  
 
According to the Catholic Minister of CRM Gardeniers-Berendsen (CDA, 1977-
1981, 1982 a.i.), the main driving force of this responsible society had to be the 
public itself:  
 
                                                        
 
40 Kamerstukken II 1988/89, 20 800, nr. 2 (MvT) 
41 Kamerstukken II 1978/79, 15 300, nr. 2 (MvT); Kamerstukken II 1979/80, 15 800, nr. 2 (MvT); Kamer-
stukken II 1982/83, 17 600, nr. 2 (MvT); Kamerstukken II 1983/84, 18 100, nr. 2 (MvT); Kamerstukken II 
1984/85, 18 600, nr. 2 (MvT), Kamerstukken II 1989/90, 21 300, nr. 2 (MvT) 
42 Kamerstukken II 1979/80, 15 800, nr. 2 (MvT); Kamerstukken II 1981/82, 17 100, nr. 2 (MvT); Kamer-
stukken II 1982/83, 17 600, nr. 2 (MvT); Kamerstukken II 1983/84, 18 100, nr. 2 (MvT) 
43 Kamerstukken II 1977/78, 14 800, nr. 2 (MvT); Kamerstukken II 1979/80, 15 800, nr. 2 (MvT) 
44 Kamerstukken II 1977/78, 14 800, nr. 2 (MvT); Kamerstukken II 1983/84, 18 100, nr. 2 (MvT) 
45 Kamerstukken II 1977/78, 14 800, nr. 2 (MvT); Kamerstukken II 1978/79, 15 300, nr. 2 (MvT); Kamer-
stukken II 1979/80, 15 800, nr. 2 (MvT)  
46 “Decentralisatie, democratisering, ruimte voor het particulier initiatief, inzet van vrijwilligers, (…) zijn 
evenzovele instrumenten ter ontplooiing van de menselijke mogelijkheden. (…) Ontplooiing van de 
individuele mens is een voorwaarde om tot een “verantwoordelijke maatschappij” te komen.” Kamerstuk-
ken II 1978/79, 15 300, nr. 2:7 (MvT) 
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“To accomplish this, we want to point to the citizen his responsibility for so-
ciety and his solidarity with his fellow citizen, often based on ideology or 
world view.”47  
 
Therefore, even though worldviews and ideologies were still valued by the gov-
ernment on the level of the individual citizen, the civil society organizations that 
had traditionally represented these, seemed to have lost their prominence in this 
process.48 As was already indicated by Van Doorn in 1976, it would now be the 
turn for a new individualistic version of civil society, and the government had 
set its intentions on shifting at least some of the responsibility for a general well-
being on to the public itself. It was exactly this new support for individual acti-
vation of citizens, for instance in their role as volunteers, that offered civil socie-
ty a chance to once again align its goals with the government and to give itself 
new meaning and relevance.49 
This line of thought on individual activation of citizens was also attuned to 
the assumed increase of dependency on welfare provisions, for “the availability 
of welfare provisions is believed to have created its own demand”.50 Now the 
tendency of habituation to state provision had become visible on both the meso-
level as well as on the micro-level. By once again stressing the importance of 
individual self-help capacity, availability of a social network and voluntary con-
tributions from individuals to society, the Ministry of CRM concluded that: 
 
“These developments are also the result of social isolation and alienation 
and the associated decreasing availability of spontaneous voluntary aid.”51  
 
However, the government also took some responsibility. Minister of CRM De 
Boer (CDA, 1982) acknowledged that during the last two decades, the govern-
ment had taken over certain diaconal and charitable tasks on the matter of social 
care from civil society, which had not only led to a boost in professional care, 
but it might very well have nourished the idea that the government was respon-
sible “also in cases in which aid was needed on the basis of mutual responsibil-
ity”.52 
                                                        
 
47 “Daartoe willen wij de burger aanspreken op zijn verantwoordelijkheid voor de maatschappij en zijn 
solidariteit met de medeburger, veelal stoelend op levens- of wereldbeschouwing.” Kamerstukken II 
1979/80, 15 800, nr. 2 (MvT); compare to Kamerstukken II 1981/82, 17 100, nr. 2 (MvT); Kamerstukken 
II 1982/83, 17 600, nr. 2 (MvT)  
48 Kamerstukken II 1980/81, 16 400, nr. 2 (MvT) 
49 Kamerstukken II 1981/82, 17 100, nr. 2 (MvT) 
50 “(…) het aanbod van voorzieningen zou de vraag ernaar hebben geschapen (…) ” Kamerstukken II 
1981/82, 17 100, nr. 2:4 (MvT) 
51 “Deze ontwikkelingen zijn mede een gevolg van vereenzaming en vervreemding en de daarmee ver-
bandhoudende afnemende beschikbaarheid van spontane vrijwillige hulpverlening.” Kamerstukken II 
1981/82, 17 100, nr. 2:4 (MvT) 
52 “(…) ook in situaties waarin hulpverlening op basis van verantwoordelijkheid voor elkaar geboden 
was.” Kamerstukken II 1982/83, 17 600, nr. 2:3 (MvT) 
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In 1983 CRM was renamed as the Ministerie van Welzijn, Volksgezondheid 
en Cultuur (WVC, Ministry of Welfare, Public Health and Culture) and its first 
head, minister Brinkman (CDA, 1982-1989), continued on this mea culpa by 
tying together the two lines of voluntarism and the undesired dependency on 
government care. In addition to increasing opportunities for the free market 
system, minister Brinkman focused on mobilization of the sense of social re-
sponsibility within the Dutch society. By introducing his concept of ‘caring 
society’, he presented his solution to the problems with which the ‘welfare state’ 
was associated.53 From that moment on, according to Brinkman, the Dutch pub-
lic had to become aware of the fact that one had to take responsibility for his or 
her own life and those of his or her fellow men. 
Referring to the report Herwaardering van Welzijnsbeleid (Reassessment of 
Social policy) by the Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (WRR, 
Scientific Council for Government Policy), Brinkman argued that the citizens 
were not to become too dependent on professional care, for they might, as a 
consequence, lose awareness of their own capabilities and responsibilities.54 
Brinkman added:  
 
“And in continuation of that idea, in my opinion more room has to be given 
to the individual responsibility and initiative of citizens. Because of that, 
volunteer work and its advancement has to take a prominent place in the pol-
icy.”55  
 
But next to solidarity with fellow citizens, Brinkman emphasized another motive 
in the ministry’s promotion of volunteer work – a motive that had surfaced be-
fore in times of economic hardship. For, especially with the current rate of un-
employment, volunteer work offered an interesting alternative to paid labor.56 
So, by 1985 the ministry had put the individual activation and responsibility of 
citizens as central to the idea of welfare by developing notions such as ‘self-
care’, volunteer aid for people close by (in Dutch:‘mantelzorg’), and volunteer 
work in other areas. Other policy aspects were effectivity, cost reduction, 
strengthening of internal cohesion and restructuring. The management philoso-
phy of the ministry was to merely stimulate rather than to regulate on matters of 
organization, development of methodology and other innovation. Therefore, 
besides its conditional and supportive role, the government was to stay aloof.57  
                                                        
 
53 Brinkman 1989; Kamerstukken II 1987/88, 20 200, nr. 2 (MvT)  
54 WRR 1982 
55“In het verlengde van die opvatting ben ik van mening, dat meer ruimte moet worden gegeven aan de 
eigen verantwoordelijkheid en het eigen initiatief van burgers. Daarom dient het vrijwilligerswerk en de 
bevordering daarvan een belangrijke plaats in te nemen in het beleid.” Kamerstukken II 1983/84, 18 100, 
nr. 2:22 (MvT) 
56 Kamerstukken II 1984/85, 18 600, nr. 2 (MvT) 
57 Kamerstukken II 1985/86, 19 200, nr. 2 (MvT) 
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On the matter of harmonization, the ministry reacted with much more inter-
ference. According to minister Brinkman, there were too many national civil 
society umbrella organizations and they were too diverse. So, once again, a 
thorough restructuring was announced: Herstructurering Landelijke Organisa-
ties (HLO, Restructuring National Organizations). In this new harmonization 
effort however, the matter of identity was pushed to the back by a new empha-
sis: from now on, organizations were to be clustered by functions that were rele-
vant to the social work demand.58 On the other hand, Brinkman substantiated the 
government’s stance of aloofness in 1987 by emphasizing the argument of the 
responsible society. Financial and administrative arguments pressed for a less 
active role of the government in expenditure and regulation of welfare. But the 
increase in responsibility, strengthening of the position of civil society by free-
dom in policymaking, and a better division of responsibilities and tasks between 
different governmental levels and the civil society, would stand in as reinforce-
ments to substitute for the role that the government had supposedly occupied.59 
This freedom in policymaking was to be created by a decrease in regulations 
and loosening of the relation between the civil society organizations and the 
ministry. The subsidy system would have to be changed from an output oriented 
system towards one based on budgetary funding. Thus in order to improve the 
effectivity of the organizations, research was being executed on the possibility to 
replace the structural annual subsidies by a system of budget-grants. That meant 
that instead of being able to count on a regular and predictable flow of income, 
every organization would have to base its budget on an annual business cycle of 
planning and reporting. The allocated amount of money would become more 
dependent on the organization’s vision, plans, and results, than before.60 This 
would contribute to the self-sufficiency of civil society, and according to the 
minister, this policy approach would help ‘private initiative to focus on the ques-
tion of public support and the identity and quality of its work’.61 
The results of this ‘no-nonsense’ policy of retrenchment and neo-
liberalization became clearly visible during the 1990s, when privatization of 
government activities like the national mail service PTT (1989) and the national 
railroad company NS (1993) started to take place. In addition, social welfare 
arrangements were curtailed and reorganized. The social welfare expenditures 
were reduced by cutbacks in the allowances and limitation of the possibilities for 
qualification for a disability benefit. This was the first time since World War II 
that the expansion of the Dutch welfare state arrangements was actually halted.62 
A renewed emphasis on economization of social policy areas like care, educa-
                                                        
 
58 Kamerstukken II 1986/87, 19 700, nr. 2 (MvT) 
59 Kamerstukken II 1987/88, 20 200, nr. 2 (MvT) 
60 Kamerstukken II 1986/87, 19 700, nr. 2 (MvT) 
61 “(…) zal het particulier initiatief ook meer bepalen bij de vraag naar het maatschappelijk draagvlak en 
de identiteit en kwaliteit van het werk.” Kamerstukken II 1988/89, 20 800, nr. 2:14 (MvT) 
62 De Beer 2007:128 
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tion, and social welfare gained visibility in terms like doelmatigheid63 and 
formed a structure of incentives to activate individuals. The result was the clo-
sure of two “escape routes from the labor market”, by reducing the allowances 
and rendering the application for social benefits more difficult.64 While overall, 
this policy resulted in a retrenchment of the budget deficit, in terms of employ-
ment promotion, the government waited for the market to contribute.65 
The charting of this course from the welfare state towards the participation or 
activation state was accompanied by another important development that had 
already begun. During the 1980s the government’s intention to decentralize 
policy power, the conferment of grants and its subsequent responsibilities to 
lower (provincial and municipal) administrative levels was taking formal shape. 
Its aim was to close the gap between the administrative hub in ‘The Hague’ 
where the seat of the Dutch parliament and the government was located, and the 
Dutch people. Local municipalities were seen as being capable of allocating 
money to where it was deemed most necessary. Additionally, efficiency and 
effectivity were expected to increase. In order to regulate this development, in 
1985 a financial arrangement regarding social welfare was made with the four 
largest Dutch cities. The cities entered into a covenant with the Dutch govern-
ment and thus obtained liberty of policy under government supervision.66 These 
‘covenant-cities’ were Amsterdam, Den Haag, Rotterdam and Utrecht, and in 
1994 this cooperation was formally instated as the G4-agreement. This devel-
opment however, did not do much to change the position of civil society towards 
the government. Even though policymaking efforts were decentralized to lower 
levels, it was still the government that remained dominant in this field of social 
welfare issues. Civil society had only to change its focus with regard to the ad-
ministrative levels with which it had to deal, but, as implied by the term itself, 
with the transition from the welfare state towards the activation state, it would 
still be the state that was in control. 
5. Summarizing overview of social policy themes 
Through this account of how the Dutch state and civil society related to one 
another with regard to welfare issues, three main policy themes come to the fore: 
quality, participation and manageability. The interpretation of these themes in 
terms of social policy lines, however, slowly altered throughout the different 
phases of the developing Dutch welfare state. Additionally, two other elements 
                                                        
 
63 The Dutch word doelmatigheid has to be translated as a combination of ‘efficiency and effectiveness’. 
In Chapter 5.6.2. more attention will be given to this word and its policy implications. 
64 Visser en Hemerijck 1998:30; WRR 2006:34 
65 Aerts et al 1999:323 
66 This financial arrangement was called: Financieringsregeling Welzijnsovereenkomst vier grote gemeen-
ten (Financial Arrangement on Welfare Four Large Cities). ‘Besluit nr. 634 “Aangaan subsidierelatie met 
de Amsterdamse instellingen voor gezinsverzorging.”’, Gemeenteblad Amsterdam, April 8, 1986. 
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seemed to have defined the relation between civil society and the state. The first 
was the matter of state interest in social welfare issues and matter of prime re-
sponsibility for welfare, and the second was how the matter of identity was val-
ued. 
During the prewar decades, the government started to show an increased in-
terest in welfare issues. Social policy was created on a national scale, and the 
traditional mutual distance between the government and civil society changed 
into a tentative, but increasingly structural, form of collaboration. For civil soci-
ety this collaboration meant a new source of income and an increase in their 
security of existence. For the government, this collaboration meant that by 
providing for the necessary resources and regulations, it now had a partner that 
was willing to implement its policies. The prime responsibility for poor relief 
however, remained with civil society, as was re-emphasized by the 1912 Poor 
Law. 
With regard to social policy themes, the theme of quality of the work was in-
terpreted along the policy lines of professionalization, during the prewar era. 
Professionalization of civil society organizations was to be brought about by 
improvement of the administrative accountability and education of the involved 
workers. The need for manageability of the fragmented work field called forth 
an emphasis on harmonization within the dominant social structure of pillariza-
tion. The ideological identity of civil society organizations became an increas-
ingly important factor in the positioning of civil society towards the state, espe-
cially with regard to its binding capacity within these pillars.  
However, already during the first decades of the twentieth century, this new-
ly defined relationship between the Dutch state and civil society led to some 
unexpected and even contradicting consequences: an increase in the number of 
organizations; growing gaps between the pillars within certain areas in the work 
field and consequential strengthening of the ideological pillars; and a prelimi-
nary dependency on and habituation to government support. 
The budding social policy system came under fire after World War II. The 
Dutch welfare state developed, and with the establishment of the Ministry of 
Social Work, the government showed that it took its social responsibilities very 
serious. The result was a structural government interest in social welfare issues 
through legislation, regulation and financial support for the civil society organi-
zations that implemented government policy. In addition, civil society showed a 
growing interest in this collaboration and it made increasing use of subsidies. At 
the same time it gained policy influence.  
During the first postwar decades, the policy theme of quality continued to be 
emphasized in terms of professionalization of the organization and its staff. 
Administrative streamlining and employee education were now not just re-
quired, but were also facilitated financially. The theme of manageability was 
also continued in policy lines. Harmonization of the work field was increasingly 
shaped by the creation of umbrella organizations. On the other hand, more and 
more types of social work and organizations came into existence, and therefore 
it became even more difficult to ascertain the effectiveness of the work and sub-
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sequently of the financial arrangements. Additionally, three new government 
strategies on manageability became visible at the beginning of the 1960s: 1) 
decentralization of policy responsibility to more local governmental levels; 2) a 
need for consolidation of the work field by a more univocal social policy; and 3) 
strengthening of individual ability to provide for oneself. In this policy process, 
the characteristic of the organizational identity of civil society continued to be 
valued because of its binding capacity, and as the representative of its grass-
roots, civil society remained an important partner to the Dutch state on matters 
of social welfare. In addition to the policy themes of manageability and quality, 
a third social policy theme emerged during the postwar decades: participation. 
Already in 1955, the government aimed to create a sense of shared responsibility 
with the representative organizations of the people, that is to say, with civil soci-
ety. This idea came to be a structural part of the government’s policy approach 
since the mid-1950s. Public participation in politics as well as with regard to 
their own well-being, had to be increased through community organization and 
social planning, but also through spurring volunteer work.  
With the introduction of the ABW in 1963, however, civil society lost an im-
portant function of providing for material social work to the government. On the 
other hand, the non-material side of civil society still made it a valued partner 
for the government. It its legitimization for the deployment of civil society or-
ganizations, the government stressed that both their identity as well as their rep-
resentational function were important assets, especially with regard to participa-
tion of the public. This made civil society organizations important instruments in 
the effort to create public involvement through shared responsibility. Another 
complementation to the effort to create public involvement was made during the 
second half on the 1960s when a growing emphasis on democratization and the 
volunteer was observed. 
With the beginning of the 1970s, a slow but fundamental change with regard 
to social welfare was visible. Economic decline, the Knelpuntennota, academic 
and public debate of the tenability of the Dutch welfare state, all reflected on the 
role of civil society. Counterproductive effects of the social policy system were 
pinpointed, and civil society was no longer regarded as representing its grass-
roots, because the organizations had been estranged from their grassroots as a 
result of secularization and a lack of democratic participation. So, in line with 
the spirit of democratization and emancipation, the government once again, but 
now much more explicitly, emphasized the important role of the volunteer as a 
possible panacea for reviving the sense of shared responsibility on an individual 
level. In addition, the volunteers were a lot cheaper. Civil society now had lost 
much of its worth as a partner to the government because it was ‘closed’, ‘intro-
verted’, and focused on raking in subsidies, instead of achieving effectivity. 
Thus civil society faced the threat of being sidelined unless it was able to rein-
vent its function. On the other hand, the government needed civil society, for 
who else could implement the necessary social policy?  
These galling bonds were not easy to loosen. However, minister Van Doorn 
suggested a way out. Shared responsibility started to change into personal re-
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sponsibility, as was reflected in the social policy themes, and in 1976 Van 
Doorn distinguished a possibly new and more relevant interpretation of individ-
ualized civil society as a replacement of the traditional and now obsolete form of 
institutionalized civil society. In the role these organizations could play in rein-
stating the value of the volunteer, civil society was offered a chance to retain its 
relevance to the government. 
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CHAPTER 3. THE SALVATION ARMY AND THE SOCIAL 
POLICY SYSTEM 
1. The Salvation Army’s two-fold mission 
1.1. Religious propagation 
The Salvation Army was established in 1878 in the poverty-stricken area of 
East-London. In a blend of social disruption that resulted from the sweeping 
industrial revolution, and an atmosphere of spiritual reawakening fanned by 
evangelists like Finney and Moody, founding father William Booth brought his 
Christian Mission to the next level and tightened the organizational reins. At 
first Booth envisioned his organization to be an evangelization movement that 
found its raison d'être in converting as many people to Christianity as possible. 
An important principle that Booth stood by, was that if a person would experi-
ence inner spiritual change, he would also change his behavior in a structural 
way and thus be able to find his way out of this misery, and if not, any social 
care would eventually be in vain.1 Within the ranks of the Salvation Army, this 
ideology of self-activation was supported by figurative rhetoric like the meta-
phor of the derailed train: if a wrecked train was put back on its tracks unre-
paired, it would very likely be wrecked again sooner or later.2 Compared to the 
Christian Mission, the most important feature of the novel Salvation Army was 
the rich imagery. It derived its name from the idea of an army of soldiers bat-
tling the spiritual evil of the times. Also, its organizational configuration resem-
bled the structure of a standing army.3 Other features remained the same. 
Preaching the gospel of salvation remained the core business and the organiza-
tional structure to provide for the necessary spiritual care for converts was em-
bodied by a ‘corps’. These corps were often small, local groups that held reli-
gious Sunday services and also incidentally offered social services for its mem-
bers and the local community.  
The military rhetoric that was used within these corps suggested a certain 
amount of aggression in its approach of corps planting: “During the past year we 
went over to the offensive and we have opened fire on fifteen other cities and 
villages.”.4 But this belligerent style was more symbolic than anything else, for 
corps were mostly started up randomly, and above all this happened without any 
violence from the side of the Army. In order to start a new corps the local popu-
lation had to officially put in a request with the Salvation Army. The Army then 
                                                        
 
1 Booth 1890 
2 Maris 1991:102 
3 Ringelberg 2005:21-50 
4 “Gedurende het afgeloopen jaar zijn wij den aanval begonnen en hebben wij het vuur geopend in 15 
andere steden en dorpen.” Jaarstaat Leger des Heils 1890:7 
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assessed whether there was a certain measure of non-religiousness and a social 
need in that particular area. Only if these requirements were met, a new corps 
could be established.5 When the approval to start a new corps came through, a 
Salvation Army officer would become responsible for its management. Never-
theless, the local community itself had to provide for a suitable building that 
could function as the community center. Additionally, the corps had to generate 
enough financial means in order to support its own activities and the command-
ing officer. Soup kitchens, handiwork activities, coffee, an occasional meal, paid 
labor and collection of second hand clothing – these activities could be part of 
the palette of social activities a corps offered. Activities that were often larded 
with spiritual advice. However, even though the structure of a corps might imply 
otherwise, the Salvation Army had no intention of becoming a church by itself. 
Instead it acknowledged being a part of the worldwide church of Jesus Christ. In 
fact the Army was in the habit of referring converts to other traditional local 
churches for their spiritual education.6 
The spectacular increase in the number of corps in the United Kingdom dur-
ing the first few years of the existence of the Salvation Army, exemplified its 
success. The Army grew from 50 corps in 1878 to more than 1000 in 1886. Also 
on an international level its success became perceptible: by 1883 the Salvation 
Army had opened new branches in The United States, Puerto Rico, Australia, 
France, India, Canada, Switzerland, Sweden, South Africa and New Zealand. In 
1887, the first Salvation Army corps in Amsterdam opened its doors to the 
somewhat suspicious Dutch public. 
1.2. Social care 
By then however, after 40 years of preaching the gospel in the most destitute 
areas of London, Booth had once again changed course, though on a fundamen-
tally different level. From his many years of experience in the London slums, 
Booth concluded that “a hungry stomach doesn’t have ears”7 and thus he 
acknowledged that social aid was indispensable in order to prepare the hearts of 
people for the gospel:  
 
“But what is the use of preaching the Gospel to men whose whole attention 
is concentrated upon a mad, desperate struggle to keep themselves alive? 
You might as well give a tract to a shipwrecked sailor who is battling the surf 
(…) and threatens to drown him. He will not listen to you. Nay, he cannot 
hear you anymore than a man whose head is underwater can listen to a ser-
mon.”8  
 
                                                        
 
5 Ringelberg 2005:99 
6 Jaarstaat Leger des Heils 1892:7; Ringelberg 2010:57 
7 This commonly used expression within Army ranks is generally ascribed to Booth.  
8 Booth 1890:63 
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So in order to make people susceptible to the message of redemption, their so-
cial needs also had to be met, and thus Booth set out the boundaries for what 
would be called his ‘social plan’. In his work In Darkest England and The Way 
Out (1890), Booth analyzed the social misery that had permeated a significant 
part of the English society.9 He presented a three phase system of care on the 
basis of outreach activities that could bring relief to those who had no helper. 
The first phase would be to actively search for people in need, by actually living 
in the poorest neighborhoods and being in touch with as many people as possi-
ble. Usually the members of the corps were charged with this duty and when 
possible, help was offered on the spot. However, others that could not be helped 
at the moment were referred to Army shelters, called “city colonies”. This was 
part of the second phase. After a period of time these people would hopefully be 
re-socialized and able to return to their former place in society. Those who were 
not yet able to do so could learn a trade or other handiwork skills in a so-called 
“farm colony” or “land colony”. If that too did not help them to find their way 
back into society, they would qualify for the third phase: a fresh start in a so-
called “overseas colony”, far away from the troublesome situation of which they 
had such bad memories. Elaborating on his three phase plan, Booth had sketched 
clear outlines for other methodic forms of aid concerning various groups that 
needed social assistance: alcoholics, pauperized young boys and girls, elderly 
people living in the streets of London, criminals that were to be released from 
prison and also people suffering from psychological disorders. For all these 
groups different approaches were suggested, and above all, the social services 
that Booth described were saturated with religious edification. In fact, preaching 
and practicing were to go hand in hand, as depicted in Booth’s description of the 
work of a “slum sister”:  
 
“The Slum Sister is what her name implies, the Sister of the Slum. They go 
forth in Apostolic fashion, two-and-two living in a couple of the same kind 
of dens or rooms as are occupied by the people themselves, differing only in 
the cleanliness and order, and the few articles of furniture which they con-
tain. Here they live all the year round, visiting the sick, looking after the 
children, showing the women how to keep themselves and their homes de-
cent, often discharging the sick mother’s duties themselves; cultivating 
peace, advocating temperance, counseling in temporalities, and ceaselessly 
preaching the religion of Jesus Christ to the Outcasts of Society.”10  
 
So, twelve years after the establishment of the Salvation Army in the UK, Booth 
supplemented his theology with the ideology of social action, making both activ-
ities the two fundaments on which the Salvation Army would build its organiza-
tion in England, as well as internationally.  
                                                        
 
9 In his opinion this was about 10% of English society. 
10 Booth 1890:180 
 
 
92 
 
1.3. The Salvation Army in the Netherlands  
Booth’s In Darkest England was rapidly translated for the international market 
and when already in 1891 a Dutch version was published, a swift adjustment of 
focus was demanded from the 37 Dutch corps. An adjustment that, according to 
Salvation Army historian Johan Ringelberg, would be facilitated by the bitterly 
cold Dutch winter of 1890-1891 that offered the Salvation Army a chance to put 
its new social work ideas into action with effect.11 In Amsterdam the Army 
opened its doors for people seeking refuge from the cold, and de facto the first 
of the Dutch Army’s structural social services was created: “refuges”. 
The Salvation Army was not the only type of social work, stemming from 
the UK that rooted in the Netherlands, as the example of the Toynbee work 
shows.12 The Army too, was able to create a durable position in the Dutch socie-
ty, at least partly due to this combination of social and religious activities. This 
was reflected by the growth in the number of corps from 37 in 1890 to 48 in 
1892, in combination with the fact that the social work activities of the Army 
needed their own balance sheet in the 1892 annual financial report.13 In this 
report the Salvation Army emphasized that its social activities were born from 
distress that was caused by the harsh winter and no mention was made of the 
new insights of General Booth. Nevertheless, the Dutch territory agreed with 
Booth’s view on the double mission of social work and religious salvation:  
 
“We realized that if we wanted to inspire the soul, we had to do a lot for the 
body; we discovered that they were not able to comprehend a gospel that 
stated: “go hence, be warm and replete, before we had offered them a bed to 
rest their tired limbs and had helped them into a condition in which their 
thoughts would not be occupied entirely by physical needs to such an extent 
that they would lack the time to contemplate higher things.”14 
 
However, as this quote underlines, social work alone would not suffice. The 
ultimate solution to material and social misery could only be found in spiritual 
conversion. Therefore the main endeavor of the Salvation Army would be the 
winning of souls. 
Soon after the harsh winter of 1890, the number of corps grew and the scope 
of their social work activities widened. Only five years after the introduction of 
Booth’s social plan, the Dutch Army had opened 74 corps. Numerous social 
work activities were set up at quite an impressive rate. Already in 1895, the 
                                                        
 
11 Ringelberg 2005 
12 See Chapter 1.3.1. 
13 Jaarstaat Leger des Heils 1892 
14 “Wij zagen, dat als wij de ziel wilden bereiken, wij moesten beginnen veel te doen aan het lichaam; wij 
ontdekten, dat zij een Evangelie, dat zegt:“gaat henen, wordt warm en wordt verzadigd”, niet vatten 
konden, aleer wij hen een bed hadden verschaft, om er hunnen vermoeide leden op uit te strekken en hen 
in een toestand gebracht, waarin niet de zorg voor het lichaam al hunnen gedachten zoodanig bezighield, 
dat zij geen tijd hadden om aan iets hoogers te denken.” Jaarstaat Leger des Heils 1892:21 
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Salvation Army was responsible for 9 refuges for the homeless; 2 refuges for 
women, 1 elderly home, 2 slum posts, 2 training schools, 1 land colony, a trade 
office and national headquarters.15 In 1890, these corps and the various social 
activities were managed by 233 officers who were answerable to the national 
leader, called Territorial Commander (TC). The commander was appointed by 
the General in London, a constellation that secured the identity of the rapidly 
expanding international Salvation Army. On January 25, 1896, the ‘Foundation 
The Salvation Army’ was established.16 
The organizational development of the Dutch Army continued into the first 
decades of the 20th century. By 1913, for example, the Army had started “indus-
trial homes” in order to help the homeless and unemployed to make themselves 
useful. These industrial homes recycled all kinds of waste, like paper and broken 
furniture that was gathered from the cities. The refurbished goods were sold in 
the local thrift stores that were also managed by the Army corpses. There were 
also homes and sanitariums for children and over time, the Army had developed 
a successful national probation program.17 Among all the different social ser-
vices that the Salvation Army developed in the Netherlands, the two sides of its 
mission (spiritual and social work) were most visible in the Army’s “Goodwill 
centers”. Of the three Goodwill centers that the Salvation Army would open in 
the Netherlands, Amsterdam was the oldest and largest. In an effort to help the 
poor, the homeless, prostitutes and other needy people in the poorest areas of 
Amsterdam, social programs and spiritual aid were combined in activities like, 
for example, a women’s shelter, a men’s shelter (De Gastenburgh), an elderly 
home (De Goodwillburgh) and family care activities. During the twentieth cen-
tury, these Goodwill centers would become rather exemplary of the Army’s 
approach towards urban social problems. An example is Major Bosshardt18, the 
driving force behind the Amsterdam Goodwill center between 1948-1978, who 
transparently expressed her view on the way this work could be most effective 
as follows: “If we don’t preach the gospel any more, we might as well hand over 
the lot to an undenominational organization.”19 This resonated with her view on 
staffing: no social work without the involvement of soldier-volunteers, for in 
Bosshardt’s view they were the bearers of the Army’s identity as they embodied 
both sides of its mission. In this way, the Goodwill centers were working exam-
                                                        
 
15 De Wijde Wereld, No. 9, September 15, 1895 (UA 1128 inv.nr. 1) 
16 De stichting “Het Leger des Heils”. Extract uit de Acte van Stichting (date unknown) Amsterdam: 
Salvation Army (UA 1182, nrs.171 and 172) 
17 Jaarstaat Leger des Heils 1812/13 
18 Even though A. Bosshardt is known by the Dutch people as Major Bosshardt, she was in fact promoted 
to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel.  
19 “Als wij het evangelie niet meer brengen, laat dan een neutrale instelling de boel maar overnemen.” 
Quoted in: Harm en Polman 1982:39 
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ples of the practical religion that resulted from the two-pronged strategy of the 
Salvation Army.20 
1.4. Two branches of the same tree? 
In its own exegesis of its two-fold mission, the Salvation Army stressed that the 
equilibrium of spiritual and social relief originated from the love of Christ: 
 
“Between both, religious and social work, exists an immediate connection. 
They spring from the same source. Both are branches of the same tree.”21  
 
Viewed from this perspective, the shared roots of spiritual and social care make 
both missions equally important. However, in the elaborate description of the 
Army’s social work activities that filled the 1913 annual report, the Army did 
not miss a chance to accentuate that everything that the Salvation Army endeav-
ored was done in order to win new souls, a predominance that was justified by 
Booth’s argument that people would no longer be inclined to do wrong when 
delivered from sin: 
 
“The Salvation Army believes (…) that when a man is relieved from his sins, 
he no longer steals, no longer drinks, no longer squanders his money, nor ne-
glects his family. And more significantly, he himself becomes a serious op-
ponent of all this evil. Hence seeks the Salvation Army in all its works the 
conversion of people’s hearts towards God.”22 
 
So, even if both objectives were seen as branches of the same tree, their function 
differed as they showed “no difference in principles, nor in aspirations, but in 
methods”.23 Nevertheless, the social objective seemed to be instrumental to the 
spiritual one, because in the Army’s view, alleviation of social and material 
needs was considered a prerequisite for possible spiritual conversion. Thus, even 
though the Army seemed to value both parts of its missions equally, they both 
served a higher goal: conversion. But though the Army’s social activities aimed 
at the winning of souls, Booth had placed his ideas on social work in an explicit 
framework of impartiality and voluntariness. When people entered the Salvation 
Army programs, they would encounter an open-minded organization:  
                                                        
 
20 By 1982, the Amsterdam Goodwill Center had developed into a professional social work organization 
employing 130 people, many of who were social workers. See: Harm en Polman 1982:39 
21 “Tusschen beide, geestelijk en maatschappelijk werk, bestaat een onmiddelijk verband. Zij komen uit 
dezelfde bron voort. Beide zijn taken van één boom.” Jaarstaat Leger des Heils 1912/13:113 
22 Het Leger des Heils gelooft (…) dat als een man verlost is van zijn zonden, hij niet meer steelt, niet 
meer drinkt, geen verkwister meer is, noch zijn gezin veronachtzaamt. En wat meer zegt: hij wordt zelf 
een ernstig bestrijder van al dat kwaad. Daarom zoekt het Leger des Heils in al zijn werk voor alles de 
bekeering van ‘s menschen hart tot God.” Jaarstaat Leger des Heils 1912/13:8-9 
23 Geen verschil dus in beginsel, noch in doel, maar in werkwijze.” Jaarstaat Leger des Heils 
1912/13:115 
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“(…) no compulsion will for a moment be allowed with respect to religion. 
The man who professes to love and serve God will be helped because of such 
profession and the man who does not will be helped in the hope that he will, 
sooner or later, in gratitude to God, do the same; but there will be no melan-
choly misery-making for any. There is no sanctimonious long face in the 
Army. We talk freely about Salvation, because it is to us the very light and 
joy of our existence.”24  
 
Although prayer, singing and attending religious gatherings were core activities 
of the Army’s corps, this was never obligatory for those who sought help from 
the Army. If, for example, a “Colonist” did not want to attend a religious Sun-
day service, he was allowed to spend the Sunday as he pleased, except for doing 
his regular work, because the other rules regarding the Sabbath were still strictly 
observed. So, according to Booth, “it will be the fault of the Salvation Army if 
they do not find our Sunday Services sufficiently attractive to command their 
attendance”.25 It also did not matter which denomination one belonged to, or 
even whether you were a believer at all. Anyone that knocked on the doors of 
the Salvation Army had to be welcomed in without prejudice: 
 
“Now that we have happened upon more fortunate times, let us recognize 
that we are our brother's keepers, and set to work, regardless of party distinc-
tions and religious differences, to make this world of ours a little bit more 
like home for those whom we call our brethren.”26 
 
Notwithstanding Booth’s accent on the tolerant character of the Army’s social 
aid, the Army officers, on the other hand, were trained evangelists, and not 
without reason. Those who worked in the children’s homes, for example, were 
made aware of their first and foremost task: “(…) to bring the boys that are 
trusted to their care to the faith”.27 So, even if the twofold objective of the Salva-
tion Army was proverbially described as two branches of the same tree, or put in 
Army terms ‘two sides of the same coin’, the fact that the social dimension was 
appreciated as instrumental to the spiritual one would soon prove its worth. It 
would be precisely these social fruits of the Army’s work that would become 
visible to the Dutch society, creating an image of a social charity that seemed to 
determine the outline of the Army’s public identity. 
                                                        
 
24 Booth 1890:134  
25 Idem:163 
26 Idem:105-106 
27 “(…) de aan hun zorg toevertrouwde jongens te brengen tot het geloof in Christus.” Jaarstaat Leger des 
Heils 1912/13:50 
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2. Reciprocity and instrumentalism (1887-1940) 
2.1. Initial income and expenditure 
Even though it was not required by the Dutch government yet, the Salvation 
Army kept its books almost from the start. Even though there are no sources 
available to support this suggestion, it is plausible to assume that this was partly 
the result of a demand by its English alma mater in order to gain insight on the 
annual progress of the Dutch territory.28  
Another reason might have been to secure the trust of its grassroots, as from 
the very beginning the Army made an appeal to its supporters in its financial 
reports: “Thou who reads this, help us to defray the pecuniary consequences of 
our battle.”29 As stated above, soon after the publication of Booth’s In Darkest 
England, the structure of finances of the Salvation Army reflected its two-
pronged mission, because it had created separate bank accounts for its religious 
and social work activities in order to keep the flows of these funds apart. This 
strict separation of finances was regarded as very important in winning the con-
fidence of the Dutch public, as was emphasized in the Army’s annual reports: 
“The funds allocated for the social activities will be used for that work only, and 
cannot be used for another purpose.”30 So, in order to encourage the public in 
their benevolent contributions, the Salvation Army described how the donations 
were appropriated:  
 
“The foundation ‘The Salvation Army’ shall gratefully receive Bequests or 
Donations for its labor, that it performs night and day, the whole year round, 
for the spiritual and social uplifting of the people. Funds donated for ‘Gen-
eral Maintenance’ will be employed for the general preservation of the work; 
and those specified for “Social Work” will go to one of the following tasks 
of our work: rescue homes for women, slum posts, children’s homes, boys 
homes, girls homes, mother homes, land colony, industrial homes for men, 
refuges for men, and the same for women and children, and for the soon to 
be opened evening home for the elderly”.31 
                                                        
 
28 A suggestion made by the Army’s former manager of finances, K. van Teijlingen, interview August 18, 
2010. 
29 “Gij die dit leest, help ons in het dragen der geldenlijken gevolgen van onzen strijd”. Jaarstaat Leger 
des Heils 1890:22 
30 “Het geld voor het maatschappelijke werk bestemd, wordt uitsluitend voor dat werk gebruikt en mag 
niet voor een ander doel worden gebruikt.” Jaarstaat Leger des Heils 1892:23 
31 “De Stichting ‘Het Leger des Heils’ zal met dankbaarheid ontvangen Legaten of Giften voor zijn 
arbeid, die dag en nacht, het heele jaar door, wordt verricht voor de geestelijke en maatschappelijke 
opheffing van het volk. Gelden die gegeven worden voor “Algemeen Onderhoud”, zullen worden aange-
wend voor de algemeene instandhouding van het werk; en die, welke voor het “Maatschappelijk Werk” 
worden gegeven, komen ten bate van den een of andere van den volgende taken van ons werk: reddings-
huizen voor vrouwen, barmhartigheidsposten, kinderhuizen, jongenshuizen, meisjeshuizen, moederhuis, 
landskolonie, industrieële tehuizen voor mannen, toevluchten voor mannen, idem voor vrouwen en kin-
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So by means of the annual reports, the Army showed its willingness to be trans-
parent to its contributors. For after all it was the Dutch public, together with the 
swiftly growing sales department, that generated the bulk of the Army’s income 
during the first years of its Dutch conquest. This way, even though separate 
accounts were created for the two branches of the activities of the Army, the 
general drive behind its work was openly confirmed: to spiritually and socially 
educate the people. 
This approach paid off. As the development of the Army’s expenditures indi-
cate, the social objective of the Army had been maturing gradually during its 
first two decades in the Netherlands. Until 1900, the costs of the religious activi-
ties exceeded the expenses incurred on social activities. But by 1908 the social 
mission had gained ground, because by then, approximately the same amount of 
money was spent for both missions. By 1910 the social objective accompanied 
the religious mission of the Army on an equal basis and the ‘two sides of the 
coin’ were in balance. From then on, however, the source of their growth would 
start to diverge increasingly. The religious activities would be supported by 
private income that was generated by donations and other public fundraising 
activities. The social activities on the other hand, would increasingly be support-
ed by subsidies that were issued by the national and local governments. 
2.2. Probation services of the Salvation Army until 1945  
One of the most structural social services of the Salvation Army was its proba-
tion program for ex-prisoners. In the United Kingdom, this service had formed a 
part of the Army’s palette of social care since its very beginnings. Based on his 
own experiences during a three month detention, William Booth concluded that 
imprisonment was not a very successful approach to resocialize people. Even 
worse, it led to social bonds being severed and the return into society especially, 
was often a period of strong disorientation that was interlaced with non-
acceptance by the very society these people tried to rejoin. So in order to help 
released prisoners to adjust to their new environment, the Salvation Army start-
ed the prison gate houses. These houses were located, literally, as close as possi-
ble to the exit of the penitentiaries, and Salvationists were on the look-out for 
released prisoners to offer them “bread, bed and a bath”. Additionally, they of-
fered a possibility to work or to take part in some other activity to help them to 
get used to society again. As part of this program in the Netherlands, some of 
the men were sent to the farm colony Groot Batelaar in Lunteren. This work-
community was situated in the Dutch woodlands called the Veluwe and aimed to 
offer ex-prisoners a non-urban working environment. Additionally, the Salvation 
Army used these remote and secluded accommodations for alcoholics to dry out. 
The importance of this work for facilitating the resocializing of released prison-
ers was stressed by the fact that it was regarded to be an obligation for all “social 
                                                                                                                                  
 
deren en voor het weldra te openen Avondstond-tehuis voor ouden van dagen.” Jaarstaat Leger des Heils 
1919/20:27 
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officers of the Salvation Army” as laid down in their orders and regulations.32 
However, long before the Salvation Army started its own probation department, 
some Salvationists were already active visitors of prisoners, be it on account of 
the Nederlandsch Genootschap tot Zedelijke Verbetering der Gevangenen.33 
This however, was not the only probation organization in the Netherlands, for 
during the first decade of the twentieth century approximately 80 probation or-
ganizations were active. These were often small and locally orientated groups 
and only four of these organizations were active on the national level, one of 
which was the Salvation Army.  
Financial development 
In 1905 the Army showed the first signs of organizational professionalization 
when it grouped all its social activities into the Army’s Department of Social 
Work amongst Men, which was headed by G. Maste. And also with regard to 
the Army’s probation work, changes were forthcoming. Until 1902 the probation 
work work was based entirely on public charity. This meant that that the Army 
had to pay for its own probation activities.34 This changed during the first years 
of the 20th century as Minister of Justice, Loeff (1901-1905, Algemeene Bond) 
made the first subsidy available for probation work. In 1905 the Salvation Ar-
my’s probation department received its first government grant as part of a bulk 
grant to the Genootschap. This money was earmarked to support the aftercare 
for released prisoners as was provided for by Groot Batelaar. These initial gov-
ernment grants however, were far from substantial. From 1906 onwards, both 
the Genootschap and the Salvation Army received fl.1,500 and the rest was 
divided amongst the other organizations. In 1908 this had amounted to fl.2,500. 
Next to the total of fl.526,501 that was reserved by the Army itself for all of its 
social activities of 1911, the amount of national subsidies of fl.2,000 seemed to 
be a pittance (about 0.4%). Five years later however, this subsidy offered by the 
Ministry of Justice had increased to 3% (fl.5,000) of the Army’s social service 
expenditure and by 1925 this fund already covered about 9.5%.35 Even though 
the state interest in supporting civil society with regard to probation work grew, 
the actual funds were rather modest, also when viewed from the perspective of 
the government. In 1913, for example, out of a total budget of fl.10,000,000, the 
Ministry of Justice had reserved a mere fl.7,500 for probation activities on the 
nationwide level. 
                                                        
 
32 Maris 1991:27 
33 The first entry in the annual financial reports on account of probation activities can be found no sooner 
than 1908, implying that until then, the Salvation Army operated mainly under supervision of the Ge-
nootschap. Also, the Het Nederlandsch Genootschap tot Zedelijke Verbetering der Gevangenen changed 
its name in 1930 into Nederlands Genootschap tot Reclassering. During this study I will used the term 
Genootschap. 
34 Regrettably, the lack of relevant sources in the Salvation Army’s archives makes a reconstruction of 
these local funds impossible. 
35 Jaarstaat Leger des Heils 1910/11; Jaarstaat Leger des Heils 1915/16; Jaarstaat Leger des Heils 1925  
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One of the results of this state support was that it sparked a discussion within 
the ministry on the issue of accountability, because the government had no 
means to ascertain how the money was spent.36 This lack of accountability was 
also one of the reasons for Catholic Minister of Justice Nelissen (1908-1910, 
RKSP) to bring into force the so-called Reclasseringsregeling (Probation code) 
of 1910.37 The main goal of this order was to allow the “free organs in society” 
to execute their probation work. Its secondary aim, though not less important, 
was to ensure a certain measure of government control on the quality of the 
probation work that it was paying for. Already at the very beginning of the 
twentieth century, and soon after the first subsidies were issued, it became clear 
that the government aimed at more than just offering support to civil society to 
expand its work. It also wanted to improve the quality of the work that these 
organizations carried out. 
Hesitations 
The debate within the Ministry was not the only discussion that was sparked by 
the emerging state support. Also within the Genootschap, this support and its 
possible consequences were discussed. One side of the board suggested that in 
order to ensure the independence and freedom of the Genootschap to make it’s 
own policy, it would be best for it to work apart from the government. Others 
argued that this would only take the Genootschap to an isolated position and 
would not contribute to the work of the organization. Eventually, the Ge-
nootschap reached an internal compromise that after having participated in the 
probation system for a year, an evaluation of its results and effects would fol-
low. The decisive argument that concluded the debate clearly reflected the 
awareness of the organization’s position towards the Dutch government: the 
Genootschap was in dire need of funds, which made cooperation with the gov-
ernment “unavoidable”.38 
The Salvation Army showed even more reserve as it clearly hesitated in its 
decision to join the arrangement. For the Army too, compliance with the 
Reclasseringsregeling would mean that it would be obliged to inform the minis-
ter on a regular basis by reporting on the progress of the to-be-released prison-
ers. Through this bureaucratic prerequisite, the ministry not only wanted to exert 
control over the quality of the work, but additionally, the probation organization 
would only be paid for its services upon the actual release of the prisoner.39 So, 
with this system of payment in arrear, the Salvation Army had to invest first, but 
without the certainty of reimbursement. This forced the Army to scrutinize the 
effectiveness of its methods. Nevertheless, even though the Genootschap sub-
mitted its declaration of willingness to the Minister of Justice in early 1911, it 
                                                        
 
36“het (ontbrak) de Regering ten enen male aan gelegenheid na te gaan op welke wijze het geld werd 
besteed” Maris, 1991:31 
37 Reclasseringsregeling 1910, Staatsblad 374, December 24, 1910. 
38 Heinrich 1995:79-80 
39 Idem:89 
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would take until 1912 for the Army’s Territorial Commander to comply. The 
available historical sources do not reveal the cause of this delay, but Ringelberg 
suggested that part of this delay was caused by the Army’s International Head-
quarters that, seemingly without any motivation, blocked the application by 
withholding its approval.40  
However, by 1912 the Army had decided to send in the application. This 
choice may well have been facilitated on a personal level as the inspector in 
question with the Probation Office of the Ministry of Justice, Veenstra, was an 
active member of the Salvation Army. And as a Salvationist, he was most prob-
ably well-informed on both the probation activities of the Salvation Army and 
the possibilities to gain support for this effort from the government.41 It is even 
suggested that both Veenstra and the chairman of the Genootschap, Fentener 
van Vlissingen, repeatedly urged the Army command to comply with the grant 
system.42  
On December 13, 1912, the Salvation Army was acknowledged as an official 
association for the care and resettlement of prisoners, and therefore it had be-
come eligible for structural subsidy which made the probation work was the first 
Army activity that was structurally subsidized by the Dutch government. 
Pillarization and harmonization 
Also on a national scale, the Reclasseringsregeling of 1910 had an important 
effect, for it stimulated the increase in probation organizations and their coop-
eration. In the light of the ongoing process of pillarization, this expansion nour-
ished the need within the work field for far-reaching cooperation between the 
various probation organizations. In order to further this intention, in 1912 the 
Genootschap and other probation organizations combined forces under an um-
brella organization: Vereeniging van Reclasserings Instellingen (VvRI, Associa-
tion of Probation Societies).43 This process of harmonization within the pillars 
continued during the decades that followed. In 1917, the Catholics founded their 
Roomskatholieke Reclasseringsvereniging (RKRV, Roman Catholic Probation 
Organization, RKRV) and in 1928, the Calvinist Protestants Christelijk 
Reclasseringsvereniging (PCRV) was established. These organizations formed 
the umbrellas for their particular grassroots, and with the Protestant branch 
opening its doors, the ideological segmentation of the probation field had be-
come a fact. 
The Salvation Army regarded this development from the sideline. In the 
opinion of the Army, there were only two sorts of probation organizations: non-
religious institutes and religious, pillarized ones.44 However, the Army regarded 
itself as a third, non-partisan alternative to this classification. This position was 
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based on the target group they chose to focus on, for theoretically, the to-be-
discharged prisoners were allowed to choose a probation organization that suited 
them best according to their personal philosophy. In practice, however, the 
Catholic and Protestant organizations had been focusing mainly on “their own” 
people.45 The Salvation Army however, traditionally focused on the deprived, 
homeless and vagrants, irrespective of their personal beliefs.46 So, within the 
context of a pillarized Dutch society, the Salvation Army probation service was 
the only available institute for people who did not (want to) have a connection 
with an established religious denomination, but nevertheless wanted help from a 
faith-based probation organization. Additionally, as Ringelberg observed quite 
saliently, serving this type of clients also opened the door to obtain government 
grants.47 So with regard to the probation work field, the Salvation Army had 
begun to define its own place within the pillarized Dutch society. By refusing to 
be confined to a certain denominational part of the Dutch public, it aimed to 
enlarge its possible work field. On an organizational level however, the Salva-
tion Army decided to follow a strategy of cooperation. At the time of its estab-
lishment in 1915, the Army joined forces with the ‘general’ probation umbrella 
organization VvRI, and to ascertain its influence in this new form of coopera-
tion, Salvation Army’s Head of the Department of Social Work Amongst Men, 
Maste, was appointed as an executive member of the board of the VvRI.48 
By 1928, the organizations that were active in the field of probation had di-
vided themselves in three parts: faith-based (umbrella) organizations amongst 
which were the RKRV, the PCRV and the Salvation Army’s Probation Depart-
ment; the Ministry of Justice; and the VvRI with its central bureau that managed 
many local probation programs. Additionally, all these entities worked more or 
less under the coordination of the Genootschap. This structure however, was 
expensive and complex, as indicated by the head of the Genootschap, N. Muller; 
it was an “organizational monstrosity”.49 So, reorganization and further harmo-
nization seemed imminent. 
Reciprocity and instrumentalism 
The initial cooperation with the Ministry of Justice soon revealed its conse-
quences for the Army. In 1913, officers were appointed to start up and coordi-
nate probation services within the 40 Army corps. The government grant, be-
cause of its stimulating effect within the Army corps, had started to become 
quite welcome.50 In the wake of World War I however, the first signs of de-
pendency on these finances started to show. The economic hardship that fol-
lowed the war forced the Dutch government to economize, but even though 
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large cutbacks were held off, the increase in subsidies halted. At first glance this 
was not a problem for the Army, however, the leveling of the grants was com-
bined with two other developments, which together actually did create a finan-
cial retrenchment during the second half of the 1920s. The first development 
was that the number of probation organizations that applied for financial support 
grew consistently, so now the same amount of money was to be divided amongst 
a growing number of organizations. The second development was that in combi-
nation with the leveling in income, the probation caseload for the Salvation Ar-
my grew from 1392 clients in 1927 to 3140 clients in 1937.51 As a consequence, 
the administrative pressure multiplied as every client had to be screened and 
extensively reported by the probation officer. This work pressure resulted in an 
increasing need for a larger staff, for which now even less government money 
was available.52 
In order to curb this negative effect of its participation in the budding social 
policy system, the Salvation Army fell back on a more or less implicit strategy. 
Together with the VvRI and the Genootschap, the Salvation Army protested 
against this growing economic pressure on their organizations. For this, an eco-
nomic argument was used: “The probation service has saved the state thousands 
of guilders.”53 By stressing this economic effect of reciprocity, the Salvation 
Army sought to create a sense of added value, and with success, for subsequent-
ly the Dutch parliament provided for a temporary increase in the subsidies.  
This strategy of reciprocity was not new to the Salvation Army, however. 
The Army had never hesitated to stress its added value to the state by presenting 
itself as an almost indispensable partner. In fact, it had been applying this strate-
gy since its very start in the Netherlands:  
 
“(…) and it is not less certain that the Army is a blessing to the state and not 
a small asset to the authorities, who often express the highest praise and ap-
preciation for our work. A shallow view on our work already reveals (…) 
how this crowd, - of drunks, of bad fathers and husbands, of people that nev-
er visit a church, of unfortunates cast aside by society, this ominous and 
growing army of malcontents, - once a threat to the state and a burden to the 
community to which they belong, now converted, fully changed for the bet-
ter, taking care of their wives and children, whom they abused and left to 
starve, now a pride of the nation, which they used to disgrace – in all regards 
has become an asset to the state.”54  
                                                        
 
51 Ringelberg 2010:174-176 
52 Maris 1991:40-41 
53 “De reclassering heeft voor het Rijk duizenden bespaard”, Maris 1991:40-41; Heinrich 1995:132 
54 “(…) en niet minder zeker is het, dat het Leger een zegen is voor den Staat en geen geringen hulp voor 
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By 1918, the Salvation Army had become even more self-confident on its posi-
tion towards the Dutch government, for in its own view it had become “an im-
portant factor in the system of social instruments, of which the government 
makes use of increasingly to fight social deterioration.”55 In these terms, the 
Army actively put itself at the disposal of the state as one of the available in-
struments to obtain shared policy aims. On the other hand, this rhetoric also 
seemed to emphasize that the national government in its turn was quite depend-
ent on private organizations like the Army in order to fight social misery. 
The developing liaison between the Salvation Army probation department 
and the Ministry of Justice helped to make a structural and professional proba-
tion service possible. For the corps this meant that structural social work activi-
ties came into being, and at the same time probation work was consolidated and 
began to form a recognizable unit within the Army. These internal Army devel-
opments were closely related to the context of the changing probation work 
field. The Salvation Army probation department seemed self-willed in its posi-
tion within the Dutch pillarized society. However, its structural liaison with the 
government seemed to stimulate a different organizational dynamics than for the 
other social activities provided for by the Army. With World War II looming up 
on the horizon, the contour of an organization within an organization became 
visible, because while the other social services were still relatively undeveloped, 
the Salvation Army probation department had shaped the foundations for a 
semi-professionalized organization. In this regard, the probation department was 
way ahead of its time compared to the rest of the Salvation Army. Nevertheless, 
towards the close of the antebellum, the Salvation Army had seemed to have 
proven its relevance to the Dutch society and the government. In its rhetoric, the 
Army had emphasized its added value in terms of reciprocity and even as an 
instrument for the government to work with. In practice, its social work branch 
operated three children’s homes; two boys’ houses and one girls’ house; one 
motherhouse; two shelters for women; three refuges for women and children and 
five for men; eight slum posts; three old people’s homes for women and one for 
men; one rest-home for women and two nursing homes; three hotels; four city 
colonies (called Metropool) and a farm colony called Groot Batelaar.56 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                  
 
gevaar voor den staat en een last voor de gemeente, waarin zij thuis behooren, nu bekeerd, geheel veran-
derd en verbeterd, zorg dragende voor hunnen vrouwen en kinderen, die zij vroeger mishandelden en 
lieten verhongeren, nu een sieraad van de natie, die zij vroeger tot schande verstrekten – in alle opzichten 
een aanwinst voor den staat is geworden.” Jaarstaat Leger des Heils 1892:7 
55 “(…) een meetellende factor (geworden) in het samenstel van sociale middelen, waarvan de Regeering 
zich in toenemende mate bedient ter bestrijding van maatschappelijke achteruitgang.” Jaarstaat Leger des 
Heils 1917/18:3 
56 Ringelberg 2005:169 
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3. The Salvation Army: a valued partner (1945-1980) 
3.1. The Army’s attitude of supplementarity 
World War II also left its mark on the Dutch Salvation Army. In March 1941, 
the German occupiers forbade the Army to continue its activities.57 It did con-
tinue nevertheless, but under different circumstances. Also on a material level, 
the Army suffered damages. This destruction of Army property and disruption 
of its social and religious activities was sketched by the Dutch Army Territorial 
Commander Durman (1946-1950) as follows: 
 
“A number of church halls were destroyed by the acts of war; numerous 
homes for social labor were raided and ransacked; the nursing home at the 
Land Colony in Lunteren was completely demolished; the farmlands ne-
glected; the valuable livestock was deported to Germany; the camp houses of 
our youth center in Lunteren were also taken down and the available materi-
als were used for other purposes; valuable printing presses and typesetting 
machines of our printing house ended up in the Russian Zone. Our work in 
Rotterdam suffered great damage because a number of buildings for social 
and spiritual work were destroyed.”58 
 
The costs of this restoration of buildings and services were estimated to be about 
fl.3,500,000, an amount that clearly exceeded the almost penniless treasury of 
the Salvation Army. The Dutch public however, showed its appreciation for the 
Army and by means of the annual National Collection in 1946, the Army gath-
ered a handsome amount of fl.365,000. This was a large sum, especially when 
taking into account the postwar economic and material deficiencies that many 
Dutch people suffered. In that light, this display of public generosity demon-
strated the popularity of the Salvation Army among the Dutch people. Neverthe-
less, this amount would not suffice by far, and so the Army’s International 
Headquarters came to their help with an annual contribution to further the resto-
ration of the Dutch Army’s territory. Additionally, new legislation was issued to 
help churches and other religious institutions with their material recovery. Ac-
cording to the Army, this was not a sudden gesture, but was inspired, at least for 
a part, by the postwar increase in public religiosity. World War II seemed to 
have awakened a certain spiritual need amongst the Dutch people, as was ob-
served in the sudden influx of people during the weekly Army gatherings. In 
                                                        
 
57 For further exploration of this period, see Chapter 4.1.4. 
58 “Een aantal kerkzalen werd door de oorlogshandelingen verwoest; tal van Tehuizen voor Sociale 
Arbeid werden leeggeroofd en uitgeplunderd; het Verpleegdenhuis op de Landkolonie te Lunteren werd 
geheel afgebroken; de landerijen verwaarloosd; een kostbare veestapel naar Duitsland weggevoerd; de 
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voor andere doeleinden gebruikt; drukpersen en zetmachines onzer drukkerij tot een grote waarde kwa-
men terecht in de Russische Zone. Ons werk in Rotterdam leed grote schade, doordat een aantal gebou-
wen voor sociale en geestelijke arbeid werd verwoest.” Jaarstaat Leger des Heils 1946:1  
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order to meet this spiritual demand, the Army intended to increase the number of 
corps from 99 in 1946 to 150 before 1950.59 So, in disregard of its urgent mate-
rial need, the Salvation Army displayed clear ambitions to undertake new activi-
ties and expand its reach on social problems. In addition to the existing 49 
homes and shelters for women, youngsters, children and elderly, 18 new homes 
were planned and new officers were needed in order to staff these new accom-
modations and programs.60 
The atmosphere of restoration was also reflected in the attitude that the Ar-
my’s General, Albert Orsborn (1946-1954) showed towards the Salvation Army 
in the Netherlands when, next to visiting the Dutch territory, Orsborn also of-
fered financial support. During this first postwar visit in 1946, Osborn also keen-
ly observed a change in the governmental attitude in the Netherlands towards the 
idea of providing for a basic social security. Orsborn noticed that the state was 
increasingly taking social matters in its own hands, but according to him that 
would not mean that the Army would no longer have a place in the social work 
area. The Dutch Army would have to show flexibility and look towards adapting 
to its new position:  
 
“The social services that the Salvation Army wants to offer the public, keep 
pace with the social developments. As the social development makes pro-
gress and governments start to do all kinds of things that were provided for 
by the Army in the past, we change our tactics.”61  
 
Additionally, Orsborn expressed his views on how this repositioning could af-
fect the work of the Salvation Army’s: 
 
“It is a fallacy to assume that in a socially highly-developed society there 
would be no room left for the social work of the Army. The contrary is 
proved. In countries where governments have implemented far-reaching so-
cial measures, the supplementary services of the Army are appreciated all the 
more. The Army asks itself: what is necessary, what has to be done; how can 
the Army place itself in the service of society and the country in which it op-
erates, and depending on the answer the social services will be organized and 
performed.”62  
                                                        
 
59 This ambition would never be actualized. In fact, until the 1990s, the total number of corps would 
hardly rise above the 110, and in 2007 it had diminished to 70. 
60 Spaan 1947:17,102-105 
61 “De sociale diensten, welke het Leger des Heils aan de menschen wil bewijzen, houden gelijken tred 
met de sociale ontwikkeling. Naarmate de sociale ontwikkeling vordert en de regeeringen allerlei zaken 
gaan doen, die voorheen door het Leger werden verricht, veranderen wij onze tactiek.” Spaan 1947:100-
101  
62 “Het is een dwaling te meenen, dat in een sociaal hoogontwikkelde maatschappij geen plaats meer zou 
zijn voor maatschappelijk werk van het Leger. Het tegendeel is gebleken. In landen, waar de regeeringen 
verstrekkende sociale maatregelen hebben ingevoerd, worden de aanvullende diensten van het Leger juist 
te meer gewaardeerd. Het Leger vraagt zich af: wat is er noodig, wat moet er gedaan worden; hoe kan het 
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This depiction of the Army’s working rationale confirmed the basic attitude of 
the Army towards the state as it presented itself as being supplementary to the 
government. These words of Orsborn reflect a great amount of responsiveness to 
political and social developments, and in his view national governments were 
increasingly taking over the work that traditionally had belonged to civil society 
organizations like the Salvation Army. This development directly affected the 
position of civil society, as a degree of marginalization seemed to be inevitable. 
The government appeared to be increasingly in control of the playing field on 
which different parties were present.  
This did not intimidate Orsborn judging by his reaction: “we’ll change our 
tactics”. However, the rather pragmatic attitude towards this issue was not new 
as the idea of supplementation had been a part of the Army’s attitude towards 
the government since its beginnings. In fact, it can be argued that the Salvation 
Army derived the very rationale of its existence from this position, because after 
all, the shortcomings of the UK government on social issues were Booth’s main 
incentives to publish In Darkest England. However, in extension of this attitude, 
the Army also had to be flexible and responsive, characteristics that also defined 
the Army’s organizational culture and identity. 
3.2. Organizational expansion and sources of income  
For the Salvation Army, restoration swiftly turned into growth and development 
according to its financial balance. Within 10 years since the end of World War 
II, the budget of the Army had doubled from fl.3,623,144 in 1946 to fl.7,042,711 
in 1955. That this expansion was of a structural character, was proven 10 years 
later when once again the Army had more than doubled itself, realizing an expo-
nential growth until the 1970s.63 This rise of income had different sources. First 
of all, the public support grew. As stated before, in 1946 the Dutch people do-
nated as much as fl.365,612 during the National Collection. Additional individ-
ual donations and bequests made up for another fl.252,672, taking the public 
contribution to a grand total of fl.618,284 in 1946.64 By 1960 this amount had 
almost doubled to fl.1,118,751, and in 1980, almost 35 years after World War II, 
the contribution of the Dutch people in support of the work of the Salvation 
Army increased eighteen-fold to fl.10,991,347, thus elevating the income curve 
of the Army spectacularly.65  
Even though in absolute terms this increase in public contribution was re-
markable, it was not the Army’s main source of income. The operating result of 
the Army not only increased much faster, but also to a much larger extent than 
the public contributions. In 1946 the operating result amounted to fl.3,623,144, 
                                                                                                                                  
 
Leger zich ten dienste stellen van de gemeenschap, het land, waarin het werkt en naar gelang van het 
antwoord op die vraag worden de sociale diensten ingericht en uitgevoerd.” Spaan 1947:100-101 
63 Jaarstaat Leger des Heils 1946; Jaarstaat Leger des Heils 1955; Jaarstaat Leger des Heils 1965  
64 Jaarstaat Leger des Heils 1946 
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and by 1955 this had almost doubled to fl.7,042,711,. Ten years later, it had 
increased tenfold to fl.73,391,010, and by 1985 the operating result had reached 
a total of fl.219,489,233,.66 
One of the sources of income for the Army was recycling of goods. Like 
many of the other activities of the Salvation Army, recycling started out as an 
order from William Booth. In his opinion, collecting the discarded but still use-
ful remnants of clothes, furniture and paper contributed to turning the city into a 
better and healthier place to live in. Subsequently, these goods were to be re-
paired or recycled into other useful products, and resold. This would generate a 
healthy supplement to the Army’s income and also provide for a form of mean-
ingful occupation for the unemployed. Until the 1970s, these recycling activities 
were operated on the relatively fragmented level of the corps, and were also 
incorporated in social programs like the industrial homes. With the increase in 
consumption during the 1950s and 1960s however, the amount of waste grew. In 
the clothing branch especially, consumption increased as the demand for cheap 
ready-to-wear clothes grew. Clothes turned from being a mere necessity into a 
reflection of the person’s social status and individuality, and were also more 
easily disposed of.67 In 1979 the diverse Salvation Army recycling activities 
were centralized in the recycling department Herbestemming van Goederen 
(reallocation of goods), turning the Salvation Army into the largest collector of 
used clothing in the Netherlands, according to its manager Van Teijlingen 
(1979-1990).68 This modernization facilitated a coordinated approach towards 
the activities of collection and reselling. As a result, the recycling department 
became a significant source of income for the Salvation Army, by 1980 it gener-
ated a turnover of fl.13,102,266 with a surplus of fl.3,722,823.69 
The main contribution to the Army’s financial growth between 1946 and 
1989 is however, the increasing rise in property value, in combination with a 
growing return on investments. To a much smaller extent, these resources were 
complemented with inventory, stock, short-term debts and liquid assets. These 
assets were financed with liabilities such as capital - including some government 
grants for real estate - reserves, long-term debts and some government funding 
in terms of social premiums that were work, age or health-related. On the level 
of the Salvation Army real estate, restoration and renewal was in full progress. 
The Salvation Army had developed new building projects and initiated real es-
tate purchases. For instance, some corps had the opportunity to construct new 
buildings. The expansion of the probation department and the department of 
recycling also demanded new office buildings. Additionally, the antiquated ac-
commodations for the elderly, children and homeless were planned to be re-
placed with new buildings as well. 
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Interestingly enough, an important impetus to these plans came from the 
Dutch government. In its ambition to restore the Dutch postwar society and 
infrastructure, the Dutch government created several ‘repair programs’ of which 
the Oorlogsschadeherstel programma (war damage repair program) was very 
influential, and the Salvation Army also benefited from these arrangements. For 
its material loss in Rotterdam, for example, the Salvation Army received gov-
ernment grants to rebuild their demolished properties. These damage repair con-
tributions started in 1946 with a grant of fl.40,000 and the program continued on 
till 1965.70 With this money, the Salvation Army rebuilt their scouting-homes in 
Lunteren and constructed a social center in Rotterdam.71 Additionally, the Sal-
vation Army was eligible for grants on church buildings. For example, for its 
construction of a corps building in Beverwijk, the Army received a church 
building grant of fl.37,248 on a total of fl.118,561, covering one third of the 
costs.72 In Nijmegen, a municipality grant for the construction of a new corps 
building covered about half of the costs of fl.137,639, and still more subsidy was 
to be expected on the architect’s bill.73 
3.3. Habituation 
In its turn, this development of the finances and organization of the Salvation 
Army generated an internal need for control. At the beginning of the 1960s the 
advisory board to the TC, the Territoriale Financiële Raad (TFR, Territorial 
Financial Council), issued an order that stated that all different plans for renew-
al, restoration and construction that were developed within the Army, had to be 
approved of by the TFR. The Army command was well aware of the diversity of 
the flows of money that streamed through the organization on a more local level, 
and over which the command apparently had no control. So, in order to make 
more efficient use of these structural and incidental government grants, coordi-
nated action was deemed necessary. This action was also generated by the fact 
that the Army’s real estate in the Netherlands was officially the property of the 
General, who was based at the International Headquarters (IHQ) of the Salvation 
Army in London. As was regulated by the statutes of the Army, the IHQ had to 
approve of most of the interventions on the matter of real estate, and by central-
izing the applications for related government grants, the TFR had both the abil-
ity to report to the IHQ on these matters and at the same time supervise this flow 
of government money.74 
At other moments, the Army started to show a growing skill with regard to 
the acquisition of government money. In October 1964 for example, Financieel 
Secretaris (FS, Financial Secretary) Verwaal announced the drafting of an aide-
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memoire that would help the Salvation Army youth department to capitalize 
government grants as much as possible: “(…) so that the Salvation Army’s 
youth work will also be able to profit as much as possible from government 
subsidies.”75 This dexterity was also refined in other, more indirect but not less 
structural flows of government money. Traditionally the Army provided for 
housing and essentials for its officers, but with the introduction of social security 
arrangements during the postwar decades, the Salvation Army balanced its con-
tributions to its officers against the increasing benefits and allowances that the 
Dutch government provided for. For example, when the state pension (AOW) of 
the officers exceeded 70% of the internal Army pension allowance, the surplus 
was reclaimed from the officers.76 The same applied to the supplement income 
that the state provided since 1959 for widows and orphans (AWW).77 This how-
ever, did not mean that the Army abandoned its function as financial safeguard 
for its personnel, and while it was obliged by law to pay the AOW and AWW 
premiums for its employees, when the premiums on the public health insurance 
rose, the Salvation Army would raise its financial compensation accordingly.78 
This structural availability of government money not only opened the door 
for the Salvation Army to restore its social and spiritual work in the Netherlands, 
but also offered the Army the opportunity to factor in the amount of subsidy it 
might avail. For example, in 1959 plans were made to build a new children’s 
home in Assen, and out of the total estimated costs of fl.414,600, the Salvation 
Army took into consideration an “expected subsidy” amount of fl.269,100 that 
was yet to be granted by the Ministry of Justice.79 This amount made up for 
more than half of the anticipated costs, so the risks that the Army was prepared 
to take were quite sizable. The fact however, that the Army nevertheless antici-
pated the subsidy and accounted for it in its calculations, makes clear that the 
flow of subsidy had become rather predictable to the Army. This was also con-
firmed by the example of the restoration of the Amsterdam Goodwill building at 
the Oudezijdse Achterbrugwal. The national government was willing to contrib-
ute fl.25,000 which was to be supplemented by the Amsterdam municipality 
with a sum of fl.33,900. Even with these contributions, the Salvation Army 
lacked fl.20,000 to cover the total costs, but instead of just chipping in, the TFR 
decided to wait to see what amount of subsidy the provincial government would 
come up with, for then it would only have to cover the remaining deficit from its 
own finances.80 This strategic attitude sometimes also took a more proactive 
turn, as was observed from the plans made in the same period for a new work 
therapy barrack for the Land Colony Groot Batelaar. The Salvation Army decid-
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ed to only start construction when the finances would be “acceptable”, but the 
Army did not just wait and see when this was possible,. Instead, this time an 
Army delegation consisting of Colonel Ramaker, the Financial Secretary and 
some other members of the TFR contacted the Head of the Office of Public 
Administration of the Ministry of Justice to try to ensure a sufficient amount of 
financial support from the Dutch government.81 And with success, because three 
weeks later the Ministry of Justice had indeed promised a grant of fl.42,000, 
which was enough to start construction.82 On a much more structural level, the 
Ministerie van Onderwijs, Kunsten en Wetenschappen (OKW, Ministry of Edu-
cation, Arts and Sciences) promised an annual grant for the outdoor center for 
the youth on the premises of Groot Batelaar. In addition, it was remarked that 
this flow of money would be guaranteed for the coming 40 years…83  
The structural and thus predictable availability of government money also 
exerted influence on the policy decisions of the Army. In 1962, the national 
grant arrangement on (re-)building of custody care homes was revised, promis-
ing financial support for the coming years ranging from 75% of the total costs 
up to 90% in some cases. This new arrangement did not only reinforce the fi-
nancial expectations of the Salvation Army, but it also in fact altered some of its 
plans for the restoration of old buildings into completely new development. For 
example, instead of renovating the antiquated boys home in Haarlem (costs 
fl.500,000), according to this new grant scheme, it had now become cheaper to 
build a totally new building, as was decided.84  
The Salvation Army began to incorporate this predictable government sup-
port in its operational strategies and policies to a growing extent. This meant that 
it would become much harder to do without these government funds. The first 
instance when the Army was confronted with this limitation was between 1960 
and 1964, when the Salvation Army had to deal with rising costs, and especially 
wages, on a national scale. The Federatie van verpleeginrichtingen (Federation 
of Nursing Institutions) had lobbied for an increase in wages for its personnel, 
and as result, a wage increase seemed imminent for the Salvation Army employ-
ees belonging to this particular work field or federation.85 The reaction of the 
Army command to this matter, however, hardly showed any concern about pos-
sible cutbacks or any other disadvantage of the growing dependency on gov-
ernment support. In the opinion of the TFR, the burden of this increase in wages 
would not be too much of a constraint on the subsidized social work sectors of 
the Army, because it anticipated the government habit of supplementing these 
extra costs.86 Furthermore, the Salvation Army seemed not only to grow accus-
tomed to the structural flow of money, but it even displayed a proactive attitude 
                                                        
 
81 TFR (minutes) June 6, 1961 
82 TFR (minutes) June 28, 1961 
83 TFR (minutes) March 7, 1964 
84 TFR (minutes) November 20, 1962; TFR (minutes) November 26, 1962 
85 TFR (minutes) April 5, 1960 
86 TFR (minutes) Februari 3, 1964; TFR (minutes) Februari 5, 1964 
 
 
111 
 
in order to create new subsidy possibilities. For instance, in 1963 it applied for 
an incidental subsidy in order to buy a new hot water boiler (fl.7,000) and in this 
case the Army made clear suggestions for how this money could be accounted 
for, because these costs could be granted in the form of an additional fare on the 
regular accommodation costs.87  
When General Orsborn mentioned the Army’s idea of supplementarity to the 
Dutch state in his speech to the Dutch branch in 1946, he probably had not envi-
sioned the way in which the Dutch Army had reacted to state incentives like 
subsidies. However, slowly but certainly, the Salvation Army seemed to change 
its attitude towards the Dutch state by accepting more and more financial sup-
port in order to facilitate its own ambitions. This attitude of the Dutch branch 
however, led to a growing habituation on government resources, a development 
that seemed to have been particularly the case with the swiftly changing proba-
tion department of the Salvation Army after World War II. 
4. Probation work of the Salvation Army (1945-1980) 
In 1939 the probation work showed a total balance of fl.64,990 and made up for 
about 12% of the total operating result of the Salvation Army. Less than one 
third of the probation work was paid for by private donations (fl.14,720) and 
government grants had accumulated to fl.50,270 on annual basis. During the 
first postwar decades, the private donations for probation work increased quick-
ly from fl.40,197 in 1946 to fl.234,536 in 1965. On the other hand, government 
grants increased even more rapidly. In 1946 the input of the state (fl.19,200) did 
not even countervail the public contributions (fl.40,197) but hardly 10 years 
later, the tables had turned drastically. In 1955 the private contributions of 
fl.57,803 were four times outnumbered by government grants (fl.211,940), her-
alding a development that would prove to be decisive for the position of the 
Army’s probation department towards the government and also within the or-
ganization of the Army itself. In 1965 the Dutch state contributed fl.1,141,904 to 
the Army’s probation department, compared to fl.234,536 in private gifts, and 
ten years yet later, the Dutch public seemed to have financially forsaken the 
probation work, for in 1975 the private donations had dropped to a mere 
fl.6,356, government contributions however had risen to fl.6,048,168 in the 
same year. These incomes made up for almost 14% of the total operating result 
of the Salvation Army that year. This development shows both the speed and the 
degree to which the financial dependency of the probation department on gov-
ernment support grew. That this dependency would have certain consequences 
with regard to the position of the probation work towards the government thus 
seemed imminent.88 
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In 1970, a group of probation professionals of different organization wrote an 
“open letter” to the Dutch government, addressing the organizational and mana-
gerial problems of the work field. This explicit call for improvement urged the 
VvRI to establish a committee that had to examine the possibilities for further 
harmonization of the probation work field.89 At the same time the Salvation 
Army made clear to the VvRI that even though it was willing to examine the 
possibilities to come to a more effective and less fragmented organizational 
structure, it would resist a merger into one large bulwark of probation organiza-
tions because it was unthinkable for the Salvation Army to give up a part of its 
work, and especially the probation work, that had formed the core of the Army’s 
social activities long before the Dutch territory was established. It became clear 
however, that a large scale merger was exactly what the VvRI committee ad-
vised, and the Army’s probation department feared for its existence because it 
had little room to manoeuvre within the social policy system. So, the Army 
turned to other means and in order to ensure that the State Secretary of Justice, 
Wiersma (VVD, 1970-1971) would decide not to follow suit but leave room for 
the Army to exist, Army representatives went to The Hague in 1970 to meet 
with Wiersma. The outcome of this meeting was that Wiersma did actually ex-
press that a possible discontinuance of the Salvation Army’s probation work was 
undesirable and that a solution should be found for the Army to continue its 
valued work.90 Now that the Army had succeeded in getting the support of the 
government, the pressure seemed to have reduced.  
On the other hand however, the harmonization process also continued and in 
1973 the Stichting Samenwerkende Reclasseringsinstellingen (SRI, Foundation 
of Cooperating Probation Organizations) was established. The SRI was a com-
bined effort of 4 of the 6 organizations that offered probation services on a na-
tional scale: the Genootschap, the Katholieke Reclasseringsvereniging (KRV, 
Catholic Probation Association), the Protestants-Christelijke Reclasser-
ingsvereniging (PCRV, Protestant-Christian Probation Association) and the 
Catholic Meijersvereniging (Meijers Association). In 1976 the SRI was reor-
ganized into the Algemene Reclasserings Vereniging (ARV, General Probation 
Association) and with this, a fundamental process of harmonization of the pro-
bation work field was concluded for the time being. There were however two 
organizations that retained their independent positions: the Salvation Army and 
the Consultatiebureaus voor Alcohol en Drugs (CAD, Clinics for Alcohol and 
Drugs). Both organizations had made clear that their specific target groups 
needed the existence of specific organizations. The CAD focused on people with 
a history of drug and alcohol abuse, and in turn also the Salvation Army had to 
prove its right of existence by defining their added value. This added value had 
especially become an important issue, because in the process of becoming part 
of the general SRI, the KRV and the PCRV seemed to have lost much of their 
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faith-based identity. This was exactly what worried the Army. The underlying 
rationale of the Army’s probation work had always been that the ultimate cor-
rective influence on behavior would not be imprisonment, but salvation. So, 
when the Army would also lose its Christian identity, how was it able to perform 
its work? The developments on the matter of professionalization did not seem to 
help either: social work organizations and their workers were increasingly 
pressed by the government to operate on a general basis, especially because 
since the 1960s spiritual conversion could neither be the primary nor the hidden, 
secondary goal of any social work.91  
Nevertheless, since it was regarded to be a main reason for existence after a 
possibly inescapable merger or another form of reorganization, the probation 
department of the Army had to look for ways to define its identity. The question 
that was posed was: “Do we look for a pastor to complement the team - or will 
justice and the ecumenical social idea of Christian unity, be a leading motive?”92 
Even though actual answers would not be found any time soon, an important 
parameter had become clear: that social work was never to be severed from its 
religious roots, or phrased by Army General Coutts (1963-1969): “What has 
been united by the gospel, will not be separated by the Salvation Army”.93 This 
newly defined assignment would become a main part of the work of the manag-
er of the Army’s probation department, Fijn (1973-1988), who took up office in 
1973. In his view, the probation department had to show the biblical notions of 
justice and righteousness in its policy and daily practice by helping those in need 
to form individual humanity, and this was how the God ordained assignment of 
the probation work could be interpreted. Fijn established an internal think tank 
that was responsible for creating policy that gave the probation department of 
the Salvation Army a clear added value with which it could position itself in 
relation to the SRI and prove its quality as a work field partner. This think tank 
operated on the belief that: “by definition, being at peace with God means being 
at war with the world”, thus forming a new understanding within the probation 
department with respect to its position towards the now unified work field and 
the Ministry of Justice. For the Army this axiom meant that next to witnessing 
salvation and doing good by means of probation work, social action was also 
needed. This criticism would be directed towards the restrictive and punitive 
measures for prisoners that the Ministry of Justice heralded, because the Army 
itself favored more humane approaches like prevention and alternative sanc-
tions.94 So now, next to having become rather dependent on government sup-
port, the Salvation Army’s probation department showed a will of its own. Its 
stance on social action was in line with the emancipatory vigor of the 1960s and 
1970s, but within the ranks of the Army itself, this attitude was not understood 
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widely. Especially with regard to its dependent position towards the govern-
ment, for should one bite the hand that feeds him? Or was the Army maybe less 
dependent on the government as might be concluded from the above? 
5. A hint of interdependency? 
According to the Dutch parliament, the Salvation Army was a respected organi-
zation that had earned its reputation in the field of youth work, care for the 
homeless, and of course, probation.95 Also, the Army’s reputation as a first-
responder organization was unrivaled. For example, during calamities like the 
1953 flood disaster and the largest railroad crash in Dutch history (January 
1962), the swift reaction and immediate presence of the Salvation Army at the 
scene, were important determining factors for its positive public image.96 The 
Salvation Army seemed to also have won its spurs as a religious organization. It 
was clear to the parliament that much of the social work that the Army practiced 
was based on religious motivation, but especially interesting was the position 
that the Army took on the Dutch pillarized society. From its start the Salvation 
Army had positioned itself alongside the mainstream churches, and at the same 
time it had tried to steer away from the inclusive and exclusive forces that were 
at work in the system of pillarization. The strategy that the Army followed was 
that of impartiality, for the Salvation Army was explicitly willing to serve the 
Dutch community as a whole, disregarding the dividing lines of pillarization. It 
expressed however to focus on the socially excluded, whereas the Catholic and 
Protestant charities were mainly focused on serving their own members. It was 
especially this non-partisan stance that was noticed by the parliament.97 The 
Salvation Army even became a rhetorical point of reference in the debates at the 
Second Chamber. In a debate, for instance, on how to curb the popularity of the 
subsidy arrangement on the improvement of houses and other residential build-
ings, it was argued that “this home improvement has become so popular that it 
can be compared with the Salvation Army: everybody favors it, and when there 
is a deficit, we’ll cough up the rest.”98 
On another level, the appreciation by the government of the Salvation Army 
also became clear, although it was much more subtle than the above rhetorical 
examples. During the 1960s, the Salvation Army started to feel the external 
pressure to modernize its administration:  
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“It goes without saying that in these swiftly and often thoroughly changing 
times in all parts of society, the demands that are made on our work are also 
higher than ever. The reputation that the Salvation Army enjoys as a spiritual 
and social institution for many years standing, imposes on us an obligation to 
meet these requirements to the best of our ability with regard to the past, as 
well as to the present and the future. In order to be able to meet the need that 
we feel to be informed regularly and short term so that we can take policy 
decision on matters of management, within the current, swiftly evolving fi-
nancial structure of society, we have ordered the accountant to make an in-
quiry into the effectiveness of the administrative organization, as a result of 
which it has been decided to switch over to a mechanized bookkeeping sys-
tem by January 1, 1967, of what we expect to improve its effectivity as much 
as possible.”99 
 
Apparently the Salvation Army was afraid to lag behind the times, and efficien-
cy and effectiveness seemed to be the primary goals behind this professionaliza-
tion of the Army’s financial bookkeeping system. Also, the improvement of the 
short-term availability of financial information was necessary in order to be able 
to take policy decisions. In addition to these arguments, a third, more concealed 
issue was at stake. An issue that seemed to have been induced by the ongoing 
decentralization of policy capacity from the national level to the local level. In 
the preceding years the Salvation Army youth department in Utrecht had been 
entangled in an administrative tussle with the financial department of the 
Utrecht municipality. In 1959, the financial verification office of Utrecht mu-
nicpality had expressed its concern with the quality of the bookkeeping of this 
particular Salvation Army unit. Its financial records were not sufficiently subdi-
vided, so it was impossible for the office to discern between various flows of 
funds. The Salvation Army had received subsidies for its youth work on an an-
nual basis for a few years, but now Utrecht municipality asked for a more accu-
rate account of the ends to which the money was spend. This particular infor-
mation was hard to retrieve from the current reports that the Salvation Army 
handed in, accompanying their grant applications.100 
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On February 23, 1962 the Utrecht verification office repeated its request to 
the Salvation Army and asked them to act on the matter adequately.101 Appar-
ently the Utrecht municipality did not receive an answer swift enough, because a 
week later a second letter followed. In this letter the verification office offered 
advice in the matter, but at the same time it increased the pressure: “If no im-
provement of your accounting can be established, we will have to take a closer 
look at our position on your youth work.”102 A year later this mild but explicit 
threat to hold back the subsidy in case the Salvation Army would not act on this 
stipulation, was repeated twice.103 However, now the Utrecht municipality 
showed its goodwill towards the Salvation Army by explaining in full why im-
provement of their accounting was necessary: “the control on our part has be-
come very time-consuming, because we have to make a subdivision into differ-
ent accounts”.104  
Nevertheless, the Salvation Army again did not react adequately, so the veri-
fication office changed its tone. Its letter of January 31, 1964 did not start off 
with the usual confirmation of the grant approval, but instead the dispute was 
directly addressed. Clearly, the verification office had become irritated with the 
whole matter, especially because the Salvation Army’s bookkeeping had not 
improved, but worsened: “Instead of improvement, we have observed a deterio-
ration of the administration. We consider this an unsatisfactory situation.”105 
The Utrecht office indicated that in future cases it would no longer verify the 
unspecified Army accounts, but just return them to the sender. This way the 
issue of whether or not to grant the subsidy was avoided by the Utrecht munici-
pality and instead the problem was put back on the plate of the Salvation Army.  
It would take the Army about another year before it promised to rearrange its 
administration according to the request of the Utrecht verification office, and the 
Army announced that implementation of these changes would start to become 
visible with the financial accounts of 1965.106 However, this promise soon 
proved to be untenable. In fact it took until 1967 for the new administrative 
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process to be brought into effect.107 Because it foresaw trouble with the Utrecht 
municipality, the Salvation Army, through its accountant Crop, had asked for 
clemency in this matter because the Army had deemed it to be imperative to 
reorganize on a greater scale in order to provide for the necessary financial in-
formation to national and local administrations. 
By 1967 the controversy seemed to have come to a satisfactory end for both 
parties involved, as the Salvation Army complied with the municipalities stipu-
lations. However, the Army waited for a convenient time to comply with these 
demands for it concluded that this reorganization of its administration on a local 
level could serve the organization on the national level as well. This discussion 
however, took quite a long time: 8 years. Utrecht could have very well shortened 
this period by executing its threat of revoking the grant, but it did not do so. At 
first glance this matter seemed to be a mere administrative issue, but while un-
folding, the issue revealed an interesting dynamic, for both the Utrecht munici-
pality and the Salvation Army did not seem to want to bring the matter to a 
head. This indicates that both parties were well aware that by preserving their 
relation they would benefit more than by putting it to the test, or, even worse, by 
ending it. The threat of Utrecht to withdraw the financial support to the Salva-
tion Army’s youth work was a strategy that would have been quite effective, 
concerning the growing dependency of the Salvation Army on government sub-
sidies. Utrecht in fact hinted on the Army’s growing dependency on government 
funding, as it applied the corrective force inherent to the subsidy system, and by 
doing so, it showed that it had the means to exert power over the Salvation Ar-
my.  
The Salvation Army in its turn, did not blink until the matter seemed to play 
up on a greater scale in the internal organization as well. Until that time the 
Army held its grounds, regardless of the threats Utrecht made. This might imply 
that the Army did not think Utrecht was going to act upon its threats. And actu-
ally, this assumption was confirmed over time. Utrecht never suited any action 
to its words in this case. It allowed the Salvation Army a distinct amount of time 
in order to react to its demands in a proper way. This implies that the Utrecht 
administration was not keen at all on losing the services rendered by the Salva-
tion Army to its youth residents. It was not only the Salvation Army that needed 
the government, but the dependency lay just as much the other way round as 
well: Utrecht had come to rely on the Army services as much as the Salvation 
Army had become dependent on the public funds. The social policy system had 
rendered both actors interdependent. 
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By 1980, the Salvation Army had become a valued partner to the government 
within the Dutch social policy system. With regard to the changing social policy 
goals, the Salvation Army proved to be flexible and positioned itself as supple-
mentary to governmental policy aims. The Army rather quickly learned the rules 
of this system and showed skill in applying them, even to the extent that it start-
ed to push the limits, as the Utrecht case showed. 
The Army however, was only able to push these limits because the relation-
ship between the government and the Army was not only based on a lopsided 
balance of power, but it was exactly this reluctance by the Army in the Utrecht 
case that revealed the government dependency on the Salvation Army itself, at 
least to a certain degree. Both actors made no real effort to break up their rela-
tionship. On the other hand, this becoming a part of the social policy system also 
influenced the Army’s identity process, because from 1910 onwards, the balance 
between the Army’s double mission changed. Due to the government support for 
the Army’s social services, this part of the Army’s mission developed very 
quickly. During this process the Army had started to become dependent on this 
external support in order to maintain its growth. This dependency would not 
have been a problem to the Army if it had no consequences for another matter 
that defined its identity: legal incorporation. A subject that we will explore in the 
next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4. THE ‘CHRONIC PROBLEM’ OF LEGAL 
INCORPORATION 
1. The roots of the Army’s chronic problem 
The first working day of 1990 was a momentous day in the history of the Salva-
tion Army in the Netherlands. From that day on, the struggle with a so-called 
“chronic problem” had taken a decisive turn. This chronic problem, labeled as 
such by Commander Schurink (1986-1992), referred to the ambiguity of the 
legal status of the Salvation Army. The question: “What is the Salvation Army? 
A foundation or a church?” phrased the issue and would become the basis of 
many discussions – a debate that culminated in a fundamental reorganization in 
1989.1 The discussion revolved around the question of which corporate body 
suited the organization best within its altering social and political context. By 
portraying this matter as a mere legal question, Ine Voorham, the CEO of the 
Army’s Foundation for Welfare and Health during the period 2000-2012, con-
tinued on the line of thought that was commonly accepted within the Army 
management ranks.2 However, if it were ‘just’ a legal problem, an organization-
al overhaul of the extent that took place during the 1980s would not seem likely. 
So what happened? What shaped this chronic problem and what made it a prob-
lem for the Salvation Army? Moreover, how did the Army cope with this matter 
and what sort of dynamics did this process reveal with regard to the Army’s 
identity process? However, in order to understand the way in which organiza-
tions were able to legally incorporate in the Netherlands, we will turn to this 
matter first. 
1.1. Legal incorporation in the Netherlands 
In Europe, during much of the twentieth century, religious communities could 
be incorporated in three forms of legal identities: foundation, association and 
church. In the case of the Netherlands however, this latter form also offered the 
opportunity to create an ‘ecclesiastical foundation’. Chapter 6 of the Constitu-
tion of 1848 acknowledged a certain degree of separation of church and state. In 
1853, this legal position of churches was developed further and codified in the 
Church Act.3 This Act stipulated that in order to be considered a church, a reli-
gious community had to be registered with the Ministry of Justice. In order to do 
so, it had to submit its articles of association, statutes or bylaws. The ministry 
would thereupon supervise whether or not these organizations violated the pub-
lic order or public decency. Van der Ploeg, specialist on corporal legislation, 
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concluded from the diversity of churches that had applied for registration, that 
the ministry carried out this task in quite a passive manner by hardly scrutinizing 
the applicants. Additionally, the ministry acted without regard for the various 
religious beliefs of these applicants. According to Van der Ploeg, this was ex-
emplified by the fact that next to mainstream denominations, even secular foun-
dations were submitted as churches.4 Furthermore, religious communities were 
actually not obliged to register with the ministry in order to exist. Also without 
this registration they were usually regarded by the government as “accepted 
moral bodies”. 
For a church, legal incorporation seemed to be most of all a formal recogni-
tion of its existence because its private character offered complete freedom of 
how to form its own administrative and managerial constellation. Except for 
sending in the articles of association, no government requirements were to be 
met and compared to fulfill the process of becoming a foundation or association, 
there was no individual (like a notary) that actually acknowledged its legal sta-
tus. All that existed was a system of passive supervision on the part of the gov-
ernment. Therefore, as Van der Ploeg remarks, a longstanding practice had de-
veloped on the matter: those who had the courage to proclaim to be a church, 
actually were regarded as a church. Only a judge could deny that status to a self-
proclaimed religious group.5 
This uncertainty of a possible negative judicial decision, made some reli-
gious groups turn to an alternative legal form, found in a (secular) ‘foundation’ 
or an ‘association’. Both forms had prescriptive organizational rules and regula-
tions, to which the group was bound. For example, at odds with a church, a 
foundation was not allowed to have members. Additionally, a foundation might 
be required to provide for democratic participation of its adherents, or control by 
an executive committee.6 An association had an even more democratic character 
because the members or its grassroots could impeach its management, an option 
that a regular foundation did not offer. So, for a religious community that es-
teemed democratic values, the association would be the preferred legal body. On 
the other hand, this would bring with it the risk of political fractioning or even a 
coup. In cases where this might be expected, or when the grassroots were al-
ready rather homogenous, the legal form of foundation was the most convenient. 
While this distinction between incorporation as a church, foundation and as-
sociation was customary in many European countries, in the Netherlands a 
fourth hybrid form existed.7 At the close of the nineteenth century, it became 
habitual for churches to organize their charitable activities in separate organiza-
tional units that were often incorporated as foundations. These foundations were 
explicitly placed under the rule of a church or religious congregation and were 
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thus called an ‘ecclesiastical foundation’. The function of the ecclesiastical 
foundation was to facilitate the raising of public funds for the charitable social 
services, and to provide for a possibility to create a separate financial account. 
This would help to give the donor (be it a private person, or the government) 
insight into what happened with their particular finances. In addition, this legal 
form would restrict possible government influence to that particular part within 
the larger organizational body and not influence the religious community. Dur-
ing the course of the twentieth century, the ecclesiastical foundation would be-
come a very popular instrument for religious organizations like churches to col-
lect government and public funding. For the Salvation Army too, this structure 
seemed to provide for certain opportunities. 
1.2. The Army’s structure of command 
As the use of the military terms implies, the Salvation Army appeared to aim for 
maximal responsiveness in its organizational structure: a hierarchical chain of 
command with its apex in the IHQ in London, UK. The leadership of the inter-
national organization was (and is) formed by one person, the General. As the 
leader of the worldwide organization of the Salvation Army he, or she8, had the 
final say on all matters concerning international policy and organization devel-
opment. The influence of the General was codified in the power to appoint the 
national leadership, Territorial Commander, and the General was aided by the 
Chief of Staff and an advisory council consisting of Territorial Commanders. 
On a national level, the Commander personified the pivot of power, having 
decisive say in religious matters and matters of social work in his or her territo-
ry.9 The communication of the Commander with the IHQ consisted of a yearly 
report on the condition of the territorial branch, and in the Dutch case also, on 
matters concerning the Salvation Army legal identity, which often pinpointed a 
change in the articles of association of the Dutch branch. But for other national 
matters the Commander was the ultimate person in charge and formed in fact a 
one-headed leadership on the national level. In the Netherlands, the Commander 
was flanked by an advisory committee of three officerss: the second-in-
command, Chief-Secretary (CS), the Assistant-Chief-Secretary (ACS) and the 
Financial Secretary (FS). 
In the decades preceding World War II, the Chief-Secretary presided over the 
three ‘operational’ secretaries who were responsible for the social work amongst 
men, the social work amongst women and the ‘field department’ (the official 
                                                        
 
8 The fact that I refer to the General and other ranks within the Salvation Army with the male ‘he’, 
doesn’t at all mean that these functions are only held by men. On the contrary, the Salvation Army has 
held from its very beginning a explicit non-discriminatory view and practice on the matter of staffing. The 
use of the word ‘he’ in these cases, is based on nothing more than reasons of efficiency. 
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started out at Rapenbrug 44, by 1895 was moved to Prins Hendrikkade 131; by 1888 to the War-
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name for the collective of corps). At this point in the organization chart, a clear 
division was made between the spiritual part of the Army’s organization (corps) 
and its social work part. The linking pin between these two was the Chief-
Secretary. The two social work sectors (women and men) were presided over by 
a different manager and staffed by officers and soldiers, and also by volunteers 
and even external employees. These latter two groups could also contain Salva-
tion Army soldiers, but then they were not salaried (volunteers) or not profes-
sionalized in terms of being a trained officer. The corps were led by the field 
secretary who was, by 1939, in charge of 112 local corps that were subdivided 
into 4 divisions. Every division was headed by a division officer, and in their 
turn, the corps were run by corps officers. 
1.3. Codification of the Salvation Army’s two-fold mission 
The first nine years that the Salvation Army was active in the Netherlands, it had 
done without any form of legal incorporation. This meant that the English stat-
utes were also applicable for the Dutch territory. Especially during the first five 
years of its presence in the Netherlands, the Salvation Army had often presented 
itself as a religious group because its main objective was, after all, religious 
salvation. A very important part of the Salvationists’ work was to sell the 
Strijdkreet and invite people to their religious Sunday meetings. The similarity 
of these activities to the methods of other churches was obvious, but after a few 
years, the Salvation Army decided to be legally incorporated, and on January 25, 
1896, the ‘Foundation The Salvation Army’ was established.10 The legal form 
that the Army chose – foundation – might have been based on the analogy to the 
Army’s situation in the United Kingdom, for since the introduction of the social 
objective, the Salvation Army in England had established a separate legal entity 
for these activities and their subsequent flow of money: The Darkest England 
Trust Deed (1891). In this way, they were able to secure the indispensable fi-
nancial support by the English people.11  
The direct connection between the Dutch Salvation Army and its English al-
ma mater was clearly visible in, for example, the matter of real estate because 
General William Booth himself had to authorize the Dutch Commander every 
single time he wanted to purchase real estate. In the case of the purchase of the 
Amsterdam building De Vrede, this meant that first a partnership of Dutch Sal-
vationists had to be established, including William Booth as a member and thus 
co-owner.12 In addition, General Booth preserved his influence on the Dutch 
territory by securing his right to appoint the TC and other staff on key positions. 
Therefore, even though the Dutch branch of the Salvation Army would incorpo-
rate into Dutch law, in line with the Army’s hierarchical principles, its statutes 
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confirmed that the General was still ultimately responsible for the Dutch territo-
ry. On the other hand, the Dutch Salvation Army clearly presented itself as in-
dependent from its alma mater in the United Kingdom. Referring to the statutes 
of 1896, this was brought to notice once again in the Annual Financial Report of 
1913: 
 
“Although the cradle of our organization stands in England, it would be 
wrong to call the Leger des Heils an English Institution. That would be 
chauvinism of the worst kind. The Salvation Army adapts to England, the 
Leger des Heils to the Netherlands.”13 
 
Even though the English Salvation Army was recognized as a church, the Dutch 
Salvation Army chose for the legal form of foundation. As Ringelberg suggests, 
this choice might very well be inspired by the Army’s need for an organizational 
form in which it could manage its properties.14 On the other hand, in the light of 
the English Salvation Army being an official church, the choice for establishing 
a Dutch branch of the Salvation Army as an ecclesiastical foundation also seems 
to have been an option, for under Dutch law any church could form an ecclesias-
tical foundation in order to accommodate its social activities. Nevertheless, the 
actual addition of the term ‘ecclesiastical’ to ‘foundation’ was not used in offi-
cial utterances of the Salvation Army.  
The establishment of the Foundation The Salvation Army, did not mean that 
the Army refrained from any religious activities. On the contrary, the statutes of 
this new foundation clearly stated that the main goal of the Army was to pro-
mote the gospel: 
 
“Article 1: The Foundation aims to promote and foster religious fraterniza-
tion; preach the blessings of the Gospel to those who are usually not under 
the influence of religious edification, or suffer great poverty because of vice 
or misfortune.”15  
 
In the second Article, the religious doctrines of the Army were presented fol-
lowed by the foundations on which Article 1 was to be realized: 
 
                                                        
 
13 “Ofschoon de bakermat van onze organisatie in Engeland staat, zou het verkeerd zijn het Leger des 
Heils een Engelsche Instelling te noemen. Dat zou chauvinisme zijn van het ergste soort. De Salvation 
Army past zich aan Engeland aan, het Leger des Heils aan Nederland” (Italics mine) Jaarstaat Leger des 
Heils 1912/13:111 
14 Ringelberg 2005:134 
15 “Artikel 1. De Stichting heeft ten doel het bevorderen en doen genieten van godsdienstig, broederlijk 
verkeer; het brengen onder de prediking en de zegeningen des Evangelies, van zoodanige personen, als 
gewoonlijk niet onder den invloed van godsdienstige leering zijn, dan wel door ondeugd of door ongeluk 
in groote armoede verkeeren.” Quoted in: De stichting “Het Leger des Heils”. Extract uit de Acte van 
Stichting (date unknown) Amsterdam: Salvation Army (UA 1182, nrs.171 and 172) 2 
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“The Foundation will try to reach the aim as presented in Article 1, by all le-
gally available means, such as: a) organizing religious gatherings, perform-
ing house calls, publication and distribution of literature, et cetera.; b) by im-
plementation of such principles and methods as are explicated by founder 
William Booth in his book “Orders and Regulations for Social Officers of 
the Salvation Army”, like the Slum Work, Rescue work, the Work amongst 
Children, the Work amongst the Homeless, the Work amongst Prisoners and 
Released Prisoners, in general the nursing, care and education, be it in and 
outside the Homes, Institutions and Organizations, of those persons who fell 
victim to, or might fall victim to, material or mental misfortune, to sin, vice 
or crime, and bring them back into society; c) the durable care of underage 
people who are consigned to the Foundation and the education and upbring-
ing according to its principles. In general, according to the judgment of the 
Director, all such means can be applied in order to achieve the goal as men-
tioned in Article 1 of these Statutes.”16 
 
By means of these two articles, a clear classification of the two parts of the Ar-
my’s mission became visible. The first priority of the Salvation Army was to 
save souls, and in order to obtain that objective, social activities were realized. 
So, irrespective of the Army trying to balance its two-pronged mission, this 
particular phrasing posed the Army’s social activities as merely instrumental to 
its religious aim, thus giving shape to the foundations of the Army’s identity.  
1.4. Legal status in trying times: World War II 
A few times during the first decades of the twentieth century, the statutes were 
adapted to adjustments in the Dutch legal system.17 These adaptations were of 
minor significance and until World War II as nothing changed fundamentally. A 
few months after the outburst of the war and before the actual invasion of the 
Netherlands by the German army, the Territorial Commander of the Dutch Sal-
vation Army, Benwell (1939-1940) foresaw that the international origins and 
organizational structure of the Dutch territory could very well become a problem 
                                                        
 
16 “De Stichting zal het in artikel EEN genoemde doel trachten te bereiken, door alle mogelijke wettige 
middelen, zoals: a) door het houden van samenkomsten, het doen van huisbezoek en verspreiden van 
literatuur, enzoovoorts; b) door toepassing van zulke beginselen en methoden als door haren stichter 
WILLIAM BOOTH zijn uiteengezet in zijn boek “Orders and Regulations for Social Officers of the 
Salvation Army”, zooals het Achterbuurtswerk, het Reddingswerk, het Werk ten behoeve van Kinderen, 
het Werk ten behoeve van Dak- en Werkloozen, het Werk onder Gevangenen en Ontslagen Gevangenen, 
in het algemeen, het verplegen, verzorgen en opleiden, zoo in als buiten Tehuizen, Gestichten of Instel-
lingen, van zulke personen, die aan stoffelijke of geestelijke ellende, aan zonde, ondeugd of misdaad ten 
prooi zijn of zouden kunnen worden, en het terugbrengen van dezulken in den samenleving; c) de duur-
zamen verzorging van minderjarige personen, die aan de Stichting toevertrouwd worden, en derzelver 
opleiding en opvoeding in overeenstemming met hare beginselen. In het algemeen door al zulke middelen 
als naar het oordeel van den Bestuurder der Stichting kunnen trekken om het in artikel EEN van deze 
Statuten genoemde doel te verwezenlijken.” Quoted in: De stichting “Het Leger des Heils”. Extract uit de 
Acte van Stichting (date unknown) Amsterdam: Salvation Army (UA 1182, nrs.171 and 172) 4 
17 These adjustments took place in September 1908, April 1910 and February 1931. 
 
 
125 
 
to the Germans, especially because since the occupation of Poland, the United 
Kingdom had declared itself at war with Germany. Therefore, in order to dispel 
any suspicion, Benwell proposed to the General that in the case of a German 
invasion he would be succeeded by the Dutch Commander Vlas (1929-1939), 
who had recently retired. By doing so, Benwell showed great strategic insight, 
and when the actual invasion of the Netherlands occurred on May 10, 1940, 
Vlas actually did become TC once again.18 However, that was not enough to 
convince the Germans that the Salvation Army was a Dutch organization and 
not British. 
Due to the German occupation, the Netherlands lost its self-governance. 
Most governmental structures remained intact, but Hitler appointed Rijkscom-
missaris Seyss-Inquart at its apex. The idea behind this political constellation 
was that the German occupiers would work out new policies to further their idea 
of a ‘Third Reich’ and make the existing Dutch administrative constellation 
responsible for its implementation.19 On an ideological level, the German aim 
was to incorporate the Dutch people into the greater German culture, concurrent 
to the ideology of Nazism. This idea of gleichschaltung was expressed in the 
disbandment of political parties and other public groups and organizations that 
did not resonate with the Nazi-ideology and its Dutch political exponent, the 
NSB.20 In fact, some religious organizations were also forbidden to show any 
activity. 
As described in Chapter 3, during the first year of the war the Army lost 
some of its properties and buildings in the bombings of Rotterdam and during 
the battles of the Grebbenberg and in the province of Zeeland. Additionally, 
some Salvationists were also killed. Seyss-Inquart however, showed no interest 
in the Salvation Army at that time. Nevertheless, being suspicious of Seyss-
Inquart’s motives, Vlas decided it was better to be safe than sorry, and started 
out for a change in the statutes of the Dutch Army in order to make sure that the 
Dutch branch was undeniably officially Dutch. His argument was that if every 
formal connection to the English Salvation Army Headquarters would be sev-
ered, the Germans might not be troubled by it. The place of the General would 
be taken by a Dutch Supervisory Board, which made the matter of high-level 
appointments an important substitute responsibility.21  
Nevertheless, Vlas’s effort came too late. Just weeks before the adjusted 
statutes would become effective, the Germans issued two ordinances that re-
quired all non-economic fellowships to grant inspection of their statutes, posses-
sions and accounts. Now that the Germans were to audit the Dutch Salvation 
Army based on the still applicable statutes of 1931, it was only a matter of time 
before the organization would be directly linked to England. On top of things, 
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all public collections that were made (besides the German-initiated program 
called Winterhulp Nederland) were regarded illegal. This added another burden 
to the feeble financial situation of the Salvation Army, because only churches 
with explicit permission by Winterhulp were allowed to make collections. The 
director-general of Winterhulp, Piek, however, regarded the Salvation Army as 
“an international body, oriented towards the West”, convincing him that the 
Salvation Army was rather an international (English) organization than a Dutch 
church or charity. Based on this international connection Piek refused to allow 
the Army to hold collections.22 
In March 1941, another directive was issued, stating that the Rijkscommis-
saris now held the power to change the statutes of associations and foundations. 
In addition, he was now also authorized to dissolve them, a fate that now seemed 
unavoidable for the Dutch Army, given it was viewed as an international organi-
zation and a possible instrument of English political propaganda.23 Indeed, 
Vlas’s initial fears became a reality: “the blow has [had] been dealt”.24 A few 
days later, on March 19, 1941, a letter from Seyss-Inquart gave notice of the 
liquidation of the Salvation Army in the Netherlands. Vlas’s efforts to sever all 
ties with London in the hope of preventing this imminent disaster had been in 
vain. At first, religious gatherings were forbidden and assembly halls and offices 
were closed. The use of the Army’s uniform, an indispensable symbol of the 
Army’s identity, was banned, as was the circulation of any printed material like 
the Strijdkreet.25 With this fundamental denial of any legal status by the German 
oppressors, it looked like the final curtain had dropped for the Salvation Army in 
the Netherlands.26 
Receiver J.H. Krafft was in charge of enforcing the liquidation. His initial ac-
tions in closing down the organization came to a hold when he was successfully 
convinced by Vlas that the latter had taken profound measures to dissociate from 
London, even though in fact the separation from the IHQ was halted. Vlas was 
also able to convince Krafft of the fact that the corps activities were non-
political and hardly different from any mainstream church activities. As a result, 
Vlas announced, already during the second week of April 1941, that the Salva-
tion Army was allowed to continue its spiritual work and that religious meetings 
could be continued.27 Therefore, because of Vlas’s swift action, the Army could 
now at least carry on its religious activities. 
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internment camp. Nevertheless, some Army officers and soldiers managed to continue the Salvation 
Army’s work illegally. See: De Jong: 263, footnote 2. 
27 Ringelberg 2005:233 
 
 
127 
 
The Army’s illegal status combined with the continuance of its church activi-
ties urged Vlas to draft a new ‘code of rules’. This code was partly derived from 
the doctrine that had formed the statutes of the foundation since 1931 and aimed 
to formalize the new position that the Salvation Army occupied since its liquida-
tion. This meant that instead of a foundation, the Dutch Salvation Army would 
become a church, with its head office in Amsterdam instead of in London. On 
September 15, the first meeting of the congregation was held and attended by 39 
members and Army notary Warmelink, where they accepted the new code. Vlas 
appointed Jacob Smael (1941-1945) as the first general manager of this commu-
nity of faith, but with the guarantee that within two months a successor would be 
elected by the leaders of the various Army sections. Upon being requested, in 
November 1941, the Ministry of Justice confirmed this new status by adding the 
Salvation Army to the official list of Dutch churches as De Nederlandsche 
Geloofsgemeenschap Het Leger des Heils (The Dutch Community of Faith of 
The Salvation Army).28 
The acknowledgement of the Salvation Army as a church however, did not 
mean that everything was back to normal. By the end of 1941, it was still for-
bidden to wear the Salvation Army uniform and to release any publications. 
Additionally, the social services of the Army were organized differently. For the 
time being, the probation services were accommodated under the probation um-
brella Genootschap (see chapter 3). The social services to men were organized 
in a separate and new foundation: Werkgemeenschap de Industriële Inrichting 
(Working Community The Industrial Institution) and its management consisted 
of officers from the Army’s corps in order to guarantee the interrelation between 
these now divided parts of the Salvation Army. With regard to the social ser-
vices for women and children, some parts were taken over by the Nederlandse 
Volksdienst (Dutch Public Service) and the remaining parts would continue their 
work on an illegal basis.29 
During the last year of the war, it became clear that the new organizational 
structure of the Army worked quite well. The German occupiers appeared to be 
satisfied with the Salvation Army’s intention to break with London, but an actu-
al realization thereof was not actually demanded. Therefore, in August 1944 the 
Army took matters in its own hands, and with the course of the war turning for 
the better, a notary deed was drawn up to halt the implementation of the change 
of the statutes, as was proposed in December 1940. In effect, the legal connec-
tion of the Dutch territory of the Salvation Army to its British alma mater re-
mained intact, but internally the wartime developments had forced the Salvation 
Army to revert to its elemental nature. In order to survive its total liquidation, 
the Army fell back on its religious core by emphasizing that is was actually a 
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church. This however meant that in a legal sense by 1945, the Army consisted of 
two legal entities: a church and a foundation. 
 
1.5. A church-foundation 
After the German surrender in May 1945, the legal status of the Salvation Army 
became a matter of significant interest to the organization itself, as well as to its 
surroundings. On November 15, 1945, the Raad voor het Rechtsherstel (Dutch 
Council for Legal Rehabilitation) decided to annul the liquidation of the Salva-
tion Army.30 The aim was to restore the legal situation as it had been at the time 
of its liquidation, meaning that the Army’s most recent prewar statutes would be 
reinstated. This however seemed to reduce the Army’s legal status to that of a 
foundation once again, as it had been on February 7, 1931, because in its deci-
sion-making process however, the Raad appeared to only have considered the 
actions that were taken by the German oppressor and apparently failed to take 
into account the fact that the Army itself had chosen to attain the legal status of a 
church – a status that was also officially confirmed by the Dutch government. 
This emphasis on being a foundation did not do justice to the Army’s desire to 
also be a church, for as Ringelberg keenly observed, the compelled separation of 
social work and religious activities during the war had not only given impetus to 
change the religious branch into an official church, but it had also internally 
emphasized the importance of being a religious community. Additionally, being 
a church also produced some other advantages, as the legal advisor of the Salva-
tion Army, Warmelink, underlined: as a church, the Salvation Army was able to 
officially take part in interdenominational forums, and ministers of churches 
(like Salvation Army officers) were also exempt from military duty as they often 
had the spiritual (and material) responsibility for their communities of faith. A 
third argument in favor of being a church was that the Salvation Army would be 
protected from future and possible destructive government intrusion, and be-
cause a church was also not obliged to keep separate books for ecclesiastical and 
social work donations, the legal status of a church might safeguard the Army’s 
identity as well as secure its existence on a more fundamental level.31 Even 
though the Salvation Army had also been incorporated as a foundation, based on 
the acknowledgement of the Army’s church-like character in jurisprudence with 
the Dutch High Council, Warmelink opined that it could very well also be rec-
ognized as a church.32 
In order to solve this ambivalent legal position of the Salvation Army, 
Warmelink suggested three possible organizational forms. The first possibility 
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was to preserve the current postwar status quo as being a church separate from 
the foundation, but both tied together by a common ideology represented by a 
shared staff. The main downside here was that this would mean an internal or-
ganizational division of the Salvation Army with a possible lack of unity. The 
second possibility was one that would indeed strengthen the unity within the 
Army by creating a new church that included the old church and the social work 
foundation. In that case, the foundation could probably be regarded as an official 
ecclesiastical foundation. The third possibility was to accept the prewar situation 
of the statutes of 1931 (Salvation Army as a foundation), but then with the 
“qualification of being a church”. The difficulty in this case was that a change of 
the Dutch law seemed to be required.33 It was nevertheless, exactly this last 
possibility that fitted the Army’s ambition, to remain a church as well as a foun-
dation, best and in a slightly customized manner, and hence this third option was 
chosen. 
Remarkably, the choice seemed to be based on a more pragmatic than ideo-
logical argument. Because the Salvation Army in the Netherlands had been a 
foundation ever since its start, and was recognized as such, a complete change of 
legal form could lead to “complicated situations in cases of property liabilities or 
legacies”.34 Therefore, at first glance it appears as if these practical financial 
considerations made the Army decide to reject the options of becoming an ec-
clesiastical foundation or a separate foundation and church. But next to pragma-
tism, the Salvation Army also showed its vision, because even though it was 
very well aware that the preferred option lacked any legal basis, the Army none-
theless wanted to maintain a close connection between the two parts of its mis-
sion and there was no law that exactly fitted this envisioned coherence. There-
fore the Army chose to explore the boundaries of the existing Dutch legal situa-
tion and a new article was added to the 1931 statutes of The Foundation Salva-
tion Army, presenting the foundation as a church:  
 
“The Salvation Army is a church in accordance with Article 1, paragraph 2 
of the Law of September 10, 1853.” 35 
 
After approval of this change of statutes by the General, the 1941 Geloofsge-
meenschap was dissolved and on June 19, 1946 the Dutch Salvation Army had 
in fact become a “church in a secular robe”– a position that fitted the Army’s 
double mission perfectly.36 From then on, the Army would present itself as 
“Foundation Salvation Army, Church”, confronting the Dutch law with a unique 
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hybrid legal form of the ecclesiastical foundation. Only in a footnote, a referral 
was made to its original legal status: foundation. 
In order to make this new form official, the new statutes had once again to be 
accepted by the Ministry of Justice. This however, was not going to be easy 
because the Army’s statutes were still regarded to be those of a foundation in-
stead of those of a community of faith. The reaction of the ministry confirmed 
the Army’s fears, for according to the ministry, the adjustment of articles had 
not transformed this legal document of a foundation into the required rules and 
regulations of a church. Therefore, once again it looked as if government offi-
cials thwarted the freedom, and in this case even the desired identity, of the 
Salvation Army, and on receiving this message of disapproval, Warmelink went 
to the ministry to discuss the issue. Warmelink’s attempt however, still failed to 
resolve the issue and the subsequent insecurity lasted for about a year. In the 
spring of 1948 however, the Ministry of Justice seemed to have figured out 
where exactly the problem was, and asked for a declaration by the members of 
the Salvation Army that would accredit the statutes as a church code. A founda-
tion was not required to have members, but a church was. Uncomfortable as the 
Army was with democratic involvement, the Army command rallied 24 ‘mem-
bers’ that thereupon would endorse the code, just like was done during the war, 
and on December 4, 1948 the Salvation Army was registered as church number 
65.37 By ‘daring to be a church’, the Salvation Army had suggested a fourth 
form of legal incorporation. According to the Dutch law, the Salvation Army 
was acknowledged to be a foundation and a church. However, in its Articles of 
Association of 1948, the Army presented itself as a new hybrid form. It was not 
just a foundation, neither was it just a church, nor did it declare to be an ‘eccle-
siastical foundation’. It was more than that - it was a church-foundation. 
2. The ‘secular robe’ in practice 
This hybrid legal form made very clear how the Army valued the balance be-
tween both goals. Based on the idea of being a ‘church in a secular robe’, the 
Army acknowledged the religious mission to be its core value. Whether or not 
this philosophy could serve as a solid foundation to the Army’s legal future, was 
still to be put to the test as the Salvation Army became a valued partner to the 
Dutch government within the social policy system. So, how did the Dutch gov-
ernment perceive the Salvation Army and how did this secular robe function 
with regard to the Army’s dual identity? 
2.1. A social service organization 
As part of the financial support to the postwar reconstruction of the Dutch infra-
structure, the Dutch government set up a grant system called the Wet op de Ma-
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teriële Oorlogsschade (Law on Material War Damage).38 A list of eligible insti-
tutions and organizations was drawn up, which included the Salvation Army. 
The presence of the Salvation Army on this list indicates that the organization 
had attained certain significance within Dutch society on a national scale. How-
ever, this relevance did not appear to bear reference to the Army as a ‘church’, 
as the classification of organizations on the list shows, because after starting out 
with enumeration of the buildings of the main churches, the classification con-
tinued with hospital buildings and buildings for youth activities. It was not until 
the catch-all category “Andere Instellingen Ten Algemenen Nutte” (Other Insti-
tutions for the Common Good) was formed, that the Salvation Army was men-
tioned. In this category, the Army was equated with private schools, public ser-
vice corporations and utility companies.39 Therefore, regardless of its legal con-
firmation as a church, by 1949 this status had not quite sunk in with the political 
realm. 
Even though within the scope of the Wet Oorlogsschade the Salvation Army 
was not regarded as a church, it was acknowledged as a religious organization 
by the Dutch parliament, as a debate on the 1950 annual budget for the Ministry 
of OKW shows. A part of the debate was about the allocation of grants for youth 
organizations, and during the debate, the Salvation Army became a pars-pro-
toto within a dispute over words, on the issue of whether or not it was “predom-
inantly” or “also” a religious organization. The grant program stipulated that 
organizations that had “predominantly political-religious or political goals” 
would not be eligible for these grants.40 In order to ascertain whether this was 
the case, the statutes of the applicants would be assessed, and as a result, the 
communist-oriented Algemeen Nederlands Jeugd Verbond (Common League of 
Dutch Youth - ANJV) was denied such subsidies. Subsequently, Member of 
Parliament Hoogcarspel, who was also member of the Dutch Communist Party 
(CPN), tried to obtain a renewed financial commitment for the ANJV. Hoog-
carspel argued that neither from the statutes, nor from its public record, could it 
be concluded that the ANJV was “predominantly” a political organization. In 
support of his argument, he compared the ANJV with religious organizations 
like the Salvation Army and the Catholic youth movement. According to Hoog-
carspel, although the names of these organization led to it being deduced that 
they were very much focused on “separation, keeping apart from others”, these 
organizations nevertheless were eligible for grants. Additionally, they were “al-
so” acting on a religious basis, so if these organizations were eligible for grants, 
why then, Hoogcarspel wondered, was this not the case for the ANJV?41 In his 
reply, Minister of OKW, Rutten (KVP, 1948-1952) only partly endorsed the 
argument of Hoogcarspel. He acknowledged that the word “also” was exactly 
                                                        
 
38 Wet op de Materiële Oorlogsschade, Staatsblad K 31, 5 februari 1950 
39 Kamerstukken II 1948/49 Nr. 705-6:104 (MvA)  
40 “met overwegend politieke godsdienstige of politieke doelstellingen” Handelingen II 1949/50, 38, 
1400:1121 
41 “(…) separeren, het zich scheiden van anderen” Handelingen II 1949/50, 38, 1400:1121 
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the right term because as soon as an organization would “predominantly” strive 
after religious or political aims, as was done by the ANJV in his view, it would 
not be eligible for such grants. 
Even though the Salvation Army openly stressed in its statutes that it was a 
church, the minister came to a different conclusion in its case, thus implying that 
the balance between the two missions tipped towards the social mission. A pos-
sible explanation for this suggestion was that the KVP-minister might have had 
more affinity with these faith-based organizations than with the communist-
oriented group during these years in which the Cold War started to show its 
teeth, and conveniently closed his eyes to the ambiguity that the Salvation Army 
revealed. However, it might also be indicative of the fact that the Army’s ‘secu-
lar robe’ functioned quite well, for this image of the Salvation Army being ‘not 
predominantly religious’, was again politically confirmed during the 1950s. 
During the first years of this decade, the Dutch Second Chamber debated the 
possibilities of establishing an advisory council to the minister of OKW on the 
social development of the Dutch youth (Raad voor de Jeugdvorming - Council 
for Youth Education). Because this council was to advice on issues that would 
probably touch upon the private sphere, like education and moral development, 
it was fundamental that the staffing of the council was to reflect the diversity in 
the work types as well as the ideological background of organizations that were 
active in this work field. The debate took place in 1953 in a political constella-
tion of which the Dutch labor party PvdA formed the political core of the gov-
ernment, and was closely encircled by the three main confessional parties KVP, 
CHU and the ARP, of which the latter had taken the place of the liberal VVD. 
The orthodox-protestant PvdA-MP Nico Stufkens sought the cooperation of the 
opposition party VVD in person of MP Jeanne Fortanier-De Wit. Stufkens’ aim 
was to ensure that the diversity of the organizations was guaranteed as so this 
new council had to represent more than just the three main ideological pillars 
that were active in this field. Elaborating on this idea, Stufkens and Fortanier-De 
Wit explained that this work field consisted of a variety of organizations like: 
Nederlandse Padvinders (Dutch Scouting), Nederlandse Jeugdbond voor Natu-
urstudie (Dutch Youth League for Study of Nature), Zonnebloemwerk (Sun-
flower Work), Leger des Heils (Salvation Army), and Nederlandse Jeugdher-
bergcentrale (Dutch Youth Hostel centre). Therefore, the new council would 
have to reflect this variety of organizations and identities.  
This enumeration shows once again that the Salvation Army was regarded 
more as a social service provider with national relevance and based on a reli-
gious philosophy, than a primarily faith-based organization like a church. This 
particular representation of the Salvation Army however, made it a rather useful 
case for Stufkens, for as a longtime adherent to social-democratic politics, he 
was closely involved in the predecessor of the PvdA, the SDAP. Also as editor 
of the PvdA magazine Doorbraak (Breakthrough), he is regarded as one of the 
inspirations of the postwar movement within the PvdA that aimed for a conver-
gence of the pillarized political structure, the so-called breakthrough movement. 
In this light, the resolution with which Stufkens insisted on guaranteeing the 
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diversity of the council by pressing for the inclusion of non-pillarized organiza-
tions like the Salvation Army, confirms the idea that the Salvation Army was at 
least not seen as part of the established religious currents.42 Because of this sep-
arate position from the pillars, the Salvation Army seemed to have been regard-
ed more as a faith-based movement than a church. A perception that made the 
Army a sympathetic and politically ‘harmless’ charity. 
2.2. The Army as a test case for the government 
During the 1950s and 1960s, welfare development saw a boost and civil society 
organizations were accordingly increasingly supported by government finances. 
With regard to the Salvation Army, the legal scope of terms like ‘ecclesiastical’ 
and ‘foundation’ seemed to become more and more confusing, and within the 
discourse that explored the boundaries of the existing law, the Salvation Army 
was produced as a test case more than once. In its increasing cooperation with 
civil society during the first decades of the twentieth century, the Dutch gov-
ernment referred to the legal form of foundation in order to “set up social-
economic activities outside the administrative hierarchy”.43 This form however 
also facilitated churches to create foundations in order to receive government 
money. The subsequent increase in foundations sparked the demand for a more 
suitable legal framework for incorporation – a process that would take until the 
1950s to bear result. In anticipation of the renewal of the Dutch Burgerlijk Wet-
boek (Civil Code, see also paragraph 3.1.), the Wet op stichtingen was intro-
duced in 1954 and passed on May 3, 1956 as the Foundations Act.44  
This codification of the foundation might also have redefined the status of 
the ‘ecclesiastical foundation’, as some had hoped for in the parliament, but in 
fact, by excluding this particular type of legal entity together with the ‘govern-
mental foundation’ from the Bill, the issue was avoided altogether. In the Foun-
dations Act, explicit exceptions were made for churches as well as “their auton-
omous parts” (i.c. ecclesiastical foundations), because as it was argued that they 
found their legal basis in the 1853 Law on Churches. The explanatory memo-
randum on the Foundation Act confirmed this viewpoint: 
 
“The [ecclesiastical] foundation will have to aim at an activity or promotion 
of interests, which has to be regarded as the inherent aim or inherent task of a 
church. Furthermore, the foundation will have to be incorporated or accepted 
as such, by that particular body of the church that is entitled to do so, in such 
a way that its administration pertains to canon law or that incumbents have 
authority over the foundation.” 45 
                                                        
 
42 This point was made by Ringelberg 2005:139-159 
43 “op sociaal-economisch gebied activiteiten op te zetten, buiten de overheidshierarchie” Quoted in: Dijk 
en Van der Ploeg 2007:10 
44 Wet op stichtingen (1956). Dijk en Van der Ploeg 2007:11 
45 “De [kerkelijke] stichting zal ten doel moeten hebben een werkzaamheid of een behartiging van belan-
gen, welke tot het eigen doel of de eigen taak van een kerk moeten worden gerekend. Voorts zal de 
 
 
134 
 
This phrasing however, did not make clear what the difference was between an 
ecclesiastical foundation and other “autonomous parts” of a church. Additional-
ly, the Act did not demarcate the exact distinction between a religious and secu-
lar foundation. The explanatory memorandum did however provide for guide-
lines, because the activities of the ecclesiastical foundation had to be an inherent 
part of the mission of the churches and had to be established or adopted by a 
church because an ecclesiastical foundation was not able to exist in its own 
right. Therefore, in this way the Foundations Act also determined that the eccle-
siastical foundation pertained to private – i.c. canon - law. It can be assumed that 
to a certain extent this codification increased the appeal of this particular form of 
legal incorporation for organizations that were religious and performed govern-
mentally supported social services. 
The indistinctness between the several forms also raised some questions in 
parliament. In 1955, during the debate prior to putting the Foundation Bill to a 
vote, MP Ten Hagen (PvdA) asked the Minister of Justice, Donker (PvdA, 
1952-1956), whether this phrasing would lead to regard the Katholieke Radio 
Omroep (Catholic Radio Company) or the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (VU 
University Amsterdam) as ecclesiastical foundations because foundations were 
formed within ideological segments of the Dutch society, respectively the Cath-
olic and Protestant.46 Without waiting for an answer however, Ten Hagen con-
tinued by stating that in his opinion this certainly ought not be the case, because 
the activities of these foundations (i.e. public broadcasting and academic re-
search and education) were not “inherent” to the missions of their churches. So 
in order to help the minister to accentuate the contrasts between the two legal 
forms, Ten Hagen juxtaposed the term “inherent” with the word “exclusively” 
by suggesting to “exclude all types of activities and goals that are also deployed 
by non-churches”.47 In support of his argument, Ten Hagen also referred to the 
Salvation Army as follows: “(…) all the social work by, e.g. ‘The Salvation 
Army’, also a registered church, could be regarded as a part of its mission.”48 
Ten Hagen thus, explicitly referred to the ambiguous identity of the Salvation 
Army and he acknowledged for the record, that the Salvation Army was actually 
a church, even though that status was disputable because of its emphasis on 
social activities. For that matter, the Salvation Army was used as a case to show 
that the two legal forms were still not sufficiently developed in this Bill, for it 
left indistinctness between both legal forms that would, in Ten Hagen’s opinion, 
                                                                                                                                  
 
stichting door het daartoe bevoegde kerkelijk orgaan als rechtspersoon moeten zijn ingesteld of aanvaard 
in die zin, dat op de bestuursvoering kerkelijke reglementen van toepassing zijn of dat kerkelijke ambts-
dragers bevoegdheden ten aanzien van de stichting uitoefenen. " Wet op stichtingen MvT, punt 20.Quoted 
in: Roeleveld 1958: paragraph 6.  
46 Handelingen II 1955/56, 8:2094 
47 “alle werkzaamheden en doelstellingen worden uitgesloten welke ook door niet-kerkgenootschappen 
plegen te worden verricht of nagestreefd” Handelingen II 1955/56, 8:2094 
48 “(…) al het maatschappelijk werk zou bv. “Het Leger des Heils”, ook ingeschreven als kerkgenoot-
schap, tot zijn doelstelling kunnen achten” Handelingen II 1955/56, 8:2094 
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lead to inequality of justice. The secular foundation would suffer from legal 
restrictions while the ecclesiastical foundation, which could be established by 
religious organizations like the Salvation Army, would have a free hand. Ten 
Hagen seemed to have had a point in his effort to clarify the boundaries of the 
legal concept of ecclesiastical foundation, for the Foundation Bill stated that the 
exact demarcation of the concept would be left to the judiciary. Ten Hagen how-
ever regarded the legislator as being remiss in its duties, for “the judge has to be 
able to know what the legislator has envisioned”.49 At least the Salvation Army 
was for the first time acknowledged as a church by the parliament and thus in 
the political realm, but still it was very closely associated with its social activi-
ties. 
The idea of transferring the power to the judiciary to assess whether or not an 
organization was actually an ecclesiastical foundation, sparked another debate 
during the 1960s. Central to this debate was the question: who actually decided 
on what defined a church? This question was closely related to the balance be-
tween the church and the state, as MP Diepenhorst (ARP) concluded in his con-
tribution to the debate on whether or not to subsidize churches with public mon-
ey in order to restore their buildings. Diepenhorst concluded that the Dutch gov-
ernment was, to say the least, confused about the status of certain ideological 
organizations:  
 
“It is the plain and simple truth that we, from the perspective of the state, are 
at a loss when it comes to the Salvation Army and, on a whole different lev-
el, Jehovah Witnesses and Mormons.”50  
 
Are they churches? And if so, according to who?, Diepenhorst questioned. Was 
it the state that had to decide whether an organization is Christian enough to be 
accepted as a church? Even though it was attempted earlier, according to 
Diepenhorst, these questions remained without a satisfying answer.51 He sharply 
commented that it was this kind of “ignorance” that caused the state “to accept 
everything as a church that presents itself like a church”. He further criticized 
the attitude of the state, because in his opinion the state possessed enough com-
mon sense to ascertain whether it was dealing with a spiritual organization that 
“valued spiritual revelation”, or that it was a secular organization that “was 
                                                        
 
49 “de rechter moet duidelijk kunnen weten, wat de wetgever heeft bedoeld” Handelingen II 1955/56, 
8:2094 
50 “Het is de eenvoudige waarheid, dat wij met het Leger des Heils, dat wij – in een geheel ander vlak – 
met Jehovagetuigen en dat wij met Mormonen vanuit de staat niet zoveel raad weten.” Handelingen I 
1962/63, 7:3026 
51 In order to codify the difference between a church and an association the ‘State committee on Church-
es’ (Commissie-Anema) put the Bill on Churches to the vote in 1922. Even though the Bill was rejected, 
the practice of the Dutch state by means of the Ministry of Justice, was that churches were regarded as 
autonomous legal bodies and that associations would be acknowlegded as such only after Royal ap-
provement of their statutes. See: Commissie-Anema 1922. 
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dressed in a religious, legal form”.52 Nevertheless, the assessment of whether or 
not an organization was a church, was put in the hands of the judiciary, even 
though it lacked governmental guidelines to do so properly.53  
This attitude of the Dutch government to avoid any ruling on whether or not 
an organization was a church, was based on the idea that church matters were 
not to be infringed upon by the state. This however, did not mean that the Dutch 
government did not have a clue about what organizations were to be regarded as 
being a church, as the registration system of the Ministry of Justice showed. In 
fact, it was actually this list that formed the basis of other classifications, as the 
example of the Wet Premie Kerkgebouwen (Act on Church Building Premium) 
shows. During a debate in the Second Chamber, a list of all churches that re-
ceived grants based on the Act on Church Building Premium during the period 
1946-1968 was presented. Because this classification was based on the registra-
tion with the Ministry of Justice, the appearance of the Salvation Army on this 
list was not a surprise.54 That however, did not alter the fact that this list, and the 
governmental attitude towards this issue, was based on the philosophy that Van 
der Ploeg phrased as: “they who dare to be a church, are a church.”55 However, 
in other debates, this axiom did not seem to apply. In terms of subsidizing 
“bricks and plumbing”, the government was not very scrupulous, but subsidizing 
churches was a completely different matter. 
2.3. The chameleonic Salvation Army 
During the late 1960s, the Staatscommissie voor de Zaken van de Erediensten 
(State Committee on Worship Affairs), also called Committee-Van Walsum, 
after its chairman, attempted to modernize the financial relationship between the 
church and the state – a relationship with a longstanding history.56 This financial 
relationship between the church and state resulted from the end of the Refor-
mation. Even though the French Revolution eventually led to introduction of the 
separation of the church and state in the Batavian Republic and to additional 
efforts to eradicate any financial relationship between the two, the intended 
division has never been absolute in the Netherlands. However, the status of the 
Nederlands Hervormde Kerk (NHK, Dutch Reformed church) was reduced. It 
was no longer the national state-church, and additionally, the government now 
deemed all existing denominations as equal. A status that was officially ratified 
in 1805 by King Louis Napoléon Bonaparte (Article 4: “no dominant church”).57 
                                                        
 
52 “die men in een godsdienstige, juridische vorm heeft gekleed” Handelingen I 1962/63, 7:3026 
53 Handelingen I 1962/63, 7:3026 
54 Handelingen II 1967/68, 870  
55 Van der Ploeg 2010:29 
56 “De Staatscommissie voor de Zaken van de Erediensten”. Because of the death of (second) chairman 
prof. mr. F. de Vries, on October 30, 1958 the Mayor of Rotterdam mr. G. E. van Walsum, was appointed 
as successor and third chairman. The committee would take over 20 years (!) to conduct its research and 
produce its report. 
57 Commissie-Van Walsum 1967:6 
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This equalization of churches worked in two ways: the Dutch state would con-
fiscate the religious properties of all churches (not profane property like church 
buildings, parsonages and presbyteries), and in return it would start or increase 
its support to these churches. This support included payment of salaries, pen-
sions, scholarships, child support and additional supplements to shortages of 
income. 
Even though over time this arrangement underwent change and mitigation, 
the habit of state support to the NHK was legally codified and would remain 
intact until its intended revision during the 1960s. According to the Committee -
Van Walsum, these financial support measures were not to be equated with the 
governmental subsidies that were being allocated since World War II. These 
primary payments were mere compensation payments to the NHK “because the 
value of the religious properties, that had come into the possession of the gov-
ernment during the Republic, would have been more than sufficient to compen-
sate for what at that time was paid out to the local pastors.”58 
Article 194 of the 1815 Dutch Constitution explicitly allowed for govern-
ment support of churches because of the precarious economic and political 
times. In the Constitution of 1848, this Article was rewritten into Article 185 in 
which the Dutch state guaranteed all denominations “equal protection” and the 
continuation of financial support.59 However, it would take until the upheaval of 
World War II, for the need for reassessment of this arrangement to rise. Already 
on December 2, 1946, the Minister of Finances, Lieftinck (PvdA, 1945-1952), 
installed the Staatscommissie voor de Zaken van de Erediensten (State Commit-
tee on Worship Affairs). Its assignment was to scrutinize the financial relations 
between the church and state because, according to the minister, the Dutch soci-
ety as well as the churches themselves had changed very much during the last 
125 years: “There is an ongoing struggle between the dynamical organization of 
the various denominations and the static stipulations that regulate the financial 
relationship between Church and State.”60 The current support to Dutch denom-
inations amounted to about fl.4,000,000 of which fl.2,217,500 was paid to sev-
eral Protestant denominations and fl.1,175,500 to the Roman-Catholic denomi-
nation.61  
                                                        
 
58 “(…) omdat de waarde van de geestelijke goederen, die onder de Republiek in het bezit van de overheid 
waren gekomen, meer dan toereikend zou zijn geweest om uit de opbrengst van die kapitalen te bekosti-
gen wat destijds aan de plaatselijke predikanten werd uitgekeerd.” Commissie-Van Walsum 1967:5 
59 “Artikel 185. De traktementen, pensioenen en andere inkomsten. van welke aard ook, thans door de 
onderscheidene godsdienstige gezindheden of derzelver leraars genoten wordende, blijven aan dezelfde 
gezindheden verzekerd. Aan de leraars, welke tot nog toe uit 's Lands kas geen, of een niet toereikend 
traktement genieten, kan een traktement toegelegd, of het bestaande vermeerderd worden.” Dutch Consti-
tution 1948 
60 “Er is dan ook een voortdurende strijd tussen de dynamische organisatie der verschillende kerkgenoot-
schappen en de statische bepalingen, die de financiële verhouding tussen Kerk en Staat regelen.” Com-
missie-Van Walsum 1967:12 
61 Amongst the Protestant demoninations were the NHK (fl.1.253.900,-), the Evangelisch Lutherse Kerk 
(Evangelical-Lutheran, fl. 43.370,-), the Remonstrantse Broederschap (Remonstrant Brotherhood, fl. 
21.500,-) and more. Commissie-Van Walsum 1967:5 
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The attitude of the minister in this matter seemed to be very open-minded 
because the assignment was set up rather capaciously in order to give the com-
mittee all the room it needed. It had the explicit freedom to come up with sug-
gestions for either “tightening or total severance of the financial bonds that bind 
the Church and State together.”62 It would however, take more than 20 years for 
the committee to come to a conclusion. In February 1967, the Chairperson of the 
Committee-Van Walsum, s’Jacob, reported to the minister and its main conclu-
sion was that article 185 had to be repealed. Instead, all churches had to be treat-
ed equally by means of an equal annual grant. This also implied that the com-
mittee had formed an opinion on the definition of church. The committee argued 
that by allocating subsidies to social welfare matters, the government had ex-
trapolated its care from the material to non-material well-being of the Dutch 
people in terms of support to science, education, and arts. These particular areas 
might not always be relevant to all people, but nevertheless, the government 
deemed them worthy of public support. Then why not financially support 
churches? According to the committee, “spiritual life is not to be placed in an 
exceptional position with regard to public provisions. (…) It is as little to be 
denied that this is of great value to large parts of society as that it strengthens its 
vigor.”63 This view also implied that in order to be called a church, a religious 
organization had to be of a larger public value.  
The parliamentary debate on the report of the Committee-Van Walsum came 
to an end in 1970 with the rejection of the proposed measures by the Dutch gov-
ernment, for it concluded that the only acceptable solution was paying a fixed 
amount of “redemption money” that replaced the “monthly allowances” for 
churches and incumbents.64 At the same time however, the findings of the 
Committee-Van Walsum had given rise to another debate. First, the committee 
explicitly denied to have the authority to decide whether or not an organization 
was to be called a church, and the committee explicitly put this responsibility in 
the hands of the ministers of Finances and Justice. Also, the committee stated 
that it lacked the right resources in order to make such an assessment. Neither 
the national census of 1960 in which church-membership was polled, nor the list 
of churches that was kept by the Ministry of Justice would be decisive in this 
matter. According to the committee: “(…) the single fact that one calls itself a 
church, cannot be decisive for eligibility for a grant.”65 Therefore, the committee 
had to come up with an acceptable solution. Because the 1960 national census 
                                                        
 
62 “van nauwere aanhaling tot algehele losmaking van de financiële banden, die Kerk en Staat verbinden.” 
Commissie-Van Walsum 1967:13 
63 “Het godsdienstige leven mag ten aanzien van overheidsvoorzieningen niet in een uitzonderingspositie 
komen (…) Niet te ontkennen is, dat dit voor brede lagen van de bevolking van grote waarde is en even-
min, dat het de volkskracht ten goede komt.” Commissie-Van Walsum 1967:21 
64 Wet van 7 december 1983 tot beëindiging van de financiële verhouding tussen Staat en Kerk at: 
http://www.st-ab.nl/wetten/0433_Wet_beeindiging_financiele_verhouding_tussen_Staat_en_Kerk.htm 
65 “(…) het enkele feit dat men zich kerk noemt, niet beslissend kan zijn om voor een uitkering in aan-
merking te komen.” Commissie-Van Walsum 1967:23 
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did give insight into the volumes of Dutch denominations by means of member-
ship numbers, without further elucidation, the committee decided that a church 
with 10,000 members or more would be eligible for financial support.66 
This definition however raised new problems, for there were some organiza-
tions that did not fit this solution. The Salvation Army, the Nederlandse 
Protestanten Bond (Dutch Protestants League) and the Jehova’s Getuigen 
(Watchtower Society) appeared to have more than 10,000 members, but, as the 
committee stated, these organizations “are not commonly regarded as church-
es”.67 This remark showed that the Committee-Van Walsum, consisting of rep-
resentatives of the main denominations and members of the Ministry of Financ-
es and the academic realm, did not attach much value to the default standard of 
churches by means of registration with the Ministry of Justice, and thus actually 
did take a clear position on the matter of what was a church.  
This position might actually have endangered the unique legal status of the 
Salvation Army as a church-foundation. Had the secular robe that the Army 
cloaked itself in worked a bit too wel? The Army’s emphasis on being a founda-
tion rather than a church might have downplayed the religious part of the Salva-
tion Army’s identity to such an extent that it was hardly recognized outside the 
Army ranks. Did the Salvation Army have to take action in order to re-
emphasize the duality of its identity, now that it was explicitly mentioned in the 
report as not being a church? Even though the Army was provoked to nail its 
colors to the mast, it did not so much as blink, and gave no official reaction. A 
silence that however, was not appreciated by everyone.  
The report of the Committee-Van Walsum seemed to invoke the idea that 
churches might become state-subsidized institutions. So, in a reaction MP Schol-
ten (CHU) exclaimed that the Salvation Army was an organization that “clearly 
did not want to be a church in our society”, probably because it did not seem to 
want to apply for these government payments to churches.68 Two years later, the 
implicit definition of ‘church’ given by the committee based on number of 
members was openly defied in the Second Chamber. MP Jongeling (GPV) stated 
that historically, being a church had never been decided on by membership 
numbers and then again, even though organizations like the Salvation Army did 
actually meet this requirement, they still were not regarded as a church in prac-
tice.69  
This issue was also elaborated on by the liberals, and it was especially this 
liberal contribution that brought a new perspective to the debate. MP Geurtsen 
(VVD) expressed that it was incomprehensible that a distinction was made be-
tween these organizations based, in his opinion, on much less important criteria 
like size of membership rather than social relevance. As an example to this 
                                                        
 
66 Idem. 
67 “(…) het Leger des Heils, de Nederlandse Protestanten Bond en de Jehova's Getuigen, die echter naar 
de gangbare opvatting niet als kerkgenootschap worden beschouwd.” Commissie-Van Walsum 1967:24 
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statement, he also mentioned the Salvation Army and the Dutch Protestants 
League, that were not regarded as churches and therefore were not able to re-
ceive benefits as churches could.70 According to Geurtsen, this was especially 
undesirable because of the fact that “(…) the accomplished work by these 
groups is surely not of less importance than those groups that actually are al-
lowed to call themselves a ‘church’.”71 With this remark, Geurtsen emphasized 
that social relevance was not actually reflected by membership numbers, but 
much more by the perception of its actions by the Dutch public. Therefore, for 
the first time, the coherence between the religious and social missions of the 
Army seemed to have been acknowledged and valued openly in the Dutch par-
liament. In March 1971, this new angle on the social relevance of the Salvation 
Army was discussed further, but now within the senate. In the debate on social 
relevance, a distinction was made between spiritual relevance, like pastoral care, 
and social relevance as expressed by social work activities. With reference to 
this dualist approach, Senator Beerekamp (CHU) criticized the Committee-Van 
Walsum for its denial of the Salvation Army being a church. Beerekamp ex-
pressed to be well aware of the ambiguous identity that resulted in the chamele-
onic appearance of the Salvation Army: 
 
“Anyone who knows something about the Salvation Army can in fact under-
stand that this Christian grouping is not only interested in de cura animarum, 
but that the social work ensues from this so logically and it is such an im-
pressive part of the work of the Salvation Army that such a division is simply 
unthinkable.”72 
 
In this statement, Beerekamp not only underlined the importance of both mis-
sions, but he also acknowledged them to be very much interconnected, for the 
social services of the Salvation Army would be lifeless without its religious 
drive. Therefore, once again the Salvation Army was put forward to exemplify a 
political idea where social relevance was the criterion in order to decide whether 
or not an organization was a church. The membership numbers could arguably 
be seen as much less relevant than the actual social impact of an organization 
like the Salvation Army. Now, in line with this reasoning, the Salvation Army 
could actually be very well regarded as a church. 
                                                        
 
70 “ (…) godsdienstige verbanden als Leger des Heils en de Nederlandse Protestanden Bond, die niet als 
kerk worden aangemerkt en daarom geen uitkering als kerk zouden kunnen ontvangen.” Handelingen II 
1970/71, 47:2524 
71 “(…) Het door deze verbanden verrichte werk is zeker niet minder belangrijk dan dat van die verban-
den, die zich wel ‘kerk’ mogen noemen.” Handelingen II 1970/71, 47 
72 “Iemand die iets van het Leger des Heils afweet, kan toch wel begrijpen dat het voor deze christelijke 
groepering helemaal niet alleen om de cura animarum gaat, maar dat het maatschappelijk werk daaruit zo 
logisch voortvloeit en dat het zo’n geweldig stuk werk van het Leger des Heils is, dat die scheiding 
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From the above can be concluded that the Salvation Army has clearly served 
as an example of rhetorics in the discourse on the legal definition of ‘church’. 
Apparently, it was hard to pinpoint what the Salvation Army actually was, and 
to a certain extent that might have been the result of the secular robe that the 
Army dressed itself in. If that actually has been the case, the attitude of the 
Dutch government might well have amplified this image, because it is quite 
conceivable that it was much more convenient for the government to regard the 
Salvation Army as a foundation than as a church. For as a foundation, the Army 
could be supported as a social service provider, but if the Salvation Army would 
only be a church, this position would become a lot more complicated. As for the 
Army itself, it remained aloof from these political discussions.  
The discussion on the matter of the financial relationship between the Dutch 
state and churches also continued until December 7, 1983 when the Wet van 7 
december 1983 tot beëindiging van de financiële verhouding tussen Staat en 
Kerk (Act of December 7, 1983 for ending the financial relationship between 
State and Church) was adopted. The government refused to adopt the sugges-
tions made by the Committee-Van Walsum with regard to the membership 
numbers, and with this conclusion, the Salvation Army also disappeared from 
the political discourse as a rhetorical example. That however, did not mean that 
the Army itself was finished with the matter, because the recognition as a foun-
dation in the political realm secured its position as a social service provider, but 
it almost denied its existence as a church. In addition, it was exactly this reli-
gious aspect that formed the core of the Army’s identity around which the secu-
lar robe was wrapped, as will become visible when this part of the Army’s iden-
tity process is examined moving on from the above parliamentary discourse. 
3. The Army’s process of legal identity (1958 - 1976) 
Next to how the Army’s legal position provided for a secular robe and a chame-
leonic appearance, also internally the Army’s process of defining of its legal 
identity continued after World War II. Since its confirmation as a church-
foundation in 1948, the legal status of the Salvation Army had not been dis-
cussed internally for more than a decade. In 1958 however, General Kitching 
(1954-1963) drew the attention of the Commander of the Dutch territory, Åhl-
berg (1957-1960), to the legal status of the Dutch Salvation Army. The Interna-
tional Headquarters of the Salvation Army had started a worldwide survey of the 
legal positions of all territories in order to secure a legal separation between the 
territories and the General in London. The aim was to ensure that the General 
was no longer to administer possessions of the organization worldwide because, 
as the Dutch case had painfully shown, this could provide for difficult local 
situations.73 In order to understand the ambiguous legal position of the Dutch 
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Salvation Army, the IHQ asked for copies of the 1946 Deed of Rights - re-
establishment. Additionally, the International Secretary Duggins suggested to 
Åhlberg to make sure that the organization was at least legally incorporated. He 
refrained nevertheless, from making any suggestions with regard to the choice of 
legal form.74 Åhlberg was not allowed much time to take action on this subject 
however, because in 1959 he was replaced by Commander Palstra (1959-1966). 
Based on the 1946 statutes, Palstra was convinced that the Salvation Army 
held two corporate identities: church and foundation. In a letter to his Italian 
colleague Evans, Palstra explained the legal status of the Dutch Salvation Army 
as follows: 
 
“1. The Salvation Army is established in The Netherlands as a foundation 
and on the merits of its statutes, recognized as a charitable organization. As 
such, it enjoys the rights and benefits emanating from the Poor Law, Chil-
dren Protection Act, Reclamation Acts, Death rates Act, etc. etc. 
2. Since December 4, 1948 The Salvation Army in The Netherlands is also 
recognized as a church and as such, entered in the list of churches known to 
the Department of Justice under number 65.” 75 
 
The tone of this quote suggests that Palstra regarded the two parts as being in 
perfect balance. The matter of legal incorporation seemed to be no issue at all 
and no attention was given to the subject at that time.  
Six years later, however, in February 1965, the issue surfaced again and now 
it was Palstra that called upon the IHQ. In contrast with the previous time, Pal-
stra now expressed a tremendous sense of urgency by presenting it as a matter of 
the highest importance. The issue that he referred to was not so much the matter 
of being a church or a foundation, but it was the same issue that was addressed 
by General Kitching: According to the law, the material part of the Dutch Salva-
tion Army was still owned by the IHQ. Palstra underlined that this issue of de-
pendency was “highly dangerous” from a political point of view, and “inac-
ceptable” by the Dutch government as well as the Dutch people.76 The immedi-
ate reason for his haste remains unclear, but now a very different problem 
seemed to form the impetus for Palstra’s action: 
 
“(…) I think I ought to say that I would be very much afraid of the conse-
quences if either the government or the press and the public in general were 
to become conscious of the fact that all Salvation Army property is British 
owned. As far as the government is concerned, I am, of course, thinking of 
the huge financial contributions made and subsidies given by the government 
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with respect to new building schemes as well as to rebuilding and renovation 
of existing Salvation Army buildings. And with regard to the general public, 
I am sure that knowledge of the actual legal position of the Salvation Army 
in the Netherlands would have a devastating effect on their generosity in giv-
ing financial support to the work of the Salvation Army.”77 
 
Therefore, even though in 1959 the ‘British’ problem of dependency was not 
shared very much by the Dutch territory, this letter shows that by 1965 it had 
actually developed into a shared problem. The dependency on the IHQ was a 
historically formed safeguard against alienation of national territories from their 
alma mater, and thus was meant to conserve a worldwide shared identity. But 
now it had turned into a problem. A problem that, according to Palstra, worked 
in three directions because the Dutch Salvation Army had been cornered be-
tween the IHQ, the Dutch government and the Dutch public.  
As a valued actor in the social policy system the Army’s dependency on 
governmental support had developed throughout the twentieth century. But now 
that by 1963, the Dutch state had become its main financial provider, a positive 
public image was essential to the Army. As has become clear during parliamen-
tary debates, this image could very well influence political debates. But also the 
financial support of the Dutch public was of utmost importance to the Army, for 
by means of this flow of money the existence of the Army’s corps was guaran-
teed. These corps were not state-subsidized, but were entirely dependent on 
public donations and earnings made through the thrift stores and other recycling 
activities. Palstra’s fear of defacement of the Army’s public image was not 
without reason, because it would have direct consequences on the generosity of 
the Dutch public and thus on the corps. Therefore he expressed his concerns on 
how the lucrative relationship with the Dutch government as well as the Dutch 
public would be affected when this financial relationship with the UK would 
become public. In his view, it was unthinkable that both the government and the 
Dutch people would find out that the Army was in fact an English-owned organ-
ization and that the bulk of financial support was actually donated to a foreign 
organization. Combined with the fact that the Army had become a valued part-
ner in the social policy system, this international connection once again seemed 
to turn against it. 
Another issue that confronted the Army with its unclear legal status was that 
the Army command regarded the Army primarily as a church, a church that 
offered various social services. With respect to government subsidies however, 
the Army’s legal advisors had tried to cut the Gordian knot of the Army’s legal 
identity by affirming that even though the Army regarded itself as a church, it 
had presented itself as an ‘ecclesiastical foundation’ and thus was eligible for 
subsidies. The fact of the matter is that the Salvation Army was both a church 
(Ministry of Justice, 1941) and a foundation (statutes, 1946). Nevertheless, the 
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Army additionally chose to represent itself officially as an ecclesiastical founda-
tion. The available sources do not reveal the reasoning on which this was based, 
but the only manner in which this claim on being an ecclesiastical foundation 
could be substantiated, had to be based on the fact that the Dutch branch of the 
Salvation Army was a legal part of the British Salvation Army, which actually 
was acknowledged to be a church. Only as an extension of this British legal 
body, could the Dutch Army be an ecclesiastical foundation, but in no available 
sources was this argument openly made. In the statutes of 1946, the Army stated 
that it was a foundation that also claimed to be a church, but because according 
to Dutch law, an ecclesiastical foundation could only exist as a part of a church, 
the claim that the Army was an ecclesiastical foundation might have been con-
testable. Nevertheless, during the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, the Dutch 
Army considered itself to be an ecclesiastical foundation.78 This legal position 
did not mean however that the Army’s connection with London was not up for 
evaluation in the 1970s again, because subsidization became a very important 
reason for the Salvation Army to recalibrate its legal position:  
 
“Various government bodies grant subsidies to certain branches of social and 
youth work for which very often a condition is that the subsidized institution 
has the foundation or association form.”79 
 
Directly after his appointment in 1974 as Territorial Commander, Verwaal 
(1974-1978 and 1980-1982) tried to come to grips with the issue by assigning 
the Army’s legal advisor Houthoff to draft new statutes in order to establish a 
separate foundation for the Army’s properties. While this revision was to take 
place however, the statutes also had to be brought up to date in a linguistic 
sense. In addition, Verwaal took the matter one step further and also established 
a committee to recalibrate the Army’s mission, as this mission would form the 
base for the new statutes. In this committee, the Commander included the two 
legally schooled staff members from the probation department: Hartjes and 
Fijn.80 Interesting fact is that both men were not Salvation Army officers, as the 
other members of the committee (Ligtelijn and Nijman) actually were. The ad-
vice of the committee was to use the probation department mission statement as 
a mould to rephrase the general Salvation Army mission. This was phrased as 
follows: 
 
                                                        
 
78 Even though the Army was not ben very active in presenting itself as an ecclesiastical foundation, it did 
considered itself as such. This is confirmed by the fact that the Army did not consider the 1956 Law on 
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“To propagate the gospel of Jesus Christ in the broadest sense to all people 
and especially to those who are usually not confronted with it, and, based 
upon this gospel, to relieve their social needs and necessities as much as pos-
sible”81 
 
Even though the propagation of the gospel was mentioned first and thus seemed 
to be the primary goal, the Army’s social activities were no longer regarded as 
auxiliary to this religious mission. In this new phrasing, the social objective was 
not just merely a means to win souls, but it seems to have become an objective 
on its own. The phrasing was adopted by the Army’s command, and was broad-
ly applied throughout the Salvation Army and its different departments. Rather 
soon after his appointment, Verwaal had established his first crown jewel: a new 
definition of the Army’s mission. Soon, however, the matter of the legal incor-
poration of the Army would surface again, as in 1967 the Second Book of the 
Dutch Civil Code was adopted. 
3.1. Civil Code, Book 2: 1976 
The Dutch Civil Code was created in 1838 and just before World War II, its 
centennial was celebrated. Soon after the liberation, however, the Dutch gov-
ernment ordered a re-codification due to the growing disparity between the code 
and the changes in society that had occurred over more than a century. A new 
civil code had to incorporate the 110 years of law development that had taken 
place in the meantime. In 1949, E.M. Meijers from Leiden University was 
commissioned to modernize the civil code and he presented the drafts of the first 
four books just before he died in 1954. Successors Drion, Eggens, De Jong and 
De Grooth continued his work and finished the assignment in 1992. 
The revision of the second book was adopted in 1976 and brought an end to 
the discussion of the legal status of the (ecclesiastical) foundation. A clear dis-
tinction was made between ‘association’ and ‘church’ on the one side, and 
‘foundation’ on the other. In Article 2 of Book 2, it was confirmed that a church 
was indeed a legal body by itself. Nevertheless, defining the term ‘church’ was 
once again avoided, for, echoing the arguments used in the parliamentary dis-
cussions, the state did not deem itself qualified to give an interpretation of how a 
church was to be defined and organized. Therefore, further interpretation of 
what set a church apart from a foundation was still in the hands of the judici-
ary.82 With the introduction of Book 2 however, another more relevant subject 
to the Salvation Army was actually decided on. By positioning the church and 
the foundation quite opposite to one another in a legal sense, the gray area that 
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until then had offered space for the ecclesiastical foundation had disappeared, 
and the legal status of ecclesiastical foundation was abolished. An faith-based 
organization, like a church, could still start foundations, but these were from 
then on considered separate and above all secular organizations on their own. 
That meant that a church could no longer also be a foundation and vice versa, 
even if they shared the same goals. Dijk and Van der Ploeg rephrased the defini-
tion of a church accordingly:  
 
“An organization that aims at common religious experience is a church ac-
cording to art. 2:2 BW, when it acts accordingly in the public sphere and is 
not incorporated as an association or a foundation.”83 
 
After 1976, in order to become a church an organization had to meet two condi-
tions: it had to have the right legal form (no foundation), and it had to present 
itself as a church. These new rules of incorporation forced organizations that 
were considered to be ecclesiastical foundations to choose a new legal form. 
This push for clarity from the side of the government on the issue of incorpora-
tion would also have its consequences on the legal position of the Salvation 
Army, for its preferred chameleonic appearance of a religious organization in a 
secular robe would no longer be tenable in a legal sense. The new civil code 
presented the Army with the question of how to do justice to its valued double 
mission in this new legal constellation, and confronted the Army with a radical 
choice. A choice that would soon prove to be a troublesome dilemma. 
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CHAPTER 5. PROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE SALVATION 
ARMY 
 
Various historical images exist of the early beginnings of the professionalization 
of social work in the Netherlands. With regard to occupational groups, it can be 
argued that professionalization had already started during the seventeenth centu-
ry with the system of guilds. This formation of occupational groups had modern-
ized during the second half of the nineteenth century, when teachers, medical 
doctors and public notaries organized themselves into groups based on profes-
sion. Also, from the micro-perspective of the workers, the urge for professional-
ization was already detectable in the Netherlands before 1900, as in 1899 the 
first educational institute for (women) social workers worldwide (!) opened its 
doors in Amsterdam: Opleidingsinrichting voor Socialen Arbeid (Training insti-
tute for social work). This school provided for the education of volunteer work-
ers in order to equip them for the increasingly complex social work they wanted 
to provide.1 This school was however not the first attempt to equip certain occu-
pational groups to provide for better services and care. During the last decades 
of the nineteenth century, for example, nursing had become a profession on its 
own by means of schooling and in 1878, the first diplomas on nursing were 
awarded.2 
1. Professionalization boosted 
The first impetus for professionalization was felt in the work field itself, but 
with regard to the possibilities for schooling and certification of workers for 
community work, it is observed that such professionalization was still in its 
infancy during the 1960s.3 Nevertheless, during the first decades of the twenti-
eth century, professionalization received a major boost. The combination of 
industrial development and a persistent belief in progress resulted in new activi-
ties that developed outside the framework and finances of the 1912 Poor Law. 
Between 1875 and 1931, seventeen new forms of social work came into being, 
amongst which were child welfare, after-school child care; shelters for home-
less; treatment of drug addicts and recreation work.4 By then, a larger group of 
people, beyond just the poor, could benefit from a certain degree of support. The 
diversity of social work activities stemmed from a dichotomy that also was per-
ceptible in other European countries: social work and social pedagogy. In this 
dichotomy, social work refers to activities that aim to (temporarily) support 
individuals and groups who need social assistance. Social pedagogy on the other 
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hand, is aimed at the support of the educational power of communities and in-
formal networks such as families and youth groups. This resulted in an interest 
in care for youth and children, and also in more community centers and the sup-
port of volunteer work.5 
The Dutch government also increasingly started to gain interest in this devel-
opment. As was described in Part I on a local level, municipalities regarded this 
development as a chance to increase their support to the public, and arrange-
ments were made to subsidize civil society organizations to provide for social 
services.6 On a national level, the government started to determine attainment 
levels for educational programs in order to assure a basic level of skills and 
knowledge within an occupational group. When a program met these require-
ments, its diploma was officially endorsed by the state, as was the case with the 
nursing program in 1921.7 
Even though the process of professionalization had started long before 1900, 
during the 1950s it experienced a boost. The social disruption that resulted from 
the war instigated an intensification of social care during the postwar decades, 
especially with regard to family care and youth care.8 Many areas of the social 
work field would start up their own training programs and schools, as the alumni 
of the School for Social Work in Amsterdam were not always prepared for these 
new areas of work. In the area of the community center work, a growing discon-
tentment with the quality of alumni even incited the umbrella organizations to 
found their own educational programs.9 During the 1960s however, the Schools 
for Social Work started their own curricula for cultural work and tried again to 
catch up with the work field organizations.10  
In addition to the increase in numbers of professionals, the developing wel-
fare state arrangements had also created a new brand of professionals: a stratum 
of professional experts and administrators that, according to some, had become 
increasingly dependent on the expansion of the welfare state system itself and its 
myriad of provisions. This so-called ‘transformation of the middle class’ was the 
result of the ascension of a group of experts that was able to position itself aside 
from the more traditional middle class by its specialist knowledge in combina-
tion with its relative proximity to the state. A proximity that in fact would mean: 
dependency. In many ways, this professional was confined to boundaries set by 
the state and was urged to make use of provisions offered by the state. In return 
for this loss of independence, these professionals would gain in terms of social 
mobility.11 This group of bureaucratic professionals would even prove to be able 
to impose a “professional regime” on the citizens, as they became an active 
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element in the creation and subsequent control of welfare arrangements.12 Addi-
tionally, as experts, these professionals started to define beforehand, the needs 
and interests of the clients and organized the service accordingly. Therefore, 
according to De Swaan, through these state-dependent professionals the state 
itself initiated and implemented organized social services that often reached into 
the private sphere of the individual client.13  
The urge to professionalize did not only seem to come from the Dutch gov-
ernment and the professionals themselves, it was also shared by the civil society 
organization. The example of the creation of training programs for community 
center work does not stand alone. Also in case of nursing and maternity care, the 
Wit-Gele Kruis (see Chapter 1.3) started its own educational programs and initi-
ated the additional unification of the many other courses and programs that were 
offered in the Netherlands in this work field.14 The recognition of the im-
portance of professional education was clear. 
Next to pragmatic considerations like the staffing of the organization, other 
motives contributed to this need for professionalization. For one, professionali-
zation offered the possibility for emancipation and social mobility to young 
women. During the 1950s, the echelon of professionals was actively strength-
ened by the influx of Catholic girls.15 Another motive to professionalize was 
that it opened the way for the work field to be acknowledged as a profession.16 
Many of these activities had originated from charity and were still associated 
with that past, which had by then become somewhat uncomfortable. Especially 
because this association no longer did justice to the financial structure of the 
work, nor to its level of quality or its moral implications.17 Therefore, profes-
sionalization seemed to provide for a solution to certain problems that the work 
field dealt with. On another level, however, professionalization seemed to create 
new problems by itself. 
2. Professionalization debated 
The complexity of the social policy system and Dutch society as a whole had 
contributed to the need for more professionals. Nevertheless, during the 1970s 
the presence of the professional within the social policy system became the sub-
ject of intense critique. In 1969, sociologist Milikowski published a popularized 
version of his dissertation Lof der onaangepastheid (Tribute to non-
conformity).18 In this book, he criticized the morally normative character of the 
Dutch social care system. As an exponent of the 1960s, Milikowski regarded 
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non-conformity as a prerequisite for social emancipation and, ultimately, self-
sufficiency, but the normative superiority of the professional over the clients 
seemed to produce the opposite effect.19 This criticism on the role of the profes-
sional was underlined with the publication of Nieuwe vrijgestelden. De opkomst 
van het spijkerpakkenproletariaat (The newly dispensed. The rise of the ‘denim 
suit proletariat’) in 1977. In this work, sociologist Vuijsje questioned the discre-
tionary powers that professionals possessed. What exactly were these profes-
sionals doing in their work and to what extent did the professional have a free 
rein?, were questions that Vuijsje addressed.20  
During the 1970s and 1980s, professional care was being increasingly criti-
cized as patronizing and unwanted interference, and the call to maintain profes-
sional distance from one’s clients became louder. This approach was quite the 
opposite to what had been the prevailing standard since the introduction of the 
social casework method (see paragraph 4.2 of this Chapter). In addition, Van 
Doorn and Schuyt contributed to this criticism in their elaboration on the per-
ceived problems that the modern welfare state was confronted with. According 
to them, professionalism had driven up the costs of the welfare system substan-
tially, for professionals always demanded further development of their speciali-
zation and area of work. Therefore, by claiming this professional space the pro-
fessional put his own interest above the common interest, and this would lead to 
an increasing distance from the clients that he worked for, and additionally in-
crease managerial uncontrollability from the side of the government.21 What was 
even more menacing according to Van Doorn and Schuyt however, was that 
these professionals seemed to make the clients dependent on their specialized 
services. They detected a growing interference in the personal life of individu-
als, which was visible in the increasing supply of services like infant care and 
kindergartens, elderly care, socio-cultural training, community work, and moral 
instruction like sex education, a development that might make the client accus-
tomed to being provided for by the state.22 Philosopher Hans Achterhuis drove 
home this argument of the growing dependency of the clients.23 In his De Markt 
van Welzijn en Geluk (The market of welfare and bliss), Achterhuis argued that 
viewed from the perspective of the free market, professionalization of the wel-
fare work had generated its own demand.24 The system of supply-orientation by 
means of the multitude of social services had, according to Achterhuis, led to a 
preserving tradition that seemed to have one aim: to maintain the level of care as 
it is. Professionals were serving their own interest and by generating new ser-
vices, they created a new demand, making people unhappy through welfare 
work, rather than happy. 
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Next to this perceived growth of dependency on the professional, a second 
problem that was ascribed to professionalization had to do with was the institu-
tionalization of civil society. Sociologist (and co-author of the Knelpuntennota 
of 1973, see Chapter 2) Peper observed that the combination of a growing finan-
cial dependency on the government; the removal of the traditional religious and 
socio-political barriers (de-pillarization) and the emphasis on professionaliza-
tion, had undermined the legitimacy of civil society as a whole.25 Its grassroots 
were relieved of financial obligations towards their organizations because of 
state support, and the influx of professionally (in contrast with ideologically) 
motivated employees had disconnected these organizations from the people they 
aimed to represent.26 At an organizational level, Peper argued, professionaliza-
tion had resulted in “an erosion of one’s own initiative and material responsibil-
ity”.27 This erosion had become quite visible in the tensions that had risen be-
tween the professionalized work force and their volunteer management.28 With 
their increasing skills and knowledge because of their professionalization, the 
workers started to become more and more independent from their management 
in determining the goals and direction of the work, and at the same time, non-
professionalized managers were increasingly unable to control the quality or the 
direction of the work of the professionals. A position that, according to Peper, 
deprived them of the last bit of legitimacy that they held in that time of anti-
authoritarianism.29 
A third problem that was perceived to be connected to the professionalization 
process had to do with voluntarism. Traditionally, charity and other forms of 
social services had been drawing from a seemingly inexhaustible source of vol-
untarism provided for by family, friends and communities. Voluntarism had 
been an important element in the development of societies and had been valued 
as such in both the academic and political realm. Even Beveridge, who had 
elaborated on the possibility of a state-supported system of social welfare, clear-
ly envisioned the concept of the welfare society consisting of smaller groups of 
– ‘Friendly Societies’ – that helped the people to maintain awareness of one’s 
responsibilities towards oneself and others.30 This sense of responsibility would 
prevent the individual to just appeal to the state for help, and would instead 
would encourage citizens to care for each other. T.H. Marshal however argued, 
in 1949, that Beveridge’s vista might be utopian and instead Marshall envi-
sioned a “mutual aid society run by the state”. A type of welfare society in 
which individual responsibility, and as its result also voluntarism, might evolve 
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in a different direction than Beveridge imagined, because the growing domi-
nance of the state would function as a determinant of this relationship.31  
In addition, the Dutch government chose a side in the debate on the effects of 
professionalization. In 1980, the Ministry of CRM openly acknowledged that the 
position and relevance of the volunteer in society had been neglected in the ad-
vancement of the welfare system. The ministry concluded that due to a variety 
of causes, the number of volunteers was dropping and the influence of volun-
teers on public management declined.32 The main causes observed for this drop 
in voluntarism were: the increase in other leisure activities that competed with 
the available time that would be taken up by volunteer work; the lessening of the 
bonds with religious institutions; growth of collective welfare arrangements that 
diminished the stimulus to engage socially; and the increase in professionalism 
that encouraged tutelage and dependency of the client. A revaluation of the vol-
unteer seemed pivotal – an observation made by the government that was partic-
ularly awkward at a time that was generally regarded as the completion of the 
welfare state system, as Adriaansens and Zijderveld concluded.33 From this 
perspective, the ongoing emphasis on professionalization had created a tension 
between the professional and the volunteer. On the other hand, not everybody 
was positive about this revaluation of the volunteer that the ministry proposed. 
Labor unions especially, thought of this strategy as a government scheme to 
increase the influx of volunteers to the labor market as a cheap alternative to 
expensive professionals.34 Additionally, the image of voluntarism was not very 
positive. Over time, it was associated with amateurism and incompetence, espe-
cially when it came to the managers that were increasingly outwitted by their 
professionalized staff.35 Therefore, professionalization of certain social services 
was quite welcome in order to gain recognition of the profession.36 This invokes 
the question of how professionalization affected the Salvation Army, and to 
what extent the Army suffered from these perceived negative effects of profes-
sionalization. In order to understand this to its full extent, we will first have to 
gain some insight on how the Salvation Army was organized. 
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3. Salvation Army: vocational voluntarism (1887-1945) 
3.1. The officer: personification of the Salvation Army’s identity 
In the organizational structure of the Dutch Salvation Army, the axiom ‘distinct 
but inseparable’ was clearly recognizable during most of the twentieth century, 
and especially since World War II. When looking down the Army’s organiza-
tional chart, the social and religious work were embedded in its structure and 
statutes and the Army’s double mission was firmly tied together by the man-
agement constellation. And when looking upward, the two missions were clearly 
distinct, as, for example, the social and religious activities had their own sepa-
rate financial flows. The linking pin between the spiritual and social work of the 
Salvation Army was formed by the officer. Serving as the personification of the 
Army’s double mission made the officer a key element of the Army’s identity. 
In order to illustrate the position of the officer, the Salvation Army itself tends to 
draw the analogy with the Catholic Church. The position of the General resem-
bles that of the Pope; the position of the Territorial Commander can be com-
pared to that of an archbishop; the officers are the priests of the Salvation Army 
and the soldiers can be equated with committed and active church members or 
parishioners.  
The central place of the officer was also stressed by General Booth in his ex-
pectations towards the compliance of the officer. Booth compared the role of the 
officer to that of a soldier-volunteer of an army prepared for battle: 
 
“For Discipline I can answer. The Salvation Army, largely recruited from 
among the poorest of the poor, is often reproached by its enemies because of 
the severity of its rule. It is the only religious body founded in our time that 
is based upon the principle of voluntary subjection to an absolute authority. 
No one is bound to remain in the Army a day longer than he pleases. While 
he remains there he is bound by the conditions of the Service. The first con-
dition of that Service is implicit, unquestioning obedience. The Salvationist 
is taught to obey as is the soldier on the field of battle.”37 
 
Just a few years after its start in the Netherlands, the Salvation Army claimed to 
already have 110 officers. In 1939, the number had risen to 743 active officers 
(78 retired) and approximately 12,200 soldiers.38 These officers had, like priests, 
committed themselves to the Salvation Army for life, by contract, and were 
mainly active within the corps. By doing so, the officers avowed the Army’s 
articles of faith, and just as within the Catholic Church, the Army command 
could assign tasks to officers at will: 
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“These officers are in the field, constantly exposed to privation and ill-
treatment of all kinds. A telegram from me will send any of them to the ut-
termost parts of the earth, will transfer them from the slums of London to 
San Francisco, or dispatch them to assist in opening missions in Holland, Zu-
luland, Sweden, or South America.”39 
 
This resulted in an organizational culture of complete devotion and flexibility on 
the part of the soldiers and officers. And of course, to an increasing extent, skill, 
because an officer could be assigned to be a corps leader (including conducting 
the Sunday services and other religious tasks) or a probation worker, or even 
both, and such a transfer of tasks could occur haphazardly. As a cadet, as an 
officer-trainee was called, one had to also waive his rights to any wages – ex-
cluding the possibility of becoming a salaried employee. Voluntarism was the 
only way these devotees could become successful officers, and voluntarism that 
was based on an individual and very personal conviction that one was called to 
do this work:  
 
“No good salary will keep him at work when his heart is not present anyway. 
(…) Vocation and profession have to remain apart.”40 
 
This ‘vocational voluntarism’ was highly valued by the Army and was regarded 
to be the main motivation for the Army’s officer. Salary was not at all to be the 
main incentive for the Army’s recruits, for that was regarded to be merely mate-
rial and basically unsatisfying. The spiritual incentive on the other hand, was 
regarded as eternally rewarding – an idea that was not unwelcome regarding the 
circumstances that officers sometimes had to endure. The livelihood of the of-
ficers was maintained by the Salvation Army for only a part, by providing for 
housing and heating and a very basic income. So, in order to develop their corps 
activities officers had to generate additional income. The Army also stated some 
restrictions on private matters. Even though the Army did not apply the vow of 
chastity, an officer was only allowed to wed another Salvation Army officer, and 
not even a soldier nor someone from outside the Salvation Army. Therefore, the 
Salvation Army’s officer, as a dedicated vocational volunteer, was often active 
in both the religious as well as the social work activities of the organization and 
thus was the very personification of the two missions that the Army held so 
dear. 
3.2. Preparing for the (spiritual) battle 
The fact that the Army valued voluntarism so highly however, did not mean that 
the organization did not expect its recruits to develop a certain level of 
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knowledge and skills that were deemed necessary for their work. From its early 
beginnings, the Salvation Army aimed to train its officers, for already in 1892 it 
had two functioning training schools for officers in Amsterdam: one for female 
officers that was located at Prins Hendrikkade 131 and a training school for 
male officers at Parklaan 4.41 The curriculum included studying the Salvation 
Army doctrines, singing, prayer, bookkeeping, reading, arithmetic, education 
theory, and of course “methods to save souls” and to recruit new soldiers.42 In 
the afternoons the newly acquired knowledge could be brought into practice 
when the cadets went out in groups of two and tried to sell the Strijdkreet to the 
willing passersby or in the local café’s, and undoubtedly try to strike up a con-
versation on matters of the soul. This meant that the training of the officers also 
had to be seen in the light of saving souls: 
 
“Our goal is to save souls, - so we have to raise soul-winners. Everything has 
to work together to achieve this aim. With the training of Officers, we aim 
only at this target: saving of souls. Everything in the Cadet’s life will serve 
this purpose: all the lessons, the prayer, the singing, the work, all are focused 
on that (…).”43 
 
For the part of social work however, structural and professional training was not 
provided for by the Army at first.44 As stated before, most of the necessary skills 
and knowledge were acquired on the job, but nonetheless the Army was clear on 
the fact that their officers needed “a certain amount of spiritual education under 
able supervisors” before they were sent out to “spread the gospel of salvation”, 
and this training would already take four to six months.45  
However, times were changing rapidly and the altering scope and complexity 
of social problems also seemed to demand more and more attention. As a result, 
in 1913 the Army concluded that the training programs had to be modernized. 
Due to “increasing demands that are made on the Officer it has proven to be 
necessary to attend more care to his education”, and in order to school its offic-
ers the Army opened a training school in 1917 on the Overtoom in Amster-
dam.46 In 1933, this training school moved to a new building in Amstelveen, and 
was now renamed the William Booth Kweekschool (training school). By then, it 
provided a 10 month training curriculum. The growing interest in professionali-
zation in the Netherlands coincided with the development of the manifold social 
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work activities. One of the first activities to be professionalized was probation 
work, and because the Salvation Army was traditionally a valued participant in 
this work field, it had to adopt to this development in one way or another. 
4. Professionalization of the probation work field (1887-1980) 
4.1. Initial professionalization (1910-1945) 
As has been addressed before, during the decades before World War II, the pro-
bation work field in the Netherlands was increasingly supported financially by 
the government. In 1913, the Ministry of Justice started to finance the first Sal-
vation Army probation officer, and at the end of the 1930s, the Army seemed to 
have been quite comfortable with this arrangement, for by then there were eight 
probation officers at work in the Army ranks, all receiving their salaries from the 
Ministry of Justice.47 This governmental grant system had an enormous influ-
ence on the probation work field. It facilitated the increase in probation organi-
zations that adhered to their ideological pillars during the antebellum, and thus 
the government indirectly strengthened the pillarized society. With the financial 
crisis of the 1920s and 1930s however, this ideological division proved to be 
rather expensive and not very efficient, as was observed by the Genootschap. As 
a consequence, the Genootschap actually even called out for government regula-
tion of the work field during the 1930s.48 This call for government influence was 
not much appreciated by the confessional probation organizations like the Cath-
olic RKSV and Protestant PCRV who were mainly concerned about the 
strengthening of their ideological grassroots, but the Ministry of Justice reacted 
promptly. It appointed five ‘external’ government officials on a departmental 
level that had to supervise the probation officers in the field, thereby forming a 
temporary administrative layer between the government and these private proba-
tion organizations. In the case of the Salvation Army, the state-salaried officers 
had to report to the Ministry of Justice and at the same time coordinate the work 
of hundreds of Salvation Army soldier-volunteers who were doing most of the 
probation legwork. This legwork, called “correspondence”, consisted primarily 
of visiting the prisoners and their families in order to prepare them for their 
return into society.49 
By 1920 however, it became clear that a demarcation dispute had developed 
between these two echelons of officials, because in the daily practice both these 
types of officials were increasingly doing the same work – both were providing 
“information” and aftercare. When, because of the rising amount of work, in 
1921 the Ministry of Justice (by the person of former Salvation Army officer 
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Veenstra) expressed its intention to appoint more government supervisors, the 
private organizations protested and in return opted for more staff within their 
own ranks. After being requested repeatedly, the ministry gave in and in 1925, it 
broadened the range of tasks for the private probation organizations with the 
underlying justification that the prime responsibility for probation work had to 
be in the hands of these organizations. In return, they had to demonstrate that 
they were capable; professionalization thus, seemed to be inevitable.50 
With the increase in workload during the first decades of the twentieth centu-
ry and the pressure to meet these rising expectations of agovernment that pro-
vided subsidies, the need for organizational development grew, and the Salva-
tion Army in its turn also set out to professionalize its workers. This form of 
professionalization however, had to transcend the traditional emphasis on prepa-
ration for a spiritual battle, for now the Army officer had to also explicitly 
demonstrate his or her capability as a social worker. Therefore, in order to create 
a professional identity for its workers the Salvation Army probation department 
issued an internal magazine called Onze Kracht (Our Strength). In this magazine 
probation workers discussed topics and issues that they encountered in their 
work and read about the experiences of other workers and thus Onze Kracht 
served as a platform of professional knowledge sharing and forming of ideas. 
Another such platform was the annual study conferences organized by the Ar-
my’s probation department. During these conferences, probation workers were 
able to discuss recent developments that they encountered in the work field. By 
doing so, a culture of debate and knowledge sharing started to grow within the 
probation department, and additionally, these activities strengthened awareness 
of unity amongst the Army’s probation workers, an awareness that would devel-
op into an organizational culture that distinguished this department from the 
other Salvation Army social work departments in the near future.51 
4.2. Postwar professionalization (1945-1970) 
After World War II, the Dutch government showed a growing interest in the 
development of many different social services, as described in Chapter 2. The 
rise in demand of probation activities spurred the government to also increase its 
financial support to this line of work. The growing complexity of the probation 
work created the need for better-qualified personnel, a need that was shared by 
both the government as well as the probation organizations. So, in order to en-
sure a certain standard of quality, a combined effort was made to professionalize 
the branch by education of the professionals and ‘scientification’ of the proba-
tion work itself. In its wake, the need for efficiency and controllability grew. 
Directly after the war, a first attempt to enhance the quality of the work was 
reflected in the Reclasseringsregeling of 1947. In this Order, it was specified 
that all changes in state-salaried personnel had to be approved of by the Ministry 
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of Justice. This meant that the ministry would scrutinize recruits on their abili-
ties and qualifications. In return, their salaries would be subsidized by 90%. This 
directive made the employment of untrained workers highly unattractive for 
probation organizations.52 During the same period, the improvement of proba-
tion work was reflected in the announcement of a new methodology for social 
work: ‘social casework’. Social worker Marie Kamphuis introduced this origi-
nally American approach to social work in the Netherlands in 1950.53 Social 
casework explicitly valued the relationship between the client and its helper. The 
professional and the client were regarded as fundamentally equal and from that 
idea, the professional had to stand beside the client instead of above him. The 
idea behind social casework was that only on the basis of this form of confi-
dence and informality, would the offered assistance be effective.54 Additionally, 
the idea of ‘good or bad behavior’ changed into ‘conformist or non-conformist 
behavior’, and thus stressed that it was not just that external factors contributed 
to an individual’s problems, but also the fact that they themselves were respon-
sible for these problems.55 So, social casework combined existing methods into 
a more comprehensive approach that would become leading in the social work 
field and also this personal approach, combined with taking responsibility for 
one’s own life, corresponded well with the view of the Salvation Army on pro-
bation work. This proximity to the client would, of course, also provide for a 
good possibility to exercise the Army’s core idea of probation work: spiritual 
‘rescue work’.56  
This widely accepted concept of social casework incited a spur in education 
in the welfare work field. In order to quickly build this new spirit in new trainees 
of probation work, a crash course was created by the national bureau of the pro-
bation organizations. This course was soon adopted by the social schools and 
was called the “urgency-program”, a name signifying the sudden need for new 
and qualified workers. In 1964, the Ministry of Justice made the training pro-
gram compulsory for probation workers and thus publicly acknowledged proba-
tion work as a part of the broad array of professional social services.57 The 
growing complexity of the problems that prisoners showed called for specialized 
helpers. During the 1950s, the probation organizations called on the ministry to 
provide for means to hire psychologists and sociologists, and from 1958 on-
wards, the ministry actually started to subsidize the hiring of such experts. Of 
the 16 probation bureaus that the Salvation Army had by 1961, 13 were facilitat-
ed with their own psychiatrists.58 
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The boost in professionalization also became visible on an organizational 
level. The various governmental flows of subsidies, the growth of the different 
social work activities and the growing pressure on the organization itself to con-
trol all these developments, incited the Salvation Army to reorganize its social 
work activities. In 1963, it parted with the old tripartite structure of ‘Social work 
for women and children’, ‘Social work for men’ and its so-called ‘Charity 
work’, and reorganized into separate sectors: probation, child care, nursing, 
hotels, elderly care and homeless care.59 Apparently, the professional idea of 
furthering the organizational efficiency also started to permeate the Salvation 
Army.60 By 1970, the contours of a semi-professionalized probation department 
had become visible, and additionally, the department grew extensively. In 1967 
it worked with an annual budget of fl.1,582,244 and in 1971, its budget had 
increased to fl.3,197,964.61 This growth was also detectable on the level of its 
workers, for the increase in workload and the lack of qualified personnel meant 
that many new employees were actually not yet qualified. Many of them were 
put into the urgency program directly after their employment. The manager of 
the Army’s probation department, Hartjes (1963-1973) candidly emphasized to 
the Ministry of Justice the great pressure that the organization was under: “Of 
six persons that were employed in 1969, one held the degree of the Social 
School.”62 On the other hand, the trend seemed promising. In 1964, only 17% of 
the probation officers were certified and in 1970, the number had risen to 50%.63 
This trend however, would create another problem for the Salvation Army, for 
in the additional letter to the 1970 subsidy-proposal, Hartjes argued that the rise 
in the budget proposition of the 1970s was partly caused by the former alloca-
tion of subsidies by the ministry, and with the influx of new staff the pressure on 
the available facilities was growing. Therefore, a proposed increase in subsidies 
from the side of the Army was to expand these facilities.64 The initial supply of 
subsidy seemed to have created its own demand for new, additional subsidies, 
and Hartjes boldly pointed out to the ministry how the Army was put in this 
position of being forced to ask for more funding by the ministry itself. 
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5. Effects of professionalization on the Army’s identity 
5.1. Professional depillarization 
An important consequence of this need for professionalized personnel was that 
the Salvation Army’s probation department was soon in short supply of quali-
fied workers from its own rank and file, its ‘own people’. The demand for pro-
fessionalization by education had resulted in an unforeseen development. For-
mer policy adviser of the Army’s probation department, Maris recalls that many 
officers that had followed higher education were “a loss to the Army”:  
 
“Even though they came from a family of officers, they distanced themselves 
from it. (…) They could absolutely not relate with the Army any longer. The 
officers in particular – they hurried out. And they especially disappeared 
completely outside the organization. Thus the organization became more 
secularized.”65 
 
This lack of ‘own’ personnel meant that if it wanted to maintain the level of 
service that it had been providing so far, the Army had to open its doors to peo-
ple outside its own ranks. This was not something entirely new, for the Salvation 
Army probation department always did have non-Army volunteers within their 
brigades, but a shortage of troops on such a scale was actually quite new. There-
fore, during the 1950s both on the level of management, as well as in the work 
force, this serious deficit called for drastic measures. On the managerial level, 
for the first time a somewhat controversial appointment was made when Hartjes 
became manager of the Salvation Army’s probation department. Hartjes was the 
first manager within the Salvation Army that was not an officer. Even though he 
was a dedicated Salvation Army soldier, the fact that he had not completed the 
regular Salvation Army training and thus was not an Army officer, was quite a 
novelty. The fact of the matter was that the Ministry of Justice exerted increas-
ing pressure to appoint a professional that was schooled in matters of the law, 
and so, to the ministry, Hartjes, being an academically schooled lawyer, quali-
fied for this role just fine.66 
Also on the level of workforce, the Salvation Army liberalized its hiring pol-
icy. Already at the beginning of the 1950s the Army decided to: 
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“(…) broaden the recruitment of probation workers to all those that stand to 
the same attention of beliefs, irrespective of which (Protestant-) Christian 
denomination one is a member of.”67 
 
Even though the professionalization process had put the Army in the position of 
having to somewhat water down the wine, it clung to its philosophy of a two-
fold mission by strongly emphasizing that “professionalism without personal 
inspiration” was not at all acceptable for the Army.68 Nevertheless, this liberali-
zation of the Army’s hiring policy would have its effects. For one, it would start 
up a process that was greatly feared by the Salvation Army’s management, for it 
touched directly upon the Army’s identity. A process that the historian of proba-
tion work, Heinrich called “professional depillarization”.69 Heinrich described 
that people that already worked as probation officers would become trained 
professionals and new recruits would only be hired when they were qualified. In 
the process of schooling, these students would become acquainted with values 
other than the ideology of religious charity that formed the traditional base of 
social work. Values like professional distance from the clients, a discerning 
attitude towards new developments within the profession and a critical attitude 
towards the organization became inherent to this new professionalism. The per-
sonnel that finished such training programs might still possess an ideological 
drive that inspired them to do their work, but they were also increasingly profes-
sionally motivated. It was not unthinkable that in this process, they might lose 
their regard for the ideological identity of the organization that they worked for. 
According to Heinrich this was actually the case in the probation work field, 
which consequently led to the eroding of the ideological pillars.  
Even though all key positions within the Salvation Army were to be occu-
pied by internally trained and totally committed officers, within the Army too, 
this professional depillarization became tentative in the slow but unavoidable 
influx of qualified and certified personnel from ‘outside’. Although these re-
cruits were carefully scrutinized for their religious beliefs, and were thus practic-
ing Christians, they were still at some distance from the organization and its 
ideology. 
5.2. An exodus of the volunteers 
Professional depillarization also became visible on another level. A level that 
was not discussed by Heinrich: the volunteers. Until the late 1950s, the two 
main probation tasks were divided between the professional probation officers 
who provided information to the judiciary before trial, and the volunteers who 
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offered aftercare to the convicted or released prisoner. The new professionals 
however, started to arrogate more and more of the probation work. In the name 
of quality enhancement, the professionals strove for the concentration of both 
the aftercare and information tasks in their own hands. The volunteer had always 
been the core upon which the probation work had relied since its start, but since 
World War II further education of these workers seemed imminent and in order 
to improve the quality of the probation services, the government also started to 
subsidize the education of the volunteers. Those volunteers who were not inter-
ested, were increasingly be replaced by qualified staff. In 1954, the ratio be-
tween the professionals and volunteers was 1:54, but already ten years later, this 
had shrunk to 1:14.70  
That this change in personnel was unexpected, can be concluded from the 
fact that it called for protest within the other confessional probation organiza-
tions PCRV and KRV. Like the Army, they also seemed to sharply feel the lack 
of suitable volunteers in their workforce, for they also acknowledged the volun-
teer to be ideologically driven to do his work, thus personifying the organiza-
tion’s ideological values. Subsequently, with the replacement of these people 
with well-educated, and thus maybe more professionally driven workers, the 
organizations’ ideological identities seemed to be at stake.71 With regard to the 
Army, the large part of the probation workers were volunteers, and it was espe-
cially these volunteers that had been able to build up effective relationships with 
the clients. So, with the concentration of information and aftercare tasks in the 
hands of the professionals and the growing knowledge gap between the well-
trained professionals and the untrained volunteers, the trend of avoiding the use 
of a volunteers became visible. The result was that the probation brigades within 
the corps ran down.72 The probation brigades, that stemmed from a different era 
and hampered the professionals, seemed to have become dead weight to the 
corps. This process culminated in 1972 when the approximately 500 volunteers 
of the Army were invited to attend the annual probation congress in one of the 
large market halls of the Amsterdam RAI, and after being heartily thanked for 
their valued services by Commander Pindred (1971-1974), they were dismissed. 
Arend Maris recalls:  
 
“They were cast off. They gathered in the RAI – there were a few hundred – 
and: ‘It has been enough, thank you very much for all you have done!’ Nev-
ertheless, the undertone was clear: the professionals had seized power. And, 
indeed, they had become redundant. And that is painful. The arrogance of the 
professional: ‘Listen, we can do it ourselves and don’t need those fossils an-
ymore.’ Terrible!”73 
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Within Army ranks, this choice is presently regarded as a black page in the Sal-
vation Army history, and not in the least because of the personal grief this in-
flicted on all those devoted workers. But also because this choice would enlarge 
the already widening distance between the probation department and the rest of 
the Salvation Army’s organization.74 In addition, in combination with the em-
bracement of the social casework methodology, it would also prove to bring the 
Salvation Army probation department in an even more difficult position. 
5.3. Social casework: “a Trojan horse” 
The Salvation Army had always been open to new methods that could further its 
mission, and the social casework method seemed to offer a perfect match be-
cause the idea of proximity to the client that the Salvation Army envisioned now 
seemed to be legitimized. However, as Maris concluded, it soon proved to be “a 
Trojan horse”.75 At first glance, social casework offered the perfect possibility to 
provide for pastoral care. Therefore, it was greeted as an ally to the Army’s 
evangelization work, or as Salomon declared on this matter: “Science will help 
us to analyze the client and dismantle him, and through the Gospel we will re-
build him.”76 Soon however, it became clear that it was nothing more than a 
mere “secular variety of pastoral care” and it would, according to some, even 
elbow out the spiritual work, for with the increasing professionalization it be-
came clear that social (probation) work had its own mission and this was not 
religious influencing:  
 
“Conversion cannot and may not be the primary goal, nor the concealed goal 
of the aid offered by social workers.”77 
 
It almost even became a taboo amongst probation workers to speak of religious 
matters. This process was encouraged by the process of professionalization 
which created an influx of new professionals who had little connection with the 
Salvation Army’s organization or its philosophy. Combined with the exodus of 
the volunteer, the ideological core of the Army’s probation department was 
severely weakened. In that sense, the embracing of social casework and its un-
foreseen consequences renewed the friction between the Army’s spiritual and 
social mission. 
                                                                                                                                  
 
kwam duidelijk over: de professionals hadden de macht gegrepen. En inderdaad, ze waren overbodig 
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74 Maris 1991:102 
75 Idem:61 
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5.4. Waves of merger 
At the end of the 1960s, another force also started to threaten the Army’s proba-
tion work. A combination of rising wages and costs and the expansion of the 
probation work field led to excessive expenditures and incited the Ministry of 
Justice to make cutbacks. It was to be expected that the probation field too 
would have to contribute its mite, and especially because of the steadily growing 
workload, scaling-up and increased cooperation seemed imminent. In close con-
sultation with the Minister of Justice, the probation organizations decided that 
maintaining the present level of efficiency and quality could only be guaranteed 
when joint action was taken, and during a gathering in 1968 possible scenarios 
of cooperation were explored, like the forming of a federation, merging organi-
zations, working together in coalitions or participating in projects. The work 
field was divided on the issue. The PCRV was hesitant because of its ideological 
stance. The Genootschap and the KRV however, thought quite the opposite. 
They were no longer convinced of the private character of the probation work, 
because its core seemed to have been reduced to nothing more than carrying out 
the law and, consequently, government policy. The KRV was even willing to 
abandon its Catholic identity in the process of a merger in order to further effi-
ciency.78 
The Salvation Army was quite explicit in not wanting to cooperate more than 
a mere coalition, because it regarded its probation work to be very much inter-
connected with the other social services that it provided. A merger or other in-
tensive forms of cooperation were not an option to the Army:  
 
“The Foundation The Salvation Army, of which the probation department is 
a part, is not restricted to just probation work with regard to its activities. The 
entire work includes much and much more.”79 
 
In addition, the personnel of the Salvation Army’s probation department did not 
appreciate a merger: 92.2% were opposed to the idea.80 Next to these reasons of 
the organizational kind, ideological reasons also played a part, for the Army was 
convinced that its added value lay in the fact that it was an organization with an 
explicitly faith-based identity and a merger was unthinkable without the loss of 
this identity.81 With the Genootschap and the KRV striving after a thorough 
collaboration however, and even pressing for a merger within the probation 
field, the PCRV and the Salvation Army now openly turned against them and in 
turn agreed on a certain degree of cooperation between themselves, “with 
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preservation of one’s own goals”.82 In 1970 however, the PCRV changed its 
mind and together with other probation organizations it issued a statement that 
they were willing to cooperate on a close level. The only two Dutch probation 
organizations that did not take part in this new constellation were the CAD, 
which concentrated particularly on those prisoners who had a substance abuse 
problem, and the Salvation Army. In July 1973, this merger resulted in the es-
tablishment of the Stichting Samenwerkende Reclasseringsinstellingen (SRI, 
Association of Cooperative Probation Organizations) and three years later, this 
altered into the Algemene Reclasseringsvereniging (ARV, General Probation 
Society).83 
5.5. The relationship with the government as a counterbalance 
Many of these external pressures were counterbalanced by the personal bonds 
that were formed between the Salvation Army and the Dutch government. In 
1969, public administration scientist R. Crince Le Roy stated in his inaugural 
lecture, that next to the three official branches of government (legislative, judi-
ciary and executive) a fourth branch had developed: the civil servants. This 
fourth branch, or fourth estate, was also recognizable from an international per-
spective, but then consisting of pressure groups and the press. In the Nether-
lands, it was, according to Crince Le Roy, the large group of civil servants that 
formed this ‘shadow power’.84 These civil servants had to interpret and imple-
ment the political decisions that were made by the politicians and were to be 
executed by their employer: the Dutch government. These civil servants were 
not democratically chosen and also often formed a continuous base under the 
often-changing echelon of ministers. Thus, for the Salvation Army’s probation 
department, the importance of maintaining good relations with key persons 
within this fourth branch was obvious. This was abundantly clear by the fact that 
the Army could very well even discern certain periods within this branch, peri-
ods that did not at all cohere with subsequent cabinets but that correlated with 
the Secretaries-General that were responsible for the policy lines on probation 
within the Ministry of Justice: the ‘Veenstra era’ (1912-1939); the ‘Tjaden era’ 
(1945-1968) and the ‘Goedemans era’ (1970-1984).85 
The Salvation Army was very keen on maintaining their own relations with 
these key persons. In general, policy discussions between the ministries and the 
civil society organizations were held on the level of the umbrella organizations, 
like the Genootschap, but because the Salvation Army and the CADs did not 
merge into the newly formed ARV, they formed a kind of troika that had its own 
contacts within the Ministry of Justice. Therefore, in disregard of its relatively 
small size, the Salvation Army’s probation department had seized its place at the 
                                                        
 
82 Heinrich 1995:237; Maris 1991:90 
83 See also Chapter 3.4 
84 Crince Le Roy 1969 
85 Maris 1990:25 
 
 
166 
 
national policy table, which meant in practice that, for instance, Fijn was a regu-
lar guest of Goedemans at the ministry. However, the one-on-one deliberations 
between Goedemans and Fijn were about subsidies and budgets, not about poli-
cy. In such a negotiation, Fijn and Goedemans talked for instance about the 
necessity of qualified personnel.86 Usually Fijn made the suggestion of expand-
ing the staff with another very useful worker, and when Goedemans was con-
vinced of the necessity, he would approve and allocate the budget. Especially on 
the matter of professionalization, this effort to align policy goals between Fijn 
and Goedemans could result in a lucrative collaboration; For example, for work-
ers who were still studying to attain a qualification, a compensation was bar-
gained such that they had a five-day work week that was fully paid for by the 
ministry, but of which they were allowed to use two days for study at the social 
school. In addition, the ministry did have an interest in a well-managed organi-
zation, so when asked for the employment of qualified policy advisors by Fijn, 
Goedemans would usually agree. However, manager of the Army’s sector for 
nursing and elderly homes Jansen, defined this mode of operation as quite the 
opposite: “It was also the case that when you wanted to hire someone, you had 
to ask for approval at the level of the individual. That’s how far government 
influence reached.”87 Even though this mode of operation was also applied by 
other ministries, the employment of qualified personnel could also be enforced 
in a different way, as Jansen recalls:  
 
“There has been a time that when, for example, if a nursing home had a cer-
tain number of patients, the government stipulated the particular number of 
nurses and orderlies that it required. Thus the inspection determined, on the 
basis of the number and sort of patients, which professional groups had to be 
brought in.”88 
 
Because of this close scrutiny by the government, the matter of identity became 
an issue for the Army, for how was it to acquire qualified and Army-allied per-
sonnel? The Army’s probation department reacted by drawing a clear policy line 
on hiring in which identity became a precondition of appointment: “When spo-
ken of competencies, religious aspects are a part of working for the Salvation 
Army. Besides owning the diploma of the Social School, you’d have to be a 
                                                        
 
86 Fijn estimated that during the period of his directorate, the Army’s probation organization formed about 
10% of the total of probation work. The CAD’s 20% and the ARV about 70%: Interview with Fijn, 
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Christian.”89 Of interest is the fact that Fijn hardly remembers an occasion on 
which the ministry withheld its support to a professionalization demand. Any 
reservation on the availability of government support thus actually came from 
the Army itself. In the words of Fijn:  
 
“Well, at some point, you yourself also find it enough, I can still remember 
that. With a staff of seven people: two managers, four executives, and an of-
fice manager, we found ourselves to be big enough. (…) You can also sense 
that this is about the max. We should not push it beyond the limits, that 
would not earn any applause anyway. A sort of self-restraint.”90  
 
Moreover, all new personnel would have to be appointed according to the stipu-
lations of the CAO of their branch. The main stipulation was that they had to be 
officially qualified and this matter would also be a subject of discussion between 
Goedemans and Fijn. In fact, that is exactly why it was possible for people like 
Fijn and his predecessor Hartjes, to be able to hold the management position 
they were in: non-officer but Army manager. It was the Ministry of Justice that 
demanded qualified managers on these posts, qualified by education and not by 
ideology or experience, and within the Army ranks there was apparently no such 
person available who was also an officer at the same time. 91 These personal 
bonds however, could not prevent for the Army’s probation department to be 
confronted with the matter of its identity.  
5.6. Identity as a precondition for existence? 
Even though the probation work of the Salvation Army succeeded in avoiding 
being pressured into a new organizational body, this position of exemption 
evoked a new problem, for as this position was required based on an argument 
of identity, it would now have to prove its worth. What exactly was the added 
value of the Army’s probation work as compared to the other probation organi-
zations? What provided for its raison d’être? The Salvation Army’s probation 
department had always held the view that there were two sorts of probation or-
ganizations: confessional and general organizations, and in its own opinion, the 
Army reckoned itself to being part of the latter group, because it wanted to be 
available for the general public, regardless of which denomination people be-
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longed to.92 From the beginning of the 1970s, the Army struggled with the 
above existential questions – an effort that would from that moment on become 
a structural debate within the realms of the Salvation Army. This debate and the 
struggle for existence would however not be led by Hartjes. In September 1973, 
he was succeeded by his colleague and also lawyer, Fijn. It was Fijn who would 
be commissioned to shepherd the probation department through the troubled 
times that loomed up in the horizon. But first, attention had to be given to anoth-
er quite specific development that resulted from the process of professionaliza-
tion, and that knocked on the Salvation Army’s doors quite suddenly at the be-
ginning of the 1970s: democratic participation. 
6. Democratic participation 
Based on his analysis of community work, social scientist Van Ewijk argues that 
democratic participation is the most abstract form of social participation that an 
individual can strive after.93 Van Ewijk discerns four levels of participation that 
are loosely based on their degree of formality, four phases that are recognizable 
in the activation process of an individual. The most informal level that Van 
Ewijk describes is a personal commitment of individuals in the private sphere. A 
commitment that becomes visible in e.g. providing for care in informal social 
networks like family, friends and neighborhood. The second phase of participa-
tion is the rather hybrid category of “voluntary work and civil society”. This 
type suggests a more abstract level of organization, but still exists on an inter-
section of different private spheres of individuals and groups based on voluntar-
iness. and is thus still quite informal. According to Van Ewijk, a third level of 
participation becomes visible in the labor market, including its preparatory 
phase of education. Participation of individuals in the labor system is regarded 
to be an important activating force for individuals to participate in society in a 
broader sense. This phase of participation is based on a formal relation with the 
organization (employer, school) that provide for this opportunity. The fourth 
level of participation is involvement in the political process or decision-making 
process. This categorization makes the concept of democratic participation the 
most abstract formalistic possibility for citizens to participate.94 
When these phases are used to roughly analyze the development of participa-
tion in the Netherlands, it can be argued that the first two phases were predomi-
nantly visible before World War II, even though participation in the labor mar-
ket and political participation also played an important role in the public debate 
during the first decades of the twentieth century. The emphasis on the latter two, 
however, became evident after World War II, because the combination of 
wealth, secularization, depillarization, professionalization and the political 
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awakening of a new and engaged generation called the baby-boom generation, 
kindled a process during the 1950s and 1960s which can be phrased as the 
‘emancipation of the citizens’. The idea gained ground that the general public 
was being spoon-fed by authorities in all spheres of life - whether it be private, 
work, politics, or arts -, and thus lacked real influence on how to shape these 
matters that they were involved in to their own will.95 During the public debate 
on how participation related to the Dutch welfare state developments, participa-
tion was often associated with the perceived effect of the state intervening in 
private matters. Even though the coming of age of the welfare state could be 
regarded as an era in which, for the first time in history, a society had been able 
to take its fate with regard to welfare into its own hands, an often heard counter-
argument was that because of the myriad of social arrangements, the individual 
was perceived to have lost his or her power to really influence their own living 
circumstances and people had become inactive. Although this counterargument 
was not substantiated with scientific data, the call for the activation of these 
groups by taking part in the labor market or being educated, grew louder during 
the 1970s and 1980s.  
A decade ago, however, this call for emancipation of the people had set the 
path for the so-called participation democracy.96 Provos, students, women – all 
kinds of groups within the Dutch society answered this call and started to claim 
their right to influence and participation. In the political realm, this process re-
sulted in the establishment of new political parties: Democraten’66 (Democrats 
’66, D’66) and Politieke Partij Radikalen (Political Party for Radicals, PPR). 
Additionally, a spirit of renewal was awakened within the political establish-
ment, as the PvdA’s internal New Left movement revealed in 1966. This coun-
termovement aimed to create clarity with regard to the PvdA’s ideals after dec-
ades of political compromises.97 Another argument came from another PvdA 
thinker, Bram Peper. The coming of age of the welfare state had induced a large 
amount of government regulation and influence, and according to Peper, the 
subsequent bureaucratization and institutionalization had widened the gap be-
tween the individual and the state and increased a feeling of impotence amongst 
its citizens. That people had to be ‘activated’ for participation was deemed es-
sential for their well-being.98 So, since the 1960s, two perspectives on participa-
tion became visible: emancipation and activation. 
During the 1960s, the Dutch government increasingly sought for means to 
support this fourth phase of participation as described by Van Ewijk, i.e. the 
general public was to be involved with the decision-making process of social 
policy and also with the determination of relevant policy goals. The people had 
to be invited to shape their own personal environment and in 1967, public partic-
                                                        
 
95 Aerts, et al. 1999:312; Maris 1991:91 
96 De Haan en Duyvendak 2002:101; Aerts, et al. 1999: ch. 9, par.10. 
97 Aerts, et al. 1999:297-306 
98 Peper 1972:233. Compare with Putnam 2000, and Van Ewijk 2010:94-95 
 
 
170 
 
ipation by democratization became an official policy goal.99 One of the ways in 
which this would occur, was to increase employee participation in organizations, 
for this was a kind of democratic influence on organizational policy that would 
not only increase the accountability of the managers to the workers, but would 
also bind the employees to their organization. Of course, in this era of mistrust 
towards many of the state-initiated activities, this participation model of em-
ployee influence induced critique. For instance, social-democrat thinker Paul 
Kalma regarded this model not so much as a participation model, but much more 
as a pacification model. According to him, this binding of the employee to the 
organization was meant to win over the workers by offering them a stake in the 
power.100 Regardless of these opponents, however, the new emphasis in gov-
ernment policy on democratization within organizations was patently obvious 
and as a result, in 1971 the renewed Works Councils Act was adopted by the 
parliament. 
6.1. Works Councils Act 
The original Works Councils Act was already established in 1950, though in a 
rudimentary form. Before World War II, employee participation on the level of 
the organization had only sporadically been allowed in a few isolated cases, 
such as, for example, the yeast and alcohol factory Van Marken in Delft and the 
Stork machine factory in Hengelo. On a collective level however, participation 
in the Netherlands had made further development. Already in 1927, the Col-
lectieve Arbeidsovereenkomst (CAO, Collective Work Agreement Act) was 
adopted. After World War II the concept of bedrijfsraden (corporate councils), 
in which both the employee and the employer were represented, came into fash-
ion, and also the idea of collaboration between private organizations (like un-
ions) with public representatives of the government, was also codified in 1950 in 
the Wet op de Bedrijfsorganisatie (Wbo, Dutch Industrial Organisation Act). 
Surfing the waves of collectiveness that supported the reconstruction efforts 
during the postwar decade, employee participation was solidified on a more 
general level into the Stichting van de Arbeid (Foundation of Work) in 1945, a 
deliberative body of both employers and employees providing the national gov-
ernment with advice. Additionally in 1950, the Sociaal-Economische Raad 
(SER, Social and Economic Council) embodied a first move into the direction of 
collective consultation on the level of subsequent industrial and business sectors. 
In the same year, participation on organizational level was legally guaranteed 
in the Wet op Ondernemingsraden (WOR, Works Councils Act) making works 
councils obligatory for organizations within the private sector. In fact though, 
these employees would not have much say in policy matters. The management 
was in charge and the works council only had non-binding advisory rights. To-
gether with the management, this works council strove after the monistic aim of 
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the well-being of the organization, as the council was not yet a real exponent of 
the well-being of the employees.  
During the 1960s, the call for participation and democratization also rekin-
dled the discussion on this limited role of the works council. As a result, labor 
unions like the CNV provided for coaching classes for works council members, 
and in 1971, the Law on Works Councils was adjusted. Now the rights of the 
employees became more central to its focus on the establishment of a right to 
consent to social policy, and the legal position of the council’s members was 
secured. The most important change in the role of the works councils was that 
they acted on behalf of the employees and consequently the relation between the 
councils and the organization was able to alter from monistic into a more dualis-
tic relation. This revision also boosted the number of works councils within 
organizations, even though they were hardly in working order yet.101 
6.2. Democratic participation and civil society  
That the employee involvement in the decision-making processes within organi-
zations was not always in good working order, was also confirmed by the Knel-
puntennota of 1974.102 Especially in the case of civil society organizations, the 
people that these organizations were to represent, still hardly possessed any 
influence. An influence that was regarded to be vital, for in order to maintain 
their social qui vive, these organizations were quite dependant on their grass-
roots. This idea however, was not shared by some of these organizations, where 
as a result of archaic conceptions of hierarchical management structures, thor-
ough internal democratization was blocked more than once. According to the 
Knelpuntennota, the general perception was that these civil society organizations 
had become undemocratic and therefore unrepresentative, drifting away from 
their original grassroots supporters, and in order to make concrete suggestions 
for improvement of the “democratic, effective and efficient functioning of sub-
sidized institutions”, Minister of CRM, Van Doorn, appointed in July 1974 a 
committee under the direction of lawyer F.H. van der Burg. 
Fields of tension 
The findings of this Committee-Van der Burg were presented three years later, 
in March 1977. First of all, the committee stated that the interesting combination 
of the concepts of ‘democracy’ and ‘doelmatigheid’ in their assignment, made 
the possibilities for an overall advice very complex.103 The committee tried to 
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find their position between the two main but very divergent ideas on the relation 
between these concepts. The first position being the idea that democracy always 
supported effectivity. This idea seemed to make democratization a goal in its 
own. The other position was that democratization intrinsically meant inefficien-
cy, because of the measure of deliberation that characterized the concept. The 
committee stated that examples of these extremes could be found throughout the 
work field, that consisted of these subsidized organizations. For example, in the 
area of community work that had been developing since the 1950s, the direct 
involvement of the clients seemed to secure their influence in shaping the goals 
and means of the work, but organizations in other areas were functioning rather 
like regular companies in their provision of services. In those kinds of organiza-
tions, democracy might indeed have its negative effects on efficiency, so, as the 
committee stated: 
 
“The matter of democratization is, in its relation to effectivity and efficiency, 
different, for example, for a theatre company, than for an institution for the 
mentally handicapped; different for a housing corporation than for a hospi-
tal.”104 
 
Therefore, in its effort to advise the entire group of subsidized organizations, the 
committee decided to focus on separate sectors, relevant subjects, available 
instruments and on the various stakeholders. Stemming from its analysis of the 
concrete problems with democratization that were present within the organiza-
tions, the committee listed the following three fields of tension: 
1) The mission statements in the statutes of many of these organizations were 
broadly formulated and were done so in general terms. Any derived policy line 
could thus become equally vague, creating tensions between the managers and 
the professionals on how to phrase and implement these missions.105 
2) Because of their high qualifications, professionals tended to stipulate poli-
cy directions and form subsequent activities and they had thus become quite 
autonomous. Based on their education, these professionals were also inclined to 
“strongly orientate themselves (…) towards the prevailing standards that apply 
to their profession”. Since the 1960s, these values were increasingly being per-
ceived as politically colored and openly critical of authority. This development 
towards autonomy and criticism was combined with a lack of an official descrip-
tion of their formal competences and authority, and the lack of an official plat-
form by means of which these professionals could exert their influence on the 
organizational processes, thereby increasing this tension. Therefore, from the 
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side of the professional, the acceptance of any supervision by managers became 
a problem, and from the side of management, this attitude could only be coun-
tered by “referral to the subordinate position of the employees.”106 This often 
implicit but strongly felt display of power could be interpreted as a demonstra-
tion of impotence because, as the committee stated, from this lack of formal 
description of competences and authority, the coordinating and stimulating ef-
forts of these managers were often interpreted as the mere use of power. Inter-
estingly, the committee also mentioned that part of this tension between the 
professional and the manager could be pinpointed to the difference in age be-
tween the young professionals and the long-term managers. In this light, the call 
for more influence of this younger generation was perfectly in line with the anti-
authoritarian attitude that related to what had been acknowledged as the ‘genera-
tion gap’.107 
3) Another group that formed a relevant stakeholder to the committee was 
that of the clients, and to a growing extent, the relation between the professional 
and the client seemed to be based on divergent values. The client wanted a per-
sonal approach from a committed professional. The professional was of course 
willing to provide for this, but that might go against the also very much needed 
methodological approach to the sizeable caseload that he or she had become 
responsible for. In return, the client was asked to trust the capabilities of these 
professionals, and when the client did not or could not do so because of the lack 
of a personal approach, this might be misinterpreted by the professional as ob-
struction. The problems that resulted from these divergent values had no official 
organizational structure that could be used as the basis for arriving at a solution, 
and the clients lacked any formal influence on this process.108 
Basic assumptions and preconditions 
In their preparations for advice on these problems, the committee acknowledged 
to be basically in line with the ideas of sociologist Van Doorn who stated that 
the interest of the three main stakeholders had to be promoted: the general pub-
lic, for they were paying for these services; the clients because of their depend-
ency on these organizations; and the employees, because they did the actual 
work.109 Additionally, the committee acknowledged that the issue of democrati-
zation might also very well have its effect on the identity of the organizations. 
Already in many subsidy arrangements, a provision was made that the services 
of the organizations were to be offered to everyone without any distinction be-
tween race, religion or social status. On the other hand, the committee agreed 
that in the Dutch pluralist society these organizations had to be able “to show 
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their own special character and that they do not have to become colorless and 
neutral because of the subsidies.”110 The committee however, also saw that to a 
growing extent, organizations were populated by people that had become distant 
to the organizational values, but that did not mean that these people were to be 
excluded from shaping their organization. When it came to exertion of influence 
on certain organizational processes like decision-making or policy preparation, 
no group was allowed to be slighted. There was however, according to the 
committee, an exceptional position with regard to the hiring policy and the ap-
pointment of people for key positions within the organization. The committee 
regarded this as a prerequisite for an organization to safeguard its own identity 
and these possibilities were not to be eroded by any measure of democratization. 
Ultimately, for those organizations for which no satisfactory solution could be 
found that would do justice to both the requirement of democratization and the 
preservation of their identity, democratization was of overriding importance, 
according to the Committee-van der Burg.111 
A suggested policy line 
The committee concluded that in case of democratic participation within subsi-
dized organizations, there were too many variables to create one all-
encompassing Act. Therefore, different proposals were made for all relevant 
sectors. In addition, the possibility to make amendments to already existing 
legislation was worked out and it was suggested that these proposals could very 
well be enforced by means of the subsidy arrangements. The main themes in 
these policy proposals were: distribution of responsibilities and power over 
management and professionals; broadening of the support of management in the 
organization; improvement of transparency of different processes for all stake-
holders; creation of councils in which all stakeholders (clients, general public, 
employees) would be able to give relevant input; and the creation of a supervis-
ing authority.112 
The committee also reacted on two other related issues. During 1976, the 
Works Councils Act had been revised once more, and again the dualistic nature 
of this instrument of participation was strengthened. Now, also a works council 
was obligatory for every organization that had 100 or more salaried employees. 
According to the committee, this provided for enough possibilities for workers 
to participate.113 Additionally, the matter of legal incorporation was addressed, 
for a part of the assignment of the Committee-Van der Burg consisted of an 
assessment of which legal form suited these subsidized organizations best, with 
regard to the possibilities for democratization. The committee concluded that all 
suggested proposals suited the legal forms of foundation and association very 
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well, so no alterations of Book 2 of the New Civil Code were deemed necessary. 
Nevertheless, all organizations were obliged to include in their statutes or arti-
cles of association, a description of how they organized democratic participa-
tion.114  
After the presentation of the report of the Committee-Van der Burg, the 
Dutch government decided on the matter by assigning another committee to 
draw up a draft Act based on the presented advice.115 The result of this effort 
was the Wetsontwerp Democratisch Functioneren van gesubsidieerde In-
stellingen (WDFI, Bill on Democratic Functioning of Subsidized Institutions). 
Initially, the report of the Committee-Van der Burg had escaped from the Ar-
my’s attention, but with the announcement of its derived WDFI-Bill, the Army 
command started to show a certain amount of interest. In October 1984 the sug-
gestion was made to organize a study day on the report of the Committee-Van 
der Burg, but even though this idea was approved of, it did not seem quite as 
urgent, because it made way for a more short-term matter in February 1985.116 
Nevertheless, one year later, in February 1986, the Army again put the Bill on 
its agenda. Now, the decision of the Amsterdam municipality to test its subsidy-
policy against the proposed Bill, urged the Army to also take the Bill into con-
sideration.117 Nevertheless, because of a cabinet change in 1986, this Bill never 
made it through the parliament. It took until the mid-90s before two derived 
Bills were adopted by the Dutch parliament to codify democratic say (Wet 
medezeggenschap cliënten zorginstellingen, 1996) and the right of complaint 
(Wet klachtrecht cliënten zorgsector, 1995). With regard to Van Ewijk’s phasing 
of the public participation process, during the 1970s the fourth phase of partici-
pation had presented itself to the full. This phase however, would cause a lot of 
tension for civil society organizations with a strong sense of identity, like the 
Salvation Army. 
7. “Water and fire": Salvation Army and democratic participa-
tion 
Democratic participation had always been at odds with the management culture 
of the hierarchically organized Salvation Army. Nevertheless, the autocratic 
constellation of a one-headed leadership did not remain undisputed within Army 
ranks as already during the 1920s, this matter of democratic influence stirred up 
quite some trouble. Gustaaf Maste, the first manager (1906-1921) of the Salva-
tion Army’s social work activities for men, had more than once suggested to the 
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Army command that leading officers of the social work department should have 
at least some say in whether or not to start up new social aid activities and also 
in the hiring policy of this social work department. In support of his plea, Maste 
stated that he had positive experiences with democratic participation, especially 
because within some of the probation brigades this was already a common prac-
tice. The Army’s probation department was once even described as “a democrat-
ic flower in an autocratic garden”.118 The Army command however, would not 
hear of this request for democratization. Not even when Maste threatened to 
resign and to start his own Salvation Army organization. And indeed, due to a 
combination with other unrewarding experiences that he endured with the Ar-
my’s command in the Netherlands and the IHQ, Maste decided in 1921 to se-
cede and actually start a new organization: the Dutch Salvation Army.119 So, at 
the beginning of the twentieth century, the Salvation Army was not quite ready 
for large-scale democratization. 
7.1. A monastery and its brewery  
The call for democratic participation during the 1970s would cause internal 
commotion again. The Salvation Army had always been averse to any external 
influence and also the works councils were perceived as such an external influ-
ence, for even though they were manned by own employees, it was rather un-
thinkable for the Army command to give up control over its own organization, 
to whatever be the extent.120 Chief-secretary Schurink characterized the possibil-
ity of works councils within the Salvation Army organizational structure as in-
compatible as “water and fire”.121 Schurink and the Salvation Army’s public 
relations officer Jan Filius recapitulated the internal difficulties with democratic 
participation: “In real terms, the works council cannot surpass chit-chat on cof-
fee and tea. That will get you nowhere.”122 The employee representatives were 
regarded to be ill-informed on policy issues, which made them ill-qualified as 
interlocutors in the opinion of the Army command. On the other hand, this al-
leged deficiency could however also be very much to the Army’s advantage, as 
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the authors concluded: “But more than chit-chat on coffee and tea however was 
hardly the intention.”123 
It was not only the supposed lack of knowledge of the workers that bothered 
the spokespersons. It was a much more fundamental matter, a matter of identity. 
The Works Councils Act required that the council consisted of employees. But 
within the staffing structure of the Salvation Army, those that were considered 
the bearers of the Salvation Army identity, the officers, were not employed by 
contract and thus not regarded as regular employees. They also did not partici-
pate in collective labor agreements (CAOs), nor were they entitled to govern-
ment retirement pay, as for example many of the probation workers were. Be-
cause of this position, officers basically lacked the influence that external em-
ployees actually did possess by law. The problem was chalked out strikingly by 
Filius: 
 
“It is like a monastery that has its own brewery and the workers of this brew-
ery want to take part in deciding on the education of the priests at the semi-
nary. They surely are no adequate discussion partners.”124 
 
These examples of rhetoric show that the Army was more than reluctant to pro-
vide for the opportunity for works councils. Viewed from the perspective of 
identity however, this attitude actually was quite understandable, for their fear of 
external influence on the internal identity did not seem to be without cause. The 
process of professionalization had actually changed the Army’s work force with-
in the social work sectors. By 1980, the Salvation Army had 317 officers, of 
which most were part of the corps work or retired. About 70 officers were work-
ing in the government sponsored social work sectors and usually held manageri-
al functions. These 70 officers had to cooperate with about 1200 employees.125 
With the officer being the personification of the organization’s character, this 
part of the Army’s identity had been watered down to a ratio of 1:17, and thus it 
was not very off the mark to assume that the acceptance of democratic influence 
of these new professionals, who were not raised in the Army tradition, might 
lead to a quite different view on various subjects that touched directly on the 
Army’s identity. More concretely, when the works councils would receive the 
power to (dis)approve of the organizational budget and of proposed policy lines, 
the Army command would have no control over the Army’s identity, for he who 
controls the flow of funds, controls a large part of an organization’s identity, 
especially when this social work organization also was a church.126 In the worst 
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case, these new non-Army professionals might even start to interfere with reli-
gious principles that the Army held!127  
At some occasions, this fear was actually confirmed. When during a game 
show on the Dutch national television one of the contestants stated that he 
worked for the Salvation Army probation unit, the quizmaster assumed that this 
meant that the contestant also believed in God. The man however answered: 
“No, I don’t believe in anything.”128 This was frowned upon by the whole Sal-
vation Army leadership, but also within the probation department this was expe-
rienced as rather startling. The probation department had by then, already creat-
ed a system of scrutiny on whether or not an applicant adhered to religion and 
the mission of the Army. If he did not, he would not be hired. This incident 
opened a discussion on creating a hiring policy that was in line with the subsidy 
stipulations on the one hand, but that also would do justice to the Army’s identi-
ty on the other. So, to what extent was the Army able to influence this relation-
ship? 
7.2. The Army’s effort to obstruct democratic influence 
Quite in line with these developments of the Army’s hiring policy, the Army 
leadership tried to do everything within its power to prevent democratic partici-
pation. So it was clear that the Salvation Army leadership did not want works 
councils, and additionally, based on its legal position as a church, the Army 
command was under the impression that it was not obliged to have works coun-
cils at all. In the years following the 1971 adjustment of the Works Councils 
Act, the Salvation Army leadership aimed for release from the obligation to 
install works councils by following the strategy of attaining formal dispensation 
from the Dutch government. A strategy that was quite successful because the 
government soon approved . This obstruction of the external demand for partici-
pation however, soon faced the democratic powers that were alive in the proba-
tion department. As stated above, the Salvation Army probation department had 
had some experience with democratic expression within its organization by 
means of the influence of workers in its brigades. In 1970, it went a step further 
and the department willfully decided to formalize this democratic participation 
in a workers committee and a committee of advice.129 The workers committee 
formed a deliberative body for representatives of the probation workers and a 
delegation of this committee conferred with their employer in the committee of 
advice. Even though the workers did not have very much influence, they had 
achieved an acting role in the consultative structure.130  
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Soon they also proved to be ready for battle – internally. For when the work-
ers committee got wind of the dispensation to install works councils, it protested 
heavily. First this protest was contained within the committee of advice, but 
when this proved to be fruitlessly, the workers commission, supported by the 
workers union CNV, turned directly to the Ministry of Social Affairs. They 
informed the minister about the fact that the Salvation Army actually employed 
many salaried workers and thus had to be regarded as a regular labor organiza-
tion, meaning that the Army had to comply with the Works Councils Act. The 
workers committee pleaded for discontinuance of the Army’s exemption. The 
argumentation was favorably received and the minister acted accordingly, but 
now the Army’s leadership was unpleasantly surprised and lodged various ap-
peals on this suspension of the dispensation, though without lasting effect. On 
May 26, 1978 the judicial department of the Raad van State (Council of State) 
ruled that because the Salvation Army had more than 100 employees it was a 
labor organization and consequently had to comply with Works Councils Act 
and allow works councils to be formed.131 Remarkably, the Raad was not at all 
sensitive for the Army’s argument that it was a church. The legal form of the 
organization apparently did not apply when the organization was also an em-
ployer. In the end, the initial fears of the Army command had become reality: 
the door was officially left open for what they experienced as a direct external 
influence on the Army’s identity, and what is more, this episode had also 
brought something else to the light; a budding internal struggle between the 
Army’s command and the probation department had come into view. 
7.3. Alienation of the probation department 
The tension between the Army and its probation department rooted from the 
prewar era. The probation work was the first type of social work that had en-
tered into a structural relationship with the Dutch government by submission to 
the Reclasseringsregeling in return for financial support. Even though it was not 
prohibited, this relationship was looked at by the Army command with Argus’ 
eyes, as the cooperation with other probation organizations and the Ministry of 
Justice would soon become very close. The second oddity in relation to the pro-
bation department was the commencing democratization within the department, 
a point that Maste tried to bring to the attention of the Army commands too, but 
without much success. Therefore, by the beginning of World War II, the proba-
tion department had already displayed a hint of its non-conformist nature to-
wards the Army’s command. 
Directly after World War II, the matter of professionalization revived this 
tension. In 1950, the probation work was still embedded in the local corps and 
the national headquarters, but during the following decades, the department 
underwent a process of detachment. Until the end of the decade, the central bu-
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reau of the probation work was situated in the same building as the Dutch Salva-
tion Army’s Head Quarters in Amsterdam. In 1960 however, it moved out and 
in 1963, an even more radical change was made: the probation work formed its 
own department and was no longer a part of the social work department.132 
Whether or not this internal branching off was a requirement from the Ministry 
of Justice is hard to retrieve from the available sources on this matter, but the 
fact that against all odds a non-officer lawyer like Hartjes became the manager 
of this new department can actually be related to the government demands for 
professionalization. However, at the same time that this organizational dissocia-
tion took place, the Commander Palstra showed the firm intention of not allow-
ing the mutual bonds to loosen. He actually installed an internal advisory board, 
the Council on Probation Affairs, consisting of the high-ranking staff of the 
Salvation Army including the manager of the probation department. This coun-
cil would however be dissolved in 1970 when another deliberative organ was 
created, the Coördinatieraad Bestuurders (Coordinating Council of Managers). 
In addition, the probation work force was subject to thorough professionali-
zation, as we have seen above. The government overtly demanded further pro-
fessionalization, and by incorporating these requirements in the subsidy ar-
rangements that the Army’s probation department had grown dependent on, the 
measure of government interference with the probation work must have been 
quite unbearable for the Army’s command. The way that the Ministry of Justice 
seemed to decide who to hire and who not, speaks volumes, and moreover, 
many of the probation employees were very much alike salaried public servants 
- a position that they were actually quite proud of - and not so much vocational 
volunteers.133 Even though that should not make any difference in a legal sense, 
this element seemed to have especially made a huge contribution to the concep-
tualization of mutual images between the probation workers, other Salvation 
Army people and the corps.134 In general, according to former key persons, the 
probation department was regarded as the odd one out by both the Army leader-
ship and the corps.135 The image of the department was that it consisted of state 
hired workers, who were highly educated and often adhered to values like dem-
ocratic influence and anti-authoritarianism. 
7.4. Cracks in the indivisible coin? 
Viewed from the perspective of the corps, this image was quite understandable. 
The emphasis on quality had provoked a process of professionalization, decen-
tralization and reorganization of social work. The Salvation Army leadership 
however, had actively prevented the corps from being a part of this process. 
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Except for improving the training of the officers, the corps were kept aloof from 
every form of externally motivated professionalization, for this would automati-
cally mean government influence.136 In the case of the corps, this was unac-
ceptable to the Army command. Additionally, before the probation workers 
were state-salaried, they were embedded in the corps and so they might very 
well have been a speaking example of how social and religious work could be 
successfully unified. Therefore, with the probation department becoming inde-
pendent from the corps, this symbiotic unity began to show some cracks, further 
inciting the fear of loss of identity. The exodus of the volunteers in 1974 en-
hanced this fear, because now also the vocational volunteer was put aside, and 
with it, the connection with the corps. Therefore, when viewed from the per-
spective of the corps, the probation department seemed to have steered away 
from the Army’s core and had contributed to the watering down of the Army’s 
identity. 
Also, in the eyes of the Army command, the probation department could very 
well be regarded as a troublemaker. For one, the probation department had posi-
tioned itself as a structural partner to the Ministry of Justice with a consequence 
of having became (mutually) dependent. Even when the pressure from the gov-
ernment for merger during the 1970s had made it vividly clear that this position 
was quite a threat to its autonomy, the probation department chose to stay close 
to the ministry. The legitimization for this strategy was in line with the anti-
authoritarian spirit of the 1960s: instead of being on the leash of the government, 
it now wanted to act as “a counterforce” and “humanize” the “indifferent and 
cold” probation system.137 This attitude of social action and reformation that the 
probation department revealed during the 1970s echoed a distant memory of 
what the Salvation Army stood for in the era of the nineteenth century East-
London: a shield for the weak and poor, guarding them against the miseries that 
were inflicted on them by the many problems of industrialization and by a ne-
glecting government but according to Fijn, during the twentieth century the 
Army had gained too much to lose, and had become reluctant to overtly pressure 
the government, as the probation department seemed to want to do now. 138 This 
renewed call for social action seemed to separate their paths.  
The matter of work field positioning was another issue that confronted the 
Army command with the exceptionality of the probation department. Being part 
of a confined judicial system with its own directives and rules, and having em-
ployees that were paid based on the CAO-stipulations including pension plans, 
made the probation department look like a mere administrative organ of the 
Dutch government. Some even began to ask how much a part of the ‘Salvation 
Army’ the probation department actually was and whether it should still be in-
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corporated in the Army structure.139 It was increasingly regarded as a separate 
organization, an island, within an organization.140 In addition, the struggle for 
democratic participation during the 1970s did confirm the controversial position 
that the probation department was in. Fijn characterized the way the Army 
command frowned upon him as the manager of the probation department as 
follows:  
 
“You are those troublemaking people who want to hand the Salvation Army 
over to the power of the employees!”141 
 
At the brink of his departure as manager of the probation department in 1973, 
Hartjes acknowledged that the gap between the autonomous and heterogenic 
probation department and the rest of the Salvation Army had become quite sig-
nificant. The dual loyalty of the department towards the probation work field 
and the Salvation Army, combined with a growing influx of external profession-
als seemed to have caused the mutual bonds to loosen.142 The above-sketched 
causes of this development would most probably not alter in the near future. So 
the task that Hartjes’ successor, Fijn, was confronted with seemed quite impos-
sible. With a futuristic view, however, the probation department sought for pos-
sibilities to strengthen its bonds with its mother-organization without severing 
the bonds with the work field, including the ministry. In the visionary policy 
proposal called Forensia 2000, a research group within the Army’s probation 
department saw good opportunities to improve the relationship between the 
probation work and the Salvation Army by creating a coherent overall policy for 
all social services that the Army provided. However, this was still a suggestion 
that was made way too early.143 Over all, the probation department seemed to be 
ahead in time compared with the rest of the Salvation Army for about 30 years. 
The fear of the Army command had to a certain extent come true: the main-
spring of the probation department was altered from being ideological towards 
that of professionalization.144 It would actually take until the mid-1980s for the 
two organizational entities to find each other once again, as we shall see in the 
next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6. REORGANIZATION OF IDENTITY (1980-1990) 
1. Interdependency v. identity 
The developments with regard to the Salvation Army that are described in the 
preceding chapters flow together during the 1980s. In the decades before the 
1980s, the matters of (inter)dependency, the Army’s legal identity and its mod-
ernization process largely influenced its relationship with the government, and at 
the same time, increasingly seemed to shape the Army’s process of identity. 
During the 1980s, these three processes would put the Salvation Army before 
fundamental dilemmas that forced it to make difficult choices with regard to its 
identity. Also, the Salvation Army had encountered the new currents of econo-
mization and neo-liberalization. In fact, its financial report of 1986 made up the 
balance.1 With its centennial coming up in 1987, the Army took the opportunity 
to call attention to its basic principles and how they translated into the daily 
work and had served to form its history as a faith-based social service provider.2 
That this account needed more than just financial figures had become obvious: 
 
“Our targets are not primarily of an economic nature, like companies. The 
measure to which we accomplish our goals of social care and evangelization 
is not deducible from an annual financial report. For that purpose an activity 
report is more suitable.”3  
 
This however did not mean that the Salvation Army would not provide for clear 
information on the financial status of its social and health care activities and the 
organization itself. In 1986, the Army had 1800 active workers, of which 1500 
were external employees and 300 were officers. This workforce was flanked by 
8500 vocational volunteer (soldiers and adherents) who staffed the 92 corps 
nationwide.4 The annual costs of the social services had amounted to 
fl.76,854,000, and the report stated with a certain amount of pride that, “The 
costs of the social services and health care activities are almost entirely subsi-
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dized by the state.”5 The Army had become quite comfortable with its position 
as a partner in the social policy system, but for how long? 
1.1. Interdependency: pointing out the problems  
As described in Chapter 3, the Army had developed an interesting strategy of 
anticipatory action towards its subsidizers. At the same time, the Army had 
grown accustomed to a certain amount of government support and this habitua-
tion resulted in a somewhat calculating approach to the possibility of new fund-
ing. During the 1980s, this approach seemed to have developed into a subtle but 
quite full-fledged strategy: innovation. A strategy that also fitted very well with 
the Army’s position as an ‘advanced guard’. The Army was well known for its 
ability to spot newly developed social problems because it was present at all 
levels of society, and especially with, in the words of the Army, those who have 
no helper. Whenever the Army detected a new social problem, its first step was 
to start up a social service that addressed this problem because there was a clear 
need for it. The initial costs of these activities were paid for by the Army itself, 
through fundraising efforts or by the corps. But when these activities proved to 
meet a structural demand, the costs would become more pressing on the limited 
Army budget. In such a case, the need for such services would be presented to 
the relevant ministry in order to support the argument that a more structural 
financial support was needed than what the Army could supply. This strategy of 
anticipatory action made it possible for the Army to be innovative by developing 
different social services, and when a social service seemed successful, the Army 
was very well able to tap new sources of subsidies.6 As an example, in 1986 the 
Army had opened a new home for various groups (homeless, unwed mothers, 
etc.) in the rural province of Drenthe because the area lacked such an accommo-
dation. The high occupancy rates underlined its local relevance and the only 
downside of this project was that because the Ministry of WVC “has [had] not 
yet made financial support available”, it had to be financed by the Army itself. 7 
However, the addition of ‘not yet’ in this statement, reveals that the Army antic-
ipated the ministry to change its mind at some point. 
On another level, the Salvation Army had clearly learned from its experience 
with the Dutch government. Some of the Army’s activities were intentionally 
kept aloof from governmental support. The alcohol detox-center De Wending in 
Apeldoorn was such a project. Everybody was welcome at De Wending to kick 
their alcohol addiction, regardless of their religious background, and the project 
was financed solely out of the Army’s own resources, though motivated by a 
clear goal: 
 
                                                        
 
5 Met hart en hand:31; “De kosten van het welzijnwerk en de gezondheidszorg worden bijna geheel door 
de staat gesubsidieerd.” Van zeep, soep en redding tot evangelisch geinspireerd maatschappelijk werk:37 
6 Coördinatieraad (minutes), January 1988 
7 Met hart en hand:6 
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“The project (…) is purposely kept aloof from subsidies in order to safeguard 
freedom of action. ‘De Wending’ wants to preserve a Christian character and 
considers the way towards God a way out for the alcoholic. A way out that is 
otherwise only indicated, but is by no means obligatory.”8 
 
This case shows that the Army was very well aware of what the effect of being a 
valued partner in the social policy system could mean. The suggestion that some 
types of work had to be protected against the possible erosion of intrinsic values 
implied that the Salvation Army knew very well what it was up against when it 
dealt with the government.  
The government on the other hand, also knew what it was dealing with, as 
the Salvation Army’s nationwide availability and service history had made it a 
valued partner. This was once again confirmed when during the harsh winter of 
1986, the Amsterdam municipality allocated a large extra subsidy to the local 
Goodwill Center in order to ensure the provision of night shelters and food. The 
council had no choice other than to allocate the money to the Army for: “The 
Salvation Army was the only organization that had the apparatus (for dealing 
with this problem) at its disposal.”9 Nevertheless, the financial situation of the 
1980s forced the Dutch government to make drastic cutbacks, also with regard 
to the Salvation Army. Not only did the government-oriented probation depart-
ment have to downsize, but also other parts of the Army’s social services suf-
fered financial hardship.10 The Amsterdam elderly home De Goodwillburgh 
started to show a lack of occupancy and its residents were less able to pay for 
the services.11 The Army’s community work also experienced rough times. Be-
cause of the ongoing cutbacks, its financial base had become weak and the num-
ber of employees had decreased. Additionally, even though most of the Army’s 
youth centers seemed to be able to keep their heads above water, for Ons Honk 
in Utrecht things took a turn for the worse, as will be elaborated further in para-
graph 1.3. And as a worrying confirmation of the difficulty of the times, the 
Army’s corps reported a growing number of homeless people to which they 
made a bed and a bath available.12 So, especially in terms of its innovative reflex 
to social evils, the Army was a welcome partner to the government. On the other 
hand, the Army was not spared when cutbacks and reorganizations were deemed 
necessary, and once again, it was painfully confronted with its dependency on 
government resources. With regard to decentralization, the difficulty of this 
position also became tentative on a local level. 
                                                        
 
8 “Het project wordt geheel uit eigen middelen van het Leger des Heils gefinancieerd en is doelbewust 
buiten de subsidies gehouden om vrijheid van handelen te waarborgen. ‘De Wending’ wil namelijk een 
christelijk karakter handhaven en beschouwt de weg tot God als een uitweg voor de alcoholverslaafde. 
Een uitweg die overigens slechts aangeduid wordt en zeker geen verplichte route is.” Met hart en hand:6 
9 “(…) omdat het LdH de enige organisatie was die het apparaat al had.” Met hart en hand:9 
10 Idem:11 
11 Idem:10 
12 Idem:15-16 
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1.2. Identity: the Amsterdam omen 
Amsterdam became the first so-called covenant city that shaped its social policy 
to suit its decentralization efforts.13 The underlying idea of the Amsterdam view 
on decentralization was that the social welfare services had to be organized in 
regions. This meant that a social service organization was allocated a certain 
part of the Amsterdam region to which it was to offer (and had to restrict) its 
services. This policy would become effective starting 1985 and the municipality 
of Amsterdam had already started to take relevant measures during the prepara-
tory years. 
 
Identity as a problem 
In line with these preparations, in April 1984 the Salvation Army Goodwill Cen-
ter in Amsterdam was confronted with having to reorganize its homecare activi-
ties in Amsterdam.14 From its start, the Army’s Goodwill Center had resided in 
a specific area in Amsterdam: the prostitution zone in the inner city. Over time, 
however, it had developed into a sizeable social work organization that provided 
for shelters for the homeless, women and elderly on a very local level. Addition-
ally, it also provided for social work and homecare services throughout Amster-
dam. In 1982, the Goodwill Center employed 130 professionals.15 Because of 
the new policy responsibility and the necessity to make financial cutbacks - both 
a result of decentralization - the Amsterdam municipality had taken up the plan 
to restructure the available homecare services from a city-wide service into dif-
ferent “uniform care districts”. This meant that each social service provider 
would become responsible for one particular district alone.16 At first glance, this 
arrangement might seemed to have offered security to the Army’s Goodwill 
Center because the actual size of the homecare work of the Army in Amsterdam 
was relatively small. It provided for just 111,000 hours of care out of a total of 
4.5 million hours (= 2,5%) that the Army served within the Amsterdam area.17 
The assessment of this situation, done by the manager of the Homecare and 
Goodwill Department, Wim van der Harst, was that probably “the inclination 
will exist to allocate its hours to another larger organization” and the Army 
would have to leave the field.18 The same development was expected in the area 
of homeless care and this posed a major problem for the Army, because the total 
amount of subsidy for homeless care in Amsterdam amounted to about 
fl.7,500,000 annually.19 Additionally, the idea that the Army would have to 
                                                        
 
13 The term ‘covenant city’ is described in Chapter 2.4.3. 
14 Coördinatieraad (minutes) April 1984:3 
15 Harm en Polman 1982:39  
16 Besluit nr. 634 “Aangaan subsidierelatie met de Amsterdamse instellingen voor gezinsverzorging.” 
Gemeenteblad Amsterdam, April 8, 1986 
17 Coördinatieraad (minutes), November 1984 
18 “De neiging zal bestaan haar uren onder te brengen bij een grotere instelling.” Coördinatieraad (minu-
tes), November 1984:6 
19 Coördinatieraad (minutes), November 1984 
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retrench and confine its services to a certain geographical area, was incompati-
ble with the Army’s ambition to reach as many people as possible. 
This was not the end of it however. During 1984, it had become clear that the 
Amsterdam municipality also wanted to make sure that the organizations that 
opted to participate as social service providers in the local area, would need to 
meet the subsidy requirements. In the case of the Salvation Army, this matter 
was taken very seriously as the municipality announced a debate in the city 
council on the participation of the Army as a religious organization in the field 
of social work. Central to the debate was the issue of the Army’s legal position, 
because as a church the Salvation Army would not be eligible for subsidies. 
Therefore, the Amsterdam municipality asked the Army to submit its statutes. 
When this matter reached the Army command, Van der Harst emphasized that: 
“For the financing of the social work, the legal form must be made clear 
soon.”20 This was not the only issue at hand however, for the Amsterdam mu-
nicipality also wanted to check “whether or not these organizations acted against 
the regulations that the Amsterdam municipality agreed on, e.g. regarding the 
issues of democratization and gay-emancipation”.21  
Now, together with the problems of decentralization and the Army’s legal 
status, these matters of internal democratization and ethical views completed the 
areas of tension that the Army had to take into account, while operating in Am-
sterdam. One of the central issues that was influenced by these different tension 
fields was that of the Army’s legal identity, as became clear when three ques-
tions presented themselves to the Army: What are we? What do we want to be? 
And what can we be? Questions that formed the base for elaborate discussions 
in the Salvation Army Coördinatieraad. This coordinating council consisted of 
the executive managers of the various social services of the Army in combina-
tion with the Army’s financial council (i.c. TC, CS and FS). This meant that by 
means of the coordinating council, all information lines from the various de-
partments converged into one deliberative body. This structure facilitated a 
somewhat reflective debate on possible national Army approaches on different 
policy subjects and it first and foremost aimed to advise the TC on its policy 
decisions.22 While discussing the Amsterdam developments in the coordinating 
council, Van der Harst expressed his worries as follows: 
 
                                                        
 
20 “voor de financiering van het algemeen maatschappelijk werk moet de rechtsvorm op korte termijn 
duidelijk zijn.” Coördinatieraad (minutes), April 1984:3 
21 “(…) of deze instellingen in strijd handelen met de speciale door de gemeente Amsterdam aangenomen 
regelingen, bijv. over democratisering en homo-emancipatie.”: Coördinatieraad (minutes), November 
1984 
22 Coördinatieraad (minutes), April 1985; Coördinatieraad (minutes), September 1984 
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“At this moment the old Salvation Army statutes of 1946 still apply, of 
which it is established that, if only on the matter of democratization, they do 
not meet the requirements of the city council (…).”23 
 
In reply, Territorial Commander Cox (1982-1986) suggested sending a letter to 
the relevant departments of the municipality in which a change of the Salvation 
Army’s legal form would be announced. According to Cox, this had to be ac-
companied by a phrase stating that: 
  
“(…) we are working on it, but that the Salvation Army will not be able to 
have entirely adjusted its legal form to the subsidy policy of the Amsterdam 
municipality by January 1, 1985.”24 
 
This token of the willingness to be very flexible in order to retain subsidies, was 
presumably meant to buy the Army some time. Van der Harst however, was not 
reassured, for the municipality could suspend the subsidies pending this matter 
and that would have great financial consequences for the Army’s departments. 
Following up on the same debate, the Assistant-Chief Secretary, Ligtelijn won-
dered if a transitional period was possible, because, as he argued, when the na-
tional government had previously granted subsidies on the basis of a certain 
legal form, would municipalities be authorized to change that on such a short 
notice? 25 Van der Harst in his turn, responded that he shared this opinion, ex-
cept for the fact that it could be established that the current subsidy denominator 
had also not covered the old legal form, suggesting that the national government 
had been rather careless in this matter. However, in order to assess the situation 
better, he proposed to have the Amsterdam subsidy requirements checked by 
legal experts.  
Commander Cox continued on his proposal to send a letter to the municipali-
ty and suggested including this question in the letter and thus be transparent in 
communication, but now the Manager of the Recycling Department Van 
Teijlingen and the Manager of the Probation Department Fijn, opposed this idea. 
It was “not correct” to suggest the idea of suspension to the Amsterdam munici-
pality as Van Teijlingen put it, for one should let sleeping dogs lie. Then Fijn 
proposed to “informally probe a legal friend” on the issue.26 The Commander 
however concluded the debate with the remark that:  
                                                        
 
23 “Op dit moment gelden nog de oude L.d.H.statuten van 1946, waarvan geconstateerd werd dat zij 
alleen al op het punt van de democratisering niet voldoen aan de voorwaarden van de gemeente (…).” 
Coördinatieraad (minutes), November 1984:2 
24 “(…) we hiermee bezig zijn , maar dat per 1 januari 1985 het L.d.H. nog niet zo ver kan zijn dat haar 
rechtsvorm geheel is aangepast aan het subsidiebeleid van de gemeente Amsterdam.” Coördinatieraad 
(minutes), November 1984:2 
25 Coördinatieraad (minutes), November 1984:2 
26 Idem. Actually during the next meeting of the Coördinatieraad, Fijn reported that his ‘legal friend’ had 
confirmed that the Army was not to fear anything. In such a case, transitional arrangements could be 
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“(…) we have to put our cards on the table for the works councils as well as 
the municipality of Amsterdam, and explicate the actual situation in such 
terms that they will accept our argumentation.”27 
 
The complexity of the effects of decentralization on the Salvation Army was 
clear. As an actor in the social policy system, the Army was forced to deal with 
the new local policy regulations. In the Amsterdam case, these regulations 
seemed to pose a threat to the Army because they touched directly on the Ar-
my’s identity. Anticipating things to come, the Army itself already concluded 
that it did not meet the local standards that were to be met in order to continue 
its existence in Amsterdam. Local standards that seemed to differ greatly from 
the previous national requirements, since before the decentralization movement 
these issues had never stirred any trouble. Was the Amsterdam government 
more demanding than the national one?  
 
Identity as a solution 
The reaction of Commander Cox on the issue was quite meaningful. He decided 
that the Army had to be transparent towards the local government as well as to 
the works councils, which he apparently perceived as an external force. This 
approach expressed a great belief in the character of the Salvation Army as the 
municipality was to be persuaded by nothing more than an adequate explanation 
of the actual situation, supported with the right arguments, arguments that re-
ferred to the Army’s mode of operation that in its turn stemmed from its identi-
ty. So, even though the Army’s identity was under fire from these external de-
velopments, it was this very same identity that Cox suggested should be brought 
into position to counter these external influences. 
A month earlier, during the meeting of the coordinating council in May 
1984, Van der Harst had already made a plea for a profiling strategy.28 By doing 
so, he portrayed the same line of thought as the Commander, and even more 
explicitly so. In the case of general social work activities that the Amsterdam 
Salvation Army Goodwill Center provided for, the claim for an exceptional 
position to proposed policy rules by the Amsterdam municipality had proven to 
be a successful strategy. In this particular case, the strategy consisted of stress-
ing both the Army’s unique “identity”, and its service to certain “specific target 
groups”.29 However, in the case of the Salvation Army’s homecare services, the 
argument of target groups would not apply, as Van der Harst reasoned, for these 
                                                                                                                                  
 
applied for the period of 1 to 3 years. And also the fact that organizations have functioned well under the 
old regime, could not be waved aside and ignored; Coördinatieraad (minutes), December 1984:1 
27 “(…) wij open spel moeten spelen naar zowel de O.R.-en als de gemeente Amsterdam, en hun de 
feitelijke situatie in dusdanige bewoordingen moeten uiteenzetten dat zij onze redenering accepteren.” 
Coördinatieraad (minutes), November 1984:3 
28 Coördinatieraad (minutes), May 1984:5 
29 Coördinatieraad (minutes), October 1984:2 
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services were available for anyone in need of them. If an alternative argument 
could not be found soon, the result would be having to give up the autonomous 
Salvation Army homecare service. So, as an effort to increase the Army’s oppor-
tunities, Van der Harst announced that the Amsterdam homecare services would 
join forces with the Jewish Social Work, which also found itself cornered. The 
crux of their common strategy would be that both would place ‘identity’ at the 
center of their argument towards the municipality. Van der Harst concluded his 
plea with a call for support among the members of the coordinating council for 
“the battle that he was about to wage” with the Amsterdam municipality.30 
During the same period, the Army’s regular social work had succeeded in 
obtaining financial support to facilitate and maintain its accessibility. Being a 
corps on its own, the Amsterdam Goodwill Center was able to deploy Salvation-
ists and volunteers around the clock and because of this, the Army was regarded 
to be the best-equipped organization for night duty in Amsterdam. Based on that 
assessment, the municipality had offered to subsidize 2.4 FTE’s until 1990.31 In 
the process of the application for the preservation of the homecare service, the 
argument of being able to provide for a 24/7 homecare service was swiftly add-
ed.32 Additionally, both the arguments of identity and around the clock availa-
bility were used in deliberating with personal contacts from the local administra-
tion like Amsterdam alderman Jonker.33 And with success, for already in April 
1986 the Amsterdam city council reached an agreement that seemed workable 
for all parties involved:  
 
“The Salvation Army draws attention to the special character of its social 
services, which are mainly focused on the more complex cases, and to the 
deployment of volunteers from within its own organization, through which 
the Salvation Army is able to offer care in situations in which the regular so-
cial services are in remiss.”34 
 
Based on their argumentation of being unique, both the Jewish Social Work and 
the Salvation Army retained their municipal functions in Amsterdam. There was 
however a catch, because the Amsterdam municipality still wanted to test the 
statutes of these organizations against the local subsidy arrangement called 
Algemene Subsidieverordening Amsterdam (General Subsidy Arrangement Am-
sterdam). Furthermore, the municipality stated that it “reserved the right to de-
                                                        
 
30 Coördinatieraad (minutes), November 1984:6 
31 Coördinatieraad (minutes), August 1985 
32 Coördinatieraad (minutes), March 1985:3 
33 Coördinatieraad (minutes), March 1986 
34 “Het Leger des Heils wijst op het bijzondere karakter van het hulpverleningsaanbod, dat vooral is 
gericht op zwaardere hulpverleningsgevallen en op de inschakeling van vrijwilligers vanuit de eigen 
organisatie, waardoor het Leger des Heils in staat is hulp te bieden in situaties waarin het normale hulp-
verleningsaanbod tekort schiet.” Besluit nr. 634 “Aangaan subsidierelatie met de Amsterdamse instellin-
gen voor gezinsverzorging.” Gemeenteblad Amsterdam April 8, 1986 
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mand for changes of the statutes when deemed necessary.”35 This meant that the 
Amsterdam municipality could actually demand of the Salvation Army to live 
up to its word and adjust its statutes – an offer that was primarily made to satisfy 
the Amsterdam council. And indeed, the municipality took up on its statement, 
as in December 1986 the council demanded to be granted inspection of the Ar-
my’s statutes in order to assess whether or not the Army could remain eligible 
for subsidy.36 This announcement had confirmed the idea that the local adminis-
trators had a different approach than the policymakers on a national level. An 
idea that might have incited Manager of the Homeless Care, Egberts, to an-
nounce: “(…) it will not be only the case as it is in Amsterdam that subsidies are 
channeled through the city, the same will apply to more large cities.”37 Egberts 
was right and the Amsterdam example could very well be regarded as an omen, 
as the consequences of decentralization could provide for the same kind of trou-
ble for the Army in the other covenant cities. Would the strategy of identity also 
prove to be enough to counter these perils in other cases? Was the strategy of 
identity enough to persuade local governments to continue to hire the Salvation 
Army in order to fulfill their local social policy goals? 
1.3. Identity: the Utrecht case 
During the same period, the municipality of one of the other covenant cities, 
Utrecht, had already decreased the amount of subsidy to the Army’s youth 
homes to such a measure that one of its homes, “Ons Honk”, was on the verge of 
being closed. The expected date of closure was June 1, 1985.38 The Army how-
ever, would not let this pass without any opposition and in order to fight this 
decision, a legal procedure was started. By doing so, the Army displayed an 
attitude that seemed to have caught the Utrecht municipality by surprise: “The 
Utrecht city council appears to be shocked by the fact that the Army is going to 
court.”39 
Whether or not it was a direct result of this approach, the Utrecht municipali-
ty backed down and offered the Army to help find alternative housing for its 
youth home. Nonetheless, the three youth homes in the province of Utrecht were 
to merge into two houses, and both in the Utrecht municipality as well as in the 
province, the Army’s youth activities were under great pressure because of cut-
backs.40 On the other hand, in the Utrecht town of Driebergen, the youth work 
                                                        
 
35 Besluit nr. 634 “Aangaan subsidierelatie met de Amsterdamse instellingen voor gezinsverzorging.” 
Gemeenteblad Amsterdam April 8, 1986 
36 Coördinatieraad (minutes), December 1986:4 
37 “(…) dat het niet alleen in Amsterdam zo zal zijn dat subsidies over de gemeenten gaan lopen, hetzelf-
de geldt voor meer grote steden.” Coördinatieraad (minutes), December 1984:1 
38 Coördinatieraad (minutes), January 1985:3 
39 “De gemeente Utrecht blijkt nu toch wel geschrokken te zijn van het feit dat het Leger gaat procede-
ren.” Coördinatieraad (minutes), January 1985:3 
40 “Uit subsidie-technisch oogpunt zal gesproken worden over de Utrechtse Jeugdhuizen Leger des Heils 
(UJL).” Coördinatieraad (minutes), March 1985:4 
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division that provided for non-residential care actually grew, and this appeared 
to also be the case in Voorburg and Veendam.41 This incongruent development 
within this work field suggests that the government showed a growing prefer-
ence for non-residential work above residential work, maybe because it was 
cheaper.  
Identity as a problem 
One month later, the general tone of the worries about the Army’s youth work 
within the coordinating council had changed for the worse: 
 
“The Salvation Army does not meet all the government requirements includ-
ing those regarding democratization. That has its consequences for the con-
tinuation of and the amount of subsidy for this work. They want to know the 
vision of the SA on this work. The people involved in this work are waiting 
anxiously, which has to be brought to an end with clarity.”42 
 
Like in Amsterdam, this desired clarity had to come from the statutes. Accord-
ing to the Utrecht municipality, the statutes of the Salvation Army contained 
references to religious ideology and the municipality wanted to speak about that 
with the Army. Referring to the possibility of a national trend, the manager of 
the Army’s Youth Work, Kruisinga stressed the importance of this development 
for the Army by suggesting that the Army was to prepare this meeting by fully 
considering how this view reflected on the totality of the Army’s social-cultural 
work and how the Army wanted to incorporate the government requirements on 
democratization in this work.43 This exercise was necessary, according to Kruis-
inga, because it would be useful to all departments in deciding on how to cope 
with their local governments: 
 
“A debate with municipalities on their proposition that ‘he who pays the pip-
er calls the tune’ can only be held when the Salvation Army has a clear view 
on its social-cultural work. Then the Salvation Army can show the councils 
what it has to offer. It may turn out that the vision has to be readjusted. That 
does not automatically have to lead to the termination of the work. Of course, 
there are basic principles, but the Army should not be immediately afraid 
(…).”44 
                                                        
 
41 Coördinatieraad (minutes), March 1985:5 
42 “Het Leger des Heils voldoet niet aan alle eisen van de overheid o.a. m.b.t. de democratisering. Dat 
heeft consequenties voor de voortzetting en de mate van subsidie voor dit werk. Men wil de visie van het 
LdH op dit werk weten. De mensen die bij dit werk betrokken zijn leven nu in een spanning, waaraan 
middels duidelijkheid een einde moet komen.” Coördinatieraad (minutes), April 1985 
43 Coördinatieraad (minutes), May 1985:3 
44 “Een discussie met de gemeentes over hun stelling dat wie betaalt ook bepaalt kan pas plaatsvinden 
nadat die LdH visie op het sociaal cultureel werk duidelijk is. Het LdH kan dan de gemeentes duidelijk 
maken wat het te bieden heeft. Het kan blijken dat bijstelling van visie noodzakelijk is. Dat behoeft niet 
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As the Army was still awaiting the outcome of the legal procedure that it had 
started against the Utrecht council, with the beginning of 1986 the situation of 
the youth work in other parts of the Netherlands presented a mixed develop-
ment. In Haarlem and Zierikzee the financial pressures seemed to lead to a diffi-
cult situation for the Army’s local youth work.45 On the other hand, in Veendam 
and Driebergen new youth facilities opened their doors in February.46 Yet, irre-
spective of the pending legal procedure, the Utrecht municipality went ahead 
with cutbacks and as a result, the Army staff had to be discharged, making the 
Utrecht case a striking example of this ambivalent but worrying development. 
In March 1986 the pressure on the Army was amplified by the announcement 
that the Amsterdam municipality was about to adjust its subsidy requirements to 
the outcome of the report of the Committee-Van der Burg.47 As stated above, 
the Army thought of itself as not being able to sufficiently meet the government 
requirements on democratization, so it was not a real surprise to the coordinating 
council when during the same month, the Utrecht municipality had once again 
announced that the subsidy for the Army’s youth home in Utrecht would be 
terminated. The reason behind it however, was actually quite surprising to the 
Army, because now it was not so much the inadequate facilitation of democrati-
zation, but the Army’s faith-based identity that seemed to cause the trouble: 
 
“(…) we cannot escape the impression that because of our religious view the 
municipality of Utrecht ceases to support our work. They prefer neutral insti-
tutions.”48  
 
This observation was of enough importance to return to the agenda of the coor-
dinating council and indeed, after having consulted with the province in April, 
Jan Nieuwland reported to the coordinating council that there was no escape:  
 
“The municipality of Utrecht is (…) very definite with regard to its point of 
view. The Provincial Executive states: the municipality is autonomous. We 
cannot prove it, but ideology will play a part, also with regard to decentrali-
zation. One does not have any possibility of appeal and there will be great in-
security. We lack proper on-site lobby contacts. The standards that the Salva-
tion Army has laid down, play a great part and are very often an obstacle.”49 
                                                                                                                                  
 
zonder meer te leiden tot beeïndiging van het werk. Uiteraard zijn er basisprincipes, maar het Leger moet 
niet meteen bang zijn (…).”Coördinatieraad (minutes), May 1985:3-4 
45 Coördinatieraad (minutes), January 1986:4; Coördinatieraad (minutes), February 1986:4 
46 Coördinatieraad (minutes), February 1986:4 
47 Coördinatieraad (minutes), March 1986, see also Chapter 5.6.2 
48 “We kunnen niet aan de indruk ontkomen dat vanwege onze levensbeschouwelijke visie de gemeente 
Utrecht wil stoppen met de ondersteuning van ons werk. Men wil liever neutrale instellingen.” Coördina-
tieraad (minutes), March 1986:5 
49 “De gemeenteraad in Utrecht is zeer beslist in haar standpunt. Gedeputeerde Staten zegt: de gemeente is 
autonoom. “We kunnen het niet hard maken maar levensbeschouwing zal doorwerken ook in het verband 
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Following his analysis, Nieuwland raised the question of how to deal with this 
situation in which the Army was not just profiled as a faith-based organization, 
but where the local administration was also inclined to stop the collaboration 
because of this profile. How to change the minds of these administrators? Or 
was the Army maybe no longer the obvious organization to provide such ser-
vices in Utrecht. Should the Army quit its local activities in Utrecht? These were 
questions that Nieuwland asked in the coordinating council. Nevertheless, sur-
render was unthinkable, as the overall conclusion of the ensuing debate in the 
coordinating council reveals:  
 
“We’ll have to defend our position aggressively, support the normative con-
tent of our work with actual facts. Deliver good quality and be attentive to 
new developments.”50 
 
Identity as a solution 
This position of being driven into a corner by the local government, made the 
Army realize very well that it had to work actively on its image. The above 
statement shows that the Army was quite aware that its social services did con-
tain a ‘normative content’, and as this content formed the base of the Army’s 
relationships with (any) government, the Army had to prove its added value to 
the Utrecht council. The suggestion was made that this was to be done by 
demonstration of the quality of the Army’s work: ‘actual facts’ would have to 
support the effectivity of the Army’s normative approach. This solution howev-
er, raised a new problem, for how was the Army to communicate these facts to 
the people that decided on the allocation of funds? Earlier, the coordinating 
council had concluded that they suffered from a lack of local contacts that were 
able to lobby for the Army. So, in addition to a change in tactics towards local 
governments, the Army decided to arrange for local contacts that could actually 
convey the Salvation Army image of effectivity and commitment to the local 
administrators. Also, it was decided that the role of the Internal Committee for 
Press and Publicity (also referred to as ‘Politics and Publicity’) was to be scaled-
up. This committee had already existed for some time, but apparently without a 
structural role in trying to convey the unique character of the Salvation Army’s 
work to local administrators. Now the Army started a lobby that targeted exactly 
these public officials.  
Since the matter of faith-based identity had raised some questions, the unique 
character of the Army’s approach to social work served as ammunition. On re-
                                                                                                                                  
 
met de decentralisatie. Je hebt geen beroepsmogelijkheden meer en er komt grote onzekerheid. Ter plaat-
se missen wij de nodige contacten om te lobbyen. De normen die het Leger des Heils aanlegt spelen een 
grote rol en zijn heel dikwijls een struikelblok.” Coördinatieraad (minutes), April 1986:3 
50 “We moeten agressief onze standpunten gaan verdedigen, onze normatieve inhoud van ons werk onder-
steunen met actuele feiten. Goede kwaliteit leveren en alert zijn op nieuwe ontwikkelingen” Coördinatie-
raad (minutes), April 1986:3 
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quest of the committee for press and publicity, the coordinating council decided 
to start with publishing an article in the designated magazine for local adminis-
trators De Nederlandse Gemeenten (Dutch Municipalities). This article was 
meant to elaborate: “(…) on the Salvation Army, namely its goals, its core and 
criteria of its care program in order to try to eliminate misunderstandings.”51 In 
order to write this article, a well-known Christian journalist, Sipke van der Land, 
was approached.52 In addition to this article, another, more thorough approach 
was chosen. The coordinating council decided to send every member of a city 
council in the Netherlands a personalized letter. In this letter the Army aimed to 
point out its unique character and presumably hoped to emphasize that the gov-
ernment had nothing to fear from it in terms of identity. Especially the covenant 
cities were targeted, for:  
 
“In Amsterdam, Den Haag, Utrecht and Rotterdam the welfare subsidies are 
allocated by the city councils. In doing so, the city council has its freedom to 
prioritize with regard to the apportionment of funds from the subsidy pot. Po-
litical influencing of these councils can be a means to not be slighted in the 
subsidy distribution.”53 
 
As a third action, the coordinating council decided that, after the upcoming local 
elections, meetings would be held with the new political parties on the councils 
of these cities to accentuate “the aim, core and help-criteria” of the Army’s so-
cial work. Also, in order to streamline the representation of the various interests 
that the diverse social programs of the Army had on this local level, the Com-
mander decided to appoint one Salvation Army representative for every cove-
nant city. He or she would then keep in touch with relevant local administra-
tors.54 Added to this lobbying on a local level, the members of the Army coordi-
nating council would also try to influence the national key administrators. 
 Following the Amsterdam omen and the Utrecht case, the religious funda-
ment of the Army’s social work became the talking point. However, the reaction 
that the Army had on this matter was quite strategic and maybe even quite unex-
pected. The Army did not try to mitigate its perceived identity, but it actually 
chose to cultivate and deploy it, thus revealing quite a sense of self-
consciousness and political assertiveness. The developments on the matter of 
youth work and community centers however, seemed to take another turn for the 
                                                        
 
51 (…) over het Leger des Heils, n.l. over de doelstelling, het wezen en de criteria voor hulpverlening 
teneinde misvattingen daaromtrent proberen uit de weg te ruimen.” Coördinatieraad (minutes), March 
1986:2 
52 Coördinatieraad (minutes), March 1986:3 
53 “In Amsterdam, Den Haag, Utrecht en Rotterdam worden de subsidies voor het welzijnswerk toebe-
deeld door de gemeentebesturen van deze steden. Hierbij hebben de gemeentebesturen de vrijheid om 
prioriteiten te stellen ten aanzien van het toebedelen aan het particulier initiatief van gelden uit de subsi-
diepot. Politieke beinvloeding van deze besturen kan een middel zijn om in de subsidieverdeling niet 
achtergesteld te worden.”, Coördinatieraad (minutes), March 1986:4 
54 Coördinatieraad (minutes), March 1986 
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worse during the second half of the 1980s. The introduction of a budgetary sys-
tem for youth work in 1987 altered the manner in which subsidies would be 
allocated, and combined with the cutbacks, this led to a significant reduction in 
subsidies for youth work from fl.760,000 in 1986 to fl.645,000 in 1987 and with 
a further prospect of reducing to fl.515,000 in 1988.55 Additionally, the Utrecht 
municipality substantiated its claim that it would enforce the outcome of the Van 
der Burg-report, and now it issued stipulations on the matter of democratic par-
ticipation within the Salvation Army. This combination of measures confirmed 
within Army ranks the idea that “Utrecht wanted to get rid of the Army”.56 The 
coordinating council kept receiving signals that this would actually be the case, 
and that the Army’s youth work would be closed down in Utrecht.57 But for the 
time being, through a different flow of subsidy (of a far smaller amount than 
before) than the regular program, it would be possible to continue their work in 
another location.58 
1.4. Harmonization and decentralization 
In line with the national trend to harmonize social policy and its civil society 
organizations, the Salvation Army youth work also experienced increasing pres-
sure to combine forces with other organizations. The idea was, like in Amster-
dam, to decentralize youth work activities into separate districts in which all 
types of youth services would be available, and if necessary, these would be 
offered by different organizations.59 This plan however, would infringe on the 
Army’s idea of providing for coherent services on a national level and urged the 
Army to think about preserving its identity.60 At the end of 1988, the Rapport 
harmonisatie van standaarden in de residentiële jeugdzorg (Report on harmoni-
zation of standards in residential youth care) was issued, in order to accompany 
the proposed policy implementations. For the Salvation Army this new direction 
seemed to be disastrous, as the accompanying cutbacks of 2 million euro’s 
would mean, for the Army, a large reduction of its staff and management.61  
In the covenant city Den Haag, a thorough reorganization of social work was 
also announced to achieve further harmonization of the work field. The plan was 
to unite all active social service organizations in a municipal umbrella organiza-
tion with the legal form of a foundation. This would mean that the Army’s rela-
tively young Goodwill Center in Den Haag would have to merge into this new 
foundation and its employees would have to take up office with this new organi-
zation. Thereupon, these workers would be sent on secondment to their original 
                                                        
 
55 Coördinatieraad (minutes), August1986; Coördinatieraad (minutes), November 1986 
56 Coördinatieraad (minutes), November 1986:3 
57 Idem; see also Coördinatieraad (minutes), April 1987 
58 Coördinatieraad (minutes), November 1986 
59 Coördinatieraad (minutes), April 1988 
60 Coördinatieraad (minutes), March 1988 
61 Coördinatieraad (minutes), December 1988 
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organizations, which in this case was the Salvation Army.62 That this would 
mean a fundamental intrusion on the Army’s identity was confirmed by the 
Manager of the Goodwill Center Den Haag, Holland, who stated that he would 
do “everything in order to be able to continue to work the same way.”63 In fact, 
Holland started a lobby with local political parties and even in the parliament. 
In the field of homeless care as well, the policy of harmonization resulted in 
reorganization. In October 1987, the Army’s coordinating council learned that 
the national foundation for homeless care would lose its subsidy. This would 
open the possibility to reorganize on a local level, as was the case in Den Haag. 
The result would be that each covenant city would have its own service-bureau 
in which all parties would be united. If the Army did not want to participate in 
such a cluster, it would have to form a cluster of its own in order to maintain its 
right of existence. After having discussed the issue, the coordinating council 
however, agreed on not forming a cluster of its own for the time being, because 
the Army lacked the necessary volume. Even though the alternatives were not 
yet clear to the Army, in 1988 the finances of the umbrella for homeless care 
were actually be stopped and this was experienced as a great loss of the possibil-
ity of representation of civil society organizations at the national level.64 These 
developments on the front of decentralization and harmonization, let the Army 
feel the burden of being dependent on government finances, and the threat of 
losing parts of its social work activities was imminent. The Army however, did 
not concede, for its reflex was to come into action in order to win the battle, and 
for this purpose it deployed two important approaches.  
2. Recalibration of the Army’s identity 
2.1. First efforts of recalibration  
The first approach of the Army was to convince the local and national decision 
makers of the quality of its work by showing its plumage by starting a lobby on 
its identity. This approach however, suggested that the Army actually did have a 
clear idea of its identity, for otherwise it was hard for these tactics to be convinc-
ing. This assumption however, might not be correct as the call for clarity on the 
subject of how the Salvation Army viewed its faith-based character in regard to 
its social services was increasingly heard, both inside and outside Army ranks. 
As shown above, local governments, more than once, asked questions on this 
subject and subsequently Army officials wanted to know what to communicate 
in such a case. As a result, the matter of religious identity was placed higher and 
higher on the Army’s agenda during the 1980s. For instance, the discussion on 
the matter of religious identity seeped through to the practical level of the work 
                                                        
 
62 Coördinatieraad (minutes), September 1986 
63 Coördinatieraad (minutes), November 1986 
64 Coördinatieraad (minutes), July 1988 
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field, confronting the Army with the difficulties of the operational interpretation 
of its vision. On February 13, 1987, the Manager of the Homeless Department, 
Egberts pointed the attention of Chief Secretary Krommenhoek to an internal 
dispute on rephrasing a clause on the living regulations in the care homes. Until 
then the regulations mentioned the following stance on the subject of ‘spiritual 
care’:  
 
“Spiritual care: this is based on putting into practice the Christian faith in the 
broadest sense of the word. The preaching of which shall take place, among 
other ways, during the home meetings on Sunday morning, where every resi-
dent is welcome.”65 
 
A member of the staff of the department for homeless care, Zürhaar, had sug-
gested changing this text into what was regarded to be a more professional and 
up-to-date phrasing:  
 
“Spiritual care: Christian therapeutic approach whereby it is attempted to 
meaningfully anticipate the spiritual needs c.q. signals of the residents. This 
being an aspect of the wholesome human being. On Sunday morning there 
will be a short time of reflection for all residents. This is in relation to the 
aforementioned.”66 
 
Because of the subtle but more compelling ring to it that the new phrasing 
seemed to bear, the other staff members did not comply with Zürhaar’s proposal, 
for the Army did not compel its residents to any form of religious activity. Nev-
ertheless, both parties insisted on bringing this matter before the Army com-
mand, and thus hoped to gain clarity on ‘what is wise’ in this matter. Krommen-
hoek informed Egberts that the issue would be discussed in the coordinating 
council, but Egberts protested heavily to this procedure: 
 
“I object to this. I have, in consultation with the managers, put this matter be-
fore you as Army command. When this would be discussed in the coördi-
natieraad, people that do not belong to the Salvation Army will help decide 
on matters, at least those who are not Soldiers.”67 
                                                        
 
65 “Deze is gebaseerd op het beoefenen van de christelijke godsdienst in de ruimste zin van het woord. De 
verkondiging hiervan vindt o.a. plaats in de huissamenkomst op zondagmorgen, waar iedere bewoner 
welkom is.” Letter from J.J. Egberts to L.E. Krommenhoek, Februari 13, 1987 (UA 1182, nr. 80) 
66 “Christelijk therapeutische benadering waarbij getracht wordt zinvol in te spelen op de geestelijke 
behoeften c.q. signalen van de bewoners. Dit als aspect van de totale mens. Op zondagmorgen is er een 
korte bezinningstijd voor alle bewoners. Dit in het kader van het eerdergenoemde. ” Letter from J.J. 
Egberts to L.E. Krommenhoek, Februari 13, 1987 
67 “Ik maak daar bezwaar tegen. Deze zaak heb ik, in overleg met de directeuren, aan u voorgelegd als 
Legerleiding. Indien dit in de Coördinatieraad aan de orde zou komen, besluiten mensen mee die niet in 
het Leger des Heils behoren, althans geen heilssoldaat zijn.” Letter from J.J. Egberts to L.E. Krommen-
hoek, Februari 18, 1987 (UA 1182, nr. 80) 
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With this reaction, a second problem was revealed with regard to the Army’s 
identity, because next to the question of what this identity was all about, now the 
question emerged that: who would decided this? Army people or outside profes-
sionals? A week later, the matter seemed to have come to an end when 
Krommenhoek, after having consulted with Commander Schurink, informed 
Egberts: 
  
“You are right that the coördinatieraad of management cannot and will not 
decide on such matters, but this matter does require a certain form of coordi-
nation for it plays a part, one way or another, in all sectors. That is why it is 
decided to discuss this matter in the coördinatieraad. In my opinion you do 
not have to worry about this procedure.”68 
 
Thus Egberts was only partly accommodated. And maybe he was right to worry, 
for in April 1987 the coordinating council gave him a “proposal for alterations”:  
 
“This [spiritual care] is based on putting into practice the Christian faith in 
the broadest sense of the word. The implementation takes place within the 
pastoral care under which fall the home gatherings, etcetera.”69 
 
Even if Egberts had his way in terms of a lighter, less compelling phrasing of the 
care home regulations clause, he was confirmed in his fear that the coordinating 
council incidentally decided on matters that did not belong to its capacity, and 
that these decisions were made with the help of what was perceived as non-
Army people. However, according to the coordinating council itself, the issue of 
the Army’s faith-based identity was to remain a subject of discussion, for: “The 
Christian basis can form a ground for provoking termination of subsidies.”70 
2.2. Scrutinizing the Army’s faith-based identity 
The decision of the Army command to approach the matter of identity in a com-
prehensive manner, became visible during the second half of the 1980s when the 
Army deployed a second approach on convincing the government of its added 
value. As mentioned in Chapter 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 was the Army used to prepare its 
                                                        
 
68 “U heeft gelijk dat in de Coördinatieraad bestuurders geen besluiten over dergelijke zaken kunnen of 
moeten worden genomen, maar het is wel zo dat deze aangelegenheid een bepaalde coördinatie vraagt, 
daar deze zaak in alle sectoren op de één of andere wijze speelt. Daarom is besloten om in de Coördina-
tieraad over deze zaak van gedachten te wisselen. Ik stel mij voor dat u over deze procedure geen zorgen 
heeft.” Letter from L.E. Krommenhoek to J.J. Egberts, Februari 26, 1987 (UA 1182, nr. 80) 
69 “Deze [geestelijk verzorging] is gebaseerd op het beoefenen van de christelijke godsdienst in de ruim-
ste zin van het woord. De uitwerking vindt plaats binnen de pastorale zorg waaronder de huissamenkomst 
e.d. valt.” Coördinatieraad (minutes), April 1987:4 
70 “De levensbeschouwelijke basis kan aanleiding zijn tot het niet in aanmerking komen van (sic) subsi-
dies.” Coördinatieraad (minutes), April 1987:1 
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soldiers and especially its officers for the Spiritual battle. An additional measn 
to this end was the ‘social congress’. By means of regular gatherings the Army 
Aimed to develop and strengthen a common view on matters of identity amongst 
its members. Also in 1987, a national social congress was planned, but because 
of the economic hardship of these times, the estimated costs of more than 
fl.300,000 proved to be rather an obstacle. After a short debate however, the 
coordinating council unanimously decided that the congress had to take place, 
for a social congress had to be seen as a form of employee education: 
 
“We profess to be more than just an organization that offers social services. 
The color that has to be in our work, that is what such a social congress is 
about.”71 
 
So, even though it would cost a fortune, the congress was on, and not in the least 
because in that particular year, it would be combined with the centennial anni-
versary of the Salvation Army in the Netherlands. However, it was not time yet 
for any festivities, for in February 1987, once again attention was called to the 
tendency of local governments to question the Army’s stance on religious mat-
ters: 
 
“ (…) this question is not only asked in Rotterdam, various other municipali-
ties present questions on religious identity. The political choice is often for a 
neutral organization (…). The trend is obvious.”72 
 
In a reply to this observation, Assistant-Chief-Secretary, Ligtelijn, announced 
that during the centennial a symposium would be held on the subject of ‘Chris-
tian identity and social service’. Ligtelijn sketched out the plan: first the attend-
ing major political parties would describe their points of view on the matter of 
identity. And then:  
 
“Based on these statements, we can determine our strategy. What is quite 
clear and necessary however, is that we will have to outline a strategy in the 
future.”73 
 
                                                        
 
71 “Wij pretenderen meer te zijn dan alleen maar een organisatie, waar maatschappelijk werk wordt 
bedreven. De kleur die in ons werk moet zitten, daarvoor is zo’n maatschappelijk congres.” Coördinatie-
raad (minutes), November 1986:5 
72 “(…) niet alleen in Rotterdam [wordt] deze vraag gesteld (…), diverse andere Gemeenten komen ook 
met vragen omtrent levensbeschouwing. De politieke keuze is zeer dikwijls een neutrale instelling (…). 
De tendens is duidelijk.” Coördinatieraad (minutes), February 1987:2 
73 “Naar de uitspraken, daar gedaan, kunnen wij onze strategie bepalen. Wat wel duidelijk en noodzake-
lijk is, is dat wij in de toekomst een strategie moeten uitstippelen.” Coördinatieraad (minutes), Februari 
1987:3 
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After the centennial celebrations and its symposium, further deliberation on this 
subject was planned, but in order to create a proper strategy, Ligtelijn also con-
cluded that the Army had to be better prepared than it was currently: “It is estab-
lished that we are too unschooled in a political sense to be attentive to such mat-
ters.”74 
The Army’s view on its identity 
On the morning of Saturday, May 23, 1987, almost 500 people flocked together 
in the vast conference hall of the Jaarbeurs in Utrecht to participate in the Salva-
tion Army’s centennial symposium: “Christian identity and social services. So-
cial policy once more confronted with a choice”. Next to many interested Salva-
tionists, a multitude of delegates from other organizations were also present, 
including people from elderly homes, care centers, hospitals, Catholic diaconal 
organizations, probation organizations, broadcasting companies, the govern-
ment, and other faith-based and secular social service providers.75 Territorial 
Commander Schurink opened the symposium. Even though his speech was not 
preserved, it can be assumed to be in correspondence with the preface to the 
symposium booklet, which was handed out to the attendants as they entered. In 
this preface, Schurink defined the issue that induced the Salvation Army to or-
ganize the event:  
 
“We can establish that professionalization of the services, which includes 
health care, social work, family care, youth work, probation and elderly care, 
has been increased. During this symposium we want to dwell together upon 
the question of what a Christian character means in these mentioned areas of 
interest. To put it briefly, we want to focus on asking each other the question 
of whether or not the Salvation Army still has a right of existence in these 
times of social needs and unprecedented wealth.”76 
 
Schurink explicitly related the tendency of the local governments to ask the 
Army to give account of its identity in relation to their subsidy arrangements to 
the ongoing process of professionalization, as a result of which social service 
providers like the Salvation Army seemed to have to repress the Christian ele-
ment of their identity. Additionally, after presenting this urgent matter to his 
                                                        
 
74 “Wel wordt geconstateerd dat wij te weinig politiek geschoold zijn om op deze zaken alert te zijn. Over 
genoemd onderwerp zal lektuur verzameld moeten worden.” Coördinatieraad (minutes), Februari 1987:3 
75 Christelijke indentiteit en maatschappelijke dienstverlening. Samenlevingsbeleid opnieuw voor de 
keuze. Symposium booklet of the Leger des Heils symposium, May 23, 1987 (UA 1182, nr. 400) 
76 “Wij mogen constateren, dat de professionalisering van de dienstverlening, waaronder de gezondheids-
zorg, het maatschappelijk werk, de gezinsverzorging, de jeugdhulpverlening, de reclassering en de be-
jaardenzorg steeds meer is toegenomen. Op dit symposium willen wij met u allen stilstaan bij de vraag 
wat een christelijke signatuur betekent voor de genoemde aandachtsgebieden. Kortom, wij willen elkaar 
bepalen bij de vraag of het Leger des Heils nog (steeds) bestaansrecht heeft in deze tijd van maatschappe-
lijke noden en ongekende welvaart.”Christelijke indentiteit en maatschappelijke dienstverlening, 1987: 
preface.  
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audience, Schurink emphasized the coherence between the Army’s social and 
religious objectives by quoting former General Coutts: 
 
“These [the Army’s twofold mission of evangelization and social work] are 
just two activities of one and the same salvation that aims for total redemp-
tion of the human being. Both are inspired by the same motive. Both aim for 
the same target. And where the Gospel has united them, we do not intend to 
separate them.”77 
 
Thus, the Army’s point of departure regarding the theme of this symposium was 
clearly framed, for however the debate would evolve during the day, the Army 
was determined to conserve the coherence between the two parts of its mission, 
thus confirming the fact that this coherence formed the mainstay of the Army’s 
identity.  
Alternated with musical intermezzos and slide shows of the Army’s social 
activities, four speakers were invited to shed light on the theme and the existen-
tial question that Schurink introduced. In the first contribution, the manager of 
the Army’s youth department and the department of elderly care and nursing, 
Noorlander, elaborated on Schurink's train of thought while trying to answer the 
question: what inspires the Salvation Army to provide for social services?78 
According to Noorlander, the cause of this question lay in the dominant charac-
ter of the Dutch welfare state, for this dominance often resulted in a loss of spe-
cific character of faith-based social service providers.79 That the Salvation Army 
had to position itself towards this problem was clear, and Noorlander made a 
plea to firmly hold on to its faith-based identity in the process, for it was exactly 
this identity that provided for the inspiration for the Army’s social services:  
 
“Without the capital ‘C’ the Salvation Army would lose its right of exist-
ence; its founding principle. It is also the source of inspiration for social ser-
vice and the point of departure that gives content to the performed labor. (…) 
This is how a theology of social service came into being within the Salvation 
Army.”80 
 
                                                        
 
77 “Zij [evangelisatiewerk en maatschappelijk werk] zijn slechts twee activiteiten van één en hetzelfde 
heil dat de totale verlossing van de mens beoogt. Beide worden geïnspireerd door hetzelfde motief. Beide 
hebben hetzelfde doel voor ogen. En waar het evangelie hen heeft samengebracht, zij wij niet van plan 
hen te scheiden.” Christelijke indentiteit en maatschappelijke dienstverlening, 1987: preface. 
78 Noorlander was manager of the Youth Work department and also of the Nursing and Care department. 
79 Christelijke indentiteit en maatschappelijke dienstverlening, 1987:5 
80 “Het Leger des Heils zou zonder de ‘C’ met een hoofdletter zijn bestaansrecht verliezen; het is zijn 
grondbeginsel en zijn fundament. Dat is ook de bron van inspiratie tot maatschappelijke dienstverlening 
en het uitgangspunt dat inhoud geeft aan zijn uitvoerende arbeid. (…) Zo ontstond er een theologie binnen 
het Leger des Heils van maatschappelijke dienstverlening” Christelijke indentiteit en maatschappelijke 
dienstverlening, 1987:6 
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Indeed, the Dutch government showed an increasing tendency for change, insti-
gated by a policy that, according to Noorlander, left less and less room for a 
faith-based character and pressured the Army to show more and more flexibility 
on the matter of its identity, especially with regard to harmonization and mer-
gers.81 In response to this development, however, Noorlander stated that the 
reduction of the Army to a mere social service organization was out of the ques-
tion. In reference to social scientist Thoenes’ observation that the main weak-
ness of the Dutch welfare state was that “it lacked a great and inspiring ideal”, 
Noorlander stated that it was exactly this Christian identity that formed the base 
for the added value of the Army’s social services. This was an important argu-
ment for the creation of a level playing field by distributing financial means on 
an equal basis:  
 
“On the market of welfare, that offers no intrinsic security, safety, justice and 
social security, the Salvation Army wants, together with other Christian insti-
tutions, to keep providing for the added value of Christian identity and so 
improve the happiness of people.”82 
 
So in her reaction to the Commanders’ quest for legitimization of the Salvation 
Army’s existence as a religious social service provider, Noorlander emphasized 
that this Christian character of the Army could be regarded as indispensable as a 
counterweight to the neutralizing efforts of an encroaching government. 
Other views on the Army’s faith-based identity 
This emphasis on the Army’s identity as an added value, was however criticized 
by the second speaker, expert on criminal law and state law, Diepenhorst.83 
Diepenhorst focused on the question of: how to display this Christian character 
in the services? He started off by summarizing the idea that some understand 
faith-based social services to openly differ from non-faith-based services, an 
idea that Diepenhorst disregarded by calling it “primitive self-exaltation” be-
cause of a lack of scientific evidence that supported this idea. Elaborating on this 
point of view, he continued that based on common sense and “public spirit”, all 
people have, or at least should have, a certain urge to help each other.84 In such 
situations mutual respect excluded condescension, sense of responsibility was 
strengthened, and character was valued. Even though Diepenhorst remained 
silent on the specific situation of the Salvation Army and the legitimization of its 
                                                        
 
81 Christelijke indentiteit en maatschappelijke dienstverlening, 1987:7 
82 “Het Leger des Heils wil op de welzijnsmarkt, die uit zichzelf geen geborgenheid, geen veiligheid, geen 
rechtvaardigheid en bestaanszekerheid schept, met andere christelijke instellingen de meerwaarde van het 
christelijk goed blijven aanbieden en zo geluk van mensen bevorderen.” Christelijke indentiteit en maat-
schappelijke dienstverlening, 1987:9 
83 Diepenhorst (Rector of the Free University Amsterdam (1972-1976) and Minister of OCW (1965-
1967)) 
84 Christelijke indentiteit en maatschappelijke dienstverlening, 1987:16-18 
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existence, and even confessed to his own Christian roots during the second half 
of his contribution, he was quite critical of the idea that faith-based organiza-
tions possessed a certain glorified uniqueness – it was enough for these organi-
zations to present their Christian ideology through action. This was a message 
that might very well have disturbed quite a part of the audience. 
The third speaker, however, seemed to be more supportive to the idea of the 
Salvation Army’s unique right of existence. In his speech on the possibilities 
and boundaries of modern social services, expert in andragologie (adult educa-
tion theory), Van Beugen, came to the same conclusion as Schurink, that far-
reaching professionalization had changed the identity of these social services 
from being value-based towards value-free, or ‘neutral’. Van Beugen however, 
also observed that this development was being averted by the growing criticism 
on the professional, during the 1980s. “Does this maybe mean a recurrence from 
‘professionalism’ to personal motivation, even maybe to a Christian inspired 
motivation?”, Van Beugen wondered.85 In his answer, Van Beugen started out 
by stating that even though criticism on professionalization was quite helpful, 
there were also two “extremely valuable products” of professionalization: the 
individual approach of the ‘personal-service’ ideology, and the expertise that is 
needed to counter the growing complexity of the social problems of the clients. 
According to Van Beugen, the combination of these two aspects implicated that 
personal motivation alone would never be enough to become an effective pro-
fessional. On the other hand, the importance of the personal approach implied 
that the professional would have to be facilitated by, for example, the govern-
ment. Additionally, the professional would have to show a non-expansionist, 
supplementary character towards volunteer aid, for professionals had also to 
contribute to the revitalization of solidarity and to, what had been called, the 
‘caring society’.86 So, how did a Christian ideology relate to this interpretation 
of professionalism? According to Van Beugen, this was not at all a problem. 
The professional profile of the social worker acknowledged the importance of 
personal values, and even though services were not a means for evangelization, 
Van Beugen recognized the convictions of a Christian worker as a “working 
style”. The primary task of a professional, be it a Christian or otherwise, was to 
provide for expert help, but this help could only be effective when offered by a 
‘real’ person, which involved his values. Additionally, in support of his plea for 
granting a certain measure of Christian values in social work, Van Beugen spent 
a few words on the difference between hiring a Christian professional and work-
ing with a professional faith-based organization: a Christian professional could 
also very well be employed by a ‘general’ organization, for it was not that these 
organizations were value-free, or neutral, but the designation ‘general’ only 
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implied that professionals in such an organization did not all adhere to the same 
convictions.87 Christian organizations however, were valuable in facilitating and 
supporting professionals to do their work from a strong personal conviction. So, 
summarizing the words of Van Beugen, one could conclude that in his view a 
social worker is inherently ‘value charged’ and can act accordingly, be it within 
certain boundaries. 
From the perspective of the Army command, the fourth speaker, Director-
General of the Ministry of WVC, Gijsbers might have been regarded as the most 
significant.88 As a government representative and a vital contact for the Salva-
tion Army in terms of welfare subsidies, Gijsbers’ view on how the Army was to 
legitimize itself was important. As Ligtelijn had stated in preparation of this 
symposium: the Army would mould its position partly in reaction to political 
points of view.89 Citing former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pronk, Gijsbers 
introduced his argument by stating that the “government should always work at 
the Salvation Army becoming redundant”, meaning that political solutions had 
to be found for the needs that the Army addressed.90 By this statement, Gijsbers 
pointed out that the Salvation Army functioned as a mirror, or even a conscience 
to the Dutch government. And according to Gijsbers it was especially the Ar-
my’s ideology, its combativeness and decisiveness, which had made the Army 
recognizable within Dutch society. Addressing the matter of separation of 
church and state, Gijsbers argued that the Dutch state did not favor one ideology 
over another, but aimed to give room to all different forms of expression. This 
resulted in a type of government that did not actively support different social 
groupings to pursue their religious goals, but, according to Gijsbers, it also did 
not hamper it. Did this mean that a subsidized organization would still be able to 
propagate its own convictions?91 Gijsbers stated that this was very well possible. 
All actions of an organization could be in line with its specific philosophy of 
life, as long as they were also in line with Dutch law, and especially criminal 
law. When the criminal law prohibited certain actions, subsidies could be re-
voked. “So, what about an issue like equal rights?” Gijsbers asked rhetorically, 
for in Amsterdam the Salvation Army was threatened with revoking the permit 
to collect money publicly because of its conviction that homosexuality was in-
compatible with Army views. Gijsbers replied:  
 
“I can hardly imagine that the subsidies for the huge amount of work that the 
Salvation Army does, (…) often in places where no one has access to or is 
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88 Gijsbers, (Director-general Welzijn, Ministerie WVC; Chairman General Diaconal Council of the 
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89 Coördinatieraad (minutes) February 1987:3 
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prepared to go to, that the subsidy for this work must be revoked based on 
the opinion of the Army on homosexuality.”92  
 
This remark was actually quite on the borderline, for it could very well be inter-
preted as a display of government endowed meritocracy. After all, it implied that 
the Army did not have to conform to all the demands that the government made, 
because of its good work. Gijsbers, however, continued that exactly because of 
this fact that there was no religious pressure or coercion in the case of the Salva-
tion Army at all, and that it did not try to hide its identity, the Army provided for 
both social services and spiritual propagation, and was quite effective in both. 
According to Gijsbers, the Army did not apply “evangelical blackmail” by ask-
ing a needy person: do you believe? But by providing care to such a person 
without any pressure to convert, the Salvation Army proved to be a mature so-
cial work organization, and one that also brought the gospel overtly.93  
Continuing on the matter of separation of church and state, Gijsbers also ad-
dressed the question: How can a church be subsidized? He firmly stated that 
Dutch law, including the Constitution, did not at all prohibit the state to subsi-
dize religious communities, but that it was actually quite careful with it. With 
regard to the Salvation Army however, the state did not seem that reserved at all, 
and Gijsbers explained: “With the Salvation Army, the propagation of faith and 
services are impossible to separate. Not even administratively.”94 So, if the gov-
ernment wanted to deploy an organization like the Salvation Army, according to 
Gijsbers: 
 
“It would be a tragic mistake if we would put subsidies up for discussion 
because of this, or when we would plead for or even force a separation be-
tween social services and propagation. The Army would not be the Salvation 
Army anymore.”95  
 
So, as final speaker, and displaying the government’s perspective, Gijsbers had 
openly acknowledged the Army’s added value to the government, a value that 
was primarily based on the Army’s double mission. It might be the case howev-
er, that being invited as a VIP-speaker to the Army’s congress, Gijsbers paid 
mere lip service to the Army’s principles. Nevertheless, as an active member of 
                                                        
 
92 “Toch kan ik mij nauwelijks voorstellen dat de subsidie voor het vele werk dat het Leger des Heils 
verricht en dat (…) dikwijls verricht wordt daar waar niemand toegang heeft of bereid is heen te gaan, dat 
de subsidie voor dit werk moet worden ingetrokken op grond van de opvatting over homofilie van het 
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93 Idem:25 
94 “Bij het Leger zijn verbreiding van geloof en dienstverlening niet te scheiden. Ook administratief niet.” 
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the Reformed church, Gijsberts might very well have given his personal profes-
sional view on the matter, and if this was the case, a more telling declaration of 
support from the side of the government seemed impossible. The Salvation Ar-
my was not only labeled as indispensable to the government as a mirror on so-
cial developments, but it was indispensable exactly because of its dual mission, 
instead of despite of it. This message must have strengthened Schurink and the 
other members of the coordinating council in their efforts to formulate a fitting 
answer to the trend of accountability on a local level. 
Concluding observations by Schurink 
In a subsequent panel discussion, the matter of the Army’s Christian identity in 
relation with the professionalized social services, and a few other related issues, 
were addressed and this concluded the afternoon session of the symposium.96 
The question that Schurink posed at the start of the gathering seemed to have 
been answered, as Schurink’s closing statements reflected: 
 
“The place of religion in our society has changed considerably. While 50 
years ago nobody could imagine charity without Christian inspiration, nowa-
days Christian inspiration is for a large part replaced by other methods that 
have resulted in a great generalization of the services. Even though quality 
and expertise are certainly recognized as preconditions, the Salvation Army 
adheres to the point of view that in these services, the Christian aspect is in-
valuable, also in these times. Hence our package of services also aims to in-
clude this deeper dimension, that has to become visible in, amongst others, 
the contact with those who need help in certain situations of their lives. (…) 
With this we are very well aware of the fact that in (professional) services 
quality deserves attention primarily, at all times. We believe that the Chris-
tian aspect of our philosophy also gives an impetus to that.”97 
 
                                                        
 
96 This panel consisted of Army representatives, politicians, scientists, representatives from government 
and the work field: De Pree (MP, PvdA); Van Meteren (Provinciale Staten Noord-Holland, VVD); Van 
Leeuwen (Wethouder - Alderwoman, Zoetermeer, CDA); chairman Jansen (Manager a.i. Salvation Army 
Nursing and Care; Luchtmeyer (Manager Health Insurance Fund Rotterdam); Noorlander (Manager 
Salvation Army Youth Department and Manager a.i. Nursing and Care); Van Beugen (Catholic Universi-
ty of Nijmegen); Gijsbers (Director-general Welzijn, Ministery of WVC) 
97 “De plaats van de godsdienst in onze samenleving is aanzienlijk veranderd. Was het 50 jaar geleden 
voor niemand denkbaar zich naastenliefde en charitas voor te stellen zonder christelijke inspiratie, tegen-
woordig is voor een groot deel de christelijke inspiratie vervangen door andere benaderingswijzen die tot 
een sterke veralgemenisering van de dienstverlening hebben geleid. Hoewel kwaliteit en deskundigheid 
zeker als voorwaarden erkend worden, blijft het Leger des Heils de mening toegedaan dat in de dienstver-
lening het christelijke aspect ook in deze tijd van onschatbare waarde is. Vandaar dat er in ons hulpverle-
ningsaanbod naar wordt gestreefd ook die diepere dimensie aanwezig te laten zijn, wat o.a. moet worden 
gezien in de omgang met hen die in bepaalde situaties van hun leven hulp nodig hebben. (…) Hierbij zijn 
we ons terdege bewust dat in de (professionele) dienstverlening de kwaliteit te allen tijde primair aan-
dacht verdient. Wij vinden dat vanuit onze filosofie het christelijk aspect daar mede een aanzet toe geeft.” 
Christelijke indentiteit en maatschappelijke dienstverlening, 1987:3 
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In this statement Schurink implied that he felt supported by the contributions of 
Van Beugen and Gijsbers that it was especially the Christian aspect of the Army 
that gave a positive impetus to the quality of its work. And especially in the light 
of the public debate on the welfare state during the 1980s, the Army seemed to 
be of at least certain value to the government. This image was confirmed by the 
Dutch press as reporter Gérard van Tillo observed in his account of the Salva-
tion Army centennial symposium, that:  
 
“The Salvation Army has a future to the extent that the welfare state 
fails. Never before has an organization caught the wind in its sails be-
cause of that.”98  
 
On the other hand, the Army was still confronted with a development on the 
local level that seemed to indicate that municipalities were aiming to get rid of 
it. Such contradictory signals also became visible on other levels during the 
1980s. 
2.3. Contradictory signals 
The era of economization and cutbacks during the 1980s gave municipalities the 
opportunity to leave their mark on local social policy. Even though this had its 
consequences for social service organizations like the Salvation Army, the total 
costs of the Salvation Army’s social services did not decrease. but even re-
mained practically the same during this decade. In 1980 these costs were 
fl.79,665,907 and in 1989 they amounted to fl.79,614,329.99 At the same time, 
the total net worth of the Salvation Army’s organization rose during these years 
from fl.172,647,167 in 1980 to a spectacular fl.279,410,553,- in 1989. One of 
the main contributing factors was the increase in fixed capital such as the acqui-
sition of new property and the increasing value of possessions (fl.107,416,841 in 
1980 and fl.137,652,098 in 1989). Another contribution came from the rising 
value of investments. The Salvation Army had developed an early habit of in-
vesting a part of its surplus in stocks and bonds. The rangeof investment varied 
from the Dutch Railroad Company (NS), the Dutch State, Royal Dutch Airline 
(KLM), to various social funds and banks.100 These investments now paid off, 
for while in 1980 the total amount of investments was a mere fl.27,106,547, by 
1989 it had quadrupled to a whopping fl.100,264,478.101 
The perceived aim of municipalities to get rid of the Army was contrasted by 
the fact that, at odds with the general tendency of cutbacks, new support was 
                                                        
 
98 “Het leger des Heils heeft toekomst naar mate de verzorgingsstaat verstek laat gaan. Nooit heeft een 
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allocated to the Army on a local level more than once. In February 1985, the 
town of Goes in the province of Zeeland allowed the Salvation Army to open a 
building to facilitate recycling activities, and in Driebergen, Voorburg and 
Veendam too, new homes were opened or planned to be opened.102 In May 
1985, the Amsterdam Goodwill Center reported that the municipality seemed to 
be prepared to make new subsidies available to finance the 24/7 opening of the 
center for homecare.103 Even though the residential home of the Army’s youth 
care was under pressure in Utrecht, against the odds, the municipality did actual-
ly agree to financially support a cheaper alternative: a bus that functioned as “a 
mobile living room”.104 In August 1986 the Army’s field department reported 
the opening of several new buildings by the corps of Alphen a/d Rijn, Delft and 
Beverwijk. Also the Care and Nursing Department announced the construction 
of a new building in Almere for the elderly. At the same time, in Dordrecht the 
municipality was considering subsidizing the renovation of an elderly home. 
Their reason to do so was actually “the Christian character of the home”. This 
led the responsible officer to state that the same argument could be applied in 
order to persuade the municipality of Baarn to do the same. In Rijswijk also, 
new construction plans seemed to be received positively.105 Another example of 
newly subsidized Army activities during this decade was found in Groningen. 
For even though in November 1986 the coordinating council observed that the 
youth department had to make drastic cutbacks for 1987 because the Ministry of 
WVC was about to change the system of budget subsidies, the members them-
selves were astonished with the fact that the Groningen municipality allocated a 
subsidy of fl.100,000 to a new family shelter project of the Army.106 Similarly 
amazing was the fact that, even though the residential youth work suffered fi-
nancial hardship and workers were let go, as seen in the Utrecht case, the non-
residential youth work continuously grew and people were actually hired.107 To 
add to these observations, in March 1987 the Army swiftly bought a new build-
ing because the Rotterdam Goodwill activities had grown to such an extent that 
certain “accommodation problems” had risen.108 
The national and local trend during this period was financial economization, 
and in case of specific areas of the work field, this was translated into concrete 
cutbacks. Additionally, some municipalities questioned the practical implica-
tions of the Army’s Christian identity with the threat of revoking their subsidies. 
Nevertheless, the above examples show that even though these measures led to a 
lot of financial pressure on the Army, it did not automatically mean that these 
local governments wanted “to get rid of the Army”, as the Army presumed. 
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Even during the times of financial hardship that the 1980s characterized, the 
government seemed to value the Salvation Army as a partner in the social policy 
system. There was however, still some unfinished business for the Salvation 
Army to deal with, because, as the Army’s modernization process reveals, it was 
still struggling with its legal and moral identity. 
3. Democratization coming to a head 
3.1. COR: a field of tension 
After the ruling of the judicial department of the Raad van State in May 1978 on 
the matter of whether or not to allow works councils to be formed within the 
ranks of the Salvation Army, the Army was compelled to install works councils 
in its various departments.109 A few years later these councils were represented 
in a central works council (COR) – the main organ of democratic participation 
with which the Army command was to deal. The report of the Committee-Van 
der Burg had described three fields of tension that had to be addressed by new 
legal adjustments: 1) the statutes of these subsidized organizations, 2) the per-
ceived gap between the professionals and their managers in these organizations, 
and 3) the perceived gap between the professionals and their clients. At the same 
time, the committee concluded that further democratization could very well 
affect the organizational identity, for it allowed all workers to have certain influ-
ence on the organizational policy, irrespective of their measure of commitment 
or other characteristics.110 This sudden vulnerability seemed to have invoked a 
thorough adjustment of hiring policies of institutions, as the example of the Sal-
vation Army shows. The Army made the adherence to its Christian identity a 
precondition of appointment. 
That the Army command had learned from its experiences with the unsuc-
cessful attempt to delay the establishment of works councils, became clear in 
May 1984. In preparation of the Bill on democratization, the government 
seemed to aim for the enhancement of the democratization possibilities for an-
other group of stakeholders – clients – by mandatory installment of client coun-
cils for all subsidized social service providers. The coordinating council 
acknowledged that this also was awaiting the Army, and Fijn and Van 
Teijlingen stated that it was better not to wait for things to happen, but to antici-
pate this development policy-wise:  
 
“That way the Salvation Army can control the matter better. Even though it 
is still a proposal Bill, Fijn and Van Teijlingen insisted getting into the mat-
ter, even before the law is adopted, and through an amendment, to possibly 
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attempt to take off the sharp edges. The Salvation Army, possibly, by exper-
imenting within its sectors, can come up with a better model that is tested in 
daily practice.”111 
 
Commander Cox seemed to be in two minds. On the one hand he acknowledged 
the possibility that this new democratic arrangement for clients could conflict 
with Army ‘rules’: 
 
“Of course it cannot be the case that the Salvation Army people have no say 
over anything in their own care homes, but there are also positive sides to it. 
We have to face both.”112 
 
So, on the other hand, the Army’s reflex to counter anything that might infringe 
on its autonomy was restrained by the acknowledgement of possible upsides to 
what had previously been regarded as merely negative. Even though the possible 
downside of this client council plan was clear to the Army, a vanguard strategy 
of early influencing was adopted. 
Also on another level, the Army’s command showed flexibility. During a 
discussion on how to involve the COR in the appointment process of a new staff 
manager, two management models were discussed that could be applied in this 
context. The first was the consultative model that meant that the COR was to be 
involved in the process from the first moment on. The second model was the 
diktat model and implied that the TC appointed a new staff manager and subse-
quently informed the COR. Even though, when viewed from the outside, the 
second model might have suited the Army’s organizational culture quite well, 
the coordinating council decided that the consultative model was to be preferred, 
alas without retraceable argumentation.113 So, by September 1984, the Army 
command and the coordinating council showed that it took a far more flexible 
position towards the matter of democratization than before. This however, did 
not mean that the search for how to shape the relationship between the Army 
command and its works councils had come to an end, because still, almost 5 
years after their installation, the coordinating council spent a whole study day on 
how this relationship could be formed.114 This was not without reason, for the 
COR did actually show active involvement in Army policy. For example, the 
COR stated that it clearly favored the idea of a selection committee above a one-
                                                        
 
111 “Dan kan het Leger des Heils de zaak ook beter in de hand houden. Het gaat nog om een wetsvoorstel, 
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headed approval of applications. In this case, the COR pressured for a system of 
approval in which at least more than one person would be responsible for the 
appointment of new applicants.115 
Also with regard to the matter of volunteers, the COR forced the coordinat-
ing council to be clear on its standpoint as it reacted on this issue because the 
Army was in the habit of sometimes deploying retired officers or other volun-
teers for positions that might also be filled by professionals – a form of enroll-
ment of volunteers that, according to the COR, might endanger regular employ-
ment. This observation led to a discussion during the coordinating council meet-
ing of April 1985. The governmental trend of economization had resulted in 
redundancies, but when the financial means to hire a professional were reduced 
by the government, was it alright to re-appoint such an individual as a volun-
teer? Or, in a broader sense, was it alright to appoint a volunteer instead of a 
professional?116 According to the entire coordinating council, when viewed from 
the perspective of employment this was not alright, but in addition, Van 
Teijlingen suggested that the dividing line between the tasks of the professional 
and the volunteer had changed over time. Forced by the government cutbacks, 
the range of duties of the professional had clearly been reduced.  
 
“Because of this, you are forced to determine again and again what job be-
longs to the volunteer and what has to be done by the paid staff.”117 
 
The fact that the COR started to ask certain questions on the issue of volunteers, 
did spark a sense of urgency within the coordinating council on this subject. 
Also on other subjects the COR was able to assert its influence, as the discussion 
on the restructuring of the organization will show. 
3.2. Probation Department: identity and proxy 
Next to democratization, another result of the professionalization process played 
out its course. The Army was growingly confronted with the ongoing govern-
mental pressure on the probation organizations to unite. The axiom of a free 
market and less public expenditure resulted in a growing demand for efficiency 
of social services, in combination with financial cutbacks. For the probation 
sector, this proved to be a difficult task because of the hardening climate of 
crime as crime rates increased and organized crime flourished. Unemployment, 
poverty, drug abuse, and ethnical problems grew, and the increasing sense of 
social insecurity led to a call for more severe punishment. As crime and proba-
tion became important issues on the Dutch political agenda during the 1980s, the 
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probation organizations in general, held the point of view that their purpose was 
to function as a loyal but critical partner of the Ministry of Justice.118 
Diverging courses 
In 1982, the probation department of the Salvation Army presented its national 
policy plan called Van organisatie naar beweging (“From organization towards 
movement”). Its core idea was that the probation department had to go back to 
its roots and become a broader movement than being just a partner of the gov-
ernment. The plan stated that the reinforcement of criminal law revealed that the 
society did not know how to deal with inter-human conflicts; conflicts that were 
the product of power differences between social groups, in combination with an 
increase in poverty. On the other hand, the Salvation Army probation depart-
ment was caught between two evils. Being part of the social policy system, it 
was also part of the criminal law system. This latter system was however, exact-
ly the very system that the Army wanted to confront on this matter of power 
differences. In his presentation of the plans of the probation department, manag-
er Fijn made a plea to work towards “extra-judicial conflict resolution” (an ap-
proach that can be compared to the current methods of mediation). In order to 
facilitate this innovative method, the Salvation Army had to be a refuge, a neu-
tral ground. This idea stirred up quite some debate within the Army’s probation 
department.119  
The Dutch government also seemed to aim for quite a different policy line 
than the one Fijn had presented. After the previous unsuccessful attempts of the 
probation umbrella organization ARV, to reorganize the probation work field, 
now the Ministry of Justice itself took the lead. In May 1982, it presented a re-
organization proposal called Taak en Structuur van de Reclassering in Neder-
land (Task and structure of probation work in the Netherlands). In this proposal, 
certain models of reorganization of the work field were presented, additional to 
the proposal to shift policy responsibility and control of the deployment of 
means from the probation organizations to the government.120 This policy inten-
tion suggested that with this increase in government responsibility over proba-
tion matters, the actual probation organizations would be reduced to mere ad-
ministrative organs that had only to choose whether or not to agree with their 
government-initiated assignments. Heinrich appropriately concludes that with 
the acceptance of this proposal the probation organizations would give up their 
independence and even their cherished private character.121 
At first, the probation organizations showed some opposition to this pro-
posal, especially because the main rationale behind these plans was formed by 
motives of economization and efficiency and not the quality of work. It was 
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estimated that already in 1982 the probation work field would receive 
fl.8,000,000 less in subsidies. The Salvation Army, in addition, reacted against 
the diminishing plurality of organizations. According to the Army, the faith-
based element could not be missed from the work field and therefore it kept with 
its position that it did not want to merge into any other organization whatsoever. 
The Army however, had to do something in order to counter the government 
proposal, and in December 1982, together with the ARV, the Salvation Army 
announced that it would increase their cooperation in a federate structure. The 
idea encountered forceful resistance within the Salvation Army, especially from 
the works council of the probation department. It was assessed that the plans 
offered too little guarantee against the threat of loss of identity, and the plan was 
canceled.122 
Heading for a conflict 
Almost a year after disclosing its policy intentions with regard to harmonization, 
in March 1983 the Ministry of Justice presented its concept of the Reclasser-
ingsregeling for 1986. This plan included many of the ideas that were presented 
in Taak en Structuur. The probation work field would have to restructure into 19 
autonomous districts and these districts would be unified in a national federation 
that decided on policy lines for all districts. In their turn, the districts were al-
lowed to interpret these policy lines on their own account.123 For the Salvation 
Army probation department, this proposed constellation was unacceptable. The 
Army traditionally operated on a nationwide level, and confinement to a certain 
district directly opposed the Army’s ambition to reach as many people as possi-
ble. The second problem was that in these plans the district’s management 
would become responsible for the Army’s probation work and its workers. In 
fact, these new plans endangered the continuance of the Salvation Army’s pro-
bation department. In a written reaction to the Reclasseringsregeling proposal, 
the Army emphasized that it was much more than just a probation organization. 
It was an internationally known and well-respected community of faith, as well 
as a social service provider. The organization involved thousands of people and, 
as the Army argued, to demand for such an organization to give up its autonomy 
and identity in order to reorganize and economize, would be unrealistic.124 
This reaction incited a series of deliberations between the Army and the Min-
istry of Justice, and also the ARV and other probation organizations pulled up a 
chair in the discussion. Soon however, it became clear that the Army remained 
the only obstructionist. The other parties accepted the idea of working in dis-
tricts, and now the former ally of the Army, the CADs, which like the Army 
fulfilled a national service as well, also complied and accepted a status as a con-
tract partner of the government, as was suggested in the Reclasseringsregeling 
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proposal. The Army however, continued to decline such a status, for this would 
still mean a significant reduction in autonomy as Army probation teams would, 
as sub-contractors, work under the responsibility of the district management. 125 
So, with no alternatives left but to give up a part of its organization and identity, 
the Army engaged in battle. 
The first move on the battle scene was made by Commander Cox. In Decem-
ber 1983 he wrote a letter to the Second Chamber arguing that the Army was 
being deprived of its managerial responsibilities towards its probation work, 
reducing the Army’s organization to merely providing for spiritual counsel to 
the workers. Furthermore, the Army’s General also engaged in the battle and he 
also wrote to the Dutch parliament. In his turn, he underlined the threat of the 
Army’s probation work in the Netherlands being cut loose from the international 
organization – a development that in his opinion defied all historical founda-
tions. Next to this high-profile attack on the proposed plans, a more intermediate 
level opposition was also raised by the Army’s management. The management 
of the probation department tried to win political parties within the Second 
Chamber for their cause, by contacting possible supporters like Evenhuis-van 
Essen (CDA), Trippels (VVD) and Leerling (RPF).126  
These specific opening salvos were followed by a more widespread attack: 
now the Army mobilized the public opinion. It sent pamphlets to various organi-
zations and institutions in the Netherlands, and on the first day of the budget 
debate in the Second Chamber (January 31st, 1984), the Army organized what 
has become known within Army ranks as the “March at the Binnenhof”.127 On 
this day the Army’s brass band, accompanied by Salvationists and other adher-
ents, marched through the inner city of Den Haag and ended their procession at 
the central square of the Binnenhof. Accompanied by an overt display of flags 
and the shining brass of their instruments and omnipresent uniform buttons, the 
Army’s command presented a petition signed by thousands of adherents, to the 
chairperson of the Parliamentary Committee of Justice. 
Whether or not as a result of the Army’s offensive, during the debate in the 
Second Chamber, a CDA-VVD resolution was adopted that incited the parties to 
return to the negotiating table. The manager of the probation department, Fijn 
again engaged in close consultation with the State Secretary of Justice, Korte-
Van Hemel, in order to construct a policy framework for their cooperation.128 
The result of this new round of negotiations was a statement of principles, that 
affirmed that after the reorganization, as put forth in the Reclasseringsregeling 
proposal, the Salvation Army was to contribute to the districts, be it in a valua-
ble manner and under its own responsibility. This last part was especially of 
great importance to the Army. On the other hand, the direction of the probation 
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work would change focus form a national level to the districts. A level that in its 
turn was subject to government directions. So, in the end, the Army complied 
with a painful compromise. It was allowed to maintain its own probation work 
and workers, but it had to give up its individual national policy.129 
Aftermath: the Army’s probation department as a government proxy 
It is hard to assess the effects of the Army’s efforts to influence the decision-
making process in the Second Chamber. One of the Army’s probation profes-
sionals who had been closely involved in the creation of the probation policy 
during that period, Maris, stated that the Army was able to appeal to an enor-
mous amount of goodwill amongst the Dutch people: “We actually lacked valid 
reasons to stay apart, but we have just always been a good organization.” And, 
especially after the sensational march at the Binnenhof, the debate stopped. Ac-
cording to Maris this was because the politicians must have thought: “Well, 
that’s the Army, we cannot get around it.”130 Fijn remembered this moment as 
an important contribution to the internal search for how to operationalize the 
Salvation Army’s unique identity. He remembered this march as a demonstra-
tion of “the unique evangelical element” that the Army possessed.131 
The Army’s probation department had been confronted with a predicament 
over which choices would lead to a certain measure of surrender of its identity. 
The options were: merger into another organization; discontinuance of the work, 
or become a contract-partner and hope to preserve some of its own identity. The 
choice the Army made ensured that the probation work was able to continue. 
This new position of a contract partner seemed to have reduced the probation 
department to a mere instrument in the hands of the Ministry of Justice. On an 
internal level, however, this struggle for perseverance of the probation work for 
the Army led to positive results. Throughout the Salvation Army, and in fact on 
all levels, the Army had shown that it valued its probation work very much. 
Even though the probation department had been perceived as the odd one out, it 
proved to form an essential part of the Salvation Army’s identity. In this sense, 
for many Salvationists, the march at the Binnenhof was the symbol of unity and 
fraternization of the Army’s ranks – a symbol that to a certain extent evokes the 
biblical image of the prodigal son. 
The new proxy-position that the probation department found itself in, was to 
be operationalized swiftly into a workable policy for the Army’s probation de-
partment. Presumably with his back against the wall, the department’s manager 
Fijn accepted the policy of district concentration as opposed to the policy line 
that had formerly been chosen in the case of the Amsterdam Goodwill Center. 
Fijn argued that after much internal debate, this policy line was chosen because 
it was the best of the three options that were left to the Salvation Army. From 
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now on, the Salvation Army was responsible for those discharged prisoners that 
would voluntarily choose for the Army:  
 
“Viewed from the perspective of the individual character of the Salvation 
Army – an institution with a general (i.e. available for everybody) package of 
services that are motivated and designed from a strong inner conviction 
about life – it would be more or less ideal, when a ‘choice by the probation-
er’ could function as such.”132 
 
In daily practice however, this did not work as well as was presumed. In many 
court districts the choice by the probationer appeared to have been hindered by 
other probation organizations, and in those court districts where it did seem to be 
possible to choose, 60% to 90% of the probationers did not make a choice at all 
– they did not seem to care. So, in order to preserve its market share, the Salva-
tion Army concluded that it had to create clear and simple criteria in order to 
stop its dependency on these more accidental and varying factors. There were 
three options available. The first option was the division of probation tasks be-
tween all parties involved, but with the battle for preservation still in mind, this 
option was basically unacceptable for the Army. Coherence between all parts of 
its social services had proven to be an intrinsic part of the Army’s identity. The 
second option was a segmentation of the different target groups, but even though 
it fitted the philosophy of the Army to serve the weakest of society, this option 
had shown not to be the most effective. As Fijn added, this “could not be asked 
from our workers with regard to a reasonable workload and job satisfaction”.133 
So, this left open the last option: division into coherent districts in which all 
different tasks and target groups could be serviced. This would only be accepta-
ble when the right of the probationer to choose for an organization was guaran-
teed. It also implied that a discharged prisoner was allowed to seek for care 
across the district borders when he desired. This last option was the only way for 
the Army to “remain available to everyone as usual”, as Fijn stated.134 And the 
Army decided accordingly. 
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4. Legal incorporation 
4.1. Two lines of reasoning 
As described in Chapter 4, the initial motivation to change the Army’s statutes 
came from the internal need to address the matter of possession of real estate in 
the Dutch territory, first from the side of the London headquarters, and later 
from the Dutch Army command itself. This need rekindled the debate on the 
legal form of the Dutch Salvation Army - a debate that ran parallel to another 
problem: how to frame the Army’s twin mission in a contemporary and compre-
hensive mission statement? The fact that the problems of legal and organization-
al structure and the Army’s mission were addressed simultaneously, is no coin-
cidence. Both were essential to the Army’s identity as the process of redefining 
this identity reached its peak during the 1980s. 
With the abolishment of the legal form of ecclesiastical foundation in 1976, 
the Army’s legal status came under fire once again and, as Ringelberg describes 
vividly, the connected issues of the Army’s mission and its legal identity were 
extensively debated within the Army ranks. On April 19, 1977, the Territorial 
Financial Council (TFR) of the Salvation Army gathered to discuss the draft of 
the statutes written by the Army’s legal advisor Houthoff.135 This draft was 
already based on the newly adopted version of the Army’s mission, and Com-
mander Verwaal had invited Houthoff himself, as well as Hartjes and Fijn to this 
meeting. Soon it became clear that Hartjes disagreed with Houthoff’s premise 
that the Army was basically a church, as he had stated in the first article of his 
new statutes. In return, Houthoff argued that the Army had been using the term 
foundation in the sense of an ecclesiastical foundation. Hartjes however, argued 
for his part that the Salvation Army was a foundation and secular, in terms of the 
law, with religious activities that were developed under the name of a church for 
“practical reasons”. He continued with stating that in the future the Salvation 
Army could not be primarily a church with derived ecclesiastical foundations, 
because according to the author of the Civil Code, Meijers, any subdivision of a 
church had to be of a religious character. That was hardly the case, as Hartjes 
put it, with the Army’s recycling work or its low budget hotels, and Houthoff’s 
viewpoint led to the conclusion that certain parts of the Army’s activities had to 
be separated from its core into foundations. In Hartjes’ view, this would lead to 
the splitting of the indivisible coin of its identity. In order to preserve the inter-
nal organizational unity, Hartjes argued that it was best that the Army preserved 
the legal status quo of the statutes of 1946 – of the Army as a foundation.136 
This implied however, that in order to remain eligible for government support, 
the Army had to present itself more distinctly as a foundation than as a church. 
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During this debate two lines of thought became discernible. Both parties 
meant well for the Army and both parties were searching for the optimal balance 
between preservation of the Army’s identity (translated as internal coherence) 
and the external political context that the Army had to deal with. There were 
however, distinct differences between the two lines of thought on what this iden-
tity actually encompassed and how this was to be organized in the best possible 
way, and both parties based their argument on the statutes of 1946. Analysis of 
the ‘Houthoff-argument’ shows that it represented the idea that the Salvation 
Army was at its core a Christian community, a church. Everything else was 
subsidiary to this core. This idea was strongly supported by the Army’s leader-
ship. The ‘Hartjes-argument’ on the other hand, did not exactly contradict 
Houthoff’s reasoning, but it expressed a more equal position for both the reli-
gious and the social mission, arguing that both were equally important, as Wil-
liam Booth had described in 1890. According to Ringelberg, this view found 
more supporters in the Army’s rank and file of officers and employees.137 Ver-
waal nevertheless, chose for the ‘Houthoff-argument’. Even though his underly-
ing motives are no longer retraceable, the Army position towards government 
interference makes it plausible to assume that this choice was based on the idea 
that the legal form of a church would give more freedom of organization than a 
foundation. Also, the consequent accommodation of many of its subsidized 
social services in a separate foundation was not perceived by Verwaal as a prob-
lematic split in the Army’s identity. 
4.2. Mission statement altered again 
With the rise of the debate on the Army’s legal position, the rather newly 
phrased mission statement of the Army was also brought up for discussion. 
When in 1977 the chief editor of the Strijdkreet, Filius questioned the balance 
between the religious and social mission, he stated that the social work activities 
were “mere auxiliary forces” in the Army’s effort for spiritual conversion.138 As 
this argument was rather in line with the Houthoff argument, it is of no surprise 
that Verwaal was sensitive to this view. He was even prepared to review the new 
mission again, and in November 1977 he established a committee to carry out 
this task. Again this committee was staffed by Ligtelijn, Nijman and Fijn, just as 
its predecessor, but now Hartjes was replaced by Filius.139 That the almost unal-
tered staff on this committee raised no objections to a rather new orientation 
became patently clear, for the new wording of the mission had become:  
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“The Salvation Army is a community of people who know that their sins are 
forgiven and who are bound together by the love for God and fellow men, 
with the shared goal to bring others to Christ.”140 
 
This version of the Army’s mission not only made explicit that evangelization 
was the most important goal of the Army, but it also totally replaced any refer-
ence to the Army’s social objective. Fijn, who had contributed to the new phras-
ing of the mission, was displeased with this result, for the quest for freedom 
from government influence that the Army command had pursued seemed to 
have made social work quite auxiliary to spiritual work in terms of organization-
al structure.141 
The result of the renewed debate on the Army’s mission and the abrogation 
of the ‘ecclesiastical foundation’ incited Houthoff to rewrite his proposal for the 
new statutes. Now that the hybrid form of ecclesiastical foundation was no long-
er valid, in a theoretical sense, the intended legal detachment from the Interna-
tional Headquarters meant that the Dutch Army had to choose between becom-
ing a church or a foundation. This meant that the choice between freedom from 
government influence and the preservation of organizational unity now proved 
to be a new dilemma. A matter that was mirrored at the grassroots level, for any 
decision Verwaal made between the ‘Houthoff-argument’ or the ‘Hartjes-
argument’ might automatically mobilize a countermovement from supporters of 
the other line of thought. Nevertheless, a choice had to be made. When Verwaal 
decided to follow the Houthoff-line of thought, a widespread commotion was 
detectable throughout the Army ranks that prevented the debate from stop-
ping.142 
In 1980, legal advisor Dijk stated, in line with Houthoff, that based on the 
statutes of 1946 the Army was actually a church, and if the Army wanted to be a 
foundation, it had to adapt its organization to the Civil Code. Dijk advised, con-
clusively, to preserve the status of the Army as a religious denomination.143 As a 
result, Verwaal’s interim successor Commander Nelting (1978-1980) ordered 
avoiding the use of the term foundation in official documents like employment 
contracts, but once again the Army command found the Central Works Council 
in its path. Led by Nieuwland the COR protested against this decision. They 
were further supported by Fijn who warned that when the Salvation Army would 
present itself as a church it would create a new legal problem, because in retro-
active effect, it would have received much of its subsidies till date, illegally. 
And, he added in line with Hartjes, in 1946 the Army had not dissolved its status 
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of a foundation and thus the establishment of a new foundation was superfluous. 
A mere presentation of the Army as a foundation seemed to solve the problem, 
but even though the ‘Hartjes-argument’ seemed to have gained some ground, 
once again the two factions found themselves opposed to one another. 
In order to come to a definite solution, in October 1980 Commander Nelting 
gathered all parties, including the representatives of two workers unions and the 
Ministry of Justice. During this meeting Goedemans, Director of the Probation 
Section of the Ministry of Justice, made very clear that a church was not eligible 
for subsidies, but in addition, he granted the Army command a year to solve this 
legal problem.144 This remark presumably strengthened the fear that Fijn had 
expressed earlier: the Army should not become solely a church, nor split up the 
organization. On the other hand, it also confirmed the ‘Houthoff-argument’ in 
that a separate foundation was needed in order to secure further subsidies and to 
guarantee the corps their freedom. Additionally, the pressure to decide on how 
to reorganize in a structural and durable manner had increased even more, and 
this time under an external influence. 
Another externally initiated pressure began to accumulate as the call for im-
plementation of democratic participation of employees and clients grew louder 
and louder. In May 1978 the Army was decreed to install works councils, but the 
implementation process proved to take some time and in addition, as described 
above, now client’s councils were to be installed as well. As difficult as these 
developments with regard to its social work departments were for the Army 
command to accept, in the case of the Army’s fieldwork department (corps) the 
idea of democratic participation was unthinkable and as long as the Salvation 
Army remained one legal entity, the influences of democratic participation 
would also touch upon this part of the Army’s work. When viewed in this light, 
some sort of isolation of this organizational branch seemed a rather sound idea, 
and strengthened by the confronting meeting with Goedemans, Commander 
Nelting asked Dijk to draft statutes for separate foundations for the probation 
work and the youth homes department, which were to be swiftly sent to London 
for approval. Before the General had answered, however, the works council of 
the probation department claimed its right to give its opinion on the drafts.145 
Even though the search for coherence between an acceptable legal identity and a 
compatible mission had become a complex effort because of the various internal 
groups and individuals that influenced the process, it was actually an external 
influence that would soon prove to be of overriding importance. 
4.3. The Gordian knot (1983) 
This Gordian knot was finally cut in 1983. In December 1982, the Dutch weekly 
Vrij Nederland issued a Christmas special on the Salvation Army and how it 
managed its flow of funds. This critical article sparked the suspicion of the insti-
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tution that granted permits of public collections in the Netherlands: Central Ar-
chives for the Collection system (CAC). Until this publication the CAC had not 
been aware of the fact that the Salvation Army was a church, and a church was 
not allowed to make public collections.146 Soon the CAC announced that the 
Salvation Army would only be allowed to continue to collect public money 
when it adapted the legal form of foundation or association.147 In combination 
with the remarks of Goedemans and the growing pressure for democratic partic-
ipation, this notification seemed to have tipped the scale in favor of Houthoff’s 
argument.  
The Army had to react with adequate measures, because the monetary flow 
for both the social and the spiritual mission was now in danger, and in both cas-
es the solution seemed to be clear-cut: real estate and other property matters 
would have to be accommodated in one or more separate foundations. So, in 
order to survive financially, the Salvation Army had to become a foundation or 
association. 
5. Solving the ‘chronic problem’: reorganization of identity 
Just before Verwaal’s second term as Army’s Territorial Commander was ter-
minated, he established a committee that was to come up with a first draft of 
how the new organizational structure could be shaped, taking into account all 
the issues and arguments previously discussed. This so-called “committee on the 
legal form” consisted of Ligtelijn (Assistant-Chief-Secretary); Van Nee (Army’s 
secretary for Legal Matters); Van Boven (financial secretary of the Army); Ter 
Haar (successor of Dijk as external legal adviser of the Army); Jansen (Manager 
of the department of Care and Nursing); and Telling (external accountant).148 
The committee worked with a lot of drive and already in the very same year, 
gave their recommendations. These recommendations followed the arguments of 
Houthoff suggesting the establishment of a new so-called “mother-foundation” 
that included three sub-organizations: the religious denomination based on the 
existing legal form; a new foundation called “services” that would be responsi-
ble for all coordinating and other general functions; and a new foundation called 
“welfare and health care” in which all social work sectors would be combined. 
The proposal was cheerfully welcomed and in due time also approved by the 
General in London.  
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Even though the matter now seemed to be settled, this was not by far the end 
of it. For now that a transparent proposal had been presented, the Army’s grass-
roots came to action and already in March 1983, the sectoral works councils 
fiercely opposed these plans. Six out of nine councils reacted unfavorably and 
they collectively appealed to the Ondernemingskamer (Central Chamber of 
Business). The President of the Chamber however, decided that both parties had 
to continue their deliberations until they had worked out a solution, and subse-
quently both parties agreed on calling for expert help. This aid was offered by 
the lawyer Van Schilfgaarde who, like Dijk, assessed in August 1984 that the 
Salvation Army was a church by law, and that if it would change into a secular 
foundation it would lose its denominational status.149  
Even though this was not the first time that the conclusion was drawn that 
the Army was a church, the political and legal context in which this took place 
now, had changed considerably from earlier. The new Civil Code and the de-
mands from the Ministry of Justice and the CAC all pointed in the direction that 
in order for the Army to be able to maintain its subsidy-relations, it would have 
to incorporate into a foundation or association.150 Another consequence of this 
assessment of Schilfgaarde was that the ‘Salvation Army church’ could never be 
included in a mother-foundation, as was proposed by the committee. In the view 
of the Salvation Army, a foundation was too vulnerable to external regulation as 
the Army command argued: 
 
“(…) The work of the corps should explicitly be placed in a church in order 
to guarantee that in the spiritual work the freedom is preserved to take points 
of view so as to pursue policy from our respective biblical view without be-
ing impeded by, for instance, restrictions which the legislator might put in 
book II of the Civil Code.” 151 
 
Combined with the additional demand of the CAC that the Army would adopt 
such a legal specification that fitted “with the demands made by law at which a 
public raising of funds is not permitted for denominations”, the additional con-
sequence was that the social work was to “be placed in a foundation or associa-
tion on the basis of subsidy schemes.” This suggestion seemed to head for a 
growing disconnection of the spiritual and social branches of the Salvation Ar-
my in an organizational sense, a detachment to the extent that “no employees 
should be working in the denomination Salvation Army”, for all salaried social 
activities were to be centralized in a separate organizational entity. So it was 
now clear that the matter “has (had) been decided on once and for all” and that 
another thorough re-adjustment of plans was necessary. That this intention 
headed for a rearrangement of the balance between the social and spiritual parts 
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of the Army’s identity was clearly felt, as revealed by the debate in the Army’s 
coordinating council on how this new organizational structure would have to be 
shaped. 
5.1. Fundamental debate 
After the sectoral works councils agreed on continuing with the organization 
plans, a study group of 5 sub-committees, under the guidance of Ligtelijn 
(chairman) and Jansen (secretary), set out to work on subjects like ‘welfare and 
healthcare’; ‘denomination’; ‘personnel’; ‘services’ and ‘finance’.152 The start-
ing points of this study group were formed by 1) the statement of Schilfgaarde 
that the Army was a church; 2) preservation of the identity and unity of the Sal-
vation Army; 3) preservation of the legal position of members of the labor or-
ganization; and 4) preservation of the positions of the officers and Salvationists. 
These preconditions had to comply with other limiting conditions that were 
stipulated by the International Headquarters, which consisted of 1) preservation 
of the Army’s principles; 2) preservation of the position of the General as 
worldwide leader of the Salvation Army; and 3) application of internationally 
valid rules like guaranteeing of the position of the Territorial Commander, the 
Chief-Secretary and the Financial Council, and some additional directives of 
which the most important was the safeguarding of the denomination of any ex-
ternal influences like works councils.153 In November 1985 a first draft of their 
report was discussed in the coordinating council. The first issue on the agenda 
was the quality of management: 
 
“The organization the Salvation Army is part of society. Influences from that 
society also find their way into the organization. More managerial power and 
adequate management is clearly necessary. (…) The social developments 
have to be monitored closely and answered adequately. The board and man-
agement of the organization have to engage themselves with the broader pol-
icy lines more than they have been doing up to now. At the moment it is the 
case that there is too much distraction because of matters of detail. (…) High 
quality standards are set for management. Pay attention to this especially in 
a.o. training policy and hiring policy.”154 
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It was agreed upon that the new management had to be of a different caliber 
than it had ever been before. This subject was followed by another quite funda-
mental matter: decentralization of government policy. Nieuwland (a namesake 
of the chair of the COR) wondered about the extent to which the structure pro-
posed by the study group was flexible enough to anticipate diverging local situa-
tions: “Every place seems to have its own set of desires and demands”.155 Lig-
telijn replied that decentralization had been considered to the extent where it was 
possible to establish separate foundations on a local level when needed. But, as 
he hurried to add, the Salvation Army did not favor this option at all. Jansen 
came to the aid by rephrasing this issue by saying that the Army had to be able 
to “respond flexibly to demands of local communities.” . And Van Boven added, 
that after deliberation with the relevant ministries, there was no objection to-
wards the proposed legal form, nor was this to be expected on a local level.156 
But in order to put things into perspective, Jansen stated pragmatically that 
“when subsidizers pose their own demands, we will have to meet them.”157 
This positioning towards an unpredictable but unavoidable government that 
influenced the Salvation Army was further discussed with regard to the case of 
the Reformed church in Rotterdam. There, the Reformed church had been able 
to successfully claim its “own space” in order to guarantee its right of existence. 
Again Jansen dismissed the suggestion that this might also be of interest to the 
Salvation Army by stating that he held the view that “when an organization 
provides a product of good quality, local communities will probably go along 
with the wishes of such an organization.” Nieuwland, for his part, objected that 
it were not the local municipal officials but the local politicians that worried 
him. So once again it was emphasized by the council that in order to counter that 
possible obstacle, contacts with these local council members had to be main-
tained by competent Army people.158 
This part of the discussion on the external pressures on the Army’s identity 
was brought to a close via another subject: would the new foundations follow 
the recent agreement between the unions and the employer’s federations on how 
to board of subsidized organizations was to be formed? Now the idea was that at 
least a one-third of the board was to be filled by employees, and maybe in the 
future even a part was to be filled by external members. This raised the question 
of adherence to the Army’s mission. When Bakker, manager of Groot Batelaar, 
asked whether or not the new board members would have to support the Army’s 
mission statement, Jansen replied that they would indeed have to positively 
comply with the Army’s mission.159 
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The above considerations were to a certain extent connected to the Army’s 
identity, but the next item on the coordinating council’s agenda proved to touch 
upon its core. Chair of the Sub-committee on Personnel, Fijn, had written a 
memorandum in which he expressed his doubts on the proposed restructuring: 
“The Salvation Army is in crisis,” Fijn argued, referring to “a crisis of “soft-
ware” - of ideas.” In Fijn’s view, the struggle for the legal form had cost the 
Army much of its energy while the Assistant Chief Secretary had stated that 
“whether we are employees or officers, together we fight for one cause.”160 Ac-
cording to Fijn, this implied that “Salvationists are jointly responsible for the 
areas of well-being and healthcare, but also that employees are co-responsible 
for the Salvation Army as a whole.”161 Even though the unity of the Army was 
beyond dispute and had to be preserved, according to Fijn, the new plans 
seemed to head for splitting up the organization, while in his opinion, coherency 
and unity were more important aims than “security and controllability”. So, the 
crisis of software (ideas) was being addressed by changing the hardware (the 
organization), just like, as Fijn added subtly, the Ministry of Justice has done 
with the probation work field.162  
Commander Cox replied by stating that he did not share Fijn’s point of view 
because he was of the opinion that the reorganization actually accentuated the 
wish for organizational unity. According to Cox the Army lacked a sense of 
unity at the moment, but that had more to do with the “thinking of the people” 
than with the organizational form: “The legal form does not alter the thinking of 
the people.” To illustrate this, Cox drew a parallel with the case of an officer 
who is transferred from one department of the Salvation Army to another: “This 
person will not think that he is appointed to another Salvation Army.” With 
regard to Fijn’s remarks on the underlying motivation of the reorganization, Cox 
additionally argued that the core motive was not “safeguarding, control and 
continuation”, but that this legal form had been chosen “in order to bridge the 
gap that existed between the organization and the external demands”.163 When 
the Commander continued to stress that the unity within the Army would be 
strengthened by the reorganization by means of the increase of responsibilities 
on a local level, Fijn replied that the current proposal in fact, excluded the 
church from the foundation. The Commander stated that this was done because 
the external demands that were put on the foundation would be of great influ-
ence on the church, and he continued that this form had also been applied in 
other territories without alienating the church from the rest of the organiza-
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tion.164 Fijn however continued by citing his experience as manager of the pro-
bation department where he had observed a great lack of unity within the Army, 
and thus these reorganization plans would be “a psychological confirmation of 
what many already feel”. Because he regarded this division as unnecessary, Fijn 
would continue to resist it. In fact, he was of the opinion that these new plans 
would even “betray the heritage of William Booth”.165 
5.2. Tension between employee and officer 
What response this ultimate remark had brought about in the coordinating coun-
cil was not recorded in the minutes of the meeting, but the fundamental debate 
between Fijn and Cox seemed to have loosened up more tongues within the 
council. Now more members showed their reservations towards the plans. For 
example, Van der Harst stated that he preferred one, undivided organization 
because that formed the main guarantee for preservation of the Army’s identity. 
Even though he expressed his trust in the legal experts that had studied this is-
sue, Van der Harst was still of the opinion that this proposed structure “bears the 
life-size possibility that the Army will grow further apart - a process that had in 
fact already begun.”166  
Egberts too, expressed his concerns. To begin with, he confirmed that the 
question of whether or not the new legal structure would endanger the Army’s 
unity, was very much alive within his department of the homeless care as well. 
Additionally, together with Nieuwland he also addressed a new matter: the posi-
tion of the officer in this new structure. The already strained relationship be-
tween the officer and the employee seemed to be worsened by this new pro-
posal. Now officers already seemed to feel “neglected as opposed to employees, 
because of which employees were blamed for having more rights.”167 Com-
mander Cox replied that it was not so much the legal form that determined the 
position of the officers, but the fact that the Army worked with employees. This 
has caused the Works Councils Act to apply to the Salvation Army. And, as Cox 
added: 
 
“Because of these works councils, the employees have an apparatus through 
which participation and advice is arranged. The officers lack such an appa-
ratus.”168  
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So, because of the fact that the officers were not employed, they lacked a legally 
recognized right to democratic participation like the non-Army employees. At 
that time the Army had 9 sectoral councils for every type of social work, and a 
Central Works Council (COR) had only recently been established, in which all 9 
sectoral councils were represented. Even though the question of how this struc-
ture was to be continued in the new organizational form was regarded to be the 
subject of further study, it was clear that the works councils had advisory and 
approval rights with regard to the restructuring proposal. In order to smoothen 
the path towards this much-needed approval, certain details of this plan were 
discussed in advance with the council, like for example, the internal flow of 
funds and how this was subdivided between the separate organizational enti-
ties.169 Commander Cox however, emphasized that he had no problems whatso-
ever with the existence of works councils (OR): “The responsibility of a Chris-
tian organization and employer has to also be fulfilled well with regard to the 
OR.”170 When however, Cox suggested pragmatically that the other ranks of the 
Salvation Army (officers and soldiers) be informed only after the OR had given 
its reaction on the reorganization plans that they had already received, the sensi-
tivity of the tense relationship between the officers and the employees revealed 
itself once more. For the reaction of the coordinating council was that it might 
be better if this was done in an earlier stage, or “otherwise a number of officers 
will again have to learn from the employees which plans are made.”171 
5.3. Birth pangs of a new organization 
After further fine-tuning the reorganization proposal, on August 16, 1988 the 
COR received a voluminous document from Commander Schurink on the in-
tended decisions regarding the restructuring of the Salvation Army. This docu-
ment reflected the latest state of affairs on this matter as it included all adjust-
ments made on the basis of earlier remarks, discussions and COR advice. It was 
also made up to date with possible new demands from the subsidizers, and the 
COR was asked to give its formal advice on it before December 1.172 Exactly 
one day before this deadline, the COR sent its reply. It started off with a short 
description the frame of reference it used in order to “test the restructuring 
plans”. The first starting-point was democratization. In accordance with the 
demands made by several subsidizers, the COR also emphasized the fact that:  
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“(…) all parties directly and indirectly involved in the institution will also be 
able to influence the policy, to be determined and to be executed by the 
board of the institution.”173  
 
The second point was closely related to the first: participation. The COR explic-
itly stated that its mission was to facilitate the organization to function well in its 
social and economic aims (and not religious aims!). This was “not exclusively a 
matter of management, but also a task of the employees and therefore the works 
councils.” The COR stressed that in order to fulfill this task, it must operate in a 
dual tension field of consulting with management, and representing the employ-
ees and protecting their interests. The third starting-point of the COR’s advice 
was that income by subsidy and other means was to be secured and as a result, 
any flow of money (external and internal) had to be “recorded in a clear way.174 
As a fourth point, the legal position of the employees had to be guaranteed, in-
cluding “a good social policy”.175 The last point was formed by the issue of 
doelmatigheid, for a focus on efficiency had to reduce overhead costs.176 After 
having conferred with the sectoral works councils, an external consultancy 
agency, and labor unions CFD and AbvaKabo, the COR concluded that the test-
ing of the plans revealed three main “pressure points”:  
 
1) Not all foundations which employ employees have a joint management. 
2) There is no Central Works Council, which handles the affairs of all em-
ployees. 
3) The planning of two (labor) foundations results in a loss of suitability and 
an increase in costs.177 
 
In addition, there were quite a few matters that the COR wanted to see changed. 
As a 10-page long list of Army-concessions and new COR-suggestions shows, 
the COR had devoted itself to increasing the possibilities of employee participa-
tion, decreasing organizational costs, enhancing the democratic character of the 
management and boards of the foundations, and strengthening its own position 
within the new organizational structure and its influence on the Army’s identity 
by means of asserting its right of approval of changes in statutes.178 Already on 
several occasions, the COR had been asked for advice on earlier versions of the 
plans, and in general terms the COR seemed to be pleased with the results of the 
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long and intensive process of negotiation between the COR and the Army’s 
management. However, after the Army’s denial of the COR’s suggestion in 
February 1988 to establish a separate foundation to manage labor issues, the 
COR expressed its hope for other concessions from the part of the command. In 
his turn, Commander Schurink expressed the importance he attached to a swift 
and successful restructuring process, because the very next day already he had 
formulated his reply to the COR’s advice. After thanking the COR for its con-
structive attitude throughout the whole preparatory process, and a long reprisal 
of the concessions to and new demands of the COR, the Commander concluded 
that he was aware that not all of the COR’s wishes had been granted. Neverthe-
less he expressed to be: 
 
“ (…) of the opinion that a well-balanced decision has been taken with which 
a solid basis has been laid for a new legal framework of the Salvation Army 
in the Netherlands. (…) I express my faith that the new boards, works coun-
cils and all officers, employees and volunteers will cooperate in good harmo-
ny to realize the plan.”179 
 
With the approval of the reorganization intentions by the COR, the way was 
paved for the actual realization of the seven-year-long effort to modernize the 
Salvation Army and on January 1, 1990, the new organizational structure came 
into effect. 
6. The new Salvation Army (1990) 
From 1990 onwards, the Salvation Army consisted of five legal entities: a de-
nomination and four foundations. Each entity was endowed with its own as-
signment and each was responsible for a part of the many services, tasks and 
activities that the Salvation Army had developed over time in The Netherlands. 
The overall structure complied with internal aims like cost-efficiency, work 
expansion and safeguarding of the church against external influences, and be-
cause this structure was created in close consultation with the Ministries of Jus-
tice and WVC and with the CAC, it also complied with external demands on 
matters of legal form and democratization. Or, as the Army itself stated in a list 
of underlying motives for this reorganization:  
 
“1. To enlarge the flexibility to anticipate the social developments. 
2. To improve/enlarge the controlibility (sic) and efficiency of the organiza-
tion. 
3. To increase the total result of the aid.  
                                                        
 
179 Letter from Commander R.J. Schurink to the Central Works Council, November 30, 1988, quoted in: 
Decisions for legal restructuring of the Salvation Army in The Netherlands 1989:17 
 
 
231 
 
4. Space for the denomination to come to the determination of a point of 
view etc. without immediate consequences for the work within the other le-
gal bodies. 
5. The certainty for the financing of the subsidized social work. 
6. To maintain, if possible enlarge, and secure the income flows. 
7. To improve the controlibility (sic) of costs. 
8. To create more clarity regarding the legal frames of the Salvation Army 
towards third parties.”180 
 
Even though the creation of five separate entities suggested a thorough fragmen-
tation of the Salvation Army, the intention was to make as many connections 
between these entities as possible (See Appendix C, figure 1). These connec-
tions comprised the flow of funds, staffing and shared principles. 
6.1. Flow of funds 
The Foundation Salvation Army was to function as an umbrella-organization for 
all entities, interconnecting the three other foundations and the denomination by 
means of its central banking function.181 It was responsible for redistributing all 
income that was generated through “contributions from private individuals and 
organizations, bequests and legacies, and allocated government subsidies.”182 A 
part of this income was generated by the Foundation Salvation Army Fundrais-
ing. It was assigned to “actively raise funds on a central level for the financing 
of the social and humanitarian activities of the Salvation Army in the Nether-
lands”.183 This focus on the funding of the Army’s social activities by this foun-
dation was dictated by the demands of the Central Archives, for in order to con-
tinue its annual public “National Collection”, the Salvation Army had to be a 
foundation.184 This however, meant that the Foundation Salvation Army would 
focus more on the financial support of the Army’s religious activities as they 
were organized in the denomination Salvation Army. Both foundations were to 
make their generated funds available to the other two foundations, especially 
money that was earmarked for a designated activity or aimed to be spent on that 
particular goal. The other flow of funds -undesignated money - however, was 
divided amongst the denomination, the social work and other parts of the Salva-
tion Army, and in order to make this work, a distributive code was created. Ini-
tially, this code was enforced during 1984 by the ORs, but subsequently, it had 
become a regular method. The distributive code was guarded carefully against 
certain possible misinterpretations, and only with the consent of the board of the 
Foundation Salvation Army (i.c. Territorial Commander) and the Territorial 
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Financial Council, and after consultation with the boards of all the other entities 
and both Central Works Councils, could it be altered.185  
In addition to these two entities, the Foundation Salvation Army Services 
was to render administrative and executive services on a contract basis to the 
other entities, including the denomination.186 Next to the income that these ser-
vices generated, the foundation could profit from contributions made by private 
individuals and organizations, bequests, and legacies, on the condition that these 
were especially allocated to this foundation.187 The core of the Salvation Army’s 
social work was embodied in the Foundation Salvation Army Welfare and 
Health Care. This entity was assigned to prepare and execute policy and to or-
ganize separate working-units in order to carry out its “institutionalized social 
work”.188 Headed by a board and supported by a national bureau, these working-
units were probation; social-psychological care (a.o. Groot Batelaar); youth 
welfare (both residential and non-residential); care and nursing; homeless care; 
goodwill centers; sociocultural work & life education (also for the Army em-
ployees and members).189 Finally, yet importantly, as mentioned above, the 
denomination Salvation Army would remain an entity on its own, based on its 
legal status of 1946 as a church. 
6.2. Staffing 
Now that the separation of the social work activities and the religious core of the 
Salvation Army had been legally confirmed and given shape in a new organiza-
tional form, it was even more essential to the Army to secure its identity. With 
regard to this matter, the staffing of the organization was of great importance, 
for the Salvation Army had always held the view that the core of its identity was 
formed by its staff, and especially by its vocational volunteers – officers. There-
fore, in order to maintain the connection between the two parts of the Army’s 
mission, an overlapping of the management was to be realized throughout the 
several entities (See Appendix C, figure 2).  
The interconnection between the various entities was ensured by the presence 
of the Territorial Commander, who had a place on the boards of all entities, 
including the denomination. The General, as head of the international Salvation 
Army, secured his influence (and with it the Army’s international identity) on 
the Dutch branch by the provision that the Dutch Territory was under a one-
headed command. For practical reasons however, the General delegated much of 
his power to the Territorial Commander, as had been done traditionally.190 The 
above figure also shows that the Army paid special attention to the interconnec-
tion between the religious community, the Army’s main income generator, and 
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the Army’s social activities. In all three boards, the Commander was assisted by 
the Chief-Secretary. On explicit demand by the Central Archives, the board of 
the Foundation Fundraising was complemented with five external members that 
were able “to mirror the plurality of Dutch society”.191 One of these members 
was to be appointed on the recommendation of the Central Works Council of the 
Foundation Salvation Army Welfare and Health Care, and a second member was 
to be appointed on behalf of the works council of the Foundation Salvation Ar-
my Services. Additionally, it was established that the CAC had to approve of the 
board. The board of the Foundation Salvation Army Welfare and Health Care 
itself was also complemented with four external members, and thus complied 
with the demands on democratization and representation.192 The external board 
member of the Foundation Salvation Army Services was to be appointed by the 
Employee’s council of the foundation itself.193 With regard to the legal position 
of the Army’s personnel and the participation of staff members, it was clear that 
all officers would legally stay attached to the denomination and that all employ-
ees would be attached to the labor–organization (i.c. Foundation Salvation Army 
Services and Foundation Salvation Army Welfare and Health Care). This was 
done for reasons of external influence:  
 
“The denomination Salvation Army will have absolutely no employees with-
in the meaning of the law so that it actually is not required to comply with 
the demands of the Law Works Council.”194  
 
Nevertheless, the exchange of staff was not ruled out: 
 
“Although officers know themselves called for work (sic) in the entire Salva-
tion Army, they come (sic) in the organizational sense and, for legal reasons, 
under the denomination Salvation Army. As the occasion arises, they will 
(must/can) be appointed in the foundation Salvation Army Welfare and 
Health Care or in the foundation Salvation Army Services. It may also hap-
pen that employees are placed in relation to a certain piece of work in the de-
nomination Salvation Army, although this denomination does not have any 
employers in the legal sense.” 195 
 
Because both financial foundations (Foundation Salvation Army and the Foun-
dation Salvation Army Fundraising) had no employees, a works council was not 
required for these entities. However, the foundation Salvation Army Welfare 
and Health Care was actually required to establish such councils, which it did 
for its main working-units. The smallest units could combine their forces in a 
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joined works council and all these councils would send representatives to the 
Central Works Council of the foundation.196 
6.3. Shared principles 
Next to the flow of funds and the matter of staffing, the third way in which the 
Army tried to realize a durable connection between the separate entities was by 
emphasizing their shared principles. On December 27, 1988 the statutes of all 
four of the Salvation Army foundations became effective. The legal basis of the 
denomination Salvation Army would continue to be formed by the statutes of 
1946 with the following mission statement:  
 
“The object of the Salvation Army is: to exercise the Christian Religion in 
the broadest sense and, especially to advance and enjoy of the religious fra-
ternity, to preach to and provide for the blessings of the Gospel to those who 
usually are not under the influence of religious teaching, or live in great pov-
erty because of vice or misfortune. Therefore the Salvation Army includes 
those departments, corps, groups, brigades and bonds whose labor is primari-
ly of spiritual character as well as those departments, institutes, institutions 
and homes whose endeavors on moral, social and material matters are above 
all aimed at the spiritual and eternal well-being of all people.”197  
 
In light of the fundamental legal and organizational detachment that the Army 
went through, this statement seems quite odd, because now the other entities had 
their own legal identity, therefore, hardly any legal consequences could be at-
tached to this article. It is thus plausible to assume that this Article now served 
to remind the other entities that however divided the organization might seem, 
all parts were still unified in its religious core: the Salvation Army church, at 
least in a spiritual sense. Analogous to the statutes of 1896, again in the Article 
following this one, the means to this end were described, and amongst these 
were the social work activities that the Army offered.198 This fundamental clas-
sification was also recognizable in the new statutes of the other entities. In case 
of the Foundation Salvation Army, it was translated into a subsidiary mission as 
phrased in Article 3.2:  
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“The Foundation will promote the method of the Salvation Army to propa-
gate the gospel – especially the call for conversion contained therein – in 
speech and action at and in any appropriate place, time and manner and in 
being together with our fellow-men, also to give attention to their social 
troubles and needs and try to provide for them, whether with the help of its 
own organization or through others, assuming that to be truly human in ac-
cordance with God’s purpose and to truly be a community in accordance 
with God’s purpose requires the turning and obedience to Jesus Christ of 
all.”199 
 
In addition to this statement of servitude to the ‘Salvation Army’, the religious 
identity of this particular foundation was confirmed in Article 4 and in the quo-
tation of the religious principles and doctrines that were drawn up at its very 
beginning in the UK. The same was done for the other three foundations. After 
the (now!) explicit confirmation that the Salvation Army in the Netherlands 
formed a part of the religious organization ‘The Salvation Army’ in Great Brit-
ain, the same doctrines were cited in the statutes of this foundation.200 However, 
in the statutes of the Foundation Salvation Army Welfare and Health Care, its 
non-material and material services were overtly placed in the context of the 
religious objective of the Salvation Army:  
 
“The object of the Foundation is to actively carry out the objects and method 
as described in the Statutes of the Salvation Army (…)”201 
 
And following the description of whom this Foundation directed its efforts to-
wards, the actual “objects and method” were described, a description that almost 
entirely corresponded with Article 3.2 of the Foundation Salvation Army. The 
above shows that with this new structure, the Salvation Army had institutional-
ized an organizational and legal separation of the indivisible coin. The social 
objective was firmly positioned as subsidiary to the religious aim. Propagation, 
in word and in action, was the Army’s main goal, for in its view the social ser-
vices that it also rendered were not of any lasting effect. The core business of the 
Salvation Army since its beginning, and still on January 1, 1990, had been: “the 
turning and obedience to Jesus Christ of all”. 
                                                        
 
199 Idem:11. Translation from: Decisions for legal restructuring of the Salvation Army in The Netherlands 
1989:49-50 
200 Akten van oprichting en statuten - Kerkgenootschap Leger des Heils 1989:17-18 
201 “De Stichting stelt zich ten doel daadwerkelijk uitdrukking te geven aan de doelstelling en werkwijze 
zoals omschreven in de statuten van het Leger des Heils (…)”Akten van oprichting en statuten - Kerkge-
nootschap Leger des Heils 1989:31 
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CHAPTER 7. DYNAMICS OF IDENTITY 
 
The above depiction of how the Army’s identity process was influenced by be-
ing part of the social policy system, was derived from the main research ques-
tion: What dynamics are perceptible in the relation between the state and the 
Salvation Army in the Netherlands with regard to social policy between 1890 
and 1990, and how did this influence the Salvation Army’s process of identity? 
The depiction of the history of the Salvation Army in Parts I and II of this study, 
leads to some conclusive observations. First, I will evaluate the developments 
concerning the social policy system and what these meant for faith-based civil 
society and its central feature: identity. Subsequently, I will make a recapitulat-
ing evaluation of how the Salvation Army’s identity process unfolded within 
this social policy system. These assessments will lead to conclusive observations 
with regard to the central research question. 
1. The social policy system and identity 
The development of the social policy system revealed certain underlying values 
of quality, participation and manageability, values that endured throughout the 
twentieth century, be it with different accents over time. During the prewar era, 
the approach of the (merely local) government to social problems was to inci-
dentally support goals of a concrete character of care. This support would how-
ever only occur when these problems had developed to such an extent that civil 
society organizations were not able to battle them, as was the case with, for 
example, tuberculosis and infant mortality. Additionally, local governments 
were sometimes willing to support social work, but only on the request of the 
organization that was to implement the care, and also only on the basis of sup-
plementation from other parties, like the organizations who were to pay most of 
the costs themselves. Soon after 1900, a change started to become visible. The 
government showed a growing urge to actively ask the help of civil society or-
ganizations, as the Probation Code of 1910 shows. From then on, both civil 
society and the government increasingly sought each other’s assistance on vari-
ous issues. This growing mutual interest was however, curbed by sentiments of 
anti-statism and the fear of loss of autonomy by civil society. 
During the decades between 1910 and 1945, the government became increas-
ingly aware of its policy power, as in addition to these financial arrangements, 
certain extra demands were stipulated. These demands aimed for professionali-
zation by means of hiring skilled labor, and accountability by the opening of the 
books. This early emphasis on professionalization was to improve the quality of 
the services and the organizations that delivered them, but at the same time, it 
was becoming quite clear that the government had to deal with a large variety of 
organizations that were active on different levels in many different fields of 
social work. Every segment of Dutch society was trying to create a self-
maintaining group of organizations within their pillar – an effort that contributed 
to a fragmentation of the work field. This situation was not only difficult to 
 
 
240 
 
work with for the government, but was also very expensive, so with the inten-
tion of harmonizing this field, the government encouraged the involved organi-
zations to unite themselves based on their shared identity, under umbrella organ-
izations. The results of these policy aims of professionalization and harmoniza-
tion during the prewar era were clear. The availability of money to social service 
organizations instigated a growth in the number of organizations, but the fund-
ing appeared to be of a more structural nature than was envisioned. This increas-
ingly structural cooperation between the government and civil society service 
providers gave birth to the social policy system. 
After World War II, the spirit of reconstruction and renewal strengthened the 
alignment of goals between the government and civil society. The financial 
certainty for social welfare organizations increased, together with the rise in 
national prosperity, and on a policy level, the government aimed at securing 
their social policy efforts by establishing a Ministry of Social Work. The gov-
ernmental aim for the creation of a system of social welfare arrangements, 
which had to provide for a basic level of quality of life for all, increased the 
social policy costs, as well as the ongoing expansion of the work field. As a 
counter effort, the number of these organizations had to be restrained and har-
monization efforts continued. Based on a strong notion of identity that still 
formed the main organizing principle of the pillarized civil society, this empha-
sis on manageability was inspired by its potential to activate individuals into 
joint action. Also, because identity was appreciated for its binding capacity, civil 
society organizations were regarded to be the main mobilizing force. These 
organizations thus became valued partners in the social policy system and the 
government increasingly supported them financially. 
The involvement of the public with the construction of social policy proved 
to be very important to the government. Because civil society organizations 
were regarded to be the representatives of their public grassroots, these organi-
zations were invited by the government to be involved with the actual formula-
tion of social policy. In close deliberation, they worked for the creation of a 
sense of ‘shared responsibility’ through community organization and social 
planning, because this shared responsibility was to enhance social activation and 
participation. Additional policy lines aimed for public participation in another 
way: social activation was also to be incited by the stimulation of volunteer 
work.  
Together with this new structural emphasis on the value of participation, and 
at the same time improvement in the quality of the social services and their ef-
fectivity, a debate started on the decentralization of national policy to those ad-
ministrative government levels that had more knowledge and understanding of 
how to put policy into action with effect: namely, the province and local com-
munities. This meant that some of the policy power would be redistributed to-
wards the local level, and subsequently civil society had to recalibrate its posi-
tion in this force field.  
All these policy endeavors started to show some initial effects. As was the 
case in the prewar era, the availability of finances incited the creation of new 
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organizations that were active in all different parts of the social work fields, but 
still within their pillars. Another effect was that the government itself lost its 
reserve to deploy the policy instrument of subsidies – the positive effects were 
clearly visible to the government, but this structural and abundant availability of 
funding also generated a side effect that would have its repercussions: it created 
a subsidy demand of its own. Many civil society organizations started to become 
accustomed to this infinite source of finances. 
In 1963, the ABW epitomized the development of social care changing from 
an incidental favor into a structural right. During this era of emancipation of the 
individual, the furthering of individual development and autonomy was a central 
theme. However, in disregard of this evolution of individuality, emancipation 
and secularization, during most of the 1960s the social policy concepts of pro-
fessionalization, participation and harmonization, continued to dominate the 
political agenda. Professionalization still aimed to increase the accountability of 
organizations by demanding streamlined administrative processes and employee 
education, and thus aimed for the enhancement of quality. On the matter of par-
ticipation, shared responsibility was developed further by means of supplemen-
tary financing and the creation of a common view on social policy between civil 
society and the government, next to decentralization of policy responsibilities. 
On the other hand, harmonization of the work field was aimed at by the gov-
ernment for the purpose of increasing the manageability.  
By 1970 however, some changes became visible. On the matter of quality, 
the goals of the government and civil society still seemed to be quite in line, for 
professionalization and quality were increasingly standardized. This issue of 
quality however seemed to have become of such importance to the government 
that it let go of the prerequisite of supplementary funding, and thus abandoned 
the goal of shared (financial) responsibility. On the matter of participation, the 
cooperative concept of social planning had turned into a more activist concept of 
‘social reform’ and aimed directly at what was regarded the morally empty con-
cept of consumer society. This implied a shift in the attitude of civil society 
towards the government. Their mutual alignment showed some degree of devia-
tion. This became clearer when during the 1970s - as a result of the emancipa-
tory vigor of the 1960s - participation was increasingly translated into democra-
tization and representation. Self-activation also became a central objective of the 
social policy, and public participation was to be further strengthened by the 
already often-discussed decentralization of policy and close consultation with 
civil society as representatives of their members. They were still regarded as 
being ideologically driven and thus of added value to the government because of 
their representative functions, but on the matter of manageability, a development 
opposite to decentralization was clearly visible, for in order to improve harmo-
nization, the use of the term ‘merger’ became an often heard expression, thus 
stressing the wish for further centralization, and no longer restricted to just with-
in the already crumbling organizational pillars. Civil society had been uniting 
within these pillars for half a century already, so this new emphasis on further 
unification breached the boundaries of these pillars and seemed to force civil 
 
 
242 
 
society into often-unwanted new structures of collaboration. Once again then it 
became clear that it was still the government that held the better part of the bal-
ance of power. 
The Knelpuntennota of 1974 took stock of the government’s policy efforts 
on harmonization, quality and participation ,and the results were tough on civil 
society as well as on the government itself. The report classified civil society as 
a functionally pillarized substitute for the crumbling fundaments of the ideologi-
cal pillars. The process of functional pillarization was however, incited by the 
government itself, for it actively supported many new efforts to provide for ser-
vices in every pillar. The report also pinpointed other bottlenecks that hindered 
an effective functioning of the civil society social service providers: waning 
public legitimization of welfare, increasing individualization and secularization, 
a call for democratic influence, and marginalization of volunteers by profession-
als. All this was alleged to have turned civil society organizations into introspec-
tive, self-referential organizations and had created a chaotic range of services 
that made the quality of these services uncontrollable. Professionalization had 
reduced the importance of the volunteer, a development that also influenced the 
representation function of the issue of identity, a function that had already been 
under pressure by the emphasis on the scaling-up of organizations into umbrel-
las. Because of all this, civil society seemed to have lost its added value. Its 
assets of representation and identity had been lost, and now that the government 
had obtained primacy in the field of social care, it was only a matter of time 
before it intervened, and even though both actors still aimed for cooperation on 
social relief, the function that civil society held for government was changing. 
Many policy efforts would be continued however, including the decentralization 
of social policy to local administrative levels; civil society would continue to be 
restructured and harmonized. Civil society was also to continue on the road to 
participation in terms of democratization and doelmatigheid), and possibilities 
for further democratic influence on civil society organizations would be studied.  
Now the situation of civil society itself had changed. The matter of decentral-
ization however, seemed to weaken the position of civil society organizations in 
the social policy system, and as the Knelpuntennota had made abundantly clear, 
civil society organizations had lost their added value as representatives of their 
grassroots on the matter of identity. This formed a clear threat to the existence of 
civil society in the form of organizations, and so, in order to regain its position 
in the social policy system, civil society organizations had to give up their polit-
ical position as intermediaries between the government and their grassroots - 
and had to reinvent themselves. In order to help with this process, the govern-
ment suggested an alternative that was in line with its goals: now that civil so-
ciety organizations were no longer (political) representatives, they could func-
tion very well as supportive structures to further individual activation of what 
was left of their grassroots. In this way the policy goals of participation and 
personal responsibility were combined, and civil society continued to remain 
relevant in the social policy system. On the matter of quality, the improvement 
of services by means of professionalization was continued, but now it was also 
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supplemented by a strong revaluation of the volunteer, for even though civil 
society organizations no longer incited the motivation that identity might call up, 
the volunteer’s internal motivation was still based on this identity, and the im-
portance of this source of intrinsic commitment was still recognized by the gov-
ernment. So now, instead of the civil society organizations, the individual citi-
zens were regarded as representatives of their individual identity. The im-
portance of the volunteer was stressed by the fact that in 1977 the ‘rehabilitation 
of the volunteer’ was seen as essential for the quality of social services. 
During the 1980s, these developments continued to form the base of the so-
cial policy system. To develop human potential, policy goals like decentraliza-
tion, democratization and volunteer commitment were emphasized. However, 
the new idea was that this was not to be facilitated by the central state, but on a 
local level, and also not by civil society organizations as intermediary political 
institutions, but only as supportive structures to the individual development of 
their autonomous members. In this concept, volunteer work had to be revalued 
as a means of participation, as well as a possible effective way for cost reduction 
– principles that were recognizable in the term ‘responsible society’. In the sec-
ond half of the 1980s this idea was further elaborated as individual activation 
and self-responsibility by means of self-help and volunteer work, which became 
central elements in the social policy. In order to implement these elements effec-
tively, the government aimed to stimulate more than to regulate, and it strove 
after becoming conditional and supportive instead of directive. The idea was that 
the government had to retrench and keep its distance from the welfare ‘playing 
field’. Society itself would have to regain its responsibility for its social prob-
lems, and this effort had to be supported more by the market than the state. This 
view also meant that civil society umbrellas had lost their function ,and with the 
retrenchment of the state and the lack of added value of these organizations, 
individuals and society themselves had become responsible. 
2. The Salvation Army’s process of identity 
Since the Salvation Army had been active in the Netherlands as a faith-based 
social service provider, it had experienced the above-described developments 
with regard to the social policy system up close. The description of the Army’s 
identity process in Part II provides for a diverse view on how the Army tried to 
shape its identity, an effort that can be retraced on three levels: the Army as a 
part of the social policy system, the Army’s legal identity, and the Army’s mod-
ernization efforts with regard to professionalization and democratization. In the 
struggle to shape its identity, the Army always referred to its twin mission, as 
was outlined by its founding father William Booth; providing for material and 
spiritual relief by means of the word and the deed formed the maxim of the Sal-
vation Army throughout the twentieth century. So, at least to a certain extent, all 
of the Army’s efforts with regard to its identity related to this double mission, 
and thus were part of the contest between these two parts. Another struggle that 
the Army was confronted with, was the increasing interdependence between 
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itself and the government in the social policy system. Both these issues formed 
the basis for the relationship that the Army had with the government, thus defin-
ing the dynamics of their relationship, and also contributing greatly to the Ar-
my’s identity process. 
During the decades preceding World War II, the balance between the two 
parts of the Army’s mission experienced a drastic change. Until 1910, the bal-
ance between the social and religious mission remained in balance as the Army 
grew swiftly, both in numbers of corps as well as in social activities. With the 
Reclasseringsregeling of 1910, a structural change was announced. It its ongo-
ing effort to try to align its goals with those of the government, and at the same 
time maintain its position as an autonomous organization, the Salvation Army 
accepted the financial support offered by the government and became increas-
ingly dependent on these funds. However, when the first financial cutbacks were 
announced, this position of dependency became rather burdensome. In its reac-
tion, the Army revealed its strategy on how to position itself towards the gov-
ernment by stressing that by doing its work properly the Army saved the Dutch 
state thousands of guilders. By doing so, the Army hinted at the fact that even 
though the balance of power was in favor of the government, the relationship 
that the government had with the Army was based on a certain amount of reci-
procity in which the Army was of added value to the state in economic terms. 
But there was more to it, for the Army additionally presented itself to be an 
instrument in the toolbox of government in its fight against social problems, and 
thus stressed that the goals of both actors still corresponded with each other and 
that the Army wanted to be supplement the government in their mutual struggle 
to fight social problems. So already before World War II, the Army had become 
an actor in the social policy system by revealing a strategy of its own. This posi-
tion however, had by then put the Army’s identity out of balance by inflating the 
social mission and neglecting the religious mission in itself. This process would 
continue throughout the twentieth century as the Army’s social mission contin-
ued to grow and develop.  
The tension between the two parts of the Army mission also was aggravated 
by the ongoing discussion on the Army’s legal position. Central to this part of 
the Army’s process of identity were the questions: What are we? and What can 
we be?, which demanded much of the Army’s attention. But the most interesting 
matter in this process was the question: What do we want to be? For the debate 
on this matter revealed that there existed two lines of thought within the Army 
ranks on this issue,. lines of thought that were also very much related to the two 
parts of the Army’s mission. Ideally, the Army wanted to be both a church and a 
foundation, for that position would do the most justice to the Army’s double 
mission. In fact, for a large part of the twentieth century, the Army had been 
able to maneuver itself in such legal positions that it actually was able to be 
both; it could present itself, without much trouble, as both a church and a foun-
dation, in various situations. During the 1970s however, the Army was forced to 
make an actual choice on which part of it’s double mission would legally pre-
vail. Then again, an actual choice on this matter was only taken about fifteen 
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years later, when the fundamental reorganization was decided on. Then still, the 
Army maintained its double identity as it established separate foundations from 
its church. 
With regard to its modernization process, the Army also experienced certain 
developments that influenced its identity and incited debate. Professionalization 
as well as democratization were strongly spurred by outside influences, but they 
left their marks on the Army as an organization. Already before World War II, 
the government aimed to improve the quality of social services through profes-
sionalization of the labor force and the organizations themselves. Also on the 
level of accountability, organizations were spurred to work on a more profes-
sional basis, because the government wanted to assure that the money it granted 
to these social work organizations was indeed allocated to the goals that it was 
aiming for. For the Salvation Army, this beginning process of professionaliza-
tion became noticeable in the developing probation work. From 1950 however, 
professionalization would experience a boost when the increase in social work 
and its growing differentiation and specialization resulted in various trainings 
that created professional experts. The introduction of the social casework meth-
odology offered the Army a legitimization for doing its work in its own pre-
ferred way: on an individual level, in close proximity to the client. On the other 
hand, this social casework method also required the professional to dispose of 
any hidden agendas, like possible proselytizing. Moreover, it became a sort of 
taboo to speak of any religious subject, especially during the 1980s. On another 
level, professionalization brought about a change in personnel. The number of 
well-trained officers reduced as compared to the new employee recruits, and on 
a managerial level as well, professionals were hired, as illustrated by the exam-
ple of Hartjes and Fijn. On all levels, it looked like the ideological motivation of 
the Army people was slowly but surely replaced by professionally motivated 
personnel. In order to counteract this development, the Army tried to occupy all 
other key positions with its own people, except for in the probation department, 
but during the 1970s, it had to nevertheless part with its former core: the volun-
teers. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, the probation work field and the Salvation Ar-
my probation department diverged increasingly in course. Because of the em-
phasis on harmonization, the probation work field started to merge into larger, 
general organizations, but the Salvation Army remained autonomous. This posi-
tion however, urged the Army to show its added value and justify its right of 
existence. Could the Army rely on the traditional argument that it used with 
regard to being supplementary to the government and therefore of economic 
value? Now, however, it was not only that the Army’s finances were at stake, 
but this time the Army’s existence was also tied to its identity, because when 
municipalities increasingly signaled that they wanted to scrutinize the Army’s 
statutes, the Army regarded this as a threat to maintaining its identity and auton-
omy. On the other hand, the national government had revealed that it valued 
identity as an activating force. But with the balance of power leaning towards 
the local government, the existence of the Salvation Army was endangered. 
 
 
246 
 
During the 1980s, the Army’s identity process gained momentum. The cut-
backs in subsidies threatened to result in the closure of certain Army activities, 
especially since it appeared to be combined with a growing sense that local gov-
ernments were only willing to do business with neutral organizations, and that 
they wanted to get rid of the faith-based Salvation Army. On the other hand, the 
Army had increasingly argued that it still had added value, based on its identity, 
as was confirmed by the march at the Binnenhof. This strategy however, also 
raised the question of what exactly this identity was, and during the 1980s the 
Army increasingly sought to find an answer that was both satisfying to its mem-
bers, as well as to the various levels of Dutch government. And at the end of the 
decade, the Army came up with a solution that was of startling simplicity as well 
as daring. The Army attempted to turn the pressure on its identity, into an ad-
vantage by presenting its identity as an actual weapon in the struggle for its 
existence. It was exactly this identity that had formed the foundation of the Ar-
my’s work and its continuous quality, and therefore it was exactly its identity 
that had to be assessed for its added value.  
With regard to the Army’s twin mission, it can thus be stated that early in the 
twentieth century, the government began to regard the Salvation Army as a val-
ued partner in their cooperative effort to battle social injustice. In its drive to 
support (faith-based) civil society organizations like the Salvation Army, the 
government contributed strongly towards the Army’s social mission through 
financial support. Even though in a general sense the government regarded the 
Army’s religious mission with certain respect, and even acknowledged its added 
value until the mid-1970s, it was the Army’s social mission that corresponded 
most with government policy goals. This resulted in a one-sided emphasis from 
the government on the Army’s social mission to expand the development of the 
Amy’s social activities, over its religious activities as an effect. The Army itself 
did not have many inhibitions regarding this form of government support. It did 
show a certain hesitation though, when it was invited to take part in government-
initiated and subsidized programs, as the example of the probation department in 
1910 showed. But it is also clear that the Army was soon accustomed to its new 
position in the social policy system, and with much success, for it became a 
valued partner for the government. On another level, it became clear that the 
Army did not even mind the overemphasis on its social mission, even though it 
regarded itself as a religious organization. From the process of legal incorpora-
tion, it can be deduced that even though the Army valued both its missions very 
much, on a fundamental level it regarded its social mission as instrumental to its 
religious mission. When this is related to the Army’s conceding attitude towards 
the overemphasis on its social mission by the government, it follows that wheth-
er or not this was a deliberate move on the part of the government, the Army 
considered this overemphasis rather an opportunity than a threat, for developing 
their social mission would also take their religious mission further. So even 
though the government emphasis was concentrated on the Army’s social mis-
sion, but at the same time, the legal narrative of the Salvation Army shows that 
 
 
247 
 
it considered its religious mission as the final goal, these two directions were not 
at all at odds with each other. 
3. Concluding remarks 
At the close of this research, a few concluding remarks are called for. With re-
gard to the social policy system, it is, first of all, interesting to notice that the 
various policy lines are of a rather continuous character instead of variable. 
Even though within different periods, different accents are perceptible, and over 
time, the policy concepts were interpreted in different manners, in general, it can 
be stated that the three main policy concepts of quality, manageability and par-
ticipation have formed the base for the Dutch social policy system. Another 
conclusion is that this perceived continuity can be very well ascribed to the sys-
temic approach of looking at the relationship between the Salvation Army and 
the government as taking part in the context of what I have called the social 
policy system. This approach helps to reveal coherent patterns between the two 
actors, like for example that both the government and the Salvation Army oper-
ated in certain fields of tension that characterized their relationship: attraction 
and repulsion, alignment and variation of goals; the measure of (in-
ter)dependency, the balance of political power; tension fields that bear certain 
resemblance to that of a courtship. 
A third concluding observation is that even though the balance of power be-
tween the two actors lay very much in favor of the government, the Salvation 
Army had actually been able to make some use of its space to maneuver. Habit-
uation to subsidy arrangements and playing by the rules of the social policy 
system, were at times replaced by Army initiatives to influence its position to-
wards the government. These initiatives often also indicated a great persever-
ance in guarding the Army’s autonomy. In fact, the Army developed a particular 
response to encroaching developments by proving its added value towards the 
government. At first the Army presented itself as being supplementary to gov-
ernment policy, and even willing to function as a government tool. Additionally, 
the Army argued that its work was of actual economic importance, and thus tried 
to convince the government of the reciprocal character of their relationship. 
During the 1980s however, the Army complemented these arguments of sup-
plementarism and reciprocity with a third argument: the Army’s faith-based 
identity as a precondition of the quality of its work. This leads to the conclusion 
that the Army was not only a part of the social policy system, but it also actively 
contributed to the development of this system. Also, in disregard of its dominant 
position, the government was not the only initiator in this system, but shaped the 
system together with civil society and the Salvation Army. 
However, the government did show a rather ambivalent attitude toward the 
matter of identity in the social welfare system. For one, a growing emphasis on 
ideological generalization of traditionally faith-based social services became 
detectable after the 1960s. The sympathy that the parliament expressed with the 
clearly religious Salvation Army however, seemed to contradict this trend. In 
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parliament, the general opinion of the Army varied from being a sympathetic 
faith community to being an important partner in social services. The Army was 
almost always regarded with much respect and affinity, and it was clearly a 
valued part of civil society and partner of the government. It remains unclear 
however, as to how this discrepancy with the idea of a neutral government de-
veloped during the twentieth century. Further empirical study on this subject is 
thus welcome. 
The metaphor of a courtship however, provides for (a limited but) expressive 
interpretative means, because in this light, the overtly sympathetic attitude of the 
government towards the overtly Christian Salvation Army might even be charac-
terized as amorous. The government seems to have had a weakness with regard 
to the Salvation Army, as its steady show of appreciation of the Army indicates. 
The Army seemed to have been a trustworthy partner with regard to delivering 
qualitative social services, but it might also have been the Army’s explicitly 
value-based character that attracted the assumably ‘neutral’ government. By 
emphasizing the supplementary and reciprocal character of their relationship at 
first, and at a later stage its own identity, the Army showed its plumage, and as a 
result it seemed to have struck a note with the government. On the other hand, it 
might even have been the government itself that incited the Army to come for-
ward and engage in this courtship, for its continuous emphasis on the Army’s 
positive image and even sometimes its faith-based identity, might also be inter-
preted as an opening move of the courtship. An invitation that the Salvation 
Army was at first reluctant to accept, but to which it soon surrendered.  
With regard to the Army’s hard work to keep the right balance between the 
two parts of its double mission, it is at this point hard to assess whether or not 
the Army had made the right choice in the form of its 1990 reorganization. For 
this, we will have to look at the period following this decisive moment – an 
effort that will be tentatively undertaken in the closing chapter of this study. For 
now, it suffices to conclude that the Salvation Army’s choice to play an active 
part in the social policy system had actually changed the Army’s financial situa-
tion. This changing financial position had far-reaching consequences for the 
Army’s legal position as well as its work force and administrative structure. 
Another important, but less explicit consequence of the Army’s nestling in the 
social policy system was that it seemed to have influenced a fundamental Army 
characteristic: the spreading of the gospel. Even though William Booth had put 
the religious and social parts of the Army’s mission at the same level of im-
portance, it was hardly thinkable for a social professional during the 1980s to 
make any verbal reference to the gospel whatsoever to the client. Any proselyt-
izing in a professional context was regarded as highly inexpedient, so the only 
way to the Army professionals to refer to the gospel was by ‘doing good deeds’. 
However, because many of these good deeds were now paid for by the Dutch 
government, it can be argued that these also might have lost much of their reli-
gious connotations. So, to what extent was an Army professional able to spread 
the gospel, now that the Army’s active contributions to the social policy system 
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seemed to have reduced the interpretation of Booth’s vision of bringing the good 
news by word and deed, to bringing the gospel by means of a deed only? 
In this sense, Kettle’s implicit suggestion that the proximity of a faith-based 
civil society to the (neutral) government will influence the identity of the for-
mer, is confirmed, for at least a part. In case of the Salvation Army, the domi-
nant power in the social policy system was the government, and it was most of 
the time the Salvation Army that had to make policy compromises. On the other 
hand, it was also the Army itself that agreed on doing so, so in that sense the 
Army chose to take such a risk. However, it had not lost its faith-based identity, 
as many of the other social service providers had. In that sense the Salvation 
Army seems to form an exception to Kettle’s theory, for by 1990 it was still a 
much valued social service provider, and a recognizable faith-based organiza-
tion. There was an imminent problem, however. The ongoing secularization had 
started to hollow out many religious communities and churches in the Nether-
lands, and this menace was also threatening the Salvation Army. So, even 
though it surpasses the scope of this research, this observation calls for another 
evaluation. Did the reorganization of 1990 prove to be the panacea for this 
trend? Was the Army able to prevent the cherished two-sided coin of its identity 
from being split after all? These matters will be addressed in the closing part of 
this study. 
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IN RETROSPECT: BEYOND THE REORGANIZATION 
  
In 2012, the Salvation Army celebrated its 125th anniversary in the Netherlands 
with various festive activities. Not many faith-based social service providers had 
survived the ideological erosion of the social work field that had characterized 
the last decades of the twentieth century. Therefore this landmark event in the 
Army’s history suggests that the Army’s new organizational structure of 1990 
had been a success. Was this, however, the same with regard to the Army’s pre-
ferred balance of its two-fold mission? Did the Army also succeed in maintain-
ing its identity based on its double mission? Or had the Army’s fear of the split-
ting of its two-dimensional identity become a reality? In order to assess the pos-
sible outcome of the Army’s reorganization, we will have to turn our attention to 
the decades that followed the reorganization. However, because this chapter 
functions as a retrospective, this effort will not consist of a thorough empirical 
study, but will be of a more discursive character in which reflections of the Sal-
vation Army itself will also have a place. 
When we assess the development of the two Army missions during this peri-
od, it can be observed that the Salvation Army’s position in the social policy 
system continued to consolidate. Compared to the period before the reorganiza-
tion, by 2010 the operating result of the Salvation Army’s Welfare and Health 
Foundation (W&G) had multiplied eight times from fl.76,854,000 to 
€288,400,000.1 At the same time, the number of employees within W&G in-
creased from 1500 in 1988 to 5377 in 2010, operating about 244 working units 
nationwide.2 The Army’s faith community however, did endure harder times. 
Army soldiers had been reduced to half their number from 8500 in 1988 to 4618 
in 2008.3 The same was true with regard to the Army’s officers: in 1988, there 
were about 300 officers active, but in 2010, this had been diminished to a mere 
140.4 In addition, the number of corps also showed an inversely proportional 
development to the Army’s social services, for the 92 corps (1988) had been 
reduced in 2010 to 59.5 So, what had happened here? 
1. Professionalization of the Army as social service provider 
The Salvation Army experienced three phases of organizational development 
during the post-reorganization period of 1990-2010. Interesting however, is that 
                                                        
 
1 Met hart en hand. Beeldverslag en financieel overzicht 1986, 1988:31 (UA 1182, nr. 8); Jaarverslag 
2010:135. It is important to notice that in 2002 the Dutch guilder was replaced by the Euro with an ex-
change rate of 2.20371. This means that the amount of €288,400,000 would have approximately equalled 
fl.635,550,000 (without taking into account inflation or any economical fluctuations). 
2 Van soep, zeep en redding tot evangelisch geïnspireerd maatschappelijk werk 1988:34; Jaarverslag 
2010:134 
3 Van soep, zeep en redding 1988:34; Jaarverslag 2008:12 
4 Jaarverslag 2008:134 
5 Jaarverslag 2008:33; Jaarverslag 2010:134 
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this organizational professionalization only took place within W&G, leaving the 
Army’s faith community to itself. The first phase (1990-1995) of this organiza-
tional development was that of the construction and fine-tuning of the new or-
ganizational model by means of centralization; the second phase (1995-2005) 
was the return to a more decentralized model. The third phase (2005-2010) was 
characterized by the external pressure on the Army to once again prove its added 
value with regard to its identity. 
1.1. Centralization and de-compartmentalization (1990-1995) 
The first years following the reorganization were decisive for building a solid 
base for the Salvation Army. The creation of W&G did not only provide for an 
organizational structure that facilitated cooperation between the different areas 
of social work, but it also continued to support the much valued professional 
quality of the Army’s work. Before 1990, the separate social work departments 
of the Army had created a managerial monster, that slowly but surely revealed a 
particular downside to the philosophy of a one-headed management: the bureau-
cracy had risen to the highest levels, as all policy authorizations had to come 
from the apex of the organization.6 This resulted in a management situation that, 
in the opinion of many involved, had paralyzed the organization’s striking pow-
er and had brought the Salvation Army to a situation of immobility that would 
have been experienced as a disaster by any standing army. Additionally, this 
bureaucracy was stimulated by a culture of organizational fragmentation be-
cause every department had created its own culture, administration, financial 
flows and contacts.7 This meant that the central Army command was less in 
control of the organization than was implied by its external univocal representa-
tions, like the uniforms and rhetoric. With the creation of W&G, many of these 
situations were to change.  
The first assignment for the management of the new organization was to 
break through the old habits and patterns, and to create a new organization with 
a corresponding organizational culture. The new operational manager of W&G, 
Jansen (1990-2000) understood this task very well and started by collecting all 
policy records, documents and files and gathering them at the new Central Bu-
reau.8 Everything that had to do with any sort of social services was centralized 
in W&G, and from 1992 onwards especially, Jansen and his team (amongst 
which was vice-CEO Voorham) started to restructure all policies on finances, 
personnel and social work. Slowly, but surely, the contours of a rather homoge-
nous organization became visible during the first half of the 1990s. This process 
of unification was supported by memoranda that described the framework in 
which the various social service units were to operate. Jansen envisioned that all 
                                                        
 
6 This opinion is shared by all of the people that have been interviewed for this study. 
7 Interview with H. van Teijlingen, September 5, 2012 
8 Idem. 
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32 units should work with, what he called, “relative autonomy”.9 This meant 
that within the outer limits of organizational freedom in policymaking as stipu-
lated by these memoranda the units were free to act on what they thought was 
best. Additionally, the work units started to implement specific annual budgets 
and planning and control cycles – a structure that also gave them relative auton-
omy. 
This approach of relative autonomy can also be interpreted as a continued le-
gitimization of the 32 separate departments, but the difference with the period 
before 1990 was that now these departments were bound together by a coordi-
nating policy. A situation that was rather new to the Army, for now a process of 
de-compartmentalization was setting in, and on a central level, control was be-
ing regained. This was needed very much, because the Army’s social work de-
partments had not only developed into separate organizational units that were 
only compelled to cooperate by means of the monthly gatherings in the Coordi-
nating council, but they were also hardly used to working together. In Jansen’s 
view of W&G however, close collaboration was a central policy goal. This goal 
was not only based on managerial motivations, but it was also closely related to 
the Army’s philosophy that it wanted to ‘help those who had no helpers’. The 
problems of this target group were often of a complex nature, because when for 
example, somebody had become addicted to drugs, he would most probably also 
have problems with work, income, housing, and probably even social skills. 
According to the Army, only a comprehensive approach would therefore be 
effective. Even though the Salvation Army as a whole was providing for many 
of the social services that were needed in such multi-problem cases, the organi-
zational culture of fragmentation often stood in the way for such an all-
encompassing approach. 
Combined with a certain measure of centralization, this de-
compartmentalization of social services was to form an organizational context 
for what the Army called the “Army method”.10 This method was based on prin-
ciples like: everybody is valuable; everybody always deserves a second chance; 
and everybody can always contribute something11, all principles which, accord-
ing to Voorham, can be retraced to the Methodist roots of the Salvation Army. 
These principles were molded into the Army method in combination with no-
tions like “justice”, “solidarity” and “charity”, all concepts that focused the at-
tention of the Army on those who had no possibilities of their own to look after 
themselves.12 This Army method also included rhetorical one-liners that were 
                                                        
 
9 Verkenningen over samenwerken en samen-gaan 1995:4; Notitie Effecten Decentralisatie 1998:1 
10 Stichting Leger des Heils Welzijns- en Gezondheidszorg. Basisdocument Ondernemeningsplanning 
1992:5 
11 Interview with Voorham, September 3, 2012; Ringelberg 2005:56-58 
12 Door Christus aangeraakt, om mensen bewogen. Nota Identiteit Stichting Leger des Heils Welzijns- en 
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generally attributed to William Booth: “go and do something” and “an empty 
stomach doesn’t have ears”. 
The combination of the organizational decentralization, de-
compartmentalization, and the Army method appears to have been rather suc-
cessful. In an informative account of the first ten years of W&G, Voorham listed 
several new social services that the Army had developed in those years: hospices 
for terminal care; day training centers for short-term prisoners; projects for 
combined care, nursing and treatment of physically and mentally ill homeless 
people; social pensions for (temporary) homeless people; medical day care cen-
ters; a project for homeless children; holiday camps for the socially troubled; 
playgroups and possibilities for daytime occupation.13 Even though the need for 
these services seemed to be large enough to take specific actions, all these ac-
tivities were rare or even nonexistent in the Netherlands at that time. From these 
innovative actions it becomes clear that during the first years after its reorgani-
zation, the Army’s vision to put individual material and non-material needs 
central to its services, combined with a comprehensive approach towards social 
services, had resulted in new social services. 
1.2. Decentralization and scaling-up (1995-2005) 
While Jansen and his management team were fully dedicated to their centraliza-
tion effort, the next phase of professionalization presented itself. The decentrali-
zation process that the government had initiated during the 1970s was still very 
much ongoing during the 1990s. In an internal memorandum on the developing 
social trends, the Army concluded in 1995 that the increased governmental ef-
forts to decentralize its national social policy was accompanied by a tendency to 
combine coherent areas of social services on a local level. This however, created 
a local counterforce to the national decentralization effort, making it a difficult 
process to follow.14 Jansen argued that this development provided for certain 
possibilities for the Army, because it could probably combine these external 
tendencies towards harmonization, cooperation and decentralization very well 
with its internal policy to combine work units and to offer a comprehensive 
approach. Within the changing context of health care and welfare that was in-
creasingly oriented towards free market principles, these developments could 
very well be matched when the Army itself would decentralize further. Accord-
ing to Jansen, the Army would be very well able to find its own position in this 
changing market, as it was used to doing so for a long time.15 This meant that, 
after a period of organization building through centralization, the time had come 
to loosen the internal reins. In order to maintain its relevance as a strong actor on 
a local and regional level, the Army started to strengthen the position of its work 
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units by once more decentralizing the recently centralized financial administra-
tion. In addition, the units would also become responsible for their own staff and 
in order to take over these new tasks, a new administrative layer was organized 
within every work unit. Also, in line with the external developments, the local 
work units combined their forces, because by scaling-up on this level the Ar-
my’s position in the local market would be strengthened. This combined effort 
of decentralization and scaling-up was formalized into policy and had to be 
completed in 2001.16 Interestingly, during this second phase an important fea-
ture of the Army surfaced once again: it showed great willingness to be flexible 
towards its external environment – a flexibility that would be tested even further 
a few years later, because soon the Army encountered another interfering devel-
opment to which it had to react. 
1.3. Competing in a free market: identity (2005-2012) 
Already by the end of the 1980s, the discourse of the free market had become 
perceptible within debates on welfare and healthcare reform, mostly as a result 
of the recommendations of Committee-Dekker (1987) on how to revise the 
Dutch healthcare system.17 From that time on, free market principles had started 
to become a subject of debate, but it would take until the first years of the twen-
ty-first century, for those principles to become more visible in the social sector. 
For example, in 2005, the new Wet op de Jeugdzorg (WJZ, Youth Care Act) put 
the needs of the clients at the center of its approach, instead of the former sup-
ply-oriented focus.18 This fundamental shift from supply-orientation towards 
demand-orientation, also became visible on the matter of health care, as in 2006 
Minister of VWS, Hoogervorst (VVD, 2003-2007) introduced a fundamental 
reform to the Dutch system of health insurances. From then on, individual citi-
zens were able to choose their preferred health insurance company and degree of 
insurance. This development also brought about a rather new approach for social 
service providers, as in many sectors they had to compete for the possibility to 
offer their services with other providers by submitting tenders, especially con-
cerning those services that were financed through AWBZ funds. This meant that 
organizations that were traditionally providing for these services were no longer 
automatically a preferred partner for the government.  
This new modus operandi forced providers like the Salvation Army to re-
think their position in the market. They had to make very clear to possible cus-
tomer organizations like insurance companies and also to the government, what 
their distinguishing characteristics were. Once again, the Army was forced to 
scrutinize its core values, for how else could the Army maintain its visibility in 
this force field of the free market while proving its added value. To consider this 
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issue, the Army returned to both its historical roots and its grassroots. Over a 
series of sessions, Army employees were asked what they thought characterized 
the Army best, and in spite of the huge imbalance between the number of Salva-
tionists and its external employees, a clearly shared image became visible: it was 
the basic Methodist principles of the Army method that seemed to form the core 
of the Army’s personnel work ethics. Another action the Army took was the 
creation of what was called a “heritage movement”. Internationally, many Army 
branches already had a heritage department that was commissioned to keep alive 
the memories of the organization’s identity. Until then, the Dutch Salvation 
Army lacked such a department. So a historical canon of the Army’s history in 
the Netherlands was composed and in 2006, a Memorandum on Identity was 
introduced. This memorandum brought about a return to the Army’s roots 
through renewed emphasis on the combination of the Army method, with other 
basic principles that William Booth had stipulated: providing for concrete, effec-
tive and often long-term activities for those who really needed help and actually 
wanted to be helped, but had no helper in sight.19  
This renewed focus on identity also brought about the incorporation of reli-
gion as an explicit part of the Army method. As we have seen, during the 1980s 
the Army used its identity as an argument for quality in its communications with 
the government and other financers. However, the way in which the Army made 
use of its identity was rather reserved. According to Voorham, this modest atti-
tude was at that time the result of the perceived incompatibility of professional-
ism and religion, even to the extent of mutual exclusion. However, this reserved 
attitude of the Army with regard to its identity had changed by 2006 because, in 
the opinion of Voorham, during the last two decades the Salvation Army had 
experienced a transformation from: “Oops, we are a Christian organization, to: 
“Yes! We are a Christian organization”. 20 During this period, the Army came to 
realize that next to the provision of social services, its faith-based identity was 
the most important asset it had. This awareness gave birth to a renewed view on 
identity and once again in 2006, the Army sought a way to deploy its faith-based 
identity as an argument of quality, as it adopted the combination of Christian 
faith and professionalism in its personnel policy:  
 
“Therefore W&G regards the personal Christian belief as a competency of 
her staff. This competency is of equal weight as other competencies, like pro-
fessional skill and suitability, that are relevant for the hiring policy.”21 
                                                        
 
19 Door Christus aangeraakt, om mensen bewogen. Nota Identiteit Stichting Leger des Heils Welzijns- en 
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21 “Daarom rekent het (sic) W&G de persoonlijke christelijke geloofsovertuiging tot een van de compe-
tenties van haar medewerkers. Deze competentie is gelijk in gewicht als andere competenties zoals vak-
bekwaamheid en geschiktheid die meewegen bij het aannamebeleid.” Door Christus aangeraakt, om 
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Until this new personnel policy, the Army had relied on its vocational volun-
teers, but since the number of vocational volunteers had dropped, the Army 
decided to take a more structural approach to the conservation of its identity 
through its personnel. The consequence of this new approach was that all em-
ployees were to officially express their respect for the Army’s dual mission, as 
well as to comply with bringing this mission into practice in their contact with 
clients and colleagues as ‘ambassadors’ of the Salvation Army and the Christian 
faith. This did not mean however, that the Army’s view was restricted to only 
one particular religious doctrine. The Army made explicit that it valued all 
Christian varieties, as long as they respected the Army’s broad-ranging mission: 
“The diversity of Christians means an enrichment of the organization.”22 By 
2006, the Salvation Army method had become an official policy line and it had 
been developed into a clear and historically based definition of the Army’s tar-
get group; a mission-driven staff and a strong focus on the client as ‘a whole 
being’. So, just as during the 1980’s once again the Army had put forward its 
identity in order to position itself in the force field of the free market, but now 
this notion of identity was combined with the Army’s professionalism.  
Additionally, the Army confirmed its supplementary position towards the 
government, as the Army’s added value of reciprocity no longer referred only to 
the savings in expenditures, in combination with a trusted provision of services, 
but the Army was also very useful to the government in another manner. The 
Salvation Army’s focus on ‘those who have no helper’ made the Army the or-
ganization par excellence to point out to the government what the most acute 
social problems were. Also, by starting up first-response activities itself, the 
Army was also able to create initial policy proposals on such matters. First, the 
Army would fund these innovative projects itself, and when such a project had 
proven to be successful, it would ask the government for structural funding, a 
strategy that proved to be successful for both actors. That the Army had indeed 
succeeded to once again prove its added value to the government was illustrated 
in a rhetorical manner by Prime-Minister Rutte (VVD, 2010- currently) in his 
appraisal of the Army. In the foreword of the 2012 jubilee issue of the 
Strijdkreet, Rutte argued that it was exactly “the combination between a practi-
cal approach and a deep religious conviction” that led to “a unique and exceed-
ingly effective method” and that made the Salvation Army “an attractive and 
reliable partner”.23 This token of appreciation by Rutte has to be put in perspec-
tive however, for eventhough he expressed gratitude for the Army’s work, and 
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he even acknowledged that much of the effectiveness of this work was related to 
the Army’s faith-based identity, this appraisal must be seen more as a personal 
message to the Army’s workers than as official government policy with regard 
to faith-based organizations. Identity still proved to be a matter of prudence. 
Nevertheless, the Army would continue with its strategy to emphasize its faith-
based identity as an inherent part of its work in order to position itself as a social 
service provider. However, since the Salvation Army also consisted of a faith 
community, it is necessary to assess how the reorganization of 1990 worked out 
for this other essential part of the Dutch Salvation Army. 
2. The Salvation Army’s faith community 
As the figures at the beginning of this chapter show, the Army’s faith communi-
ty experienced an alarming decline in numbers between 1990 and 2010. Both 
the numbers of adherents and corps had nearly been halved. This raises the ques-
tion of the extent to which this development can be related to the reorganization 
of 1990. Did the restructuring sharpen the distinction between the social and 
religious activities in such a way that the faith community suffered from it?  
The first consequence of the restructuring seems to be that the bundling of all 
professionalized social activities into W&G resulted in a thorough undermining 
of the financial basis of the faith community.24 Since the reorganization, the 
faith community seemed to have failed to gain by the positive public image of 
the Salvation Army and its financial consequences, because most of the dona-
tions by the public were made to the Army’s social work. The Army church 
could not dispose of this money. It did however, also receive donations that 
were explicitly labeled for the church. These funds were supplemented by unla-
beled income through the Foundation Salvation Army and Foundation Fundrais-
ing. This was done by means of a distributive formula between the different 
Army foundations and the church, nevertheless it proved to be hardly enough for 
the church to keep afloat as the bulk of the income went to W&G. During the 
first decade of the twenty-first century, an unfortunate investment strategy in 
stocks led to a loss in monetary reserves, and together with the decline in visitor 
numbers and a subsequent decrease of collections, the financial situation of the 
Army’s faith community became deplorable. In 2009, it was observed that no 
more than seventy months were left before the Army’s faith community would 
have to start to sell its properties…25 
A second effect of the reorganization that had fundamental consequences for 
the Army’s church was the new organizational structure itself. The creation of 
separate entities did not only guard the Army’s religious community from gov-
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ernmental interference, but it also seemed to have prevented the faith communi-
ty from experiencing the same organizational professionalization as W&G 
had.26 In the opinion of some former and present Salvation Army managers, the 
result was that the faith community had not been able to profit from the innova-
tive drive and the subsequent expansion of W&G. This can partly be ascribed to 
the choices that were made during the reorganization process, for already then it 
was decided to concentrate much of the Army’s organizing power within W&G. 
For example, because of their abundant professional experience outside the Ar-
my, managers like Jansen and Van Teijlingen were regarded to be able to shape 
and manage a sizeable organization like W&G. Additionally, these ‘organiza-
tional professionals’ were supported by an executive board which was also con-
stituted by experienced people. The Salvation Army church on the other hand, 
was run by the Territorial Commander, the Chief-Secretary and the Field Secre-
tary, and without any structural support of other organizational professionals. 
Even though this leadership of the church was in full control of the religious part 
of the Salvation Army since 1990, W&G seemed to have outweighed the de-
nomination on a managerial level as well as on the level of finances. Seen from 
this light, the new structure of the Salvation Army certainly contributed to the 
reduction of Army’s religious community. 
On the other hand, it can be argued that the concentration of social services 
within W&G did not affect the corps much, because already long before the 
reorganization, all subsidized social services had been organized within the sev-
eral departments. Also the social activities that were exploited by the corps were 
of a voluntary and unsubsidized character and of a much different scope. Addi-
tionally, not many corps were socially active on a significant scale. That had to 
do with the size of a corps, and the focus of its presiding officer (did he or she 
feel comfortable with community activities?). Also, the possible lack of continu-
ity in leadership contributed to the modest scale of the corps’ social activities, 
for it was often the case that a certain corps-officer started a soup kitchen or 
another local social activity, but with the replacement of this individual two 
years later, the activity also often halted.27 The differences between the social 
activities of the church and W&G were too big to be a real threat to the church, 
for it were not those small-scale voluntary activities that were centralized in 
W&G. Also, within the corps the sentiment with regard to the reorganization 
seemed to have been rather abiding and indifferent, or maybe even intentionally 
unresponsive, because people would continue to gather on Sundays whether 
W&G existed or not. 
The general opinion however, was that the corps were in trouble. When, dur-
ing the mid-2000s, Van der Harst came into command of the Salvation Army, he 
made a thorough attempt to rekindle the social potential of the Army’s corps. 
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According to Voorham, Van der Harst was inspired by his work experience in 
the Amsterdam Goodwill Center and aimed to counterbalance the centralization 
of social services in W&G with the creation of a line of primary care activities 
by the corps. The high standard of professionalization of W&G’s services had 
also made them, to a certain extent, less accessible as a potential client had to 
comply with an increasing number of preconditions. The corps on the other 
hand, were able to provide for an easily accessible form of social assistance in 
their local environment and therefore, Van der Harst sought for the enhancement 
of these local corps services. These efforts however, were only partly successful. 
They sparked a certain competition between the corps and W&G, and also, as 
Ringelberg reflects, a lack of revenues from these activities and limited Army 
funds to support them resulted in a lack of fundament to professionalize into 
structural services. The approach of Van der Harst did however, inspire some 
larger corps, like Amsterdam, Almere and Utrecht to invest more in their social 
activities – others seemed to have lacked the capacity to make it work. 
The efforts and vision of Van der Harst also show that the Salvation Army 
has not been negligent with regard to the problems with its church. More than 
once, the Army attempted to revitalize the faith community, but only with little 
success. In November 2009, the most recent effort was launched. Confronted 
with a steady decline in membership and with the bottom of the treasury in 
sight, the Army was forced to resort to what it called “radical measures”:  
 
1) In order to regain financial health the number of corps had to be reduced 
from 70 to 50 by 2012.  
2) An accentuation of the vision of the faith community reveals that the Sal-
vation Army attempted to widen its scope with regard to its target group, be-
cause in addition to those that had no helper, another explicit target group 
was now non-churchgoing and secular people.  
3) As a result of regarding the Christian identity a competency, the officers 
who decided to dedicate themselves to the Army and its mission were to be 
professionalized.  
4) The corps were to create social and religious activities that were in keep-
ing with the needs of their vicinity, for example social and legal advice, ca-
tering and clothing shops.28 
 
These measures formed a strategy that aimed to strengthen the position of the 
faith community and that was called the “One Army concept”. The Army was 
well aware of the fact that Dutch society had different images of the Army, and 
with its One Army concept, it aimed to increase a balanced public image of the 
Army in which both its social services and its church were regarded as closely 
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interconnected.29 Next to the positive appeal of this effort, this new emphasis on 
internal and external cohesion of the Army’s identity explicitly acknowledged 
the gap between the faith community and the service community. 
 
Nevertheless, when making up the balance of the reorganization of 1990 with 
regard to the Army’s faith community and social services, it becomes clear that 
the new organizational structure had an ambivalent result. With regard to W&G 
a new vigor was visible and a drive to prove its added value by means of innova-
tion and supplementarity. Additionally, the Army had found a way to combine 
its social work with its faith-based identity by presenting its identity as a compe-
tence and a quality. In this way the Army tried to resonate with the discours on 
social policy and while at the same time it hoped to find a structural foundation 
for its core values. For the Army’s community of faith however, the reorganiza-
tion did produce both direct and indirect consequences of an undeniably nega-
tive character. So, with regard to the balance between the two parts of the Ar-
my’s mission, it can be stated that even though the inseparable coin of the Ar-
my’s twofold mission was still intact in 2010, in daily practice the inspiring and 
productive field of tension between the social and spiritual part of the Army’s 
twofold mission seemed to have been neutralized by a paralyzing dividing line. 
Instead for the faith community to have become a inspiring source for the pro-
fessional service community social, and vice versa, the organizational structure 
seemed to have failed to contribute to such synergy. 
3. The government: lessons learned? 
During the best part of the twentieth century, the Dutch government appreciated 
many of the traditional elements that characterized faith-based civil society: 
grassroots organizations that represented various groups in society and were 
organized based on different religious and political worldviews. During much of 
this period, identity was an important organizing principle for the social work 
field and thus the government had put much confidence in civil society for shap-
ing and defining the character of the social welfare work. This changed howev-
er. Civil society lost its added value because of its alledged disfunction in com-
bination with an altering society and subsequently, the government increasingly 
tried to tighten its grip by defining the social problems and regulating which 
organization or group was eligible to provide what type of care. At the same 
time, during this era of the ‘end of ideologies’ and decreasing interest in orga-
nized religion, the government gradually presented itself as less ideologically 
motivated and of a more neutral ‘no-nonsense’ character. This changed the bal-
ance of power between the civil society and government and additionally exert-
ed much pressure on the identity of many faith-based social service providers, as 
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we have seen in the case of the Salvation Army. At the end of the 1980s civil 
society was domesticated and sidelined by the state, and the binding element of 
identity had been disqualified. The government had lost much of its appreciation 
for identity, but at the same time the government seemed to have thrown out the 
baby with the bathwater. The alternative to this variety of small faith-based care 
providers were large general and impersonal social service corporations. Maybe 
these were better to manage as proxy organizations, and maybe even these were 
able to provide for services in a cheaper way, but were these organizations also 
capable of being as sensitive to the social problems as many of their predeces-
sors had been? And could they react to these problems with the same amount of 
responsiveness and flexibility? And with the same doelmatigheid as the former 
grassroots organizations had been able to?  
It seems that the government also had asked itself these questions, for at the 
start of the twenty-first century once again a shift in the attitude of the govern-
ment towards civil society was detectable. The revision process of the Dutch 
welfare state, which had started in the 1980s, had reached a phase of revaluation 
of civil society. Civil society was once again invited by the government to re-
think its relevance and position towards social issues and at the same time, the 
debate on the role of religion in the public domain revived. New, often individu-
al forms of spirituality, combined with the emergence of Islam and other reli-
gions in the Netherlands, demanded the attention of Dutch social policymakers 
and again some initial acknowledgement became detectable from the side of 
government with regard to faith-based civil society organizations that had access 
to the poor side of society.30 So, was there actually a broadening of the mindset 
of the government towards the role of identity in the public domain going on? 
Had the government learned a lesson? This question seemed to be answered 
positively by the introduction of the Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning 
(Wmo, Social Support Act) in 2007. 
The Wmo aimed at activation of individual citizens by appealing to one’s ca-
pacities instead of trying to find external compensation for one’s limitations. In 
the explanatory memorandum comments on the first article of the Wmo, it was 
clearly indicated that the government had come to the conclusion that the in-
tended social coherency and quality of life were to be strengthened, first and 
foremost, bottom-up. It was all about the “bringing into action of one’s immedi-
ate surroundings like family, neighbors, local volunteers or church volunteers, or 
for example the sports club.”31 The Wmo aimed to incite people to make use of 
their own individual possibilities and social connections before asking govern-
ment for support. Interestingly, at the same time it opened doors for less profes-
sional organizations like religious communities to recreate their social relevance 
                                                        
 
30 Dekker 2011:104 
31 “Ook, en veelal in eerste instantie, gaat het om de inzet van de naaste omgeving, zoals familie, buren, 
vrijwilligers in de buurt of in kerkelijke verbanden of bijvoorbeeld de sportvereniging.” Kamerstukken II 
2004/05, 30 131 (MvT) 
 
 
263 
 
because now faith-based organizations and churches were invited to cooperate 
with government in shaping social support policy.32 
This modest but detectable revitalization of the role of identity in the public 
(welfare) domain however, did not prove to be an instant success. Public serv-
ants and policymakers had to get reacquainted with working with religious or-
ganizations. Possible private motives like proselytization might have induced 
much of the hesitance from the side of government, but that did not stop the 
government from looking for possible ways to increase cooperation with faith-
based organizations. In doing so, the government hardly openly referred to their 
religious identity, but revealed a rather pragmatic attitude by showing mere 
interest in cooperation on certain policy goals like the reduction of social exclu-
sion of certain groups and the pointing out of new social problems. Goals that 
the government knew very well that it could not reach by itself. In this coopera-
tion, faith-based organizations were, once again appreciated for their intermedi-
ate functions between the government and these groups, and of course, for their 
high level of volunteer (and thus cheap) involvement.33 The way in which the 
Wmo treated religious communities as equal with family and sports clubs, re-
veals that it was not so much the identity of these religious groups that had the 
interest of government, but much more their potential to mobilize their grass-
roots in order to fulfill their civic duty in terms of volunteer work and to gener-
ate social cohesion. Civil society organizations seemed instrumental once again 
to certain policy goals that were set by the government. And identity only 
seemed to play a minor part in this view. Nevertheless, two years after the intro-
duction of the Wmo, the Vereniging Nederlandse Gemeenten (VNG, Associa-
tion of Dutch Municipalities) published a guideline for public servants, policy-
makers and faith-based organizations on how to establish durable relations be-
tween the government and faith-based organizations without breaking the prin-
ciple of separation of church and state. According to the authors, this was neces-
sary because “religion is a fact of society that government cannot ignore.”34  
Another effort to redefine their relationship took place in mid-2011, when the 
Dutch Cabinet and the philanthropic sector entered a covenant in order to make 
a combined effort to achieve their shared public goals. In this covenant, church-
es were represented by their umbrella organization Interkerkelijk Contact in 
Overheidszaken (CIO, Interchurch Contact in Government Affairs in The Neth-
erlands) of which the Salvation Army was an active member. Within the frame-
work of this covenant, the government aimed to help professionalize the sector 
and to start collective social initiatives in order to create a ‘good society’. In this 
collective manner, all parties worked towards an exchange of information and 
knowledge, the balancing of policy and spending, the creation of innovative 
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ways of financing social initiatives, enhancement of the infrastructure and trans-
parency of the philanthropic sector and the strengthening of public trust.35 So, at 
least to a certain extent, there was interest in cooperation between government 
and faith-based civil society, be it that the manner in which to shape this cooper-
ation, was still rather undefined. Both government and faith-based civil society 
were actively exploring the possibilities for a new modus operandi to combine 
their efforts. 
This reservation however, was the same for faith-based organizations and 
churches themselves, as they also needed some time to become conversant to the 
new possibilities that the Wmo offered to regain social relevance. Being accus-
tomed to the fact that the primary responsibility of poor relief and many other 
forms of care had been in the hands of the welfare state, faith-based organiza-
tions and churches had to reassess their own diaconate or social charity function. 
The Wmo incited faith-based organizations and churches to actually rethink 
their public relevance and with the creation of local platforms of cooperation, 
these organizations were, to a certain extent, able to represent themselves in 
formal policy circuits. It also encouraged interdenominational cooperation. On a 
more internal level, the Wmo has induced a contemplative process on how to be 
a church with social relevance and this in its turn has resulted in cooperative 
projects and the reinforcement of networks. Also, churches had become more 
visible in society, as is exemplified by the increasing number of church-
activities that were subsidized by the government.36 
This budding revaluation of identity in the public domain also reflected on 
the role of the social professional, a subject of debate since the 1970s. During 
recent years, the axiom of professionalization had lost some of its edge because 
of new arguments that pointed in the direction of de-professionalization of the 
welfare work. The high standard of professionalization of social service provid-
ers seemed to have created an echelon of distant and unreachable professionals, 
which had an inhibiting effect on some of those who actually needed that help. 
This growing awareness gave birth to the idea that the capacities of individuals 
had to be emphasized rather than their deficiencies, and to make the citizen him-
self an accessible “social professional”.37 This burgerkracht (civil force) also 
translated to the high level of volunteer activity in Dutch society. In 2008, the 
Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS, Central Statistical Bureau) concluded 
that almost half of the Dutch citizens were active as volunteers, which made 
voluntarism an important part of the public debate on social responsibility and 
de-professionalization.38 This voluntarism within Dutch society was particularly 
relevant to the idea of participation and activation of the individual that was 
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incorporated in the Wmo.39 The role of identity, now framed as zingeving (‘giv-
ing meaning’) had already been a part of the debate on the professional since the 
recent turn of the century when a new emphasis on ethics in social work trig-
gered an academic debate on the “normative professional”. In the Netherlands 
this debate was inspired by the University of Humanistic Studies in Utrecht but 
this interest in the role of identity and even religion in social welfare profession-
alism had continued to grow worldwide, and a renewed interest in the role of 
religion in social work was also detectable during the first decade of the twenty-
first century in the international social work field.40 In April 2011, the Nether-
lands center for social development, MOVISIE, even started a research platform 
on the issue of zingeving as an important part of social work counseling meth-
ods.41 
 
This combination of an emerging interest in cooperation between government, 
faith-based civil society, and churches; voluntarism; de-professionalization and 
even religious professionalism seems to create a challenging environment for 
civil society and the government to recalibrate their current and future dynam-
ical relationship. Part of this future however, is also the current financial malaise 
within the Eurozone. Many of the European economies are suffering hardship, 
and the sovereign debt crisis has not only destabilized many an economy but 
also hampered the European internal cooperation. The direct result of these Eu-
ropean developments is that the current Dutch government (liberal-social) is 
focusing on huge cutbacks. For many Dutch citizens these cutbacks imply a 
declining public purchasing power, and a possible increase in non-payable debts. 
So, how can the Salvation Army, as a part of the Dutch faith-based civil society, 
proceed with its calibration effort in this unpredictable and challenging envi-
ronment? Especially when one takes into account the dependent position that the 
Army has with regard to government? Is the Salvation Army up to the new chal-
lenges that it is confronted with during current times? Does the Army have a 
future in the Netherlands? 
4. A world to win, or to lose? 
When making up the balance, the decline of the Army’s faith community cannot 
be ignored. Or even worse, it can be argued that because the government had 
become such an important part of the Salvation Army’s frame of reference, the 
attitude of ‘neutralization’ of the government has also induced a certain degree 
of secularization within the Salvation Army as the doors were set widely ajar for 
non-Army professionals. The Army was forced to do so, because of its depend-
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ency on government support. This external influence on what the Army itself 
regarded to be a core element of its identity seems to have been accepted by the 
Army ‘collateral damage’ in exchange for the possibility to maintain its position 
in the social policy system. But why did the Army allow for this to happen? 
Why did the Army allow for the social activities to grow to such an extent that it 
was no longer able to pay for them by itself, and had to accept external funding 
accompanied by much governmental influence? Why did the Army not dispose 
of its professionalized social welfare activities to the partner that was already 
paying for it by means of subsidies and expenses: the government? That way it 
could very well have guarded itself from any outside influence. And in addition 
to this matter of identity, was not the Army, by accepting government funding, 
de facto denying the voluntary character and religious drive of its charitable 
work and thus allowing for the altruistic meaning of these ‘good deeds’ to be 
reduced to a merely salaried profession? Has the Salvation Army sold its birth-
right for a bowl of lentil soup by becoming a paid charity? Or was this financial 
support to be interpreted as being an initial recognition of charitable faith com-
munities that offered their services to governments and citizens? 
According to Voorham, faith-based Christian charity is not attached to mon-
ey, for it is the intention and the consequential deed that matters.42 The intention 
with which one wants to help others is regarded within Army ranks to be of 
overriding importance for the choices one makes. The Salvation Army regards 
itself as an organization that places itself between the state and those who are 
regarded as being socially excluded. As an intermediary, the Army holds out its 
hand for those that may have a legal right to obtain care but are not able to reach 
it on their own account. According to Voorham, this means that the Salvation 
Army will make use of all means possible in its effort to help these people: 
Christian compassion, professional knowledge and skills, devotion and com-
mitment, ‘others’ who can do something that is outside the scope of the Army, 
and last but certainly not least, governmental welfare provisions and other public 
and private financial support. This last mentioned resource has proven to be 
quite well accessible, for the Salvation Army in its turn, has also proven to be an 
acceptable professional partner for the Dutch government. Not many social ser-
vice providers focus their activities and services on what the Army describes as 
‘those 5 to 10 percent that live on the fringes of society’. This means that in the 
view of the Army itself, being almost fully financed by the government com-
bines very well with its pragmatic approach to help the poor and socially ex-
cluded. In that sense, the Army very suitably adapted its strategy to the sign of 
the times. 
This also explains why the Army had no urge to submit its market share, and 
retrench and fall back to its own finances and community of faith. According to 
the current CEO of W&G Vader, renouncement of government funding would 
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mean the discontinuance of much of the Army’s social services. This would 
result in marginalization of the Salvation Army within Dutch society, a position 
that would be hard to swallow for the Army, because then it would have to sur-
render its dearly won political and social relevance. The most profound conse-
quence, according to Vader, would be that the Salvation Army had to leave 
many of the socially excluded out in the cold.43 So, also from this point of view, 
the acceptance of governmental finances seems rather well-founded in its reli-
gious identity as it invokes the motto “the end justifies the means”.  
This motto fits well with any army, but what about the underlying intention 
of evangelization? Is it not the Army’s goal to save souls? For was it not Booth 
who declared that real change in people’s lives would only be possible when 
they would be spiritually converted? According to current vice-CEO of W&G 
and son of K. van Teijlingen, H. van Teijlingen, spiritual conversion lies not 
within the power of men, and even more, any form of conditional sale by the 
Army is absolutely out of the question.44 The Army is dedicated to propagating 
the gospel by means of acts of charity – good deeds – and not to actively convert 
people by words. In the Nota Identiteit of 2006, it is made explicit that the core 
of the Army’s social philosophy is based on Biblical principles.45  
 
“[34] Then the King will say to those on his right, ‘Come, you who are blessed 
by my Father; take your inheritance, the kingdom prepared for you since the 
creation of the world. [35] For I was hungry and you gave me something to 
eat, I was thirsty and you gave me something to drink, I was a stranger and 
you invited me in, [36] I needed clothes and you clothed me, I was sick and 
you looked after me, I was in prison and you came to visit me.’[37] “Then the 
righteous will answer him, ‘Lord, when did we see you hungry and feed you, 
or thirsty and give you something to drink? [38] When did we see you a 
stranger and invite you in, or needing clothes and clothe you? [39] When did 
we see you sick or in prison and go to visit you?’ [40] “The King will reply, 
‘Truly I tell you, whatever you did for one of the least of these brothers and 
sisters of mine, you did for me.’ 
 
[37] Jesus replied: ‘Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all 
your soul and with all your mind.’[38] This is the first and greatest command-
ment. [39] And the second is like it: ‘Love your neighbor as yourself.’”46 
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Based on these scriptural passages, the Army takes the view that ‘acts speak 
louder than words’, irrespective of these acts were being paid for, and that 
through the acts of Salvationists the message of the gospel may be communicat-
ed even clearer than through their words. By making this view also central to its 
policy strategy, the Army avoids being accused of proselytizing in combination 
with providing for social services, but at the same time it is able to emphasize its 
image as a religiously motivated social service provider with some specific dis-
tinguishing features: committed, trustworthy and reliable. In the effort to main-
tain its position towards the government, the Army has positioned itself by 
means of emphasizing reciprocity, supplementarity, and by arguing that its ser-
vices are of good quality, a quality that most recently has been ascribed to the 
combination of highly-professional care and identity as part of that professional-
ism. This line of argumentation would have been rather circumspect during the 
1980s and 1990s, but in current times, this approach might actually prove to be 
of value. This brings us to the last question of this book – a question that is, 
from a historian’s point of view, as tempting as it is perfidious: what about the 
future of the Salvation Army in the Netherlands? 
 
With regard to above described developments, there seems to be a world to win 
for the Salvation Army in the Netherlands, and the Army has interesting features 
that, when mobilized successfully, can prove to be of much value. But to what 
extent will te Army be able to do so? One possibility to make this effort success-
ful for the Army is to combine its highly professionalized but possibly inhibiting 
social services, with its voluntary, but very accessible local church activities. 
Then, the two pillars of its dual mission will not only be held together, but will 
continue to create a synergetic innovative and vital force. Such an approach 
might even prove to be a constructive route towards the revitalization of the 
Army’s faith community. The sentiments between the faith community and 
W&G however, give reason to believe that this will need more attention than has 
actually been allowed for a long time since the reorganization of 1990. Whereas 
the social services of W&G can be assessed as being rather over-
professionalized, and the faith community seems to have become despondent, a 
duty presents itself to the Army leadership: to ensure a close cooperation be-
tween the Army’s faith community and the professionals of W&G, and interest-
ingly enough, the Army does not have to search far to find a vivid example of 
how this can be realized. Van Teijlingen recounts:  
 
“From the growing number of visitors, our Army corps in Almere concluded 
that solitude amongst elderly had increased, for every year more elderly 
stopped by for a chat and a cup of coffee. Traditionally the corps had provid-
ed for elderly services through their Bejaardenbond (Senior Society), but 
even though W&G had also started a similar project Grijs Genoegen (Grey 
Delight) that aimed to breach the social isolation of the elderly on a national 
level, the Almere corps had initiated local activities on its own to invite the 
elderly: gymnastics, playing shuffleboard, et cetera. From the conversations 
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that occurred during those activities, it became clear that there was a more 
structural need for day care for the elderly, and the Huiskamer project (Liv-
ing Room project) was started. At the same time, in 2008, W&G also opened 
its first community center called Buurtsteunpunt “Bij Bosshardt” (Neigh-
borhood center “With Bosshardt”). This center was named after the famous 
Army Major Bosshardt, and it was open to anyone that wanted to come for a 
chat and a cup of coffee. 
In Almere, the limited opening hours of the Huiskamer were extended and at 
the end of the day, a bowl of soup was served. This attracted a new group of 
people – other than the elderly – with their own stories and problems, and 
soon one of these new problems proved to be the issue of financial debt re-
duction. Because a growing number of visitors seemed to have been con-
fronted with high debts and low incomes, the Almere corps started to provide 
for meals at low prices. With this new service, however, the corps also need-
ed new kitchen equipment, which was partly provided for by another local 
foundation that wanted to pitch in. Also, local supermarkets started to offer 
their surplus supplies, which resulted in the distribution of food parcels for 
the deprived.  
All these activities were organized according to immediate needs and with 
the strong dedication of committed individuals. The corps in Almere has 
been totally dependent on volunteer commitment, but only 15% to 20% of its 
120 volunteers are Salvationists. There are many more ‘outside’ volunteers. 
For example, when the corps continued to develop activities and increased in 
social relevance, the Almere municipality asked the corps to help people with 
their reintegration process into a regular work situation, and since then it 
functions as a certified trainee post. However, as these trainees require pro-
fessional tutoring, this part of the work is provided for by W&G staff, and 
not the corps volunteers. W&G is also indirectly involved in the activities of 
the corps as W&G staff has a place in the steering committee that supervises 
the palette of corps activities. Also on other matters, the corps knows how to 
find W&G and vice versa. When, for example, the corps encounters an acute 
problem like home eviction, it contacts the W&G project called “Per-
spectief” in order to secure a shelter for the people in question. Sometimes 
the corps also receives the request from the W&G to take over supervision 
over a certain individual.”47 
 
This insight on a tentative cooperation between an enterprising corps like Al-
mere and W&G shows that sometimes both parts of the same organization de-
velop similar activities without making use of the other’s expertise and re-
sources on the matter. It also shows that, even if it happens prudently, any syn-
ergy between parts of the Army’s organization might lead to an advantage for 
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both parties when developed consciously. Because when, for example, a corps, 
as a voluntary organization, is overloaded with work it can ask W&G to step in 
and take over certain activities. In its turn, W&G can make good use of the 
knowledge that a corps has developed with regard to the creation of accessible 
local social services, and with it increase the range and impact of its presence in 
society. It is interesting that this ‘Almere type’ of interconnectedness between 
different social and religious parts of the Army has always formed the basis for 
the Army’s goodwill centers. As a matter of fact, Major Bosshardt had always 
regarded this combination of social and religious aims essential to the effective-
ness of the Army’s work: “The secret of ‘her’ Goodwill-center and its vigor was 
that she combined two things: social work (subsidized) and an Army corps.”48 
But to what extent is this scenario possible at the current juncture the Army 
finds itself in? 
Throughout its history, the innovative capacity of the Salvation Army has 
provided for creative and relevant solutions to rather new and acute social prob-
lems. Whenever the Dutch welfare state seemed to fail a particular group within 
society, the Army has shown the potential to fill in that particular gap. Accord-
ingly, also the current financial crisis may therefore provide new chances for the 
Army to prove its social relevance. This does however, mean that the Army has 
to be able to seize the opportunity and in order to be able to do so, the Army has 
to have an organizational structure at its disposal that facilitates this innovative 
potential, and also abundant personal drive as is provided for by e.g .vocational 
voluntarism. The problem is however, that especially these two features are 
under rather great pressure, as we have seen above.  
First of all: will the current organizational structure prove to be sufficiently 
supportive for such a process of joining forces between the two parts of the Ar-
my’s mission, especially with regard to the ongoing secularization within the 
Salvation Army? What if this results in a further decrease in numbers of corps? 
For, the chances are that in the ultimate case, the Army’s mission will be re-
duced to its social objective only. And would in that case the Army as we know 
it still exist? Both Vader and Voorham are of the opinion that when viewed from 
this perspective, the Army corps are just an organizational form.49 This idea 
correlates with how social scientist Sengers views the concept of caritas. In his 
opinion, caritas stands for both belief and deed, and not so much the organiza-
tion that provides for it.50 According to Voorham, the core of the Salvationist 
motivation is not so much formalized in an organizational structure, but it is 
existent in the spirit of its people. This idea equals the analysis behind the classi-
fication that management consultant Peter Drucker put on the Salvatioon Army 
in the U.S. According to Drucker the Army is “the most effective organization 
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in the U.S.” because the Army offers non-material goals for people who there-
fore are willing to ‘go an extra mile’ and therefore embody the values that the 
brand Salvation Army stands for.51 When this line of thought is continued, ac-
cording to Voorham, in the ultimate case, the Army’s faith-based fundament 
could very well continue to form the base of its social services as long as the 
Salvation Army has a spiritual breeding ground (for example the texts of its 
founding father William Booth). In that case it is not the number of Salvationists 
that form the key to the Army’s success, but it is “Salvationism” that forms the 
secret of the Army’s social relevance.  
This line of reasoning however, denies the implications of an organizational 
structure on its identity. Organizational structures tend to form a force by their 
own and become more dominant than that people sometimes like. On the other 
hand, with regard to the spititual breeding ground, organizational structure might 
just prove to be an element of success. For even Salvationism has to be nurtured 
and fed, and without the support of an effective organizational structure, Salva-
tionism might wither irrespective of any number of Salvationists. The Army has 
chosen to make its identity into an important distinguishing feature and this 
strategy might prove to be of great interest in the Army’s struggle to curb the 
ongoing internal secularization. Additionally, the diminishing membership 
numbers has put the Army’s existential question of identity on the forefront, in a 
rather pressing manner. This need for internal deliberations however, brings 
with it the risk that the Army will become too introverted and thus also the or-
ganizational structure has to provide for mechanisms that check such a reflex.  
One of the unique selling points of the Army that might help to prevent run-
ning dry from its grassroots is to activate external volunteers. Even though the 
Army had made some unfortunate choices on the subject in the past, it has prov-
en to be able to commit hundreds of volunteers. This mobilizing potential makes 
the Army attractive to the Dutch government and society as a whole, especially 
with regard to the Wmo. On the other hand, will this influx of external people 
not encroach on the Army’s precious identity? Most obvious is that the Army 
will try to recuit its volunteers amongst kindred spirits and even also other reli-
gious communities. Is this the case? Does the Army actively try to entice mem-
bers of other churches and religious communities to make use of the Army’s 
organizational structure (W&G or corps work) and become active within one of 
the various social activities that the Army provides for? Or has the Army to 
intensify its effort in this area? The current strategy of the Army is focused on 
creating a sense of shared repsonsability between the Army and the Dutch socie-
ty in a more general sense. With the slogan: ‘Together we’re one’, the Army not 
only emphasizes the internal coherence between the various parts of the organi-
zation, but also the Army wants to make an inviting statement to anyone and any 
organization in society that is willing to contribute time, money or other means 
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in order work towards a good society.52 In this manner, the Army actually 
seemes to have widened its scope even more, in order to create a critical mass on 
a voluntary basis that can contribute to the Army’s twofold mission. But will 
that be enough?  
Even though the Salvation Army seems to have a world to win in the Nether-
lands, the way to do so depends very much on how the Army will continue to 
balance its two-sided mission, as it has done throughout its very existence in 
Dutch society. The Army proves to have a selling point that has become more 
and more unique over time: its faith-based identity. At the same time, it is exact-
ly this faith-based identity that confronts the Army with problems on a regular 
basis. So, will the Army continue to be able to raise it high enough so that it can 
give light to everyone in the house? Or will the Army feel forced to put its lamp 
under the bowl and keep its faith-based identity hidden – a private force that 
silently fuels the Army’s work? When done carefully, the Army might well 
continue on the road of propagating its identity as part of its professionalism, for 
at least within some parts of the Dutch government a budding interest value-
driven social work seems to be present. Sometimes even the government seems 
not only to have lost some of its embarrassment with religious organizations, but 
it has started to show an active interest in a renewed cooperation. This might not 
only give the Army a chance for further stabilization of its position in the social 
policy system as an important co-actor to the government, but it also leaves the 
door ajar for the Army to do so, based on its religious identity. Thus the Army’s 
two-fold mission might be rebalanced again, and this time in favor of its reli-
gious mission. On the other hand there are many developments that pose a threat 
to the Army’s faith-based identity as a social service provider, and much of the 
Army’s continuation depends on how the people who are responsible for manag-
ing this sympathetic icon of the Dutch (urban) scene: are they able to maintain 
such an organizational structure that the cherished Salvationism has a chance for 
survival? For as a member of the Dutch society I hope that during the Christ-
mases of many years to come, when I will myself probably still hurry through 
the crowded corridors of the Utrecht Station shopping mall, it will be possible 
for me to catch another glimpse of this uniformed individual, next to the Army’s 
iconic red kettle. 
                                                        
 
52 Interview with Vader, August 31, 2012 
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Appendix A – List of legislation with regard to the Dutch welfare state 
 
This list is based on four important functions of the welfare state: care, commu-
nity, education and social security. 
1803  Lager Onderwijswet 
1854  Armenwet 
1857  Onderwijswet 
1863  Wet op het Middelbaar Onderwijs 
1865  Wet op de Uitoefening van de Geneeskunst 
1874  Kinderwet  
1875  Wet op het Lager Onderwijs 
1876  Wet op het Hoger Onderwijs 
1889  Arbeidswet 
1895  Veiligheidswet 
1900  Leerplichtwet 
1901  Ongevallenwet 
Woningwet 
Kinderwetten 
1902  Beroepswet 
1912  Armenwet 
1913  Radenwet 
Ziektewet 
Invaliditeits- en Ouderdomswet 
1914  Noodregeling-Treub 
1915  Oorlogszeeongevallenwet 
1916  Werkloosheidsbesluit 
1919  Ouderdomswet 
Gezondheidswet 
Invaliditeitswet 
Zeeongevallenwet 
Werkloosheidsverzekeringsnoodwet 
1920  Wet op de Rijksverzekeringsbank 
1921  Ongevallenwet 
Nijverheidsonderwijswet 
1922  Land- en Tuinbouwongevallenwet 
1925  Arbeidsgeschillenwet 
1927  Wet op de CAO vorming 
1929  Ziektewet 
1932  Bedrijfsradenwet 
Steunregeling Werklozen 
1933  Organisatiewet Sociale Verzekering 
1934  Woningwet 
1935  Werkloosheidssubsidiewet 
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1937  Wet op het verbindend en onverbindend verklaren van CAO's 
1939  Kinderbijslagwet voor Loontrekkenden 
1941  Ziekenfondsbesluit 
1947  Noodwet Ouderdomsvoorziening 
Woonruimtewet 
1948  Kinderbijslagwet voor rentetrekkers  
1949  Werkloosheidswet 
1950  Wet op de Ondernemingsraden 
Wet op de Bedrijfsorganisatie 
1951  Noodwet Kinderbijslag Kleine Zelfstandigen 
1952  Organisatiewet Sociale Verzekering 
1955  Beroepswet 
1956  Wet op de Sociale Verzekeringsbank en de Raden van Arbeid  
Gezondheidswet 
Algemene Ouderdomswet 
1959  Algemene Weduwen- en Wezenwet 
1962  Interimwet Invaliditeitsrentetrekkers 
Algemene Kinderbijslagwet  
1963  Wet Werkloosheidsvoorziening 
Kinderbijslagwet voor kleine zelfstandigen 
Algemene Bijstandswet 
Wet op het voortgezet onderwijs 
1964  Wet Werkloosheidsvoorziening 
1965 Ziekenfondswet 
Tijdelijke rijksgroepsregeling mindervaliden 
1966  Ziektewet 
1967  Wet op de Arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering  
Algemene Wet Bijzondere Ziektekosten 
1971  Wet Voorzieningen Gezondheidszorg 
1974  Kaderwet Specifiek Welzijn  
1976  Algemene Arbeidsongeschikheidswet 
1980  Algemene Kinderbijslagwet 
1982  Ziektewet 
1985  Wet op het Basisonderwijs 
1987  Welzijnswet 
1992  Besluit Beheer Sociale Huursector 
1993  Wet op de Basisvorming 
  Wet op de beroepen in de individuele gezondheidszorg 
1994  Welzijnswet 
1996  Algemene nabestaandenwet 
Wet Educatie en Beroepsonderwijs 
1997  Wet voorzieningen gehandicapten 
2003  Wet werk en bijstand 
2007  Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning 
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Appendix B – List of Territorial Commanders of the Salvation Arm in 
the Netherlands 
 
1887-1888 J.K.Tyler 
1888-1889 H.C. Hodder 
1889-1891 G.P. French 
1891-1896 W.E. Oliphant 
1896-1902  A.S. Clibborn 
1902-1907 Various 
1907-1915 W. Ridsdel 
1915-1920 Various 
1920-1928 W.H. Howard 
1928-1939 B. Vlas 
1939-1940 A.J. Benwell 
1940-1941  B. Vlas 
1939-1946 Liquidation. Various 
1945-1945 B. Vlas 
1945-1950 C.H. Durman 
1950-1956 E. Thykjaer 
1956-1960 R. Åhlberg 
1960-1966 W.F. Palstra 
1966-1971 K. Westergaard 
1971-1974 L.P. Pindred 
1974-1978 C.A. Verwaal 
1978-1980 G.L. Nelting 
1980-1982 C.A.Verwaal 
1982-1986 R.A. Cox 
1986-1992 R.J.Schurink 
1992-2000 J.van Boven 
2000-2002 T.R.Gulliksen 
2002-2007  W. van der Harst 
2007-2010  R.A. Frans 
2010-  J.C.Y. van Vliet 
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Appendix C – Salvation Army’s organizational charts since 1990  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Function Diagram Salvation Army in the Netherlands, 1989 (source: Decisions 
for legal restructure of the Salvation Army in The Netherlands 1989:74) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Function Diagram Salvation Army in the Netherlands, 1989. Including staffing 
(source: Decisions for legal restructuring of the Salvation Army in The Netherlands 1989) 
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Summary in English 
The Salvation Army is a recognizable icon of social care all over the world. In 
the Netherlands the Army is well known for its charitable activities like giving 
shelter to the homeless and providing for other primary help like clothing, food 
or just a friendly face. Interwoven with this image is its faith-based character, 
for in its public display, the Army explicitly emphasizes that the Christian faith 
is what drives the Salvationist. In fact, in the Netherlands the Salvation Army is 
an acknowledged church. 
This image of the Army as a faith-based charity is far from complete though, 
because the Salvation Army is also a sizable professional social service provid-
er. The Army offers, on a daily basis, programs for the elderly, children, women, 
the homeless and young mothers; as well as day care programs, addiction pro-
grams, services to the armed forces, prisoners, youngsters, the unemployed, 
those in debts, the hungry and even programs to students. Apart from this, the 
Salvation Army provides for many other medical and health services, emergen-
cy disaster response, and educational programs. As a faith-based organization, 
the Salvation Army is embedded in the Dutch society as well as in the realms of 
social and medical care. 
Throughout Dutch history, these social activities were traditionally provided 
for by church groups and other, often faith-based, organizations. However, after 
the era of secularization and political neutralization that occurred during the 
second half of the twentieth century, there are not many faith-based social ser-
vice providers left in the Netherlands. The fact that the Salvation Army forms an 
exception to this development makes it an interesting organization for further 
analysis. Especially considered that 90% of the costs that the Army incurs on 
these social services are paid for by public money in the form of subsidies, 
grants, government contracts, contributions from collective health insurances 
and other social welfare legislation. 
The Salvation Army does not operate in a political or social as it had to relate 
to the Dutch national government. Also, from the moment it opened its doors in 
Amsterdam in 1887, it had to participate in a field of social care that was already 
occupied by a myriad of smaller and larger organizations. Therefore the Army 
was always part of the Dutch civil society. Since the last decades of the nine-
teenth century, the national government began to show an increasing interest in 
alleviating social problems by means of social welfare legislation. This however, 
meant that the roles of both the government and civil society would be altered. 
With the increase in social legislation between 1890 and 1945, the prime re-
sponsibility for these issues slowly started to shift from the shoulders of civil 
society to the national and local governments. This process gained momentum 
after World War II when the contours of what would be called the ‘welfare 
state’ became visible, both internationally as well as in the Netherlands. Next to 
the Ministry of Social Affairs (1933), the Ministry of Social Work was estab-
lished in 1952, and a safety net of social (welfare) legislation was laid out during 
these decades. The introduction of the Social Support Act in 1965 created in-
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come security for everyone in the Netherlands. This closing move by the Dutch 
welfare state however, also implied that civil society had lost its traditional pre-
rogative of being ultimately responsible for poor relief, a position that is still a 
fact in present times. 
This shift in the balance between the government and civil society with re-
gard to the responsibility for social care shows that the Dutch state and civil 
society maintained a relationship in their mutual effort to battle social wrongs; a 
battle in which both actors were dependent on each other. While the government 
lacked the power to actually intervene in people’s private situations, civil society 
made use of governmental (financial and legislative) support in its effort to do 
precisely that. And so this relationship was based on a shared goal. On the other 
hand, as this study shows, both actors also demonstrated reluctance in this coop-
eration. Even though they were bound together by mutual dependency, this rela-
tion seems to have been interspersed with an alternating pattern of attraction and 
repulsion in which both actors had their own, variable, preconditions. To a cer-
tain extent this pattern bears a resemblance to that of a courtship dance - a rela-
tionship in which attraction and repulsion alternate within the social framework 
of interdependence. This metaphor also applies to the Salvation Army which has 
been more than just a witness to these developments. Being part of civil society, 
the Army has also actively taken part in the social policy system process as an 
actor. Therefore, studying this relationship sheds new light on how this system 
impacted the Dutch faith-based civil society with the Salvation Army operating 
on its frontline. 
The central research questions in this study are as follows: What are the per-
ceptible dynamics in the relation between the state and the Salvation Army in 
the Netherlands with regard to social policy between 1890 and 1990? What do 
these dynamics reveal about the developing Dutch welfare state and faith-based 
civil society and how did they affect the identity of the Salvation Army itself? 
These main questions are further subdivided into more empirical research ques-
tions with regard to the relationship between the government and the Army: 
What were the policy goals and underlying principles of the government and of 
the Salvation Army? And how did these goals function in the cooperation, de-
pendency and distribution of power between both actors? Moreover, how did 
this cooperation influence the Salvation Army’s identity? This last question 
leads to more issues connected to the Salvation Army, of which the following 
are addressed: How was the Salvation Army able to maintain its faith-based 
identity within the force field of the changing governmental attitude towards 
such faith-based civil society organizations? What were the main issues in rela-
tion to the state that pressured the Salvation Army, and by what means did the 
Salvation Army attempt to control these external influences and to maintain its 
autonomy and identity? 
These questions are addressed in this study by means of historical research. 
Primary and secondary sources are studied and interpreted in a historical-
hermeneutical manner. In order to learn more about the Salvation Army, its 
archives in the Netherlands are analyzed and supplemented by interviews with 
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key-persons from the Army. The historical description of the Dutch welfare 
policy is largely based on parliamentary records and further supplemented with 
secondary literature. The most significant concepts that are studied, like the 
welfare state, civil society, organizational identity, and the idea of the relation-
ship between the government and the Salvation Army as a part of civil society, 
are framed in an international discursive academic context. 
 
Part I: The social policy system in the Netherlands 
In Part I the development is analyzed of what is framed as the ‘social policy 
system’. This system is based on a structural relationship between the govern-
ment as the main policy provider, and civil society and the Dutch citizens as 
main policy implementers and clients. In a combined effort to tackle social prob-
lems, these actors have created a system in which public and private funds are 
structurally reallocated to social policy aims; aims that alter over time, according 
to social and political developments. The time span of this part of the study 
(1854-1990) is chosen because of the underlying theme of this narrative: the 
responsibility for care and the effects this has on the position of civil society in 
relation to the government.  
Around 1900 the (merely local) governmental approach to social problems 
was mainly to support goals on concrete social issues, and only step into the 
picture when these had developed into situations beyond the scope of civil socie-
ty organizations, as was the case with tuberculosis and infant mortality for ex-
ample. This support was hardly structural, was offered on request of the organi-
zation that was to carry out the implementation and was based on supplementar-
ism, for the organizations themselves had to pay for most of the costs incurred.  
Soon after 1900 however, a change started to take shape. Both civil society 
and the national government increasingly sought the assistance of each other on 
various social issues. However, opposition to state control and the fear of losing 
autonomy from the side of civil society curbed the further structuralizing of this 
budding cooperation. Nevertheless, during the period 1910-1945 the contours of 
certain policy goals became visible. The quality of the social care was to be 
increased by professionalization of the organizations involved: skilled labor and 
accountability. Also, the intensifying process of pillarization had increased the 
number of care organizations and problems of manageability grew. So, with the 
intention of ‘harmonizing’ this fragmented and extensive group of organizations, 
the government encouraged them to unite into an umbrella organization, corre-
sponding with their ideological pillars. With World War II approaching, two 
important social policy themes had become visible: quality and manageability. 
Additionally, the availability of governmental funding to social service organi-
zations not only instigated a growth in the number of organizations, but more 
than once, the funding appeared to be of a more structural nature than was envi-
sioned. This enhanced the structural character of the cooperation between the 
government and civil society. The ‘social policy system’ was born. 
The post-war spirit of ‘reconstruction and renewal’ strengthened the co-
alignment of the government and civil society, resulting in the establishment of 
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the Ministry of Social Work in 1952. Also, between 1945 and 1965 important 
Dutch welfare legislation was adopted and implemented, and the Dutch welfare 
state was coming of age. The social policy theme of manageability, interpreted 
as harmonization and efficiency, was now legitimized by acknowledgment of 
the value of identity. This became clear in the government’s effort to involve the 
public with the construction of social policy by inviting its organizational repre-
sentatives – civil society – at the policy table. Because of their identity, civil 
society organizations were regarded to be the pre-eminent structures to mobilize 
their grassroots and made them valued partner to the government in the social 
policy system. During the empowering 1960s however, the governmental view 
on identity as an organizing principle started to change. With the crumbing of 
the ideological pillars, new ideologically ‘neutral’ organizations were created, in 
which the smaller former faith-based civil society organizations started to com-
bine their forces. With this development a third important policy theme rose to 
the surface: social activation and participation. The development of the welfare 
state was accompanied by a growing emphasis of the government on participa-
tion and during the 1960s promotion of volunteer work became one of the policy 
lines that were adopted. Also the administrative approach of decentralization 
aimed at the increase of both participation and manageability and would remain 
a recurring theme throughout the twentieth century. National policy was to be 
decentralized to those governmental administrative levels (municipality, prov-
ince) that were regarded to have more knowledge and understanding of the 
groups that were the subject of these policies. This development also meant that 
some of the power that the government possessed would be redistributed to the 
local level and civil society would have to recalibrate its position in this force 
field accordingly. 
With regard to the policy theme of quality, the emphasis on professionaliza-
tion of both personnel and the administration of the civil society organizations 
continued throughout these post-war decades. But as a result of the emancipa-
tory vigor of the 1960s, the themes of professionalization and participation were 
also translated by a new theme: democratization and representation.  
In 1974, Knelpuntennota (Bottleneck report) took stock of the government’s 
policy efforts on harmonization, quality and participation and the results were 
tough on civil society as well as on the government. In short, civil society was 
alleged to have turned into introspective organizations. Professionalization had 
reduced the importance of the volunteer, the role of identity had diminished and 
with it the representational function of civil society suffered much pressure. It 
seemed to have lost its added value and now its place in the social policy system 
was debatable. The characteristics of representation and identity that had earlier 
set civil society apart had now devaluated, and with the responsibility for social 
help in the hands of the government, it was only a matter of time before the 
government would intervene. 
The Knelpuntennota had for the first time made explicit what was already 
widely felt: civil society had lost its added value of being a representative on the 
matter of identity. This observation formed a clear threat to its existence and so 
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civil society organizations had to reinvent themselves, for which, interestingly, 
civil society received help from the government. In response to the situation 
sketched by the Knelpuntennota the government continued its decentralization 
effort in order to improve participation on the local level. Civil society itself 
would have to be restructured, but in order to do achieve success on this front 
the organizations themselves would have to be involved in the process. Civil 
society also was to continue on the road to harmonization and participation in 
terms of democratization and effectiveness, and possibilities for further demo-
cratic influence in civil society organizations would be studied. However, now 
that civil society organizations were no longer regarded as organizational expo-
nents of their grassroots, they could function very well as support structures to 
further individual activation of what was left of their grassroots. This was com-
bined with a revaluation of the volunteer from the side of the government. Even 
though the civil society organizations were no longer valued as identity organi-
zations, the volunteer’s internal motivation was still based on this identity and 
this source of intrinsic commitment was still considered important by the gov-
ernment. In place of civil society organizations, individual citizens were now 
regarded as representatives of their individual identity. These organizations 
however, could be able to maintain their place in the social policy system by 
facilitating this ‘rehabilitation of the volunteer’ which was deemed by the gov-
ernment as essential for the quality of social services. 
This development continued into the 1980s when policy goals like decentral-
ization, democratization and volunteer commitment were emphasized to develop 
human potential. New however, was the idea that this was not to be facilitated 
by the central state, but on a local level. And not by civil society organizations 
as intermediary political institutions, but only as support structures for the indi-
vidual development of their autonomous members. Volunteer work had now to 
be revalued for it was both a means of participation as well as a possible way for 
effective cost reduction. This new policy framework was phrased as ‘the respon-
sible society’ by Minister of CRM, Brinkman (CDA): individual activation and 
self-responsibility by means of mantelzorg (taking care of one’s fellow), self-
help, and volunteer work, became central elements in the welfare policy of these 
years. In order to implement these policies effectively, society itself would have 
to regain its responsibility for social problems, and this effort had to be support-
ed more by the market than by the state. So the government had to keep its dis-
tance from the playing field. With the announcement of the retrenchment of the 
state and the lack of added value of these civil society organizations, individuals 
and society had regained their responsibility. Further financing of the umbrellas 
was now needless and many ceased to exist.  
By 1990, the welfare policy system had seen different phases of develop-
ment: commencement, coming of age, flowering, hampering, adjustment and 
fine-tuning. And now it seemed to enter a new phase of change. Interesting 
however is that even though change seemed to have been the main force that 
shaped the structure and form of policy, three values were visible throughout 
this process: quality, manageability and participation. These values formed the 
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base for welfare policy concepts that differed over time in dominance as well as 
with regard to their actual interpretations: professionalization, harmonization, 
shared responsibility, democratization, decentralization, volunteer work and 
activation. A central theme in the development of these policy concepts was the 
role of civil society as co-actors in the system. As long as ‘identity’ provided for 
an organizational principle, the government seemed to value civil society as a 
partner. But when this added value became less clear, civil society had to recali-
brate its position in the welfare policy system, and even though the government 
provided for a possible new role, many faith-based civil society organizations 
united into large ‘neutral’ service providers, while others ceased to exist. What 
about the Salvation Army then? How did the Army position itself within this 
welfare policy system and how did it cope with the different force fields that 
were integrated into this system? 
 
Part II: The Salvation Army identity process 
In Part II, the development of the Salvation Army as an actor in this social poli-
cy field is described, starting with the Army’s establishment in the Netherlands 
in 1887 and continuing on till the Army’s most recent fundamental reorganiza-
tion in 1990. During this period, three narrative lines are followed: how the Sal-
vation Army became a part of the social policy system and how this influenced 
the Army’s identity; the consequences of this process on a legal level; and its 
consequences on the level of professionalization. These three developments 
converged during the 1980s, and provided for important and rather pressing 
reasons for the Army to consider a fundamental restructuring of its organization, 
which eventually took place in 1990. The Salvation Army’s identity was shaped 
along three developments: its position in the social policy system, its legal iden-
tity and its professionalization.  
 
The Salvation Army as part of the welfare policy system 
Although the English parent organization The Salvation Army started out as a 
religious community, founder William Booth decided in 1890 that the Army had 
to be more than a church. It could no longer close its eyes to the poignant social 
misery existent in the industrialized England of the late nineteenth-century. With 
the publication of In Darkest England and The Way Out, Booth introduced an 
additional goal to the preaching of the gospel: provision of social care where and 
when possible. Since then, the identity of the Army was based on a double mis-
sion: religious salvation and social care. This double mission set the path for the 
young division of the Army in the Netherlands (1887) to cooperate with the 
Dutch government. Therefore, over the period between 1887 and the end of 
World War II, the government and the Army increasingly realized that, to a 
large extent, they pursued similar goals, focusing on combating social problems. 
Soon after the introduction of the social mission in 1890 the Army in the Nether-
lands grew in size from 37 corps in 1890 to 48 in 1892. The Army’s social work 
also increased and in 1908, the Army spent an equal amount of money on its 
religious mission as it did on its social work. 
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The initial cooperation of the Army with the government became visible through 
its rehabilitation work. Although, since the early years of the twentieth century, 
the government made grants available for this work on an occasional basis, the 
Probation Order of 1910 made way for a structural government support funding. 
Because of its decades-long experience with this form of care, the Army was 
also asked to participate in this arrangement, indicating that the government 
recognized that both actors pursued similar goals. Nevertheless, the Army 
showed some hesitation, because the acceptance of this invitation would bring 
other cherished values of the Army under pressure: autonomy and independ-
ence. The Army took plenty of time before it decided to finally enter into such 
cooperation, the decision being necessitated by the threat to the very livelihood 
of the organization - an argument also used by other rehabilitation organizations.  
During the economic crisis of the 1930s, it became obvious that the probation 
department of the Army had become quite dependent on these funds. However, 
instead of withdrawing, the Army decided to strengthen its own position. The 
Army had to be spared, it argued, because the work that it did saved the gov-
ernment thousands of guilders. And with this argument, the Army claimed that 
although the balance of power had changed in favor of the government, the rela-
tionship between the two actors was based on a certain degree of reciprocity. 
This argument of economic reciprocity legitimized the Army’s position - a strat-
egy that fitted well in the time of economic downturn. But because the Army 
realized that its dependence on the government was greater than the other way 
round, it hastened to add that it was only a tool in the toolbox of the government, 
thereby presenting itself as being merely instrumental. These arguments of eco-
nomic reciprocity and instrumental supplementation remained important fea-
tures of the relationship of the Army with the government. 
After World War II the Army continued to expand as both its social activities 
and church grew, and its operating result doubled (as did the private donations). 
This was partly because the government increased its subsidy supply. But anoth-
er important factor was that the Army itself was getting accustomed to its place 
within the social policy system, and also managed to locate new subsidy 
sources. Additionally, the Army reorganized parts of the organization based on 
the subsidy flows, which was a clear sign of the readiness of the Army to be 
flexible in order to ensure its own existence. At times however, the relationship 
between the government and the Army became tensed, but the relationship with 
the Army proved to be too valuable for the government municipality to risk, 
emphasizing the interdependence of both actors.  
Between 1910 and 1980, the Army’s strategy of economic reciprocity and 
supplementation, legitimized the position of the Army in the social policy sys-
tem, and the social mission of the Army became an important pillar of the or-
ganization and its identity. But during the 1970s and especially the 1980s, this 
legitimization as well as the convergence of objectives between the two actors, 
came under pressure as the harmonization efforts of the government were hardly 
felt, especially within the rehabilitation department of the Salvation Army. The 
government aimed for harmonization of the work field and for the Army, merger 
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meant having to let go of its own rehabilitation work and disappearing into a 
larger and ‘neutral’ organization. This would prove to not be an option to the 
Salvation Army which strove for the preservation of its right of existence and 
autonomy. Thus this interdependency with the government had resulted in the 
development of the Army’s social services to such an extent that within the so-
cial policy system it pressured the other side of the Army’s coin: its identity. 
Once again the question presented itself: how to maintain its identity and at the 
same time show as much flexibility as possible in order to secure its income?  
 
The legal identity of the Salvation Army 
During most of its existence in the Netherlands, the Salvation Army has tried to 
give shape to its legal identity, especially with regard to its changing political 
and social context. This legal identity was mirrored on three levels: the Articles 
of Association; the phrasing of the Army’s mission statement therein; and the 
subsequent form of legal incorporation that the Army chose. The Army’s legal 
identity was closely related to its identity in a larger sense, as the underlying 
questions of this narrative show: What are we? What can we be? And what do 
we want to be? And to a certain extent, these questions in turn also relate to the 
balance of power between the government and the Salvation Army. 
Before World War II the Salvation Army seemed to have maneuvered itself 
into an unclear legal position. With its Articles of Association of 1896 and 1931 
it was incorporated as a foundation. But the Army was at times convinced that it 
was actually an “ecclesiastical foundation” – a legal form for foundations that 
were part of a denomination or a church. The international relation with its alma 
mater in the United Kingdom however, invoked another ambiguous image, for 
even though in fact the Dutch Salvation Army was British property, it clearly 
presented itself to be quite Dutch. Until World War II, the Army seemed to feel 
comfortable with this self-selected identity. But during the war, this changed 
with the liquidation of the Salvation Army in the Netherlands by the German 
oppressors, for the Articles of Association of 1931 clearly indicated that the 
Army was an English organization. In order to counterbalance this show of force 
from the oppressors, and to continue its activities, the Army re-established itself 
in 1941, but now as a church, and with a separate foundation for its remaining 
social activities. This flexibility in order to ensure its existence would have far-
reaching consequences, as became clear when in 1945, once again by means of 
external intervention, the liquidation was annulled and the Army’s past legal 
form of foundation was restored based on the 1931 Articles. But by then the 
Army’s rank and file had learned to appreciate being a church to such an extent 
that it wanted to remain a church. Additionally, being a church could also shield 
the Salvation Army against possible new unwanted government interference. So 
next to its internal drive, the Army also wanted to remain a church in order to 
improve its position relative to the government on the power balance. On the 
other hand, the Army did not want to give up the legal form of the foundation, 
for this provided for a better legal framework for its financial relations with the 
government. And, quite in line with its pre-war preference for ambiguity, the 
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Army chose both: based on the Articles of 1931 the Army was a foundation and 
based on its annulled recognition as a church (1941), it presented itself as a 
church. This new hybrid legal form was recorded in the new statutes of 1946, 
and with (hesitant) recognition by the Department of Justice in 1948, the Salva-
tion Army was from then on actually a church-foundation. An identity that was 
partly formed under the strong influence of governments, but which was also 
self-willed by the Army, for it perfectly fit the Army’s attitude of flexibility of 
being both a church and a social work organization, and also provided for an 
organizational framework that ensured financial certainty. 
The Army had succeeded in dressing its religious core (church) in a secular 
robe (foundation) and creating a chameleonic identity that proved to serve its 
purpose well in the public sphere. How this secular robe worked in practice 
became clear in the parliamentary debates during the post-war decades. Often 
the Army became an example of either a religious organization with a signifi-
cant supply of social services, or a regular social service provider with a reli-
gious identity. And it was even a test case during the debate on how to define a 
church. The Salvation Army was used as an example to explore the boundaries 
of possible legislation in this debate. But even when in parliament, the Salvation 
Army proved to be intangible. It seems to have been quite convenient to regard 
the Army mainly as a social service provider, for it was regarded as a valued 
partner in the social work area. So, the government intention of being flexible 
towards civil society, and in this case the Salvation Army, became quite visible 
in this instance. The co-alignment of goals might have induced certain goodwill 
with regard to the Army’s ambiguous identity.  
Next to this external debate on the Army’s legal identity, within Army ranks 
as well, there began a debate on what the Army was, during the first half of the 
1960s when Dutch Commander Palstra signaled that something had to change. 
Because the Dutch public and government finding out that they were actually 
supporting an English organization would probably have quite negative conse-
quences on the finances. This indicated that the Army was searching to enhance 
the certainty of its existence, be it in a legal or financial form. However, it still 
took until the mid-1970s for the debate to actually heat up. In 1974 Commander 
Verwaal decided that the Army had to establish a separate foundation for some 
of its social activities (e.g. probation), presumably because of the subsidy stipu-
lations that these parts had to deal with. Additionally Verwaal commissioned a 
group to rewrite the mission statement of the Army to establish a better balance 
between its social and religious missions. So, because of external pressure the 
Army once again showed rather large internal flexibility. This would however, 
result in a prolonged and sometimes heated internal debate in which two lines of 
argumentation revealed themselves. This was also incited by the introduction of 
Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code in 1976 as it knocked away the legal pillar 
which till now had supported the Army’s ambiguous identity. The legal form of 
ecclesiastical foundation (as the Army had till now presented itself) was no 
longer valid and the Army was now confronted with a choice between becoming 
either a church or a foundation. This new legislation also revealed the weaker 
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position of the Army in this power balance where it actually had little influence 
and therefore proved to be rather vulnerable with regard to its identity. 
 
Professionalization of the Salvation Army 
The modernization of the Salvation Army is closely related to the process of 
professionalization. Already long before World War II, professionalization was 
visible within the social work field itself, as educational institutes were already 
established since the end of the nineteenth century, aiming to provide for better 
quality social aid to the workers. For the Salvation Army the beginning of this 
process of professionalization became noticeable in the developing probation 
work. The rise in demand for probation work brought the government and the 
Army more on one line and the government spurred organizations like the Army 
to take on more work by offering growing financial support. Moreover, the in-
creasing complexity of social problems, which was also felt in the probation 
work field, emphasized the need for professionalization. This created a culture 
of knowledge-sharing and debate within the Army’s probation organization, 
next to a qualitative improvement of its probation workers. With regard to ac-
countability, the Salvation Army was already publishing its annual financial 
accounts before 1900, including a separate balance sheet for its social work 
activities. 
From 1950 onwards however, the process of professionalization experienced a 
new development. The increase in social work activities and its growing differ-
entiation and specialization resulted in various training programs that created 
professional experts. This development was not only supported by the govern-
ment, but civil society organizations themselves also sustained the process as 
both actors wanted to improve the quality of the provided services. Moreover, 
these organizations often strove for governmental acknowledgment of their pro-
fession, thus also creating possibilities for structural finances. 
With regard to the Army’s rehabilitation department, the Probation Code of 
1947 stipulated that all personnel had to be approved by the Ministry of Justice. 
On another level, the introduction of the social casework method offered the 
Army a legitimization for its method of work based on an individual level with 
close proximity to the client. This social casework method however, also re-
quired the professional to dispose of any hidden agendas like proselytizing. 
Even more, speaking of any religious subject became a sort of taboo. In its wake 
however, the popularity of social casework brought about a new emphasis on 
schooling and in 1964 the Ministry of Justice indicated education as being a 
compulsory prerequisite to the employment of probation officials. Just a year 
ago, the Army’s probation department had reorganized into separate organiza-
tional units and had therefore loosened its organizational ties with the corps. 
Was a breach in the two-sided coin of the Army’s identity starting to become 
visible? 
Another effect of professionalization on the Army was that its work force 
changed. The amount of well-trained officers diminished compared to the new 
employee-recruits. On a managerial level as well, professionals were hired, and 
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in the case of the Army’s rehabilitation department this was also done by the 
stipulation of the Ministry of Justice. So, on many levels the Army thought that 
its ideological core was slowly but surely being watered down by professional-
ly-motivated personnel. In order to counteract this development, the Army tried 
to occupy all other key positions with its own people, except for in the probation 
department. In 1972 however, the probation department finally parted with its 
traditional core by dismissing its many volunteers. 
During the 1960s and 1970s the probation work field and the Salvation Army 
probation department diverged increasingly in course. Because of the emphasis 
on harmonization, the probation work field started to merge into larger, general 
organizations (SRI in 1973, AVR in 1976) but the Salvation Army remained a 
faith-based probation organization on its own. The opposition towards govern-
mental actions to merge smaller organizations into a larger umbrella organiza-
tion went so far that it urged the Army to show its added value. On what basis 
could it claim retaining its right of existence? The Army’s answer was its unique 
identity. But then again the Army was confronted with the question: what did 
this identity consist of? On the other hand, the government had displayed that it 
valued ‘identity’ as a source of activating power. Nevertheless, by 1980, the 
divergence of goals between the government and the Salvation Army started to 
raise tensions that directly confronted the Army with the matter of identity. And 
this matter would have to be addressed sooner rather than later, for with the 
balance of power leaning towards the government, the Salvation Army was quite 
endangered in its existence. 
During the 1970s and 1980s the role of the professional was thoroughly de-
bated in the Netherlands. The increase in numbers of professionals was regarded 
to have created a separate group of workers within former volunteer organiza-
tions. This brought about two problems: for one, these professionals had seized 
some of the organizations’ powers at the cost of non-professionalized manage-
ment, and on the other hand, the availability of professional help seemed to have 
created a demand of its own. Professionals were suspected of making clients 
dependent on their services, stripping them of their own initiative and sense of 
responsibility. And in its wake, these professionals were blamed for sidelining 
the volunteers that had traditionally formed the core of the organizational identi-
ty, as had happened within the Salvation Army probation department. Within the 
original constellation of the Salvation Army, it was the officer that personified 
the Army’s double mission. As what this study calls a ‘vocational volunteer’, the 
officer often worked both in the social work field and in the Army’s corps. In 
order to improve this work on both types of activities, internal schooling was 
provided for that prepared the officer ‘to win souls’. 
On another level, professionalization developed into a call for democratic 
participation within civil society organizations. The public had to regain influ-
ence over their lives, and one of the forms in which this took place was to gain 
influence in the organizations they worked in or that worked for them. This 
resulted in a thoroughly revised Works Councils Act in 1971. In 1977 the com-
mittee-Van der Burg tried to support the effect of this Act by suggesting that the 
 
 
300 
 
position of all stakeholders in these organizations, general public; employees; 
and clients, had to be strengthened. In the case of the Salvation Army, democrat-
ic participation was regarded to be quite at odds with its hierarchical manage-
ment structure. Especially with regard to the declining number of (internal) of-
ficers in relation to the growing number of (external) employees. The possibility 
of democratic participation would imply the growth of external influence within 
the organization, and especially in the case of the church, this was unacceptable 
to the Army command. Even though democratic participation was already com-
mon practice to a certain extent within the probation department, the Army 
command contested the installment of works councils throughout the entire 
organization. It was convinced that the law did not apply to the Salvation Army 
since it was officially a church. However, the Dutch Council of State decided 
that the Works Councils Act did actually apply to the Army for it had more than 
100 employees. Thus in this context, the fact that the Army was also a church 
was disregarded, and the Army was considered first and foremost a social work 
organization. 
 
Reorganization of identity  
During the 1980s the developments that are described above came together. The 
decentralization movement caused the Salvation Army to an increasing extent to 
do business at the local level. The Army itself however, found that municipali-
ties were not always convinced of this cooperation, especially when the econom-
ic downturn left its mark on the public finances. In the Utrecht case, the pro-
posed cutbacks threatened a number of Army activities with closure. In addition, 
the Army itself concluded that the Utrecht municipality preferred doing business 
with general organizations instead of with the obvious Christian Salvation Ar-
my. Even though this turned out not to be true, the tone was set: the identity of 
the Army was now openly problematic. In Amsterdam as well the identity of the 
Army was debated: To what extent were non-Christian clients or even homo-
sexuals welcome in the Army? And should the government even be subsidizing 
a Christian social service? The Amsterdam municipality wanted to check the 
Army’s statutes in order to answer these questions, but according to the Army, 
these statutes were not sufficiently up-to-date. Another problem that Amsterdam 
confronted the Army with was its reorganization of the home care system. The 
city-wide approach would be constrained to separation into particular districts. 
For the Army this meant that it would lose much of its city-wide home care and 
thus the Army decided to appeal against it. The main argument that the Army 
used was that because of its 'identity' it was able to appeal to a particular audi-
ence. Additionally, due to its large proportion of volunteers, the Army would be 
able to provide for 24-hour accessibility. So now the Army tried to turn its prob-
lematic identity to its advantage, and with success because the Amsterdam mu-
nicipality agreed with this position. 
These arguments of autonomy and identity were also used in the Army’s ef-
forts to rescue its rehabilitation work that was threatened by the waves of merger 
during the 1970s. In the early 1980s, however, this seemed to have been in vain 
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as the Army was facing an increasingly compelling government approach. In 
1984 a large-scale lobby was organized by the Salvation Army. The General 
(U.K.) wrote letters to the Dutch parliament and the Army explained its precari-
ous situation to many Dutch (health)care organizations by sending them leaflets. 
On January 31, 1984 the Salvation Army rallied at the Binnenhof in The Hague. 
Among much display of flags, brass instruments and shiny buttons on uniforms, 
the Commander offered a petition to the Parliamentary Committee on Justice. 
This 'March at the Binnenhof' showed that the Army had remained committed to 
its rehabilitation organization, thus expressing its internal unity. However, it 
would not be much later that the Army faced decisions regarding the rehabilita-
tion work, whereby the options were either to merge into a large, general organ-
ization; or cease to exist; or become a contractual partner of the government in 
the hope that the Army’s identity might be preserved. The Army chose the latter 
option, as this was the most likely way to continue its rehabilitation work while 
hoping to maintain its own identity. It did however change the status of the de-
partment into a proxy organization of the Dutch government. 
This hardly meant that the debate on the Army’s identity was over. Quite the 
contrary, for during the 1980s the question of what exactly this identity con-
tained became increasingly urgent. To find a contemporary answer, the Army 
Leadership decided to use the Army’s centenary in 1987 by organizing a sympo-
sium where representatives of the Army, along with people from various fields 
in which the Army was active (politicians, policymakers and academics) could 
reflect on the question together: to what extent does a Christian organization like 
the Salvation Army have a right to exist and how can identity affect such a faith-
based social service provider? This formula proved successful. Though there 
were also critical comments on the combination of social work and religion, the 
overall conclusion of the day was that precisely because of its own identity, the 
Salvation Army was a relevant actor in the field of social work. It was even 
stated that this identity increased the motivation of the employees to an extent 
that many other organizations were left to envy. 
Nevertheless, this was not the end of it, for the Gordian knot of the Army’s 
identity had still to be cut in a legal sense. The main question here, since the new 
Dutch Civil Code had knocked away the legal pillar supporting the Army’s am-
biguous identity, was: what legal form did the most justice to the modern Salva-
tion Army? The Army was forced to make a choice between becoming a church 
or a foundation. The two trains of thought within the Army ranks on this prob-
lem were based on the same legal documents. The Salvation Army’s legal advi-
sor Houthoff and his adherents (amongst which were many of the Army execu-
tives) were of the opinion that the Salvation Army was legally a church and in 
order to protect this church from government influences, but at the same time 
remain eligible for government financing, the Army had to establish separate 
foundations for its social activities. The church would in this case remain a 
church. The other line of thought, represented by managers of the probation 
department of the Army: Hartjes and later also Fijn, stated that the Army was a 
foundation and that it had to legally alter nothing in order to maintain its posi-
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tion. It had never actually been an ecclesiastical foundation, but ‘just’ a founda-
tion. Both the Army’s legal entities (church, 1948; foundation, 1949) were al-
ready incorporated, but the Army had to present itself in the future more as a 
secular foundation instead of a religious foundation. In this way there was no 
legal alteration necessary, an alteration that would, in the opinion of Hartjes and 
Fijn, lead to a ‘splitting of the coin’ that William Booth had forged together in 
1890.  
When the Army command decided to go with the Houthoff argument: that 
the Army was and would remain a church, it led to enormous financial conse-
quences, for the government was not allowed to subsidize a church as was con-
firmed in 1980 by the Ministry of Justice. This vulnerable position was once 
again emphasized three years later when the Central Archives for the Collection 
system (CAC) stated the same with regard to public collections. So, even though 
the Salvation Army actually wanted to be a church donning a secular robe – a 
position that was opposed internally – external demands brought about a differ-
ent decision. In 1990 the Salvation Army had reorganized itself into five sepa-
rate but connected legal entities: four foundations with their own corporate iden-
tity, and a church, based on the Articles of 1946. 
 
Part III: A dynamic courtship 
In this concluding section, the perspectives of the government and of the Salva-
tion Army are brought together to analyze the main question of this study about 
the dynamic relationship between these two actors. In order to make a valuable 
assessment however, it is necessary to include the aftermath of the Army’s reor-
ganization, and therefore a chapter is added at the end that takes into account the 
developments of the governmental welfare policy as well as the Army’s identity 
process during the post-reorganization period of 1990-2010. 
The relationship between the Salvation Army and the Dutch government 
within the social policy system has yielded a dynamic that can be characterized 
as a system in which reciprocity and mutual dependence play important roles. 
To determine who has what influence, both internally and externally, the bal-
ance of power between the two actors is crucial. This balance of power is partly 
connected to the values that formed the base of the social policy during much of 
the twentieth century: quality, participation and manageability. The degree to 
which the actors were attracted to each other, was in part determined by the 
extent to which their goals co-aligned. Another element was the measure in 
which both actors were able to entice the other to demonstrate adequate flexibil-
ity, while their own position remained secure as far as possible. Additionally, 
the dynamic that has been analyzed in this study was not only at work between 
the Army and the government, but also within the Salvation Army itself.  
The Army was focused on securing its right to exist as a faith-based social ser-
vice provider, and to do so it constructed its identity on its dual mission, while it 
formed its organization according to the requirements of the time. During this 
process the Army used a number of arguments of which economic reciprocity 
and supplementation were a part. With regard to its legal identity, the Army was 
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much more ambivalent. Its idea of donning a secular robe over its religious core 
offered much flexibility in the legal field while simultaneously supporting the 
view that the Army had on its identity. With regard to the theme of professional-
ization, the Army reacted quite fiercely. From the beginning the Army worked 
to develop the professional skills of its staff and its administrative processes, but 
at the same time it could not avoid the increase in external professionals in the 
organization. Any initial resistance within the Army towards professionalization 
increased when democratization seemed to put the core of the Army’s identity at 
stake and now, the Army defended its identity, just as it did during the period in 
which the probation work of the Army was threatened with annexation. 
The two decades following the Army’s reorganization in 1990 showed that 
these external and internal developments had not ended. The free market system 
that was actively supported by the government during the 1990s and 2000s 
forced the Army to distinguish itself even more. Once again a (now)tested Ar-
my-argumentation was brought into position: its identity. In 2005 the Christian 
identity was even defined by the Army as an important competence through 
which the quality of the Army’s staff was guaranteed. The Dutch government 
also seemed to loosen up a bit with regard to faith-based civil society. The So-
cial Support Act (WMO, 2007) made an explicit appeal to the entire Dutch civil 
society, including churches and religious organization, to contribute to the social 
cohesion between the citizens and to stimulate individual participation. Yet, the 
instrumental nature of this appeal seemed to ignore all nuances that were related 
to civil society, for in the Explanatory Memorandum churches were placed at 
par with sport-clubs.  
The Army continued to develop briskly during this decade. At least the Ar-
my’s social services did, because the church proved to have a much harder time. 
Revenues declined, as did the number of members. And after several attempts to 
revive the Army church, in 2009 a thorough revision of the Army’s strategy for 
the church was set in motion. The number of corps had to be reduced signifi-
cantly, and they had to also create more relevance to their immediate environ-
ment. However, the implication that these corps could call in the support of the 
Army’s Foundation of Welfare and Healthcare was not made very concrete. In 
some places though, collaboration between the local corps and the Foundation 
was actually established and seemed to bear fruit for both entities. But, as some 
within the Army ranks wonder: is the organizational structure actually that im-
portant to keep the driving force of its members alive - Salvationism? Isn’t the 
actual deed more important to express the spiritual message? Nevertheless, the 
organization, and the way the two missions are interwoven in its structure and 
people, will continue to play a major role in the near future. Though the breed-
ing ground of Salvationism will have to be cultivated and nurtured. So, does the 
current organizational structure and culture provide for sufficient space, protec-
tion, heat and light? Answering this question is far beyond the skills of a histori-
an.
 
 
304 
 
 
 
 
305 
 
Summary in Dutch 
 
 
Een dynamische balts  
Het Leger des Heils en de verzorgingsstaat in Nederland (1887-1990) 
 
Het Leger des Heils is een mondiaal en vooral ook sympathiek toonbeeld van 
maatschappelijke hulpverlening. Ook in Nederland staat het Leger bekend om 
zijn charitatieve hulpverlening zoals het bieden van onderdak aan daklozen en 
het verzorgen van kleding, voedsel, alles gepaard gaand met een vriendelijk 
gezicht. Een onlosmakelijk onderdeel van dit imago is het religieuze karakter 
van het Leger des Heils, want in zijn publieke uitingen benadrukt het Leger vaak 
expliciet dat het geloof de drijvende kracht is van de Salvationist. Toch is dit 
beeld van het Leger als een christelijke liefdadigheidsorganisatie verre van com-
pleet. Het is ook een omvangrijke professionele maatschappelijke hulpverlener. 
Zo biedt het Leger professionele diensten aan op het gebied van ouderenzorg, 
zorg voor kinderen, vrouwen, daklozen en jonge moeders. Daarnaast heeft het 
diverse programma’s op het gebied van dagopvang, verslavingsproblematiek, 
het militaire apparaat, rampenbestrijding, vermiste personen, gevangenen, werk-
lozen, schuldenproblematiek, studenten, en ook op het medische gebied heeft 
het Leger een professioneel aanbod. Dit betekent dat het Leger des Heils een 
onderdeel is van zowel de Nederlandse samenleving, alsook van de sociale en 
medische zorgsectoren. 
Daarnaast is het Leger des Heils ook een officieel kerkgenootschap met on-
geveer vijftig lokale afdelingen – korpsen – die op zondag samenkomsten voor 
geïnteresseerden en leden verzorgen, en daarnaast vaak kleinschalige, laagdrem-
pelige sociale activiteiten aanbieden. Hiermee past het Leger des Heils in een 
traditie van kerkelijke groeperingen en andere ideologische en religieuze organi-
saties die zorg dragen voor sociale activiteiten die gevolgen van armoede, ge-
brekkige educatie, ziekte en inkomensderving tegengaan: het particulier initia-
tief, maatschappelijk middenveld, of met een meer contemporaine term civil 
society genoemd. Deze dubbele focus van sociaal en geestelijk werk heeft de 
basis gevormd van de identiteit van het Leger des Heils want, zoals blijkt uit 
deze studie, heeft het Leger zich, door zijn bestaan heen, zoveel mogelijk gepre-
senteerd als een organisatie met een tweevoudige missie: ‘woord en daad’. Een 
missie die het Leger zelf graag aanduidt met de metafoor van een munt met twee 
zijden, die onlosmakelijk met elkaar verbonden zijn. 
Na een proces van secularisatie en politieke neutralisatie (een combinatie die 
ook wel bekend staat als verstatelijking), dat vooral plaatsvond gedurende de 
laatste decennia van de twintigste eeuw, zijn er niet veel levensbeschouwelijke 
maatschappelijke dienstverleners overgebleven in Nederland. Het feit dat het 
Leger des Heils hier een uitzondering op vormt, roept een aantal vragen op. 
Zeker ook gezien het feit dat ruim 90% van de exploitatiekosten die het Leger 
maakt om deze diensten te kunnen aanbieden, wordt betaald uit publieke gelden 
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als subsidies, overheidscontracten, bijdragen vanuit collectieve zorgverzekerin-
gen en andere sociale regelingen en wetgeving. 
Dit maakt meteen ook duidelijk dat het Leger de Heils niet opereert in een 
politiek of sociaal vacuüm, want vanaf het moment dat het Leger zijn deuren 
opende in Nederland (1887) betrad het een werkveld van sociale zorg, dat al 
bediend werd door vele kleine en grotere organisaties. Hierdoor maakte het 
Leger al vanaf zijn begin onderdeel uit van de Nederlandse civil society. Tege-
lijkertijd moest het Leger zich verhouden tot de Nederlandse overheid, omdat 
deze sinds de laatste decennia van de negentiende eeuw in toenemende mate 
interesse toonde voor het verlichten van sociale nood door middel van wetge-
ving. Dit maakte echter wel dat de verhouding tussen de overheid en de Neder-
landse civil society veranderde, want met de toenemende sociale wetgeving 
tussen 1890 en 1945 verschoof ook de primaire verantwoordelijkheid voor deze 
problematiek van civil society richting de overheid. Dit proces won aan snelheid 
na de Tweede Wereldoorlog wanneer op internationaal vlak, en ook in Neder-
land, de contouren zichtbaar werden van wat de verzorgingsstaat genoemd zou 
gaan worden.  
In Nederland ontstond een zogenaamd vangnet van sociale wetgeving, mede 
dankzij het in 1952 opgerichte ministerie van Maatschappelijk Werk. Het sym-
bolisch sluitstuk van de Nederlandse verzorgingsstaat De inwerkingtreding van 
de Algemene Bijstandswet in 1963 wordt gezien als een symbolisch sluitstuk 
van de Nederlandse verzorgingsstaat, omdat elke Nederlandse burger vanaf toen 
was verzekerd van een bestaansminimum. Sociale hulp was veranderd van een 
gunst in een recht. Dit hield echter ook in dat de civil society nu definitief zijn 
eindverantwoordelijkheid voor (materiële) sociale zorg - en zeker voor armen-
zorg - was kwijtgeraakt aan de overheid, waarmee de balans tussen de overheid 
en de civil society met betrekking tot het primaat voor de zorg aanzienlijk ver-
anderde.  
Deze verandering onderstreepte daarnaast ook dat beide actoren in ieder ge-
val het bestrijden van maatschappelijke problematiek als gemeenschappelijk 
doel hadden, en dat ze elkaar daarvoor tot op zekere hoogte nodig hadden. Het 
ontbrak de overheid immers aan uitvoeringscapaciteit om haar sociaal beleid om 
te zetten in daadwerkelijke acties en de civil society maakte rijkelijk gebruik van 
de geboden overheidssteun (financieel en juridisch) om deze daadkracht werke-
lijk te leveren. Aan de andere kant, en zoals blijkt uit deze studie, lieten beide 
actoren met regelmaat enige terughoudendheid zien met betrekking tot deze 
samenwerking. Hoewel ze van elkaar afhankelijk waren in de strijd tegen maat-
schappelijke problematiek, leek de relatie tussen beiden gekenmerkt te worden 
door een afwisselend patroon van aantrekking en afstoting, waarbij beide acto-
ren hun eigen, eveneens veranderlijke belangen voorop stelden. Dit proces van 
aantrekken en afwijzen lijkt tot op zeker hoogte op dat van een balts: vanuit 
wederzijdse aantrekkingskracht maken twee actoren elkaar het hof, waarbij aan-
trekking en afwijzing elkaar afwisselen.  
Deze metafoor van de bals is ook van toepassing op het Leger des Heils. Het 
Leger was namelijk niet alleen een getuige van de bovengeschetste ontwikkelin-
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gen, maar het Leger heeft als onderdeel van de Nederlandse civil society zelf 
actief deelgenomen in, en vormgegeven aan, wat in deze studie het ‘sociaal be-
leidssysteem’ genoemd wordt. Daarmee dient zich nog een reden aan om het 
Leger des Heils als onderwerp van studie te maken. Zeker ook doordat hierdoor 
een nieuw licht kan schijnen op hoe de veranderingen in de Nederlandse verzor-
gingsstaat van invloed waren op de levensbeschouwelijke civil society. 
 
Centrale onderzoeksvragen  
De vragen die centraal staan in deze studie zijn dan ook: welke dynamiek is 
zichtbaar in de relatie tussen de overheid en het Leger des Heils in Nederland 
met betrekking tot het sociaal beleid tussen 1890 en 1990? In hoeverre beïn-
vloedde deze dynamiek de identiteit van het Leger des Heils? En wat zegt dit 
over de veranderende verzorgingsstaat en de rol daarin van de levensbeschouwe-
lijke civil society? Deze veelomvattende vraag wordt in deze studie beantwoord 
aan de hand van een aantal, meer empirische deelvragen: wat waren de beleids-
doelen en hun achterliggende uitgangspunten van de overheid met betrekking tot 
sociale vraagstukken? Hoe ontwikkelde de machtsbalans en de mate van afhan-
kelijkheid tussen beide actoren zich binnen deze relatie? Met betrekking tot het 
Leger des Heils leidt dit tot de volgende vragen: wat waren de doelen en uit-
gangspunten van werk van het Leger des Heils in Nederland? Hoe gaf het Leger 
vorm aan zijn christelijke identiteit in het krachtenveld van veranderlijke hou-
ding van de Nederlandse overheidsvisie met betrekking tot de identiteit van civil 
society organisaties? Wat waren de belangrijkste elementen hierin die de identi-
teit van het Leger des Heils mogelijk onder druk zetten? En welke mechanismen 
werden binnen het Leger zichtbaar, om om te gaan met deze externe (en interne) 
processen en invloeden, zodat de autonomie en identiteit bewaard bleven? 
 
Methoden, concepten en structuur 
Deze vragen worden beantwoord door middel van de historisch-hermeneutische 
onderzoeksmethode, waarbij zowel primaire als secundaire bronnen worden 
bestudeerd en met elkaar in verband worden gebracht. Het resultaat hiervan is 
een samenhangende interpretatie van de dynamische relatie tussen beide actoren 
en wat dat voor het Leger des Heils betekend heeft. Het narratief over het Leger 
des Heils wordt gevormd door middel van bestaande beschrijvingen van (delen) 
van de geschiedenis van het Leger, het archief van het Leger in Nederland en 
interviews met sleutelpersonen uit de beleids- en managementgeledingen van 
het Leger. De grote lijnen van de beschrijving van het Nederlandse sociaal be-
leid zijn gebaseerd op secundaire literatuur terwijl de reconstructie van de be-
leidsdoelen van de overheid en hun onderliggende waarden, hoofdzakelijk 
voortkomt uit een grondige analyse van uiteenlopende parlementaire stukken. 
In deze studie wordt gerefereerd aan een aantal concepten die belangrijk zijn 
voor het komen tot een goed begrip van de dynamische relatie tussen het Leger 
des Heils en de Nederlandse overheid. In de eerste plaats wordt uitvoerig aan-
dacht besteed aan de (internationale) ontwikkeling van wat we nu de verzor-
gingsstaat noemen. Daarna gebeurt hetzelfde voor het concept civil society. Met 
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betrekking tot de dynamiek in de relatie tussen de overheid en het Leger des 
Heils wordt in deze studie speciale aandacht besteed aan de theorie ‘government 
by proxy’ van de Amerikaanse organisatiewetenschapper Donald Kettl. Kettl 
beargumenteert dat een overheid een voorkeur ontwikkelt voor samenwerking 
met bepaalde betrouwbare partners in de verwezenlijking van overheidsbeleid. 
Deze ‘standaard partners’ worden aangeduid met de term proxy-organizations. 
Een proxy kan zich verheugen op een voorkeursbehandeling wanneer het aan-
komt op het door de overheid toekennen van subsidies, belastingvoordelen, 
opdrachten en leningen, die gericht zijn op bepaalde beleidsdoelen. Zo is in de 
Verenigde Staten de Salvation Army een proxy van de nationale en ook bepaal-
de regionale overheden op het gebied van maatschappelijke hulpverlening. Met 
betrekking tot de dynamiek tussen de overheid en proxy organisaties stelt Kettl 
dat deze relatie wordt gekenmerkt door de mate van convergentie van doelen 
van de twee actoren. Een proces dat vaak een spanningsveld oplevert, want in 
dit spanningsveld vormt de behoefte aan zekerheid voor zichzelf en flexibiliteit 
van de ander een bron voor mogelijke conflicten tussen beide actoren. Ondanks 
dit spanningsveld blijkt het gedeelde belang voor beide actoren meestal vol-
doende aanwezig om te blijven zoeken naar samenwerking, zoals in het geval 
van de Nederlandse overheid en het Leger des Heils die beiden het doel hadden 
maatschappelijke problematiek te verminderen. Aan de andere kant echter kan 
een actor ook private doelen hebben die tegelijkertijd worden nagestreefd, zoals 
in het geval van het Leger bijvoorbeeld het verspreiden van het evangelie. Ook 
dit kan spanningen opleveren. Daarnaast heeft in deze relatie volgens Kettl ook 
de machtsbalans tussen beide actoren ook een grote invloed op het karakter 
ervan, en omdat deze balans nogal eens doorslaat richting de opdrachtgever – 
i.c. de overheid – kan deze machtsbalans van invloed zijn op de autonomie en 
daarmee ook de identiteit van de proxy. Hoewel Kettl niet specifiek onderzoek 
heeft gedaan naar levensbeschouwelijke organisaties noch naar hoe dit span-
ningsveld nu precies doorwerkt op de identiteit van organisaties, kan zijn ziens-
wijze van dienst zijn bij het bestuderen van zowel de dynamiek van deze relatie. 
Ook biedt het inzicht in hoe deze bepalend kan zijn voor de dynamiek die zich 
binnen een proxy-organisatie als het Leger des Heils afspeelde met betrekking 
tot zijn eigen identiteit. Op een meer algemeen niveau is het hierdoor mogelijk 
om meer inzicht te krijgen in het proces van verstatelijking van de Nederlandse 
civil society. Een proces dat het Leger des Heils met succes lijkt te hebben door-
staan. 
In Deel I van deze studie ligt de focus vooral op het overheidsperspectief en 
wordt een beschrijving gegeven van het sociaal beleid-systeem gedurende de 
periode 1900-1990. Dit systeem is gebaseerd op een structurele relatie tussen de 
overheid als voornaamste beleidsproducent, de civil society als mede-
beleidsproducent, opdrachtnemer en uitvoerder, en de Nederlandse bevolking als 
financiers en afnemers. Om maatschappelijke problematiek gezamenlijk aan te 
kunnen pakken wordt door deze actoren structureel publiek geld verzameld en 
verdeeld over bepaalde maatschappelijke beleidsdoelen. Deze doelen zijn geba-
seerd op onderliggende waarden en beiden zijn onderhevig aan verandering door 
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de tijd heen, al naar gelang sociale, economische, demografische, culturele en 
politieke ontwikkelingen. In dit eerste deel worden deze veranderingen beschre-
ven en wordt weergegeven hoe dit de relatie met de civil society mede vormgaf. 
In Deel II wordt vervolgens ingegaan op hoe het Leger des Heils zich ontwik-
kelde als een actor in dit sociaal beleid-systeem en hoe dit van invloed was op 
de interne dynamiek betreffende de identiteit van het Leger. In deze geschiede-
nis, die de periode vanaf start van het Leger des Heils in Nederland in 1887, tot 
en met de fundamentele reorganisatie in 1990 bestrijkt, staan drie verhaallijnen 
centraal waardoor zichtbaar wordt hoe het Leger zijn identiteit heeft getracht 
vorm te geven. De eerste lijn beschrijft de ontwikkeling van de positie van het 
Leger ten opzichte van de overheid – twee actoren die binnen het sociaal beleid-
systeem wederzijds afhankelijk van elkaar zijn. De tweede lijn betreft het vorm-
geven van de juridische identiteit. De weergave hiervan laat zien hoe het Leger 
worstelde met het vormgeven van de dubbele doelstelling van religieus en maat-
schappelijk werk, die essentieel blijkt te zijn voor de identiteit van de organisa-
tie. De derde narratieve lijn laat zien welke gevolgen de positie van het Leger 
binnen het sociaal beleid-systeem had met betrekking tot de professionalisering 
van de organisatie. Deze drie ontwikkelingen vloeiden samen gedurende de 
jaren 80 van de twintigste eeuw, waardoor het Leger besloot om een fundamen-
tele reorganisatie door te voeren in 1990. 
 
Deel I: het sociaal beleid-systeem in Nederland 
Gedurende het grootste gedeelte van de negentiende eeuw heeft de Nederlandse 
centrale overheid zich passief opgesteld met betrekking tot maatschappelijke 
vraagstukken. Problematiek rondom armoede, werkloosheid, ziekte en educatie 
was de verantwoordelijkheid van het particulier initiatief – een verzameling van 
groepen en organisaties in de samenleving die in de meeste gevallen werkten 
vanuit een ideologische of religieuze motivatie – en de lokale overheden. Met de 
totstandkoming van de Grondwet in 1848 en de Armenwet van 1854 legde de 
Nederlandse overheid echter een eerste interesse aan de dag met betrekking tot 
deze problematiek. De onderliggende gedachte van deze houding was die van de 
subsidiariteit: alleen wanneer alle andere opties faalden, zou een beroep op de 
overheid gedaan kunnen worden, zoals rond 1900 wel gebeurde in geval van 
bestrijding van hardnekkige ziekten als tuberculose en kindersterfte. Ook lokale 
overheden lieten deze lijn zien, waardoor overheidssteun van het particulier 
initiatief niet alleen sporadisch voorkwam, maar ook op incidentele basis en 
minimaal qua bedragen. Rond 1900 kwam hier mondjesmaat verandering in 
door nieuwe sociale wetgeving die een groeiende overheidsinteresse in sociaal 
vraagstukken liet zien.  
Duidelijk werd dat daarbij ook de interesse voor een meer structurele sa-
menwerking met de civil society toenam, zoals de Reclasseringsregeling van 
1910 liet zien. Met deze regeling werden reclasseringsorganisaties gestimuleerd 
gestructureerd te werken aan de doelen die de overheid stelde op dit terrein. 
Toch was dit soort overheidssteun nog steeds van aanvullende aard op de finan-
ciën van de organisaties zelf, en zorgden ook de angst voor het inperken van de 
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autonomie en de dreiging van overheidsinvloed in de ‘eigen sfeer’ voor sterke 
terughoudendheid aan de kant van de civil society. De samenwerking tussen 
beide actoren op het gebied van reclassering was rond 1910 dus nog steeds inci-
denteel en minimaal, net als op andere gebieden van het sociaal werk. 
Toch veranderde dit aanzienlijk in de decennia voorafgaande aan de Tweede 
Wereldoorlog. De overheid liet door de groei aan financiële voorzieningen en 
wetgeving duidelijk zien dat ze zich in toenemende mate bewust werd van haar 
beleidsvoerend vermogen en in deze aanzet tot sociaal beleid werden de contou-
ren zichtbaar van de belangrijkste beleidsdoelen: professionalisering en harmo-
nisatie. Professionalisering werd vertaald in termen van het inhuren van ge-
schoolde arbeid en het afleggen van administratieve verantwoording, beide ge-
baseerd op de onderliggende waarde van ‘kwaliteit’. Zowel het werk als de or-
ganisaties moesten op een hoger plan gebracht worden.  
In dezelfde periode was duidelijk dat de overheid te maken had met een grote 
variëteit aan organisaties die op verschillende niveaus in verschillende werkvel-
den actief waren, met als resultaat een sterk versnipperd werkveld. Deze situatie 
was niet allen moeilijk beheersbaar, maar ook duur omdat om mogelijk ongelij-
ke behandeling van de verschillende ideologische zuilen te voorkomen, elke zuil 
in gelijke mate financieel gesteund diende te worden. Omdat de gedeelde ideo-
logische grondslag werkte als een verenigende kracht binnen de zuilen, moedig-
de de overheid de organisaties aan zich alsnog te verenigen binnen de eigen zuil, 
om zo de beheersbaarheid van het werkveld te vergroten. Deze nadruk op har-
monisatie diende dus voornamelijk om de beheersbaarheid en daarmee de doel-
matigheid te vergroten. Een onvoorzien neveneffect van deze de beschikbaar-
heid van overheidssteun was echter dat deze ook de groei in aantal en omvang 
van organisaties aanwakkerde. Daarnaast veranderde het karakter de financiële 
steun langzamerhand van incidenteel in structureel, wat de samenwerking tussen 
de overheid en de civil society ook een meer structureel karakter gaf en waarmee 
het sociaal beleid-systeem was geboren. 
Na de Tweede Wereldoorlog zorgde de tijdgeest van ‘herstel en vernieu-
wing’ voor een verdere overeenstemming van de sociaal-beleidsdoelen van de 
overheid en de civil society. Voor deze laatste nam de financiële zekerheid toe, 
samen met een stijgende nationale welvaart en op het gebied van beleid pro-
beerde de nationale overheid haar beleidsinspanning te ondersteunen door de 
oprichting van het ministerie van Maatschappelijk Werk in 1952. Ondanks po-
gingen deze te doorbreken zette de verzuiling door en de civil society maakte 
daar een stevig onderdeel van uit. Ook de sociale wetgeving breidde zich verder 
uit met als gevolg dat ook de kosten van het sociaal beleid-systeem toenamen. 
Om de uitdijing van het werkveld enigszins in banen te leiden, bleef harmonisa-
tie dus een belangrijk beleidsdoel. Het vergroten van de beheersbaarheid van 
deze organisaties werd, net als voor de oorlog, gelegitimeerd doordat deze werd 
vormgegeven op basis van identiteit, en wel levensbeschouwing. Een begrip dat 
vooral van samenbindende aard was en vanuit die implicatie de achterban zou 
kunnen aanzetten tot maatschappelijk activering. Civil society organisaties kon-
den dan, als hun vertegenwoordigers, deze achterban gericht mobiliseren en juist 
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vanwege deze toegevoegde waarde werden deze organisaties als waardevolle 
partners gezien binnen het sociaal beleid-systeem, waardoor ook de financiële 
steun vanuit de overheid groeide. Beheersbaarheid, geïnterpreteerd als harmoni-
satie en doelmatigheid, was nu gelegitimeerd door de wederzijdse erkenning van 
de toegevoegde waarde van identiteit en versterkte het samenvloeien van be-
leidsdoelen. 
Voor de overheid was de inbreng van het publiek in het creëren van sociaal 
beleid, belangrijk. Vandaar dat de civil society hier door de overheid bij werd 
betrokken. In nauwe samenwerking werkten ze aan het idee van gedeelde ver-
antwoordelijkheid door middel van maatschappelijk opbouwwerk en sociale 
planning, want volgens de overheid was het juist dit idee van gedeelde verant-
woordelijkheid dat mensen zou prikkelen om actief deel te nemen aan de maat-
schappij. Ook het stimuleren van de vrijwillige inzet vanuit de achterban moest 
dit doel van participatie ondersteunen. Doordat de civil society als vertegen-
woordigers van een achterban in beide processen een belangrijke spilfunctie 
had, leek de civil society terrein te winnen op de machtsbalans. Toch zou dit 
tegen blijken te vallen. Samen met deze nieuwe structurele nadruk op de waarde 
van participatie in combinatie met verbetering van de kwaliteit van de diensten 
en de verhoging van de doelmatigheid, werd de aanzet zichtbaar van een decen-
tralisatie van nationaal beleid naar die bestuurlijke lagen die veel meer voeling 
hadden met hoe een dergelijk beleid effectief vorm te geven: de provincie en de 
gemeente. Het afstaan van een deel van de beleidsmacht door de landelijke 
overheid aan het lokale niveau impliceerde echter dat ook de civil society zich 
moest heroriënteren op zijn positie in dit krachtenveld. Gedurende de jaren vijf-
tig en zestig werden de eerste resultaten van deze beleidslijnen zichtbaar. Net als 
voor de oorlog groeide het aantal organisaties dat gebruik maakte van over-
heidssteun en daarbij vormde identiteit nog steeds een belangrijk organiserend 
principe binnen de civil society. Ook werd duidelijk dat de overheid nauwelijks 
enige terughoudendheid toonde met betrekking tot de inzet van het subsidie 
instrument. Het stimulerend effect ervan was zichtbaar, maar dit structurele en 
ruime aanbod, genereerde ook als bijkomend effect een nieuwe vraag naar sub-
sidie: veel van de organisaties die gebruik maakten van deze kennelijk onuitput-
telijke bron, raakten er immers snel aan gewend. 
Gedurende de jaren zestig vormden emancipatie van het individu, persoonlij-
ke ontwikkeling en autonomie centrale maatschappelijke thema’s, maar ondanks 
deze revolutie van het individualisme, emancipatie en secularisatie, domineer-
den de beleidsthema’s professionalisering, participatie en harmonisatie de poli-
tieke agenda van de civil society. Ook in deze periode bestond het beleidsdoel 
professionalisering uit twee delen: het vergroten van de mogelijkheden van or-
ganisatie om zich te verantwoorden door middel van het stroomlijnen van de 
administratieve processen. Ook scholing, certificering en deskundigheidsbevor-
dering van de medewerkers kwam steeds meer centraal te staan, beide steeds 
met het oog op kwaliteitsverbetering. Met betrekking tot participatie werd ge-
deelde verantwoordelijkheid als beleidsconcept gehanteerd, door deze te koppe-
len aan aanvullende financiering van organisaties en het creëren van een ge-
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meenschappelijke visie op sociaal beleid, naast verdere decentralisatie van be-
leidsverantwoordelijkheden. Aan de andere kant werd ingezet op harmonisatie 
van het werkveld om zo de beheersbaarheid ervan voor de overheid te vergroten.  
Rond 1970 echter, werd een aantal veranderingen zichtbaar. Met betrekking 
tot de kwaliteit leken de beleidsdoelen van de overheid en de civil society rede-
lijk met elkaar overeen te komen, want professionalisering en bedrijfsvoering 
waren in grote mate gestandaardiseerd. Tegelijkertijd echter, had de overheid de 
voorwaarde van aanvullendheid van de financiering zo goed als laten varen, 
waarmee het doel van gedeelde verantwoordelijkheid minder belangrijk leek te 
zijn geworden. Met betrekking tot participatie was het coöperatieve idee van 
sociale planning veranderd in een wat meer activistisch idee van sociale actie, 
welke direct was gericht tegen wat werd beschouwd als het moreel inhoudsloze 
idee van de consumptiemaatschappij. Deze veranderende houding naar de over-
heid van delen van de Nederlandse civil society duidde op toenemende divergen-
tie van de doelen van beide actoren.  
Dit werd nog duidelijker gedurende de jaren zeventig wanneer – als gevolg 
van de emancipatoire krachten van het voorgaand decennium – participatie in 
toenemende mate werd geïnterpreteerd als democratisering en politieke invloed, 
terwijl ook noties als zelf-activering centrale doelen werden van sociaal beleid. 
Publieke participatie zou door middel van verdere beleidsdecentralisatie moeten 
worden versterkt, maar dan wel in overleg met de civil society als vertegen-
woordigers van hun achterban. Deze representatieve functie van de civil society 
was nog steeds interessant voor de overheid, mede omdat deze nog steeds geba-
seerd was op de legitimerende kracht van ‘identiteit’. Maar op het gebied van de 
beheersbaarheid werd een aan de decentralisatie tegengestelde ontwikkeling 
zichtbaar: de term ‘fusie’ werd steeds vaker gebruikt, waarmee de wens voor 
verdere centralisatie van het werkveld zichtbaar werd, zij het dat de zuilen hier-
voor niet langer de aangewezen bindende structuur vormden. De nadruk om nu 
‘zuil-overstijgend’ samen te gaan werken dreef de civil society in een nieuwe 
richting. 
Tegelijkertijd werd duidelijk, dat het nog steeds de overheid was die het 
overwicht bezat op de machtsbalans. Dit werd bevestigd in 1974, toen de zoge-
naamde Knelpuntennota het licht zag. In dit rapport werd de maat genomen van 
de overheidsinspanningen op de beleidsgebieden van het welzijnswerk. De uit-
komsten kwamen hard aan, zowel voor de overheid als voor de civil society. Het 
rapport beschreef de civil society als een instituut dat in plaats van ideologische 
verzuild, nu functioneel verzuild was doordat de overheid erop stuurde dat bin-
nen de zuilen alle diensten aanwezig zouden zijn. Daarnaast stelde het rapport 
vast welke knelpunten er waren die de doelmatigheid van maatschappelijke 
dienstverlening tegenwerkten: afnemende publieke steun voor het welzijnsbe-
grip, toenemende individualisering en secularisering, een toenemende roep om 
democratische invloed en de marginalisering van de vrijwilliger door de groei-
ende groep professionals. De conclusie was dat volgens het rapport de civil soci-
ety teveel naar binnen gericht was. Daarom, en ook omdat de rol van identiteit in 
het huidige tijdsgewricht gedevalueerd was, kon de civil society de representa-
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tieve functie van de achterban niet langer waarmaken. Met dit alles leek de civil 
society zijn toegevoegde waarde te hebben verloren. 
Na het verschijnen van de Knelpuntennota continueerde de overheid in eerste 
instantie haar beleid. Lokale betrokkenheid en participatie moesten verder wor-
den versterkt en met betrekking tot de civil society zou de ingeslagen weg rich-
ting harmonisatie en participatie moeten blijven vervolgd, waarbij democratise-
ring en doelmatigheid meer centraal zouden komen te staan. Maar voor de civil 
society betekende de decentralisatie een verdere verzwakking van de positie in 
het sociaal beleidssysteem. Ook de Knelpuntennota verzwakte deze positie, 
omdat het voor het eerst zichtbaar gemaakt had, wat al breed werd gedacht: de 
civil society had de toegevoegde waarde van representativiteit en identiteit verlo-
ren. Die vaststelling vormde een regelrechte bedreiging voor het voortbestaan 
van veel van de oorspronkelijk levensbeschouwelijke particuliere organisaties, 
tenzij deze opnieuw hun maatschappelijke relevantie wisten aan te tonen.  
Opvallend genoeg was het de overheid die de civil society hier enigszins te 
hulp schoot. In lijn met de beleidsdoelen suggereerde Minister Van Doorn van 
CRM dat nu de civil society organisaties weliswaar niet meer als representatief 
voor hun achterban werden gezien, ze allicht nog een rol zouden kunnen vervul-
len als een ondersteunende structuur bij het activeren van wat er nog van de 
achterban over was om sociaal actief te worden. Op deze wijze werden de be-
leidsdoelen van participatie en persoonlijke verantwoordelijkheid gecombineerd 
en zou de civil society een relevante actor in het sociaal beleidssysteem kunnen 
blijven. Wat dat precies inhield voor deze organisaties werd niet duidelijk, maar 
wel werd een oplossingsrichting voorgesteld: voor wat betreft de onderliggende 
waarde van kwaliteit, zouden de diensten verbeterd kunnen worden door conti-
nue professionalisering, maar nu geflankeerd door een herwaardering van de 
vrijwilliger. Ook dat zou kunnen bijdragen aan participatie, omdat de intrinsieke 
motivatie van vrijwilligers om hun betrokkenheid in daden om te zetten niet was 
verminderd. En met deze suggestie was de vrijwilliger opnieuw belangrijk ge-
worden in de overheidspogingen om de kwaliteit van de sector te verbeteren.  
Gedurende de jaren tachtig bleven decentralisatie, democratisering en vrij-
willigersinzet centrale beleidsdoelen om participatie, kwaliteit en beheersbaar-
heid na te streven. Nieuw was echter dat het zwaartepunt nu niet bij de centrale 
overheid lag, maar veel meer op het lokale niveau. Ook waren de civil society 
organisaties bezig enigszins te veranderen van alleen intermediaire instituties, 
naar meer ondersteunende structuren van individuele leden van hun achterban. 
Vrijwilligerswerk werd belangrijk voor zowel de bevordering van participatie 
alsook voor kostenreductie – een beleidsdoel dat steeds belangrijker werd in de 
jaren zeventig en tachtig. Deze nieuwe combinatie van beleidslijnen werd door 
CRM-minister Brinkman bestempeld met de term ‘zorgzame samenleving’ 
waarbij individuele activering, mantelzorg, zelfhulp en vrijwilligerswerk centra-
le elementen in het sociaal beleid waren. Om deze beleidslijn effectief te kunnen 
implementeren, zou de overheidsrol verkleind moeten worden en moest de deur 
naar marktwerking tussen vraag en aanbod worden opengezet. In combinatie 
met het afnemende draagvlak van de civil society zouden individuele burgers en 
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de maatschappij veel meer zelf de verantwoordelijkheid voor eigen en ander-
mans welzijn zelfstandig op zich kunnen en moeten nemen. Dat dit concreet ook 
betekende dat de overheidsfinanciering van de civil society koepelorganisaties 
zou ophouden, werd ook snel duidelijk.  
Rond 1990 had het sociaal beleidssysteem verschillende fases doorlopen: be-
gin, opgroeien, bloei en bijstelling. Opvallend in deze ontwikkeling is dat on-
danks dat verandering de grote kracht lijkt te zijn geweest in de vorming van het 
sociaal beleid-systeem, er drie vrij continue beleidswaarden centraal hebben 
gestaan gedurende de gehele twintigste eeuw: kwaliteit, beheersbaarheid en 
participatie. Deze waarden hebben de basis gevormd voor verschillende beleids-
concepten die gedurende die periode zowel in dominantie als inhoudelijk, ver-
anderlijk bleken: professionalisering, harmonisatie, gedeelde verantwoordelijk-
heid, democratisering, decentralisatie, vrijwilligheid en activering. Het grootste 
gedeelte van de twintigste eeuw zijn deze beleidsdoelen en -waarden gevormd in 
samenspraak met de Nederlandse civil society als co-actoren in het sociaal be-
leidssysteem. Lange tijd heeft de overheid de civil society gewaardeerd vanwege 
identiteit als een organiserend principe, maar toen deze toegevoegde waarde 
minder aanwezig leek te zijn, moest de civil society zich heroriënteren op zijn 
positie in het systeem. Hoewel de overheid nog een alternatieve rol suggereerde, 
zijn veel levensbeschouwelijke organisaties uiteindelijk opgegaan in nieuwe 
‘neutrale’ maatschappelijke dienstverleners, terwijl andere ophielden te bestaan. 
Dit roept de vraag op: hoe zit het dan met het Leger des Heils? Hoe ging het 
Leger om met de verschillende krachtenvelden die deel uitmaakten van het soci-
aal beleidssysteem? 
 
Deel II: Het identiteitsproces van het Leger des Heils 
 
Leger des Heils als deel van het sociaal beleid-systeem 
Hoewel de Engelse moederorganisatie The Salvation Army begon als een reli-
gieuze gemeenschap, besloot de oprichter William Booth in 1890 dat het Leger 
meer moest zijn dan een kerk. Het kon niet langer de ogen sluiten voor de socia-
le ellende die in het geïndustrialiseerde Engeland van het eind van de negentien-
de eeuw schrijnend zichtbaar was. Met de publicatie van zijn In Darkest Eng-
land and The Way Out (1890) introduceerde Booth een tweede doelstelling voor 
het Leger naast de prediking van het evangelie: maatschappelijke hulpverlening 
bieden waar mogelijk. Sindsdien wordt de identiteit van het Leger gevormd door 
een dubbele missie: geestelijke en maatschappelijke hulpverlening. Voor het nog 
jonge Leger in Nederland werd hiermee de deur opengezet voor samenwerking 
met de Nederlandse overheid. Toch zou het nog een aantal decennia duren voor-
dat hiervan de contouren zichtbaar werden. Zo kan de periode tussen 1887 en 
het eind van de Tweede Wereldoorlog worden gekenmerkt als een periode waar-
in de overheid en het Leger in toenemende mate beseften dat ze voor een groot 
deel gelijke doelen nastreefden, die zich richtten op het bestrijden van sociale 
problematiek.  
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Al snel na de introductie van de sociale missie in 1890 groeide het Leger in 
omvang van 37 korpsen in 1890 tot 48 in 1892, en ook het sociaal werk zelf nam 
toe: in 1908 werd door het Leger evenveel geld besteed aan de religieuze missie 
als aan het maatschappelijke werk. De ontwikkeling van de samenwerking met 
de overheid werd in eerste instantie goed zichtbaar via het reclasseringswerk van 
het Leger. Hoewel sinds de eerste jaren van de twintigste eeuw incidenteel over-
heidsgeld vrij werd gemaakt voor dit werk, maakte de Reclasseringsregeling van 
1910 een structurele financiering vanuit de overheid mogelijk. Vanwege de 
jarenlange ervaring die het Leger met deze vorm van hulpverlening had, werd 
ook aan het Leger gevraagd hieraan deel te nemen, waarmee de overheid erken-
de dat zij en het Leger gelijke doelen nastreefden op dit gebied. Toch werd aan 
de kant van het Leger snel enige aarzeling gevoeld, omdat duidelijk was dat 
wanneer het zou ingaan op deze uitnodiging, een ander belang in de verdrukking 
zou kunnen komen: autonomie, beleidsvrijheid en onafhankelijkheid. Het Leger 
nam dan ook ruim de tijd voordat het besloot in te gaan op deze vorm van sa-
menwerking. Aannemelijk is dat gebrek aan geld, hierbij van doorslaggevend 
belang zou zijn geweest. De bestaanszekerheid van de organisatie was dus een 
belangrijk argument voor een structurele samenwerking met de overheid – een 
argumentatie die ook bij andere reclasseringsinstellingen werd gezien. 
Al in 1915 zou deze samenwerkingsrelatie met de overheid ervoor zorgen dat 
de overheidsgelden de andere inkomsten van het Leger overstegen. Dit was op 
zich geen probleem, maar toen de overheidssteun stagneerde als gevolg van de 
economische crisis van de jaren dertig, werd pijnlijk duidelijk dat de reclasse-
ringsafdeling van het Leger toch redelijk afhankelijk was geworden van deze 
geldstroom. Maar in plaats van zich terug te trekken, besloot het Leger de eigen 
positie te versterken. Het Leger moest worden ontzien, want het werk dat het 
deed, bespaarde de overheid duizenden guldens, zo was de redenering. Daarmee 
gaf het Leger aan dat hoewel de machtsbalans in het voordeel van de overheid 
uitviel, de relatie tussen beide actoren was gebaseerd op een zeker mate van 
wederkerigheid. Door middel van deze argumentatie van economische wederke-
righeid probeerde het Leger zijn positie te legitimeren – een strategie die goed 
paste in de tijd van economische malaise.  
Maar omdat het Leger blijkbaar ook goed besefte dat zijn afhankelijkheid 
van de overheid groter was dan vice versa, haastte het zich om aan de argumen-
tatie toe te voegen dat het Leger slechts een gereedschap in de kist van de over-
heid was, om de sociale problematiek aan te pakken. Hiermee onderschreef het 
Leger dat beide actoren dezelfde doelen nastreefden, maar ook dat het Leger 
daarbij instrumenteel was voor de overheid. Deze argumentatie van ‘vervolledi-
ging’ zou een belangrijk middel blijven in de relatie van het Leger met de over-
heid. Het directe resultaat van deze strategie leek te zijn dat het Leger zijn re-
classeringswerk verder kon blijven uitbreiden, net als andere werkzaamheden op 
het gebied van maatschappelijke hulpverlening, en vanaf die tijd groeiden de 
activiteiten die betrekking hebben op de sociale missie dan ook veel sneller dan 
de meer religieuze activiteiten van het Leger.  
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In de periode na de Tweede Wereldoorlog zou deze trend doorzetten en tien 
jaar na de oorlog was het exploitatieresultaat van het Leger verdubbeld, net als 
de particuliere giften. Deze groei was echter eerder te danken aan inkomsten 
door investeringen en onroerend goed dan aan overheidssubsidies op sociaal 
werk. Behalve bij de reclassering, want daar nam deze subsidiëring met grote 
sprongen toe. Toch zou ook op andere maatschappelijke diensten in toenemende 
mate overheidsfinanciering volgen. Dit kwam deels doordat de overheid deze in 
toenemende mate ter beschikking stelde, maar een andere factor van belang was 
dat het Leger zelf steeds meer gewend raakte aan zijn plek binnen het sociaal 
beleid-systeem. Het Leger wist in toenemende mate zelfstandig nieuwe subsi-
diebronnen aan te boren. Daarnaast hervormde het Leger delen van de organisa-
tie al naar gelang de loop van subsidiestromen, hetgeen een duidelijk teken was 
van de bereidheid van het Leger om zich flexibel op te stellen om zo de eigen 
bestaanszekerheid te waarborgen. Dat de overheid de samenwerking met het 
Leger op prijs stelde, was al voor de oorlog duidelijk. Maar ook in deze naoor-
logse tijd ging het Leger voor de overheid niet alleen een betrouwbare proxy 
vormen, maar leek het Leger ook een bruikbaar alternatief te zijn voor het ver-
zuilde maatschappelijk werkveld.  
Toch was de relatie tussen de overheid en het Leger niet vrij van spanningen. 
Zo wilde de gemeente Utrecht in 1959 dat het Leger de boekhouding aanpaste 
aan de maatstaven van de gemeente. Vanwege de interne organisatorische ver-
snippering gaf het Leger daar echter niet snel gehoor aan, maar toen de gemeen-
te de druk expliciet opvoerde, en het Leger nog steeds niet volgde omdat het nog 
meer tijd nodig had, zou de gemeente zich uiteindelijk toch minder hard opstel-
len dan het suggereerde: de voorgehouden sancties bleven uit. Blijkbaar was de 
relatie met het Leger te waardevol voor de overheid om op het spel te zetten en 
daarmee werd ook de wederzijdse afhankelijkheid van beide actoren benadrukt. 
In het algemeen kan over de periode tussen 1910 en 1970 gezegd worden dat 
de houding van Leger richting de overheid zijn vruchten afwierp. Economische 
wederkerigheid, aangevuld met het argument van vervollediging legitimeerde de 
positie van het Leger in het sociaal beleid-systeem en deed de sociale missie van 
het Leger uitgroeien tot een belangrijk fundament van de organisatie en zijn 
identiteit. Gedurende de jaren zeventig en vooral ook tachtig zou deze legitime-
ring echter onder druk komen te staan, net als de gelijkgerichtheid van doelen 
tussen de twee actoren. De harmonisatiedruk vanuit de overheid werd ook weer 
voor het eerst echt gevoeld binnen het reclasseringswerk van het Leger des Heils 
omdat al gedurende de jaren zeventig voortdurend werd aangestuurd op eenwor-
ding en schaalvergroting binnen deze branche. Voor het Leger was het laten 
opgaan van het eigen reclasseringswerk in een groter en neutraal verband echter 
geen optie, zoals zou blijken tijdens de jaren tachtig.  
 
De juridische identiteit van het Leger des Heils 
De vraag naar de identiteit van het Leger des Heils werd ook op een andere ma-
nier aan de orde gesteld, want gedurende een groot deel van zijn bestaan heeft 
het Leger nagedacht over hoe de eigen identiteit het best kon worden vormgege-
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ven op het juridische vlak. Deze juridische identiteit kwam tot uitdrukking in 
drie elementen: de statuten van het Leger, de beschrijving van de missie daarin, 
en de rechtspersoon die het Leger koos: kerk of stichting. De onderliggende 
vragen die de discussie binnen het Leger hierover bepaalden, waren: wat zijn we 
de facto? Wat kunnen we zijn? Wat willen we zijn? 
Voorafgaande aan de Tweede Wereldoorlog was de juridische positie van het 
Leger nogal onduidelijk. Door middel van de statuten van 1896 en 1931 was het 
Leger een stichting, maar vanwege de nauwe verwantschap met het Engelse The 
Salvation Army – dat feitelijk een kerk was – werd de juridische status van het 
Leger in praktijk ook wel gelijkgesteld met wat een ‘kerkelijke stichting’ werd 
genoemd. Deze rechtspersoon was typisch Nederlands en voorbehouden aan 
stichtingen die vanuit kerken werden gesticht.  
De historische band met Engeland zorgde op andere momenten ook voor het 
idee dat het Leger des Heils in Nederland feitelijk een buitenlandse organisatie 
was, terwijl het Leger zelf zich in toenemende mate als geheel Nederlands pre-
senteerde. Tot aan de Tweede Wereldoorlog slaagde het Leger er goed in deze 
zelfgekozen autonome identiteit vorm te geven, maar omdat de statuten stelden 
dat het Leger een Engelse organisatie was, werd het in 1941 alsnog door de 
Duitse bezetters verboden. Dat betekende echter niet dat het Leger zich gewon-
nen gaf en in hetzelfde jaar registreerde het Leger zich als geloofsgemeenschap 
bij het Ministerie van Justitie. Het maatschappelijk werk werd voor een deel 
ondergebracht in een nieuwe stichting.  
Na afloop van de oorlog echter, werd de liquidatie van het Leger ongeldig 
verklaard door de Nederlandse overheid en werden de statuten van 1931 weer 
van kracht. Toch was het Leger gesteld geraakt op het idee dat ze ook een kerk 
waren, en niet in de laatste plaats omdat deze vorm meer zekerheid gaf tegen 
ongewenste overheidsbemoeienis dan een stichting. Daarnaast bood de rechts-
persoon stichting de mogelijkheid om overheidssubsidie te ontvangen, wat die 
vorm erg relevant maakte voor het maatschappelijk werk van het Leger. Het 
Leger koos dan ook voor beide vormen tegelijkertijd: gebaseerd op de statuten 
van 1931 was het een stichting terwijl tegelijkertijd de erkenning als geloofsge-
meenschap van 1941 overeind bleef. Sterker nog, vanaf dat moment zou het 
Leger zich voornamelijk presenteren als kerk.  
Om deze hybride rechtsvorm van een juridisch fundament te voorzien formu-
leerde het Leger in 1946 nieuwe statuten, welke in 1948 ook werden geaccep-
teerd door het Ministerie van Justitie, waardoor het Leger des Heils in Neder-
land in feite een nieuwe rechtspersoon had ontwikkeld: stichting-kerk. Deze 
hybride rechtspersoon deed recht aan hoe het Leger de eigen tweevoudige mis-
sie interpreteerde: het was een kerk (vanuit de geestelijke doelstelling) die zich 
juridisch had vormgegeven als stichting (vanuit de sociale doelstelling). In feite 
was het Leger nu dus een kerk die bedekt was met een seculiere mantel. 
Hoe het kameleontische karakter van deze hybride identiteit in de praktijk 
werkte, werd duidelijk gedurende de vele Kamerdebatten waarin het Leger des 
Heils ter sprake kwam. Daarin werd het Leger vaak getypeerd als zowel een 
religieuze organisatie met een aanzienlijk aanbod aan maatschappelijke hulpver-
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lening. Maar met regelmaat gebeurde dat ook andersom: het Leger was een 
maatschappelijke dienstverlener met een religieuze identiteit. In sommige geval-
len werd het Leger zelfs een testcase van de definitie van wat een kerk is. De 
hybride identiteit van het Leger werd daarmee voor het parlement onderdeel van 
het aftasten van de rijwijdte van bepaalde wetgeving. Deze ongrijpbaarheid van 
de Leger identiteit kwam de overheid dus ook wel goed uit, want met enige 
regelmaat was het juist gunstig om het Leger niet zozeer als kerk, maar als een 
maatschappelijke dienstverlener te beschouwen, omdat het een gewaardeerde 
partner in het sociaal beleidssysteem was. Ondanks dat daarmee geen recht werd 
gedaan aan hoe het Leger zelf dacht over de eigen identiteit. Of juist wel, want 
het wilde immers ook beide zijn, en zolang de seculiere mantel van de stichting 
mogelijke overheidsbemoeienis met de religieuze kern wist af te wenden was 
het goed. Op deze wijze bekrachtigde de overheid ook expliciet de overeen-
komst in doelen tussen de overheid en het Leger, en werd ook de flexibiliteit van 
de kant van de overheid duidelijk zichtbaar.  
Ook binnen het Leger des Heils duurde het debat over de juridische identiteit 
voort. De eerste aanzet kwam daarvoor vanuit het internationale hoofdkwartier 
in Londen. In 1958 kwam het verzoek de banden met Engeland te onderzoeken, 
om de situatie die zich in de oorlog voordeed, in de toekomst te voorkomen. In 
eerst instantie was het Leger des Heils in Nederland niet erg geïnteresseerd in 
deze exercitie, maar zeven jaar later zou de Nederlandse commandant Palstra 
alsnog sterk voorstander blijken te zijn van het doorknippen van de internationa-
le juridische banden. De urgentie kwam vort uit de angst dat wanneer de Neder-
landse bevolking en de overheid te weten zouden komen dat het Leger inderdaad 
zo een sterke verwantschap met de Engelse moederorganisatie had, de inkom-
sten weleens sterk terug zouden kunnen lopen. Toch zou tot de jaren zeventig 
duren voordat er serieus werd nagedacht over een mogelijk andere rechtsper-
soon. In 1974 besloot commandant Verwaal dat het maatschappelijk werk on-
dergebracht zou moeten worden in een of meerdere aparte stichtingen, conform 
de subsidie-eisen voor dat werk. Tevens zou de doelstelling van de organisatie 
moeten worden herschreven, waardoor een beter balans tussen de sociale en de 
religieuze doelstelling werd aangebracht. Dus ook nu weer werd duidelijk dat 
door mogelijke externe problemen, het Leger intern, een grote mate van flexibi-
liteit vertoonde zolang het voortbestaan van de identiteit en de organisatie maar 
gegarandeerd bleef.  
In 1976 echter werd een belangrijke pilaar onder de hybride identiteit van het 
Leger des Heils weggeslagen: deel 2 van het Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek werd 
geïntroduceerd. Hiermee werd de kerkelijke stichting afgeschaft, en dat terwijl 
het Leger zich graag als zodanig presenteerde. Opnieuw werd het Leger dus 
geconfronteerd met de eigen hybride identiteit, maar nu in de zin dat er moest 
worden gekozen tussen de stichtingsvorm of doorgaan als een kerk. Met deze 
nieuwe wetgeving werd ook nog eens extra duidelijk hoe kwetsbaar het Leger 
was op de machtsbalans met de overheid. De identiteit moest dus beter be-
schermd worden. In de discussie die hierop volgde binnen het Leger, werden aan 
het eind van de jaren zeventig twee stromingen zichtbaar, die beide een andere, 
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niet geheel tegengestelde interpretatie gaven van de statuten van 1946. De juri-
disch adviseur van het Leger, mr. Houthoff, was van mening dat het Leger voor-
al als een kerk moest worden gezien. Als men de overheidsinvloed buiten de 
deur wilde houden, maar tegelijkertijd in aanmerking wilde blijven komen voor 
overheidssubsidies, moest de maatschappelijke hulpverlening dus in een aparte 
juridische entiteit worden ondergebracht. Een andere redenering kwam van twee 
juristen, die, na elkaar, ook de directie vormden van de reclasseringsafdeling van 
het Leger: mr. Hartjes en mr. Fijn. Zij waren van mening dat de statuten van 
1946 stelden dat het Leger al een stichting was, waardoor er geen aanpassing 
nodig was. Het bijkomend voordeel was in dit geval dat de eenheid tussen de 
religieuze doelstelling en de sociale doelstelling in één organisatievorm behou-
den bleef. Want deze broze eenheid zou naar hun mening veel meer onder druk 
komen te staan bij het oprichten van nieuwe rechtspersonen. Het Leger was 
volgens Hartjes en Fijn officieel geen kerkelijke stichting, want The Salvation 
Army was geen Nederlandse kerk. Dus ook met de introductie van Deel 2, BW 
was er geen probleem. Alleen zou het Leger zich in de toekomst wel meer als 
een seculiere stichting moeten presenteren dan een kerkelijke, zoals het voor-
heen gedaan had. Het debat draaide nu, zoals eerder aangegeven dus niet alleen 
om de correcte juridische vorm, maar de onderliggende vraag: wat wíllen we 
zijn? Een vraag die gedurende de jaren tachtig pas beantwoord zou gaan wor-
den. 
 
Professionalisering van het Leger des Heils 
Het derde thema in de ontwikkeling van de identiteit van het Leger des Heils is 
professionalisering. Net als vele andere ontwikkelingen, werd de behoefte om te 
professionaliseren voor het eerst gevoeld binnen de reclasseringsafdeling van 
het Leger. Al voor de Tweede Wereldoorlog zette de Nederlandse overheid in 
op de professionalisering van organisaties en het sociaal werk. En naarmate de 
maatschappelijke hulpverlening zich ontwikkelde, nam ook binnen deze organi-
saties de behoefte aan scholing toe. Opleidingsinstituten werden opgericht en 
ook door middel van regelgeving op het gebied van bedrijfsvoering werd profes-
sionalisering gestimuleerd. De overheid wilde op deze manier zeker zijn van dat 
de toegekende subsidies ook hun doel zouden bereiken door efficiency en kwali-
teit van werken. Voor de reclasseringsafdeling van het Leger des Heils beteken-
de de groeiende vraag ook een groter aanbod van subsidies van de kant van de 
overheid. Daarnaast zorgde de toenemende complexiteit van sociale problema-
tiek ook voor een versterking van de vraag naar verdere professionalisering. 
Binnen het Leger ontstond daardoor naast een kwalitatieve verbetering van de 
medewerkers zelf door scholingseisen, een cultuur van kennisdeling en vooral 
ook debat.  
Vanaf 1950 zorgde de groei van het sociaal werk en de toenemende differen-
tiatie en specialisatie daarbinnen, ervoor dat de professionalisering een stimulans 
onderging. Verschillende opleidingen leidden professionals op, die vaak ook op 
beleidsniveau hun stempel begonnen te drukken. Deze ontwikkeling werd zowel 
door de overheid als de organisaties zelf gestimuleerd. Beide actoren wilden de 
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kwaliteit van de geleverde diensten verbeteren, en maatschappelijke hulpverle-
ningsorganisaties streefden naar erkenning van het eigen vakgebied om zo ook 
weer structurele financiering beschikbaar te krijgen. Voor het leger des Heils 
betekende deze professionalisering dat binnen de reclassering vanaf 1947 al het 
gesubsidieerde personeel voortaan door het Ministerie van Justitie moest worden 
goedgekeurd.  
Ook de introductie van het social casework gaf het Leger een middel in han-
den om hun voorkeursmethode in het sociaal werk te legitimeren: op individueel 
niveau, met grote betrokkenheid op de cliënt. De gelijkwaardigheid tussen cliënt 
en hupverlener die deze nieuwe methodiek verkondigde, vroeg echter ook van 
de professional om zich te ontdoen van mogelijke verborgen agenda’s, zoals 
bijvoorbeeld evangelisatie. Sterker nog, langzamerhand werd elk religieus on-
derwerp verbannen naar de sfeer van het taboe. Een ander belangrijk gevolg van 
dit social casework was dat er nog meer nadruk kwam op scholing, en in 1964 
zou dit dan ook een subsidie-eis voor reclasseringsorganisaties worden. Opval-
lend was dat een jaar eerder binnen het Leger de Heils al een reorganisatie van 
maatschappelijk werk-activiteiten had plaatsgevonden, waardoor elke (gesubsi-
dieerde) activiteit zijn eigen departement kreeg en waardoor het werk meer los 
kwam te staan van de korpsen waarbinnen dat tot dan toe ondergebracht was. 
Begonnen hier haarscheurtjes zichtbaar te worden in de tweezijdige munt van de 
dubbele doelstelling van het Leger? 
Naast de verbetering van de kwaliteit van het werk was een ander belangrijk 
effect van professionalisering voor het Leger dat het personeelsbestand begon te 
veranderen. Het aantal intern opgeleide officieren nam af, ten opzichte van het 
aantal externe professionals, die dus nieuw binnengehaald werden. Binnen het 
reclassering departement werden ook op het managementniveau professionals, 
i.c. juristen, aangenomen. Dit werd gedaan op uitdrukkelijk verzoek van het 
ministerie van Justitie. En met deze nieuwe lichting professionals zou, op veel 
niveaus binnen de reclassering van het Leger, de ideologische motivatie lang-
zamerhand onder druk komen te staan door een meer professionele motivatie, 
die deze externen vaak met zich meebrachten. Om deze trend te keren probeerde 
het Leger alle sleutelposities te bezetten met ‘eigen mensen’, wat dus wel lastig 
werd voor het reclasseringswerk. 
Deze kwestie van professionalisering zorgde er gedurende de jaren zestig en 
zeventig voor dat het reclasseringsdepartement van het Leger steeds meer een 
eigen koers zou gaan varen ten opzichte van de rest van de organisatie. Daar 
kwam bij dat binnen het werkveld van de reclassering een sterke beweging op 
gang gekomen was om alle landelijk opererende reclasseringsorganisaties te 
laten fuseren in een grote, algemene organisatie. Dat gebeurde ook in 1973 (SRI, 
later ARV). Het Leger des Heils echter bood sterke weerstand tegen deze trend, 
en weigerde deel te nemen aan deze vorm van schaalvergroting. Dit riep echter 
wel de fundamentele vraag op: op basis waarvan legitimeerde het Leger het 
bestaansrecht van een eigenstandige reclasseringsorganisatie? Welke meerwaar-
de leverde zo een organisatie? Als vanuit een reflex beantwoordde het Leger 
deze vragen meestal met: de eigen identiteit. Maar wat betekende dat? Waar 
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bestond deze uit? En waarom was deze zo veel waard dat het voortbestaan een 
eigenstandige reclasseringsorganisatie gerechtvaardigd was? Het zou tot in de 
jaren tachtig duren voordat het Leger hier een antwoord op gevonden had. 
Gedurende de jaren zeventig en tachtig werd deze rol van de professional 
onderwerp van maatschappelijk debat. De toenemende aantallen professionals 
leken een eigen groep te vormen die binnen de organisatie vaak redelijk wat 
macht naar zich toe wist te trekken ten koste van het vaak nog niet geprofessio-
naliseerde management en de vrijwilligers, die voorheen vaak de kern van het 
personeelsbestand vormden. De maatschappelijke discussie over de rol van de 
professional binnen het welzijnswerk barstte volledig los tegen 1980. In dit de-
bat werd gesteld dat de beschikbaarheid van professionals ook een eigen vraag 
leek te hebben gerecreëerd. En hadden professional hun cliënten afhankelijk 
gemaakt van hun diensten waardoor de cliënten hun gevoel voor zelfredzaam-
heid en verantwoordelijkheid waren kwijtgeraakt? Naast deze beschuldiging aan 
het adres van de professional werd deze ook beticht van het verdringen van de 
vrijwilligers binnen organisaties. En het waren vaak juist deze vrijwilligers die 
de kernwaarden van de organisatie vertegenwoordigden en daarmee de identi-
teit.  
In geval van het Leger des Heils was dit ook terug te zien, en wel in de func-
tie van de officier. De officier is te vergelijken met een priester in de katholieke 
kerk: de functie is een roeping, en niet zozeer een beroep. Als ‘geroepen vrijwil-
liger’ was de officier de personificatie van de dubbele missie van het Leger, 
omdat deze vaak actief was in zowel het sociaal werk alsook als korpsleiding of 
in een andere geestelijke functie. Om officier te worden verzorgde het Leger dan 
ook een complete interne opleiding aan de kweekschool, met als uiteindelijk 
doel: evangelisatie door woord en daad. Het aantal professionals binnen het 
Leger des Heils echter nam zo snel toe, dat deze vorm van identiteit stevig onder 
druk kwam te staan. Zo was in 1954 de ratio tussen professional en officier nog 
1:54, terwijl deze tien jaar later was geslonken tot 1:14.  
Op een ander niveau zorgde de ontwikkelingen met betrekking tot professio-
nalisering voor een toenemende roep om inspraak binnen civil society organisa-
ties. De burgers moesten betere mogelijkheden krijgen om invloed te winnen op 
hun eigen bestaan en een vorm daarvan was het uitoefenen van inspraak in die 
organisaties die hen vertegenwoordigden. Het resultaat van deze beweging was 
de Wet op Ondernemingsraden uit 1971. In 1977 bevestigde de commissie-Van 
der Burg het belang van deze wet door te stellen dat de positie van de belang-
hebbenden in deze organisaties moest worden versterkt: de burgers, de werkne-
mers en de cliënten.  
Deze democratiseringsbeweging ging echter lijnrecht in tegen de hiërarchi-
sche organisatiestructuur van het Leger des Heils. Sommige bestuurders zagen 
democratische inspraak zelfs als onverenigbaar met de aard van het Leger omdat 
dit ongewenste externe invloed op de organisatie-identiteit zou geven: je laat een 
medewerker van een kloosterbrouwerij toch ook geen invloed uitoefenen op de 
opleiding van de priester? Gerelateerd aan groeiende populatie aan externe pro-
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fessionals was dit inderdaad geen irreële zorg en deze externe invloed op het 
Leger was onacceptabel voor de Legerleiding.  
Toch was democratische inspraak al jarenlang gemeengoed binnen de reclas-
sering van het Leger. En daar werd met argusogen naar gekeken. En niet zonder 
reden, want toen de medewerkersraad van de reclassering lucht kreeg van de 
tegenwerking die de Legerleiding bood aan de installatie van ondernemingsra-
den binnen het Leger, bond het de (juridische) strijd aan. De Legerleiding ech-
ter, was in de veronderstelling dat voor het Leger als kerkgenootschap geen 
wettelijke plicht tot inspraak bestond. Toch besloot in 1978 de Raad van State 
anders, want ondanks dat het Leger ook een kerk was, was het ook een arbeids-
organisatie waarin meer dan 100 mensen werkzaam waren, waardoor een onder-
nemingsraad verplicht was. Daarmee werd nog eens bevestigd dat het Leger niet 
alleen zowel een kerkgenootschap alsook een maatschappelijke dienstverlener 
was, maar dat ook de externe invloed op het Leger er niet minder op werd.  
Dit betekent dat tegen 1980 de ontwikkelingen op het gebied van professio-
nalisering voor het Leger niet alleen resulteerde in een bloeiende maatschappe-
lijke hulpverleningsorganisatie, maar tegelijkertijd heeft het de vraag naar de 
identiteit van het Leger stevig op de kaart gezet. De reclassering van het Leger 
was een organisatie binnen de organisatie geworden; vrijwilligers werden aan de 
kant gezet; officieren moesten geschoold worden of verdwenen geheel uit het 
voor het Leger zo kenmerkende reclasseringswerk. En de strijd om de schaal-
vergroting binnen de sector was nog niet beslecht, zoals gedurende de jaren 
tachtig duidelijk zou worden. 
 
Reorganisatie van identiteit (1980-1990) 
Gedurende de jaren tachtig kwamen de verschillende hierboven beschreven 
ontwikkelingen bij elkaar. De decentralisatiebeweging zorgde ervoor dat het 
Leger des Heils steeds meer op lokaal niveau zaken moest doen met verschillen-
de gemeenten. Het Leger zelf constateerde echter dat gemeenten niet altijd over-
tuigd waren van deze samenwerking, zeker niet wanneer de economische ach-
teruitgang zijn sporen achterliet op de overheidsfinanciën. In Utrecht bijvoor-
beeld bedreigden voorgenomen bezuinigingen een aantal activiteiten van het 
Leger met sluiting. Daarnaast werd binnen het Leger geconcludeerd dat de ge-
meente Utrecht überhaupt liever zaken deed met algemene organisaties dan het 
duidelijk christelijke Leger des Heils. De Legerleiding had zelfs het vermoeden 
dat Utrecht van het Leger af wilde. Uiteindelijk bleek dat mee te vallen, maar de 
toon was gezet: de identiteit van het Leger was nu openlijk geproblematiseerd. 
Ook in Amsterdam werd in deze eerste jaren van de jaren tachtig kritische vra-
gen gesteld met betrekking tot de christelijke identiteit van het Leger des Heils. 
In hoeverre waren bijvoorbeeld niet-christelijk cliënten of zelfs homoseksuelen 
welkom bij het Leger? En kon de overheid überhaupt wel een christelijke 
dienstverlener subsidiëren? Om die vragen goed te kunnen beantwoorden moest 
het Leger meer duidelijkheid verschaffen over de identiteit en daartoe de statu-
ten aanleveren. Deze statuten echter waren nog niet voldoende up-to-date, waar-
door binnen het Leger de spanning rees over een mogelijke afwijzing door de 
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Gemeente. Tegelijkertijd was Amsterdam bezig met het reorganiseren van de 
thuiszorg in uniforme zorgregio’s. Omdat hierdoor het stedelijke werk van het 
Leger des Heils zou worden ingeperkt tot werken in een bepaald district, en dan 
ook nog onder een coördinerende organisatie, besloot het Leger hiertegen be-
zwaar aan te tekenen. De gebruikte argumentatie was dat het Leger vanwege de 
‘eigen identiteit’ in staat was een bijzondere doelgroep aan te spreken en daar-
naast door beroep te kunnen doen op een groot aandeel vrijwilligers, 24-uurs 
bereikbaarheid kon bieden. Het Leger probeerde nu dus de geproblematiseerde 
eigen identiteit om te keren in hun voordeel, want in eigen ogen had de identiteit 
juist meerwaarde. En met succes, want de Gemeente Amsterdam ging akkoord 
met deze geclaimde uitzonderingspositie. 
Dit argument van eigenheid en identiteit werd ook gebruikt in de pogingen 
van het Leger des Heils om de fusiegolven af te slaan, die sinds het midden van 
de jaren zeventig op het reclasseringswerk afkwamen. Begin jaren tachtig echter 
leek dit alsnog tevergeefs te zijn en werd het Leger door de overheid geconfron-
teerd met een steeds dwingender overheidsaanpak. In 1984 leidde dit tot een 
grootschalig protest van het Leger des Heils. Na brieven van de Generaal aan het 
Nederlandse parlement en het rondsturen van vlugschriften aan Nederlandse 
zorgorganisaties kwam op 31 januari 1984 het Leger samen op het Binnenhof in 
Den Haag.  
Onder veel vlagvertoon, schallend koper en met glimmende knopen aan de 
uniformen, bood de Commandant een petitie aan, aan de Kamercommissie van 
Justitie. Deze ‘Mars op het Binnenhof’ leverde de toezegging op dat het Leger 
zou blijven bestaan als reclasseringsorganisatie, maar veelmeer nog was dit 
gezamenlijke vertoon een uiting van de interne eenheid het Leger, dat met be-
trekking tot het eigenzinnige reclasseringswerk steeds meer onder druk was 
komen te staan. Toch zou niet veel later het Leger voor een keuze gesteld wor-
den met betrekking tot het reclasseringswerk, waarbij in alle opties enige mate 
van identiteit zou moeten worden prijsgegeven: opgaan in een grote, algemene 
organisatie; ophouden te bestaan of een contractpartner van de overheid worden 
in de hoop zowel het werk, als de identiteit te kunnen behouden, maar wel door 
gebonden te zijn aan contract-specifieke regelingen en eisen. Het Leger koos 
voor deze laatste optie, omdat het hiermee de meeste kans had op continuering 
van het reclasseringswerk, met behoud van de eigen identiteit. Wel veranderde 
hiermee de status van het departement tot een proxy-organisatie van de overheid. 
De identiteit van het Leger werd gedurende de jaren tachtig dus steeds meer 
een onderwerp van debat. Daarmee werd de vraag wat die identiteit dan precies 
was, steeds dringender. Om hier een contemporain antwoord op te vinden, be-
sloot de Legerleiding het honderdjarig jubileum in 1987 aan te grijpen door een 
symposium te organiseren waar vertegenwoordigers van het Leger, samen met 
mensen uit de diverse werkvelden waarin het Leger actief was, en ook politici, 
beleidsmakers en academici, zich gezamenlijk zouden buigen over de vraag: in 
hoeverre heeft een christelijke organisatie als het Leger des Heils nog bestaans-
recht als maatschappelijke dienstverlener en welke rol kan de identiteit daarin 
spelen? Deze formule bleek succesvol want, hoewel er wel degelijk kritische 
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kanttekeningen werden geplaatst bij de combinatie van sociaal werk en religie, 
was de teneur van de dag dat er zeker relevantie was voor het Leger, en wel juist 
vanwege de eigen identiteit – deze zorgde immers voor een drijfveer van de 
medewerkers waar menig organisatie jaloers op zou zijn.  
Toch was hiermee niet de kous af, want ook op het juridische vlak moest de 
gordiaanse knoop van de identiteit nog worden doorgehakt: welke juridische 
vorm deed het meeste recht aan het moderne Leger des Heils? De vraag: wat 
willen we zijn, werd in twee discursieve lijnen bediscussieerd: de lijn Houthoff 
en de lijn Hartjes. Uiteindelijk zou de Legerleiding haar voorkeur uitspreken 
voor een van de twee lijnen waarlangs de vraag wat we willen zijn, werd bedis-
cussieerd. Men koos voor de lijn Houthoff, waarmee werd aangegeven dat het 
Leger in eerste plaats een kerkgenootschap was. Dit werd gedaan omdat zo de 
mogelijke externe invloed op de religieuze identiteit zo klein mogelijk gehouden 
zou worden.  
Dit betekende echter wel dat de subsidiëring van het sociaal werk in gevaar 
zou kunnen komen, wat ook bleek uit het standpunt van het Ministerie van Justi-
tie: als het Leger des Heils geen stichting was maar alleen een kerk, zou het geen 
overheidsgeld meer kunnen ontvangen. En ook het Centraal Archief voor het 
Inzamelingswezen, de toezichthouder op publieke collectes, deelde deze me-
ning. Dus, hoewel het Leger idealiter een kerk in een seculiere mantel zou wil-
len zijn, werd als gevolg van deze externe ontwikkelingen anders besloten: het 
zou zich moeten onderverdelen in minstens één aparte stichting en een kerk. De 
voorbereidingen voor de reorganisatie werden in gang gezet en het zou tot 1990 
duren voordat het nieuwe Leger des Heils de deuren zou openen. Het kerkge-
nootschap was apart gezet van vier stichtingen waarvan de Stichting Leger des 
Heils Welzijns- en Gezondheidszorg (W&G) alle professionele maatschappelij-
ke hulpverlening in zich herbergde. De andere stichtingen waren nodig om de 
geldstromen en onderlinge dienstverlening te regelen. Ook de eenheid tussen de 
geloofsgemeenschap en dienstensector moest worden bewaakt. Deze eenheid 
zou ook worden benadrukt in de statuten van alle entiteiten, waarin duidelijk 
werd vermeld dat het Leger des Heils een samenhangende organisatie is, ge-
stoeld op dezelfde christelijke leerstellingen en principes. Deze nieuwe structuur 
zou moeten voorkomen dat de kerk teveel aan externe invloeden bloot zou staan, 
terwijl het maatschappelijke werk voldoende voeling zou kunnen houden met de 
geestelijke kant van het Leger. De Legerleiding was ervan overtuigd dat de 
tweezijdige munt op deze wijze behouden zou kunnen blijven.  
 
Een dynamische balts 
De relatie tussen het Leger des Heils en de overheid zoals is vormgegeven bin-
nen het sociaal beleidssysteem, heeft een dynamiek opgeleverd die als volgt te 
kenmerken valt: het is een systeem waarin wederkerigheid en wederzijdse af-
hankelijkheid een belangrijke rol spelen. Om te bepalen wie welke invloed 
heeft, zowel intern als extern, is de plaats op de machtsbalans tussen de twee 
actoren van cruciaal belang. Deze machtsbalans hangt deels samen met de on-
derliggende beleidswaarden als kwaliteit, betrokkenheid en beheersbaarheid, 
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die, ondanks dat er verschillende beleidsconcepten zijn uitgewerkt en ingezet, 
continu aanwezig zijn geweest gedurende de twintigste eeuw. De mate waarin 
de actoren tot elkaar aangetrokken werden of juist niet, werd voor een deel be-
paald door de mate waarin de eigen doelen met elkaar overeenstemden en hoe 
beide actoren in staat waren elkaar te verleiden om daarin flexibiliteit te tonen, 
terwijl de eigen zekerheid zoveel mogelijk behouden bleef. Dat betekent dat de 
dynamiek die in deze studie zichtbaar wordt, niet alleen tussen de actoren, maar 
zeker ook binnenin de actoren aanwezig was. 
De beschreven ontwikkelingen binnen en rondom het Leger des Heils waren 
vooral gericht op het zekerstellen van het bestaansrecht als maatschappelijke 
dienstverlener, het construeren en behouden van de eigen identiteit door recht te 
doen aan de dubbele missie, en tegelijkertijd het vormen van de organisatie naar 
de eisen van de tijd, waarbij gebruik gemaakt werd van de mogelijkheden die de 
overheid hiervoor bood. Het Leger verliet zich in deze exercitie op een aantal 
argumentaties, dat in meer of mindere mate succesvol gebleken zijn. Richting de 
overheid was dat vooral een argumentatie van economische wederkerigheid en 
vervollediging: de samenwerking met het Leger leverde de overheid dus iets op. 
Op juridisch gebied was het Leger minder concreet. De hybride vorm van de 
seculiere mantel rondom de religieuze kern, bood op juridisch vlak veel meer 
speelruimte terwijl daarmee tegelijkertijd recht werd gedaan aan hoe het Leger 
zijn eigen missie beschouwde. Met betrekking tot het thema van de professiona-
lisering, reageerde het Leger misschien wel het meest fel. Vanaf het begin werk-
te het Leger mee aan de ontwikkeling van de competenties van het personeel en 
de administratieve processen van de organisatie en tegelijkertijd kon het niet 
heen om een toename van externe professionals binnen de organisatie. De weer-
stand binnen het Leger ten opzichte van professionalisering kwam pas goed op 
stoom toen democratisering een rol ging spelen. Dat werd vervolgens zoveel 
mogelijk bestreden, want zodra de kern van de Leger identiteit in het geding 
leek te komen, kwam het Leger in actie en ging indien nodig over tot de aanval. 
Een reflex die ook zichtbaar werd tijdens de periode waarin het reclasserings-
werk van het Leger dreigde te worden geannexeerd. 
De twee decennia die volgden op deze reorganisatie lieten zien dat deze ex-
terne en interne ontwikkelingen nog lang niet aan hun eind waren. De markt-
werking die gedurende de jaren negentig en zeker in de jaren tweeduizend in de 
zorg haar intrede deed, dwong het Leger zich nog meer te profileren. En ook 
hier lijkt een bekende Legerargumentatie in stelling te zijn gebracht: net als in 
de jaren tachtig koos het Leger ervoor om de identiteit als troef op te voeren, en 
in 2005 werd besloten dat de christelijke identiteit zelfs een professionele com-
petentie was, die de kwaliteit van de betreffende medewerker waarborgde. Tege-
lijkertijd werd ook duidelijk dat de overheid identiteit ook in zekere mate inte-
ressant vond. Met de Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning (Wmo, 2007) werd 
een beroep werd gedaan op de gehele Nederlandse civil society, inclusief kerken 
en religieuze organisatie, om een bijdrage te leveren aan de sociale cohesie tus-
sen en individuele participatie van de burgers. Toch leek het instrumentele ka-
rakter met betrekking tot de civil society van deze overheidswens voorbij te gaan 
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aan alle nuance daarbinnen, want in de Memorie van Toelichting werden kerken 
direct op een lijn gesteld met voetbalclubs. De overheid liet daarmee wel een 
beperkte visie op de activerende kracht van religie zien. 
Het Leger echter bleef zich stevig doorontwikkelen. Tenminste, het sociaal 
werk, want het kerkelijke deel had het steeds moeilijker. De inkomsten liepen 
terug, net als de ledenaantallen, en na een aantal pogingen om het kerkgenoot-
schap Leger des Heils nieuw leven in te blazen, is vanaf 2009 een stevige strate-
gieherziening voor de kerk van kracht. Het aantal korpsen moest aanzienlijk 
worden teruggebracht, en ook moesten de korpsen meer relevantie voor de eigen 
directe omgeving weten te creëren. Dat daarbij de steun van de Legerstichting 
Welzijns- en Gezondheidszorg kon worden ingeroepen, werd niet heel concreet 
gemaakt. Wel kwam op sommige plaatsen een samenwerking tussen het lokale 
korps en W&G tot stand, waardoor het bestaansrecht van het korps wat meer 
verzekerd leek. Maar, zoals sommigen binnen het Leger zich ook wel afvragen, 
is er echt wel een organisatie als het Leger des Heils nodig om de drijvende 
kracht van de leden – het ‘Salvationisme’ – levend te houden? Het gaat toch 
immers om de daden, waardoor de geestelijke boodschap wordt verwoord? Toch 
zal de organisatie, en de manier waarop de twee missies daarbinnen zijn veran-
kerd, een grote rol blijven spelen. Om met een metafoor te eindigen: deze voe-
dingsbodem van het Salvationisme zal moeten worden bewerkt, gecultiveerd en 
gevoed. Biedt de huidige organisatiestructuur en cultuur hiervoor voldoende 
ruimte, bescherming, warmte en licht? Het beantwoorden van deze vraag valt 
ver buiten de competenties van een historicus – laat de toekomst het uitwijzen. 
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